Teutoberg Forest AD9: The Destruction of Varus & His Legions

[parthianbow]

Events such as the Varian or Kalkriese disaster did not happen to the Roman Empire very often. Indeed few battles in Rome's entire 750 year history can be compared to the battle of the Teutoberg forest in AD 9. Most would agree that Hannibal's unparalleled victory at Cannae and Carrhae in 53 BC are of similar importance, but the Kalkriese disaster seems to have a special resonance even today. Perhaps it is because the battle took place in the middle of Europe, and the victors are still a recognisable nation (whereas the other victors, the Carthaginians and Parthians, are not)?

 

This Osprey title is a most welcome addition to the other texts on the subject, not least because of its well-written text and its excellent pictures (by Peter Dennis). In typical Osprey style, it lays out the background to the battle for Germania Magna (the lands to the east of the River Rhine) in the years previous to Kalkriese, the generals who led the opposing armies - Varus and the Cheruscan leader Arminius - the details of their armies and so on, before moving to what is known of the battle itself. Here it should be noted that the descriptions of combat events in the book are NOT historical fact - in fact almost nothing is known of what happened during the real battle. In my mind, this should have been prominently acknowledged. Last of all, the book considers the aftermath - the punitive campaigns to recover lost eagles and honour, and the fact that from AD 9, Rome's policy towards Germania Magna was one of containment, rather than offense.

(previously published on Amazon)

It doesn't mention, however, the 3rd Century AD battlefield deep inside Germania Magna that proves that Rome continued to launch attacks into the area for hundreds of years after Kalkriese (i.e. it wasn't all about containment; see relevant threads on here and on www.romanarmytalk.com.) Nor does it mention the fact that there is NO conclusive proof that the site at Kalkriese is THE battlefield where Varus and his men were annihilated. Many many pointers suggest that it is, but frustratingly, there is nothing concrete to prove absolutely that it is.

 

Interested readers would undoubtedly enjoy the Ancient Warfare (AW) special edition about the Varian Disaster. Find it here. In my mind,the AW magazine pips this Osprey edition by a good margin. Another text well worth reading is Rome's Greatest Defeat: Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest.

[caldrail]

Perhaps it is because the battle took place in the middle of Europe, and the victors are still a recognisable nation (whereas the other victors, the Carthaginians and Parthians, are not)?

 

It would be, except that the term 'German' was invented by the Romans as a term describing certain tribes as a group. The modern national identity didn't exist back then - Arminius had to bring the tribes together to cooperate against the Romans and the underlying differences still existed, especially since there was no significant germanic union until the 'barbarian conspiracy' of later times, and even that was only a temporary cooperation.

[Centurion-Macro]

In reference to why this defeat is remembered above all the rest is because it was the battle that stopped Rome in its tracks. While Cannae was bad, the Romans recovered from that victory to win the war, and Roman armies swept over Africa. However, after the destruction of these three legions in AD 9, the Romans never tried to conquer the territories over the Rhine again.

 

Also, I think the fact it did happen in Europe is a big factor. I have never understood it myself, but it appears that most people are more concerned with European incidents (eg. Teutoberg) than areas not in Europe (eg. Carrhae).

[caldrail]

It didn't stop Rome in its tracks - it forced a retreat. But do bear in mind why the Romans were there. The occupation of territory across the Rhine wasn't about territorial conquest or the glory of Rome - it was about cash. Augustus sent a man known to be greedy to collect taxes. The German tribes didn't like it and you could in fact see the Germanic/Roman relationship from that point on as not so much a cultural conflict, but more a contest about wealth. I'm not sure I would exactly, but the motives for conflict on both sides were almost always revenue related.

[barca]

Perhaps it is because the battle took place in the middle of Europe, and the victors are still a recognisable nation (whereas the other victors, the Carthaginians and Parthians, are not)?

 

It would be, except that the term 'German' was invented by the Romans as a term describing certain tribes as a group. The modern national identity didn't exist back then - Arminius had to bring the tribes together to cooperate against the Romans and the underlying differences still existed, especially since there was no significant germanic union until the 'barbarian conspiracy' of later times, and even that was only a temporary cooperation.

 

 

The various Germanic tribes fought more amongst themselves than they did against Rome. I somehow doubt that the various raiders that crossed the Rhine for centuries viewed themselves as part of Arminius' legacy. The same goes for Fritigen's Goths and all the other groups that entered the subsequently.

