Collapse Studies Perspective

[Erik Andrus]

People have been theorizing (and moralizing) about the fall of the roman empire since the fall itself. I remember hearing all kinds of theories when I was in school, lead plumbing, too many orgies, ethnic and religious strife, depletion of critical resources, military incompetence of leaders, you name it. I've recently read Joseph Tainter's Collapse of Complex Societies, and while the book doesn't devote itself exclusively to the Roman question, it does treat it extensively. If you haven't read it, the book takes up several historically and archaeologically-documented examples of past collapses and groups the prevalent theories of why they occurred. For instance there are "spiritual/mystical" explanations of the Roman fall that were common in the 50's through the 70's.

 

Tainter reviews instances of collapse and the prevalent theories explaining them in order to find common patterns of why societies collapse, and what explanations hold true in all cases. The ultimate resulting thesis is that collapse is a rational, economical action that occurs when the burden of supporting complexity heavily outweighs the benefits of complexity. To sum up Tainter's thesis:

 

1. Human societies are problem-solving organizations

2. Complexity requires energy for its maintenance

3. Increased complexity carries with it increased costs per capita

4. investment in sociopolitical complexity often reaches a point of diminishing returns

 

The rational thing for individual members of a complex society to do when confronted with increased costs and diminishing returns is to collapse. In fact in the case of the Western Roman Empire the argument has been made that the vast majority of the population were better-off under the barbarians than under the late empire.

 

It's not hard to see parallels with our own situation. For instance health care--the benefits of modern health care are obvious to anyone. But what we have is a health care system of exponentially increasing costs and complexity, with consolidation of power and control (I am in the US, our major regional hospital has been repeatedly accused of actions intended to undermine, marginalize or eliminate smaller local hospitals). No doubt the care at the major hospital is great. Procedures are available there routinely that were rare a decade or two ago. But the cost per capita extends ultimately to us all, and you don't need to be a master mathematician to see that the pattern of exponentially increasing costs will soon lead to a crash. Like the collapse of the Western Empire, this will involve some losers. But is it possible that say just for instance, people's overall, individual health could be better without the benefits of the current health care system but also without having to work to the point of damaging ones' health in order to make medical payments, or even, as frequently occurs now, losing ones' entire financial basis in order to satisfy medical bills?

 

One of the interesting conclusions is that while the Western Empire collapsed, the Eastern Empire did not really have the option of collapse. Collapse would have resulted in the East being made part of the Persian Empire. The more-or-less constant war footing with a competing empire of equal strength helped the Byzantine emperors maintain their legitimacy. Collapse isn't possible when all your neighbors remain complex. They'll just take you over.

 

From this perspective, the breakaway independence of the Western Empire of Britain, Gaul, and Spain from 260-274 could possibly be seen as an attempt to devolve to a more local-level administration that failed when this territory was reconquered by Rome. Following Diocletian, all of the empire's resources were leveraged to ensure its own survival long after the death of its economy and the majority of what you might call its "freedoms." With the ruthless taxation, economic serfdom, and military conscription, the last century of the Western Empire must have been a pretty miserable time to be a Roman commoner, however beautiful the triumphal arches.

 

Here where I live, in Vermont, there is a group of well-meaning, well-spoken individuals who want Vermont to secede from the Union in order that we may create a simpler, more just, more locally-based society. As much as I agree with the objectives, the goal is totally impossible. The US and Canada will no more allow Vermont to simplify than the EU will allow Greece to default. The only way one of us goes down is if we all go down together. I have to say that's not very comforting.

[Artimi]

this will involve some losers

 

This phrase is used a lot when counting costs of downsizing anything such as companies, health care, public transport.

 

It is such an innocent bland phrase. Anonymus numbers of people of all ages, easily acceptable.

 

But, it involves actual people. And from what I have seen, it is usually people who cannot afford to lose more.

 

And yes I know, understand, realize, there are people who abuse any system.

Edited December 11, 2011 by Artimi

[Artimi]

Isaac Asimov's Foundation Trilogy also deals with the collapse of a complex society - an Intergalactic empire.

 

This a wonderful science fiction series from the early 1950's. Can the Dark Age that follows the collapse of an empire, complex society be shortened? Is there really a discipline called psychohistory?

