Why did the Romans fail to conquer Scotland?

[Viggen]

In the late summer of his seventh and final season (AD 83) the army of the Roman governor of Britain, Gnaeus Julius Agricola, defeated a larger Caledonian force at the battle of Mons Graupius. Agricola's son-in-law, the historian Tacitus, writing at the end of that century, was able to say(Histories 1,2),perdomita Britannia, 'Britain was conquered'. However, he goes on to state, 'statim omissa1', 'it was immediately lost'. No permanent Roman forts of first century - or any other date - have been found beyond the Mounth, where the Highlands reach the sea at Stonehaven (illus 3), though Roman camps are known (illus 1), while archaeological evidence suggests that by about 90 all installations on and north of the Forth-Clyde line had been abandoned (Hartley 1972,13; Hanson & Yeoman 1988,14). Tacitus may have been indulging in hyperbole - not all Britain was lost, only the northern part - but nevertheless the Romans had failed to complete the conquest of the island, and had even withdrawn from territory which they had overrun.....

....interesting paper from David J Breeze*

http://archaeologyda...118_003_022.pdf

[Centurion-Macro]

Interesting article there, I shall read it more later.

 

I personally think it may have something to do with the geography of Scotland. If you look at Scotland, there are a lot of highlands and a lot of islands. For the Romans it was a horrible place to be, and perhaps the Empire just didn't want to spend the resources conquering it when there was not much to gain from such an endeavor. Let us not forget that at the time of Agricola Britain had four legions to keep the peace. That is a lot of legions for such a small space, and perhaps they decided Scotland was too much effort - after all, how would you properly garrison the highlands? It would be inviting disaster.

 

However, I may be wrong. But that is what I have always thought.

[caldrail]

It was a conquest too far, for two reasons. Firstly the north of England was not entirely secure thus occupying Caledonia was always going to logistically risky. Secondly, Tacitus claims that Caledonia was conquered because Agricola was a relation of his and wants to enlarge on his achievements. Furthermore, a succesful general returning to a triumph in Rome was a threat to Domitians popularity, thus the conquest was abandoned on political grounds.

[diegis]

I think was several reasons, one political, as mentioned by Caldrail, another one was that in 85/86 a Dacian army invaded Roman province of Moesia, making big destructions (Roman troops are defeated and governor Oppius Sabinus was beheaded), so Domitian called back any available troops and rush to Moesia to deal with the problem.

Another reason is that Caledonia wasnt probably considered too worthy to be transformed in a province, as it wasnt either a rich teritory, nor a strategic one, and the costs of start building towns, fortresses, roads, aqueducts and so on and keep troops there was too big compared with benefits (similar with what happened in some Germania teritories betwen Rhine and Elba)

Edited April 6, 2011 by diegis

[caldrail]

It is true that Roman conquest was often inspired by natural resources or the potential booty and tax revenue. Obviously with such low population densities and extensive wilderness the Romans had little reason to consider territory as valuable in its own right. That's a good point about the problems in Dacia but wouldn't it make more sense to move troops closer to the trouble area? After all, even with the much vaunted roads, the Romans did not have access to modern logistics thus strategic redeployment was not extactly rapid.

 

The costs of building military forts and castles isn't what you imagine. Unlike the later medieval castles, the legions were not paying civil artisans to build it, nor were they paying land owners for the right to erect fortificartions. I'm not saying it didn't involve expense, but the legions were kept busy as labourers during such construction work. Labour costs have always been the worst expense of any construction project So for instance wood was obtainable locally without anything more than soldiers pay and tools, most of which were already paid for.

[Melvadius]

The Breeze article is interesting although as it was written in 1988 it does not address some of the more recent research and consequently latest theories about the Roman relationship with local populations in Britain exemplified in recent books such as UnRoman Britain by Russell and Laycock.