[barca]

It didn't stop Rome in its tracks - it forced a retreat. But do bear in mind why the Romans were there. The occupation of territory across the Rhine wasn't about territorial conquest or the glory of Rome - it was about cash. Augustus sent a man known to be greedy to collect taxes. The German tribes didn't like it and you could in fact see the Germanic/Roman relationship from that point on as not so much a cultural conflict, but more a contest about wealth. I'm not sure I would exactly, but the motives for conflict on both sides were almost always revenue related.

 

That's because they didn't have much in the first place. The Romans generally felt that Germania wasn't worth conquering. It was relatively backward and poor. Not a whole lot of plunder or money there.

[Viggen]

....Another text well worth reading is Rome's Greatest Defeat: Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest.

 

Ben, we did a review of this book a while back

http://www.unrv.com/book-review/romes-greatest-defeat.php

 

and i am very happy that the author,Adrian Murdoch, will do a review of Eager for Glory by Lindsay Powell...

 

p.s. and yeah the AWM special edition is a real treat!

 

cheers

viggen

[caldrail]

It didn't stop Rome in its tracks - it forced a retreat. But do bear in mind why the Romans were there. The occupation of territory across the Rhine wasn't about territorial conquest or the glory of Rome - it was about cash. Augustus sent a man known to be greedy to collect taxes. The German tribes didn't like it and you could in fact see the Germanic/Roman relationship from that point on as not so much a cultural conflict, but more a contest about wealth. I'm not sure I would exactly, but the motives for conflict on both sides were almost always revenue related.

 

That's because they didn't have much in the first place. The Romans generally felt that Germania wasn't worth conquering. It was relatively backward and poor. Not a whole lot of plunder or money there.

The Romans were colonising germanic forests, not conquering them. Evidence has come to light of Roman towns much further beyond the Rhine than previously considered, abandoned after Arminius led an uprising. So in fact, the Romans had every reason to maintain control of the area and with other regions including mainland Europe, Augustus was revialising the declining parts of the empire by rwe-colonisation. In any case, the assignment of Varus is a fairly obvious attempt to accrue as much tax revenue as possible. He was sent there by Augustus for that purpose. Turning Rome into marble wasn't cheap.

[barca]

The Romans were colonising germanic forests, not conquering them. Evidence has come to light of Roman towns much further beyond the Rhine than previously considered, abandoned after Arminius led an uprising.

 

 

I have not fully understood why the Romans weren't able to do with Germany what they did with Gaul, i.e. romanize them. Peter Heather pointed out that many of the Gallic Romans in the 4th Century were in some ways more roman than the Romans themselves.

 

Of course there were a number of Germanic individuals who became Romans, but the vast majority remained out there as an ever present threat, never fully subdued.

[Melvadius]

The simple answer is that a major issue as far as Northern Europe is concerned was that the Romans preferred to make use of linear natural barriers as part of their limes/ frontier. In Britain Hadrian's Wall was the most successful making use of raised land even cliffs for much of its route while both the Rhine and Danube rivers formed an even more formidable barrier and major component of the limes across most of mainland Europe.

 

Placing defences on such borders allowed the steady development of towns within Gaul which was away from direct threats while most of Germania either was not under direct Roman rule or if it was was always under constant threat from across the border so couldn't develop in the same way. This meant that they could not provide the necessary income for individuals to effectively 'pay their way' into the Roman elite.

[Viggen]

I have not fully understood why the Romans weren't able to do with Germany what they did with Gaul,

 

...if you compare Gaul with Germania some things were very different; the level of urbanisation and the make up of the hierarchy for example, while gaul was more top down ruled, the germanic aristocrats were constantly challenged by their own people, (voting them off was not uncommon) so Rome didnt really had a clear cut opponent like they had in Gaul, and not really big towns, settlements they could attack and once they had conquered them, the area was freed...

 

cheers

viggen

[caldrail]

The Romans were colonising germanic forests, not conquering them. Evidence has come to light of Roman towns much further beyond the Rhine than previously considered, abandoned after Arminius led an uprising.

 

 

I have not fully understood why the Romans weren't able to do with Germany what they did with Gaul, i.e. romanize them.

 

They didn't Romanize anyone. That's a fallacy. What the Romans did was present latin culture as a package and suggest that things would work better for them if the complied and got along. It was always the choice of the native whether he did things as Romans do.

 

In fairness, the campaigns of Caesar against the Gauls had convinced them that cooperation was a better idea. The Gauls recognised the Romans were stronger and got with the winning team. On the other hand, the Gauls of Caesars day were not the fierce warriors who had sacked Rome and spread across Europe and into Asia Minor.