 

Erik have you read the Ward-Perkins book- The Fall of Rome and the end of Civilization?

 

Note to self:

Possible fancy or project: reread the Foundation trilogy (for the upteenth time), re read the Ward-Perkins book, read Taintor's book and attempt once more the read Peter Heather's politically correct book.....

Edited December 11, 2011 by Artimi

[Erik Andrus]

Isaac Asimov's Foundation Trilogy also deals with the collapse of a complex society - an Intergalactic empire.

 

This a wonderful science fiction series from the early 1950's. Can the Dark Age that follows the collapse of an empire, complex society be shortened? Is there really a discipline called psychohistory?

 

Erik have you read the Ward-Perkins book- The Fall of Rome and the end of Civilization?

 

Note to self:

Possible fancy or project: reread the Foundation trilogy (for the upteenth time), re read the Ward-Perkins book, read Taintor's book and attempt once more the read Peter Heather's politically correct book.....

 

If we're to understand what collapse means, the terms "civilization" and "dark age" aren't helpful because they imply that the current order of things is necessarily "better" and that the converse is "bad." The point is that when the benefits of complexity (or "civilization," if we must) outweigh the costs then collapse is rational, necessary, and possibly even beneficial. Collapse results in a decrease in per capita costs of maintaining society. In the case of Rome, there was a large class of information-handlers that simply no longer existed under barbarian control and the beginnings of feudalism. Rank and file commoners did not have to work as hard to support this class of people. The bread and circus ended, which was no doubt an unwelcome development to citydwellers who depended on the free bread but probably more welcome to the more numerous farming classes who were taxed to the hilt to support the dole.

 

I don't mean to gloss over real hardship by the "winners and losers" line. The social convulsions that occur in any collapse are impossible to predict. But usually the resulting social organization is less stratified, and if you support the idea of social justice, that could be a good development. But also in many cases there is significant loss of life as well as livelihood and most people wouldn't welcome either of those things.

 

In the case of western empire, there is evidence to indicate that commoners often welcomed the demise of the empire, or were at least apathetic about it. I am trying to locate it, but I have heard secondhand about an archaeological bone density study before and after the collapse that suggests that physical health improved, on average, after the end of imperial control.

 

On the other hand, over half the people in the world today simply wouldn't be alive in the first place were it not for the Haber-bosch process that creates synthetic fertilizer from natural gas. So I don't mean to just casually wave my hand and say that we need to unload half the population somehow and that's just fine. But the reality of diminishing returns to social investment in complexity seems to be inescapable, and if we're to understand this process and how it may apply to us, as historians and social scientists (amateur, in my case, admittedly), doing so requires the most objective, calm, neutral consideration that we can manage.

[Kosmo]

Indeed there are many theories about the collapse of the Western Empire and usually they serve some contemporary agenda. It is not clear what to you mean by increased complexity but I presume that is about a larger cost of government.

In reality, Romans from Western Europe did not opt out of the Empire but were subjected to a violent conquest that provoked a catastrophic reduction in population and in living standards. The part that survived for another 1000 years became even more centralized and bureaucratic, even more top-heavy.

Empires are so often successful because they offer substantial economies of scale both regarding the cost of defense and that of government. A look at the history of states in Continental Europe from Middle Ages up to WW2 will show you that they heavily taxed their subjects and spent most of the money on armies but that did not prevent devastating wars and expensive armaments races. Continental empires like Romans or the EU/NATO can eliminate the military conflicts within the empire and secure a cheaper common defense. Also, the government of a small entity has most of the attributes of a large one but a smaller tax base so they have to tax more. For example, the cost of US diplomatic representation is spread among 300 million Americans, but an independent Vermont would still have to keep a large number of embassies from the taxes of 625,000 people.

After conquest Romans did not have to pay taxes anymore to a distant emperor and army but to a local elite of barbarians that was unable to give anything back in terms of governance

[Erik Andrus]

Indeed there are many theories about the collapse of the Western Empire and usually they serve some contemporary agenda. It is not clear what to you mean by increased complexity but I presume that is about a larger cost of government.

