Myth of Superpowers not trying adapt to Guerrilla Warfare/Insugency

[Guest ParatrooperLirelou]

One of the greatest misconceptions and myths I always hear regarding modern warfare is that in wars that are often labeled as "guerrilla Wars or insurgencies", Military Superpowers(who are often labeled as the losers of these type of wars) always gets criticized for failing to adapt to the terrain and enemies' tactics and sticking too much to their army's conventional style of warfare. From Indochina and Vietnam to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, people have this view that the army's of superpowers are too arrogant and conservative to change their methods of warfare and tactics in commonly labeled "insurgencies and guerrrilla wars". But the reality is that the armies of superpowers always tried to adapt to foriegn terrain and tactics of weaker guerrillas.

 

Take the French Indochina War.Popular belief is that French forces losing the war because they relied too much on European conventional warfare and refused/were to blind to adapt to Vietnam's terrain and the nature of warfare in the region.In reality the French army attempted to make tactical and technological changes so they could counter the VietMinh's terrain advantages.For example the French were the first army to use napalm on such a wide school in their war against the VietMinh and the French pioneered many innovations to cope with the VietMinh guerrillas such as the use of commandos specialized for riverborne assault(predecessors of Navy Seals) and the modern concept of winning the hearts and minds of the local population through the use of commandos specialized for the task which the French dubbed as GCMA(former GCMA commandos would go on to act as advisor for the Army Special Forces during the Vietnam War).In fact many of the innovations that the French made in their war in Vietnam were so effective that the Americans would pick them up and improve on them for use in the Vietnam War and later wars including the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

The American Vietnam War is also another war that suffers from the stigma of superpowers failing to adapt to the methods of guerrillas and insurgents. Like the French, the commonly held view of why the American military lost in Vietnam is because they failed to adapt to Jungle warfare and relied too much on conventional warfare and "Set Piece Battles".The truth is the opposite.The Americans, like the French, made many innovations in warfare to cope with the Viet Cong such as the creation of combat helicopters and the development developed an extensive air mobility capability to quickly resupply isolated units and send reinforcements in the middle of battle.

 

Much of the so called "Conventional Set Piece Battles" in the Vietnam War were actually counterinsurgency operations designed to mop up and destroy NLF units and pacifications projects to win the hearts and minds of locals!In fact if anyting, the American military and political commanders spent too much time on creating counterinsurgency theories and counterinsurgency operations to fight the Viet Cong and cope with guerrilla warfare and jungle warfare well in fact the true enemy was the conventional forces of North Vietnam!

 

 

The Afghan Soviet War suffers this same stigma of failing to adapt to enemy terrain and tactics.But documents and accounts of the Soviet War in Afghanistan revealed the Soviet forces MADE CHANGES TO THEIR DOCTRINES AND TECHNOLOGY TO ADAPT IN THE WAR!As an example, the Soviets began create smaller independent infantry units to quickly chase and destroy the Afghani rebels before they escape!Also if you recall, one of the stereotypes of the Red army(and also the current Russian Army) is that their chain of command is too rigid-soldiers have no individual initiatives and are left like dummies when their officers are killed. But the reality in Afghanistan is that once this flaw was revealed, the Soviet army began teaching their soldiers how to have individual initiative rather than merely obeying orders and they specifically required their sergeants to learn how to act as commander in the case an officer is killed!These are just among the changes the Soviet Military made to cope with the Afghani insurgents and to put them here would take up too much space and put the article completely off topic.Thus that is a topic worthy of its own article.

 

Recently the Roman Legions too suffer this stigma of being unable or unwilling to adapt to Guerrilla warfare and Insurgencies thanks to the extremely inaccurate Hollywood movies of the Roman Wars in Britannia against the Celts.Iam not well read enough to put a well written and very informative paragraph of how the Romans adapted to guerrillas and insurgents but based on what I know so far, the Roman Legions attempted to adapt to guerrilla warfare and insugencies and make innovative changes to their forces just as much and as well as the stated armies above did and were extremely successful in finding ways to counter guerilla attacks and insurgent tactics and strategies.