 

Caesar hints at their lack of warrior credibility in his account of the war, and in fact, the poor performance of his Aedui allies (who preferred not to risk their expensive and beloved horses) forced Caesar to train some of his men as cavalry, before the horse contingent was returned to the standard legion in the Augustan Reforms.

 

The germanic tribes on the other hand did not settle in quite the same way as Gauls. Whereas the gauls had begun to create the skeleton of urban life anyway (and thus were more conducive to the Roman way), germainc tribes were wilder in style. Whereas the Gauls had more or less ceased raiding (other than bullying travellers into paying tolls), the germans continued throughout the existence of the empire.

 

Peter Heather pointed out that many of the Gallic Romans in the 4th Century were in some ways more roman than the Romans themselves.

This is something that some Romans sneered at. The Gauls, having agreed to cooperate and discovering the advantages of Roman life, adopted it wholesale. They were not however at the cutting edge of Roman society and being descended from barbarians, a proportion of Roman society would always sneer at them.

 

In fairness, I don't see much of that. Tacitus for instance conserves his venom for the Britons and their clumsy attempts at aping their betters.

 

Of course there were a number of Germanic individuals who became Romans, but the vast majority remained out there as an ever present threat, never fully subdued.

But not always uncooperative. Remember that Roman foreign policy during the empire was to play one german tribe against another. The persistence of confrontation had more to do with differences in wealth between two cultures. For the germans, the relative bounty of the empire was a permanent temptation.

 

The differences between the two cultures was reinforced by geography - espially the Rhine - but also because both were essentially martial cultures whose warrior pride did not take kindly to surrender of principle. In fact, you might claim with some justification that the Romans actually maintained the germanic tribes as enemies because of their failures in diplomacy but also an unwillingness to treat the tribes with equal status.

[Ingsoc]

The Roman army being caught out of guard and suffer a defeat at a single battle was more common that you think, however they always manage to bounce back and crush the enemy.

 

To me the true greatness of Arminius as a military commander was the fact he manage to hold off and defeat Germanicus army send to avenge the defeat of Varus, so in the end the Romans prefer to retreat rather then spend valuable resources needed in order to defeat Arminius.

[caldrail]

Caught off guard? They were led deliberately into a prepared ambush by Arminius himself. In any case, the germanic tribes did not inflict any great defeat of the reprisal mission led by Germanicus, nor did they effectively fend him off, preferring to avoid confrontation (I wonder why?) Arguably Germanicus actually achieved very little. However, the Romans were rattled by their failure to colonise and tax-farm the region. Augustus had been given a serious fright and remember he told Tiberius never to attempt the same.

 

The idea that the Romans needed serious resources to conquer or colonise Germania doesn't sound right to me. Most resources would have been obtained locally at no great cost. The whole point to grab whatever cash the german tribes could gather, not to make a commercial loss on the frontier from the planning stage. That Augustus thought the tribes were ready for taxing suggests that development was proceeding to plan, and since the idea was spend money bribing citizens of Rome with games and civic improvement (both of which Augustus boasts of), it's unlikely he would have wasted any cash to begin with.

 

The Augustan Franchise was a sheme by which poor areas were re-vitalised throughout his empire. It had the advantage of occupying some thirty legions of redundant troops left over from the civil wars. It also meant that development was funded by the local economy, not the imperial purse. His whole rationale was to profit from military redundancy and to exploit areas considered less profitable.

[barca]

This is something that some Romans sneered at. The Gauls, having agreed to cooperate and discovering the advantages of Roman life, adopted it wholesale. They were not however at the cutting edge of Roman society and being descended from barbarians, a proportion of Roman society would always sneer at them.

 

In fairness, I don't see much of that. Tacitus for instance conserves his venom for the Britons and their clumsy attempts at aping their betters.

 

 

And yet being Roman was less of a birthright and more of an adoption of the Roman Way or Creed (for lack of a better term). Upstarts aimed to be a part of elite Roman Society or 'the better part of humankind' . Being a part of this depended on an intense fund of knowledge in the Classics (Vergil, Cicero, etc.) and 'correct' latin. As soon as one of these educated individuals opened his mouth he would be identified as a member of the elite.

 

During the early stages of the empire such Romanization had not fully taken hold, but by the 4th century, Gaul was extensively Romanized. Heather describes a certain Ausonius in Trier who was a teacher of Rhetoric under the auspices of the University of Bordeaux, which had emerged as one of the major centers of Latin Academics. Ausonius was of Gallic origin, and yet many of the Roman blue-bloods, such as the Senator Symmachus approached him with deference, because they valued his expertise in matters of Latin literature. The point is that Romans from Italy were seeking knowledge of Latin from individuals outside of Italy.