In reality, Romans from Western Europe did not opt out of the Empire but were subjected to a violent conquest that provoked a catastrophic reduction in population and in living standards. The part that survived for another 1000 years became even more centralized and bureaucratic, even more top-heavy.

Empires are so often successful because they offer substantial economies of scale both regarding the cost of defense and that of government. A look at the history of states in Continental Europe from Middle Ages up to WW2 will show you that they heavily taxed their subjects and spent most of the money on armies but that did not prevent devastating wars and expensive armaments races. Continental empires like Romans or the EU/NATO can eliminate the military conflicts within the empire and secure a cheaper common defense. Also, the government of a small entity has most of the attributes of a large one but a smaller tax base so they have to tax more. For example, the cost of US diplomatic representation is spread among 300 million Americans, but an independent Vermont would still have to keep a large number of embassies from the taxes of 625,000 people.

After conquest Romans did not have to pay taxes anymore to a distant emperor and army but to a local elite of barbarians that was unable to give anything back in terms of governance

 

Complex societies like empires actually incur increased costs of defense, in terms of resources. Consider a tribal hunter-gatherer or primitive agriculturalist society. Warfare is one role, a part-time role, of men who also hunt, fish, or farm. Such "defense" as this society can muster comes at a very low resource cost. It's also well-established that people in simple societies work fewer hours a day for self-sufficiency than we in highly complex societies work at our jobs in order to earn a living. This is the cheapest common defense there is.

 

In another thread someone suggested, flippantly, that the demise of Rome began with Marius and the professional army. This is a really good point. While an army of part-time soldiers had its military limitations, it provided a fighting force that didn't need to be supported by taxing non-combatants. A professional army has a higher resource cost, per capita, than a part time one, because a republican citizen-soldier could still farm as well. Granted, sometimes the investments in these higher-cost complexities pay off. After all, the Roman conquest was made possible by the professional army. But over time, continued investment in complexity inevitably yields diminishing returns. Rome found itself engaged in persistent frontier warfare versus less-complex societies who could field part-time warriors for a low resource cost. Even victory over such opponents yielded little and in no way paid for the cost of the Roman campaigns. Much like the Afghanistan, you could say. The Taliban can keep on the way they're going indefinitely, whereas the cost of the US's afganistan escapade threatens to overrun the country's ability to pay it off, ever.

 

As for the Vermont question, I don't think it can work either (though for different reasons) so I won't argue with you there.

 

And as for how ordinary people adapted to collapse in the West, whether it was violent or bloodless, catastrophic or welcome, I would welcome any discussion of contemporary accounts. What I've read suggests that by the 4th century the Empire wasn't providing much in the way of governance anyway, being too preoccupied with its own survival. I've read that in some regions of Gaul, barbarians were sometimes welcomed as liberators and even invited in the 4th century. Though no doubt there was plenty of violence too. I guess one thing you could say is that if you belive (and I don't) that the primary cause of the collapse was military defeat then you'd have to say the common people didn't do a whole lot to prevent this defeat. They certainly did not all fight to the last man to defend Roman Gaul, for instance, which is why contemporary French has much more latin influence than gothic influence. The people there had new masters but they were not displaced, and adapted through some sort of transition, retaining their language and much of their culture.

 

Here's Zosimus, writing about Thessaly and Macadonia, mid 5th century:

 

"as a result of this exaction of taxes city and countryside were full of laments and complaints and all invoked the barbarians and sought the help of the barbarians."

Edited December 12, 2011 by Erik Andrus

[Kosmo]

In another thread someone suggested, flippantly, that the demise of Rome began with Marius and the professional army. This is a really good point.

 

That would probably be me, so, thank you. But my main point was that the professional army becoming the leading political power created costly civil wars and political instability and those created conditions for collapses. Indeed, one side effect was that the army was able to use its political power to reward itself with most of the tax money making it very expensive.

The border regions were less affected by this taxation because most of the money the army got was spent locally. An important resource redistribution occurred as the Empire gathered money from the Mediterranean provinces and sent it to the northern limes. It is very probable that poor but heavily militarized provinces like Britain were a drain to the Empire.