 

The reality is that no military force ever stays rigid with traditional doctrines(in fact the concept of traditional doctrines is non existent) and military forces including those of superpowers are always inventing new tactics and docrtine out of necessity to deal with current wars and problems.Military forces in reality are fluid and would adopt and change flawed doctrine the moment it becomes obvious current doctrine is not effective for fighting ongoing wars including those of the guerrilla and insurgent types!

Edited May 27, 2011 by ParatrooperLirelou

[caldrail]

Unfortunately changes in doctrine are not so easily made in every case. Thus we have generals seeking to conduct cavalry charges in both the first and second world war. We have the French armed forces using infantry/armour tactics in the 1940's that were proven to be unsuccesful in 1918. And so on...

 

There's an inertia in military circles amplified by victory and prolongued peace. There are traditional values that persist beyond reason. Worse still, the military are usually subject to political control which may well insist on inappropriate doctrine. You can probably think of examples yourself.

[Guest ParatrooperLirelou]

A couple of things need to be clairified.

Unfortunately changes in doctrine are not so easily made in every case. Thus we have generals seeking to conduct cavalry charges in both the first and second world war.

 

Its a BIG MISCONCEPTION that in World War 1 cavalry was outdated.A closer examination of the battlefield shows that cavalry was actually still quite effective.This was particularly true in the Eastern Front, where there were many fluid Cavalry offenses by both Russians and Germans that played roles in defeating trench warfare particularly in the Brusilove Offensive.Also cavalry was extremely effective in the Middle East.

 

In regards to World War 2, ITS A BIG MYTH that cavalry charges were being conducted.While cavalry was still used in battle, they did not actually charged with swords and lances;actually in reality cavalry units only used horses to travel in WW2.Once they reached the battle field, they got off horses and proceeded to fight as modern infantry with modern weapons such as rocket launchers and heavy machine guns.

 

These links should inform you.

http://www.historynet.com/polish-cavalry-charges-tanks.htm

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/polishcavalry.aspx

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/germanhorse/index.html

http://www.zdnet.com/blog/collaboration/the-wwii-german-army-was-80-horse-drawn-business-lessons-from-history/173

 

 

 

Also KEEP IN MIND that the 80% of the German Army was Horse-based!Its a myth that the German army won because they were mechanized and a close examination shows that the Weirhmact WAS ACTUALLY TECHNOLOGICALLY INFERIOR COMPARED TO THE ALLIES!Beware of the supposed military and technological superiority of the German forces in WW2, this is based on assumptions without detailed research and (as with Roman Legions) beware of the supposed professionalism of the Germans in WW2.

 

We have the French armed forces using infantry/armour tactics in the 1940's that were proven to be unsuccesful in 1918.

 

BIG MYTH!A closer examination of the French miltiary budgeting shows THAT THE FRENCH ARMY WAS CONSTANTLY CHANGING TACTICAL doctrines and military technology during the 1920s/1930s. In fact if one examines the Battle of France in 1940, the French army was actually using the modern infantry and armor tactics and overall the French army operated the same way as the German army did on a tactical scale. If anything, the French were actually winning in military terms!

 

Beware of the claim that the French army lost in WW2 because they were using outdated tactics and weaponry. A close examination shows the opposite, that the French were just as modern overall as the Germans were. In fact the so called

Edited May 31, 2011 by ParatrooperLirelou

[Melvadius]

[Guest ParatrooperLirelou]

 

Edited May 31, 2011 by ParatrooperLirelou

[Melvadius]

I meant no offense, ...<SNIP>...if you seen my posts on the Indochina War and Vietnam forums, I can be extremely fascinated to the point that they turn unexpectedly into flame wars. ...<SNIP>...

 

 

Offence has not been taken here BUT it is the job of the legatii to ensure that posts do not devolve down to flame wars for which we have a standard response

 

We are therefore grateful when people provide factual information and/or reasoned discussions of topics but keep a light touch by considering how what they post may come across to others.

[Pompieus]

The BIGGEST myth is that nationalist insurgencies are purely MILITARY problems that can be resolved solely with military force. In such circumstances the POLITICAL aspect is decisive and Sun Tsu and Mao Tse Tung are better guides than Clausewitz. A foriegn army, no matter how adept tactically or superior technologically will not prevail against an insurgency unless it has the strong support of a LEGITIMATE and VIABLE local partner. The locals are there for the long haul; an outside power, with public opinion or other predominant strategic concerns to worry about must have a resolution in a reasonable time and at reasonable cost. Tactical success is necessary, but there must eventually be a political resolution; and only a local partner with some legitimacy can accomplish this.