 

In Russell and Laycock

[caldrail]

One aspect of the lack of territorial retention is the lack of urban centrs in Scotland. Unlike today, when just about every inch of land is defined and valued, back then it was settlements, facilities, and resources that made territory valuable. Simply occupying an area had no intrinsic value to the Romans.

 

For instance, Hadrian returned territory conquered by Trajan such as Mesopotamia and Dacia. Whilst he had political reasons for doing so, note that he kept the parts of Dacia that had gold mines.

 

But the important point, which Melvadius has underlined, is that without an urban centre, without the basis for civic organisation, they would have to build a Roman franchise from scratch. They tried that in Germania the previous century and were well aware of the hazards of trying to urbanise (and tax) hostile, disgruntled populations of aggressive barbarians.

[GhostOfClayton]

Another key question, and one which may add clarity or muddy the waters, is 'Why did the Romans withdraw back to Hadrian's Wall from the Antonine Wall, having established it?'

 

Having got the thing built and manned, was the upkeep really so much more expensive? The new land gained included plenty of nice agricultural lowland, very unlike the inhosptable highlands further north. Would the locals in the 'new' province be so different from the Brigantes, in whose territory Hadrian's Wall was built?

[caldrail]

Military credibility had been a part of political life in Roman culture for many centuries befor Antoninus Pius became Caesar. Furthermore, since the title of Roman overlord was that of a former dictator for life with a number of conquests on his achievement list, it therefore follows that Antoninus had little choice but to seek the same military credibility. To prove himself worthy as it were. Emperors often display this attitude, most obviously by Claudius whose invasion of Britain was little more than a massive publicity stunt.

 

Antoninus Pius was not a military man. He never left Italy during his reign, which was considered all the more favourable by Roman elite because he did so little to upset them. The question then is not why an advance into Caledonia was ordered, but at whose instigation? Was it Antoninus who thought up the scheme? Or was it suggested by a senior Roman, either to curry favour with his ruler or perhaps because Antoninus asked him to find him a suitable campaign to cement his status? Or was the commander acting entirely at his own cognizance and attempting to further his career with a campaign initiated at his own initiative?

 

Clearly the Romans were indifferent about their new conquest. Nice farmland it may have been, but like all undeveloped areas, it held little for the Romans to exploit. Their earlier efforts at colonisation of the wilderness had ended in disaster and that lesson wasn't lost on them. One of the major restrictions on Roman expansion was that they were running out of regions with estabnlished settlements and infrastructure. Apart from the Persians I suppose, but then the Persians weren't keen on submitting to Roman rule and were a powerful empire in their right.

 

What we have then is a campaign designed either to hold territory temporarily. Or was it? Since Hadrians Wall was a security boundary more than a national border, we have to accept the possibility that local commanders were reacting to what they perceived as a threat to security on the northern edge of british provinces, much like Israel has conducted temporary invasions and occupations in the modern era to secure boundaries and control hostilities.

 

In order to satisy this question it;s necessary to discovver whether there were any known security threats on the border, or whether this was a show of arms designed to impress the Roman elite, any of whom might have been willing to promote a coup if Caesar showed weakness.

[Pompieus]

The point about cooperative local elites, and polities or tribal groups that were big enough and cohesive enough to evolve into urban centers seems well taken. Nearly all Roman conquests met these criteria, or already had urban centers. The exceptions were always serious problems (viz Germany and Dacia) and required large permanent military forces. Even the interior of Spain, where the tribal groupings were small and loosely organized, required 200 years of fighting to pacify.

[Kosmo]

The most direct military reasons for the failure to conquest Scotland are the roman defeats in Dacia and against the Yazyges during the reign of Domitian that prevented romans to fully exploit the success at Mons Grapius because they had to withdraw a legion and other forces from Britain. This allowed Caledonians to survive and to learn a valuable lesson about the way to fight romans. After that they never offered romans a decisive battle.

[caldrail]

That idea has been mentioned before. It just doesn't work for me. Whilst it might sound militarily sound, it ignores politics. We're used to a clear social division between the two - for the Romans, they were part and parcel of the same thing.