The greatest challenge to the theory you present is the massive and long lasting decrease in population and in prosperity suffered by the regions of the Western Empire beginning from approx. 400 AD. A good example is Sub-Roman Britain where towns, villas and coin disappear for 3 centuries. If this is a positive result of the simplification of social structures then we can hail Pol Pot as a genius of social engineering.

[caldrail]

Thie idea that science fiction stories are relevant to the study of societal collapse is a little daft in my view, however much youlike reading the author. I have read that series myself incidentially.

 

Proposition 3 - that complex societies incur more costs - is a somewhat generalised phrase. The nature of the complexity and the efficiency of administration are important factors that are being glossed over. In terms of the Roman empire, the later empire saw increases in bureaucracy with people seeking sinecures and more staff/retainers to improve their visual standing. That does indeed increase costs but repesents a failure of management, not an autiomatic circumstance.

 

Also the apparent desire for local administration in the provinces is a moot point because the empire couldn't function any other way. That's why provinces had governors in the first place. The issues with the late Roman period evolve from the changing security situation. Whwereas in the past the Romans had picked off their enemies one by one or expanded to annex their territory and assets, the late empire had cordioned off Roman territory and defended a static border, combined with increasing instances of cooperation between the foreign tribes and a growing sense that Rome had become vulnerable despite their burdgeoning military.

 

As Polybius points out, all nations eventually wither of their own accord. I've always said their was a political analogy to biological life. Nations form, grow, mature, and die of old age, disaster, or conquest. The late empire had ceased expansion, though in fairness, it had already reached the practical limits for doing so. They also saw an increase in petty bureaucracy and military recruitment, resorting to shabby means to find soldiers to fill the unwilling ranks and resulting in equally shabby means to avoid service.

 

Notice also that the Dominate was increasingly insecure, both as an institution and also as central government. It wasn't therefore just a demand for local administration but a weakening of central control that had inspired Diocletian to subdivide the empire in the first place. The issue of security is just as relevant as politics however, and increasingly, as I mentioned, raids were becoming more frequent and daring in the face of exasperated Roman response. That was the reason for developing border and reaction forces in the Roman military, a system which relied on communication for effectiveness - and please note the communication system used by the late empire was not up to the job, not just because of organisational deficiencies, but also because of local interference and in some cases the consequences of local disasters like floods, earthquakes, and disease.

 

The emergence of independence movements in the provinces wasn't anything new - ambitious generals had done that for centuries and rebellions were not unknown - but the late emperors were increasingly called upon to prioritise their responses to situations and inevitably some provinces were too far away and not productive enough to warrant the attention those provinces felt they deserved. Therefore the disatisfacvtion of local populations grew to rebellious proportions. Notice also that Britain was abandoned by Cobnstantine III too as he withdrew the remaining legions to campaign for imperial ambition on the continent. At that stage Rome was collapsing in on itself and the demands of Britain, and later Gaul, went unheeded as the power struggle increasingly centered around the positions of power.

[Ursus]

A stripped down version of this "complexity" argument can be found in political science. It's called Imperial Overstretch. Very simply, empires fall when they reach the point where the costs of maintaining an empire outweigh the benefits. It's been applied to every empire from Rome to the Soviet Union, and of course plenty of people are applying it to current American hegemony.

 

As an a priori assumption the logic of the theory seems inescapable to me. When businesses take in less revenue than they spend, they go bankrupt. When empires spend more on preservation than they accumulate from their conquered territories, they collapse. Simple.

 

The question is how to apply the theory. Businesses have solid and verifiable accounting principles to determine bankruptcy. The science of determining balance sheets for economic, cultural and political capital within an imperial international relations system is not as precise. The danger to me seems in turning the concept of imperial overstretch into a kind of Hegelian deterministic historical force, which I don't think it is meant to be.

 

I think the main reasons the western Roman empire fell are a dynamic between constant internal disorders and invasions by external powers. Did this dynamic occur within a greater framework of Imperial Overstretch (or decreased returns in complexity)? I am not sure. It is an interesting theory, however.