[Guest ParatrooperLirelou]

The BIGGEST myth is that nationalist insurgencies are purely MILITARY problems that can be resolved solely with military force. In such circumstances the POLITICAL aspect is decisive and Sun Tsu and Mao Tse Tung are better guides than Clausewitz. A foriegn army, no matter how adept tactically or superior technologically will not prevail against an insurgency unless it has the strong support of a LEGITIMATE and VIABLE local partner. The locals are there for the long haul; an outside power, with public opinion or other predominant strategic concerns to worry about must have a resolution in a reasonable time and at reasonable cost. Tactical success is necessary, but there must eventually be a political resolution; and only a local partner with some legitimacy can accomplish this.

While this is true for Vietnam and the Afghan Soviet War, its not necessarily true for most insurgencies. If anything, many of the most successful counterinsurgencies were resolved through mainly military force and violence. A military force can win even wihout the support of a legitimate and viable partner and even if the war is costly and the locals oppose the invading super powers. To see an example of how military force was primarily responsible for winning a counterinsurgency without political and public support, good wars to research for how a superpower won primarily through mostly use of military force and with little to no political support/winning hearts and minds of locals are the Philippine-American War and various Indian Wars of the 1800s where the American military used a blend of military superiority and use of coercian to successfully defeat insurgents despite not having the necessary support of the American politicians and not necessarily being favored by locals.In fact the Romans used fear and military might to defeat the insurgency in Palestine by the Jews.

 

Its extremely possible to defeat insurgencies without political support and a legitimate local allied government if terorrism and coercian is used.If anything, what you state of winning insurgencies through a stable effective government supported by locals is always a failure and most guerrilla wars were better off being solved through mainly military means than through politics(though there are exceptions such as Afghan-Soviet War but these are not the norm in operating successful counter-insurgency).These articles should dispell many of the myths and misconceptions of how counterinsurgencies should be defeated.In fact the insurgency most where the "Hearts and Minds" concept was born out off, the Malayan Insurgency, shows that many of the supposed beliefs of Counterinsurgency and anti-guerrilla warfare such as ensuing a stable government are big misconceptions.

http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/923090__912750182.pdf

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/11/the-myth-of-hearts-and-minds/

Edited May 31, 2011 by ParatrooperLirelou

[Virgil61]

The BIGGEST myth is that nationalist insurgencies are purely MILITARY problems that can be resolved solely with military force. In such circumstances the POLITICAL aspect is decisive and Sun Tsu and Mao Tse Tung are better guides than Clausewitz. A foriegn army, no matter how adept tactically or superior technologically will not prevail against an insurgency unless it has the strong support of a LEGITIMATE and VIABLE local partner. The locals are there for the long haul; an outside power, with public opinion or other predominant strategic concerns to worry about must have a resolution in a reasonable time and at reasonable cost. Tactical success is necessary, but there must eventually be a political resolution; and only a local partner with some legitimacy can accomplish this.

 

All true. My military career was spent--or a large part of it was--dedicated to fighting what is now known as COIN (counter-insurgency operations). It's actually the key to the success of what was called "the Surge" in Iraq. It wasn't just the overflow of troops flooding an area, it was keeping units in one place to get to know the locals, establish a trust, know their problems (try and solve them if possible), be an 'honest broker' and so on. Gen Petreaus oversaw the US Army COIN manual (FM 3-24) which has as a sort of guiding principle the thoughts you've posted.

 

Part of the heart and soul of modern COIN strategy which encompass the spirit of your post comes from Petreaus and this guy David Kilcullen.