[Erik Andrus]

 

Proposition 3 - that complex societies incur more costs - is a somewhat generalised phrase. The nature of the complexity and the efficiency of administration are important factors that are being glossed over. In terms of the Roman empire, the later empire saw increases in bureaucracy with people seeking sinecures and more staff/retainers to improve their visual standing. That does indeed increase costs but repesents a failure of management, not an autiomatic circumstance.

 

 

Increased complexity carries increased costs per capita. This being in terms of energy and resources. It is a general concept but it explains a lot.

 

In present day western culture we consume a huge quantity of energy per capita, mostly fossil-fuel based, so the fact that most of it goes to support cultural complexity is bearable to most. But once conquest had run its course, Rome had to run on the backs of agricultural laborers, who produced maybe 1/20 to 1/10th of a horsepower each. The only way to finance additional investment in complexity was to increase pressure on the farming classes by any means necessary. By the late empire this pressure was unbearable, and had negative consequences for physical health and population growth in the provinces.

 

As a social scientist, how does one explain how some administrations are competent and others corrupt? Why do some cultures manage well and others poorly? Are there no patterns we can identify? If this pattern of inefficiency truly threatened the existence of the collective in the case of Rome, why was no decisive action was taken to correct the trend? If you believe (and I don't) that inefficiency was the primary cause of collapse, then why did this occur in Rome and not in China, which I believe had several dynasties that ended with totally endemic corruption and inefficiency, yet were replaced with new dynasties without the collapse of the entire culture?

 

Complex societies respond to crisis with additional investments in complexity (such as the increasing specialization of the roman military in the dominate, or the switch from a part-time to full-time soldiery in the republic). Initially this strategy works well for them. But over time, all complex societies face diminishing returns from additional investment. Reducing investment is not an option, the elites have too much at stake. When the marginal returns on investments in complexity are outweighed by the costs there is risk of collapse.

 

As for provincial towns reverting to villages and losing their currency, this in fact represents a collapse. But just because the population no longer uses currency and abandons urban centers, this does not mean that their welfare necessarily decreases. It may or may not. In the case of the far-flung provinces of the empire in later times, they were underpopulated anyway. The peasants may well have fared better wandering off into the woods, or farming to support their local barbarian warlord than toiling on some latifundia to feed the empire.

[Erik Andrus]

A stripped down version of this "complexity" argument can be found in political science. It's called Imperial Overstretch. Very simply, empires fall when they reach the point where the costs of maintaining an empire outweigh the benefits. It's been applied to every empire from Rome to the Soviet Union, and of course plenty of people are applying it to current American hegemony.

 

 

Tainter's theory explains the collapse of empires but also the collapse of smaller complex societies that are not empires (like Easter Island or the Chacoan society of pre-contact New Nexico) yet are also unraveled by investments in complexity and diminishing returns. So you could say that collapse is a common end to an empire, but that collapse as a social phenomenon is not limited to empires.

 

In recent times, diminishing returns have been circumvented by the tapping of a new, more potent energy source. For example the switch from wood to coal, coal to oil. For various reasons this option wasn't available to Rome, whose only sources of energy/resources were the plundering of reserves of neighbors during the expansion period, and the modest agricultural yields of annexed territories.

[bitparity]

Has anyone made a pitch for the collapse of Rome due to the failure of migrant integration? Republican Rome greatly increased its power in integrating disparate groups like the Samnites and the Etruscans. Pre-Crisis Rome with Caracalla's Constitutio Antoniniana, giving citizenship to all in the empire, from the Celts to the Egyptians.

 

I'm of the opinion had the ruling barbarian generals of late empire been "allowed" to become romans, they would've continued utilizing its infrastructure, and we would be seeing Gallic Governor Clovis rather than King of the Franks Clovis, and Western Emperor Theodoric rather than King of Italy Theodoric.

 

And as an additional corollary, one only has to look at China, and see how they co-opted their barbarians into becoming sinicized, to the point where now they consider the Xiong-nu (Huns?), Mongols, and Manchus as "Chinese." Which is why I'm of the opinion if people want to know what the Roman Empire would look like had it survived to the modern day, they only need to look at the Chinese Empire.

Edited December 13, 2011 by bitparity

[caldrail]

Increased complexity carries increased costs per capita. This being in terms of energy and resources. It is a general concept but it explains a lot.