[Guest ParatrooperLirelou]

The BIGGEST myth is that nationalist insurgencies are purely MILITARY problems that can be resolved solely with military force. In such circumstances the POLITICAL aspect is decisive and Sun Tsu and Mao Tse Tung are better guides than Clausewitz. A foriegn army, no matter how adept tactically or superior technologically will not prevail against an insurgency unless it has the strong support of a LEGITIMATE and VIABLE local partner. The locals are there for the long haul; an outside power, with public opinion or other predominant strategic concerns to worry about must have a resolution in a reasonable time and at reasonable cost. Tactical success is necessary, but there must eventually be a political resolution; and only a local partner with some legitimacy can accomplish this.

 

All true. My military career was spent--or a large part of it was--dedicated to fighting what is now known as COIN (counter-insurgency operations). It's actually the key to the success of what was called "the Surge" in Iraq. It wasn't just the overflow of troops flooding an area, it was keeping units in one place to get to know the locals, establish a trust, know their problems (try and solve them if possible), be an 'honest broker' and so on. Gen Petreaus oversaw the US Army COIN manual (FM 3-24) which has as a sort of guiding principle the thoughts you've posted.

 

Part of the heart and soul of modern COIN strategy which encompass the spirit of your post comes from Petreaus and this guy David Kilcullen.

The so called "COIN" in practice is actually a failure almost everytime its attempted.A military force does not need to "Win the hearts and minds" of locals in order to defeat insurgencies.In fact the most successful counterinsurgencies were won through a blend of coercian and terrorism.

 

Beware of the "COIN" that they currently teach in the U.S. Army.History has shown the concept is almost always a failure and often COIN was wrongly applied to situations that were never "True Insurgencies" such as the Vietnam War(which actually FAILED because they overrelied on COIN and had they just kept it simple and relied on conventional warfare, Vietnam would have been won!).

 

And even in true "insurgencies" COIN working effectively is the exception rather than the norm. As COIN principles were attempted in the Philippines to put as an example and it ended failing.Instead in the Philippines and other isurgencies, terrorism and coercian were what defeated insurgencies in the end, not "Hearts and Minds".

 

These links reveal the failure of COIN in its method and reveals the realities of what successful counterinsurgency is like.

http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/myth-kinder-gentler-war

http://www.pacificfreepress.com/news/1/6683-debunking-the-counterinsurgency-myth.html

Edited June 1, 2011 by ParatrooperLirelou

[Julius Ratus]

Whether or not US COIN tactics will work in Afghanistan and Iraq remains to be seen. There have been successes in both countries as well as failures.

 

Going back to WWII for a second (and off topic, so I apologize) - There were cavalry charges in WWII. The Soviet Cossacks performed a number of cavalry missions. Generally they fought as mounted infantry, but at times would charge. I will have to dig out my books when I get home to find sources for this but they are out there and can be found. The big cavalry myth about the Polish Lancers charging German Panzers with lances is a partial myth. They were actually charging infantry in the open (successfully) when a number of German armoured cars pulled up, saw them, and machinegunned them down.

 

As for German technical superiority - It is a bit overblown. They were better off than the Poles, Danes, Belgians, Dutch, and Norwegians. They had better tactics (or at least better executed) than either the French or the British in 1940. As far as technology goes, the Germans had no tanks comparable to the British Matildas and the Russian KV-1s and T-34s that were out in 1940. The French SOMUA tanks were probably better as well but suffered the usual French tank problem that they had two crewmen - Commander/Gunner/Loader and Driver whereas the German tanks (specifically the Pz38s, PzIIIs, and PzIVs) all had four crewmen. By the end of the war the Germans were getting worse and worse, though it is possible that a lot of their mystique comes from their ability to hold on so long against such great odds. At least one Soviet commander I have read about during Bagration referred to German tactics as "lazy".

 

But yeah, this is an interesting period to discuss. When I have more time I will try to write some about COIN that I have read or heard from people who visited the Sandbox.

[Pompieus]

The military alternative does exist, as you say. It requires amassing a large force (10 to 1 superiority used to be the rule of thumb), rounding up and relocating the population to concentration camps, destroying the villages and towns, burning, the crops, rounding up or wiping out the herds, flocks or game that the people lived on, building fortified camps and sending out flying columns to kill anybody they meet until the insurgents are killed, captured, starved or give up. This will work if you have the will. It used to be called "creating a desert and calling it peace" (solitudinem fecerunt, pacem appelunt).

Edited June 27, 2011 by Pompieus