It's also a somewhat subjective statement because it doesn't define what complexity means in terms of a society. My point is that some of this complexity at least was merely laziness, corruption, and rivalry obstructing efficient government rather than any inherent detail.

 

As a social scientist, how does one explain how some administrations are competent and others corrupt?

Who benefits most from their labour? The society or the individual?

 

Why do some cultures manage well and others poorly?

Many factors are involved but it does depend on how coherent the society is. Are they pulling together, or fighting each other? In the case of the late empire, the administration was no longer as dedicated to Roman service as it had once been, but riven by factions. Also since the Dominate functioned around the display of wealth, it generated a culture of rivalry amongst those who wanted to benefit from it. You could argue this was always the case in Imperial Rome - I agree, there was always a certain amount of this as there had been in the republic, but the polarisation of wealth accentuated this feature of Roman culture. Both Marcellinus and Zosimus make comments to this effect.

 

Are there no patterns we can identify?

Yes there are. Why else would people quote reasons for the collapse of the Roman Empire?

 

If this pattern of inefficiency truly threatened the existence of the collective in the case of Rome, why was no decisive action was taken to correct the trend?

Sometimes they did try decisive action. However your question assumes a simple decision can rectify endemic features of everyday society. That doesn't work in modern government (you need only watch Prime Ministers Question Time to see that happening) and it certainly didn't work for the explotative, corrupt, and factional Roman empire.

 

If you believe (and I don't) that inefficiency was the primary cause of collapse, then why did this occur in Rome and not in China, which I believe had several dynasties that ended with totally endemic corruption and inefficiency, yet were replaced with new dynasties without the collapse of the entire culture?

I won't dwell on this question because of forum rules. China was a different society. Different aspirations, problems, and expectations.

 

Complex societies respond to crisis with additional investments in complexity

Not always. That's one course of action possible, but in some cases, the Romans eliminated or re-aligned sections of society they thought were unnecessary or devicive.

 

To reason that the Roman Collapse (or should that be 'Deflation'?) was simply an extension of complexity is absurd. It may have been part of the problem, but also bear in mind the changes in mindset of the population as they progressed from the old order toward the immigrant and slave descended majority, or the increasing instances of disease, the economic losses that were due to excessive spending, imbalance in foreign trade, and increasing instabil;ity on the frontiers (not to mention raiding), the failure to maintain standards in the late imperial legions, and the polarisation of communities which could not possibly be described in terms of complexity.

[Erik Andrus]

To reason that the Roman Collapse (or should that be 'Deflation'?) was simply an extension of complexity is absurd. It may have been part of the problem, but also bear in mind the changes in mindset of the population as they progressed from the old order toward the immigrant and slave descended majority, or the increasing instances of disease, the economic losses that were due to excessive spending, imbalance in foreign trade, and increasing instabil;ity on the frontiers (not to mention raiding), the failure to maintain standards in the late imperial legions, and the polarisation of communities which could not possibly be described in terms of complexity.

 

Actually all of the factors you listed fall under the heading heading of problems associated with increased complexity.

 

1. You mentioned increased stratification (minority patrician power-brokers versus the immigrant and slave majority). This is a chief aspect of complex societies.

 

2. Economic losses due to increasing expenses (on societal complexity) and dwindling supplies of precious metals with which to back up those government debts

 

3. Inability to defend the frontier because the military was too expensive for the state to field and spread too thin. The level of military spending needed to pacify an incredibly long frontier became increasingly unaffordable. Costs of complexity again.

 

4. Polarization of communities, I don't understand exactly what this refers to. Maybe you could elaborate.

 

Is it true that forum rules prohibit the comparison of the Roman experience with other cultures in other times and places? If so I'm sure I don't belong here, that's most of what I'm interested in.

Edited December 15, 2011 by Erik Andrus

[Ursus]

Is it true that forum rules prohibit the comparison of the Roman experience with other cultures in other times and places? If so I'm sure I don't belong here, that's most of what I'm interested in.

 

I'll let the moderators answer directly, but in general, it is a Roman history forum.

 

I find the subject quite fascinating. Can it not be tailored to an exclusively Roman experience?