 

In any case, with victory so clearly within sight in the remotest frontier, why on earth would the Romans even contemplate removing troops from a hostile theatre of war, without any security established, to march across europe? For all practical reasons, the war in Dacia was an entirely seperate campaign and even if it did influence Agricola's efforts to conquer Caledonia, chances are it was only an excuse to prevent the man from returning to Rome as a popular conqueror by the paranoid Domitian.

 

Remember that Agricola was asked by Domitiioan whether he wanted a triumph. Agricola wisely refused. The whole thing would have been a stunt to discredit the general and provide an excuse for disempowering him in some way.

[Onasander]

Why would the romans hesitate one second in consolidating tribes into settlements? It worked literally everywhere else, from the Ionian experience, through the roman empire, into the the byzantine era. A hostile settlement is way, way better than hostile tribes on the move. Its easier to march troops on a settlement, and collect taxes. The romans wouldnt of hesitated one second.

 

Something not occuring to us is plague cycles, both the human kind and the type that strike crops. It causes sharp contractions of logistic flow, resulting in a strategic realignment. Another is weak leadership, be it indifference, xenophobia, or outright malignancy and corruption. Or it could be a strategic masterstroke, setting up a defensive line with a buffer population on the other side to take a larger, more threatening enemy's blow first, and for free at that.

 

However, I suspect the reason why is the same reason Rome didn't invade Ireland.... they just didn't like gingers. The food sucked in scotland, hagas and fried everything, the women were loud talkers, they stole stuff left and right and never pay for anything, cause the had no money, and whenever the troops left on a liberty pass for a day off to visit the locals and party, they would return with strange rashes on their genitals that would puss, making them walk funny and constantly scratch at themselves down there. Add to that the scottish and Irish weather, and its obvious by the Romans said screw it, packed up and left.

[caldrail]

It didn't always work. The German tribes in ad9 were not going to become Roman clients easily, and for that matter, please note that Hadrian's Wall was a defensive line on both sides, north and south - the area to the south, whilst ostensibly Roman territory, was never as settled as southeast England and represented a politically senstive zone. Similarly there were areas around the empire that were not fully loyal to Rome and responded to rebellions - such as Judaea, wehich had fundamental cultural and religious issues with Roman society.

 

The main reasons that Rome did not expand much further was the difficulty of control. As the frontier got further away, so communication took longer, and opportunities for local rebellion increased dramatically. Note that the majority of rebellions against Rome started far away, and not always in places that didn't like Rome. There was for instance the Gallic Empire encompassing Britain and Gaul, set up by an ambitious individual who decided it was easy to break off a part of the empire for himself than try to rule the whole thing.

 

As for the comment about gingers, Romans weren't concerned at all about racial appearances, just how latin you were. Besides, trade with Ireland would have indicated that there wasn't enough to justify another major campaign involving a sea crossing at such a distance from Rome. After all, most legionary legates were a suprisingly shy animal - a successful general is a dangerous beast - his army will by loyal, practised, and keen to see their beloved leader take the throne - that was why Domitian summoned Agricola home before Scotland was conquered and challenged his loyalty.

[Onasander]

I was joking about the gingers, I doubt many redheads until the Irish invasions of the north centuries later after Rome fell.

 

Roman power isnt the issue, but their mutually supported defensive positions over the long term.

 

The fortifications would have to provide:

 

A guard roster, including sleep and command and control elements to coordinate it, as well as a reserve force to support the walls, and preferably to sally out if needed.

 

A logistic base, enough to supply the base, and cover another fort if they lost their supplies in a raid, fire, corruption, or accident, as well as a returning army saturated with captured POWs/Slaves. Hope for, but dont expect the locals to be as prompt as usual when paying taxes in grain and livestock.

 

The excess troops and supplies can be deployed, main fighting force and logistics train. I figured though the romans were masters of the offense and defense, they still thought in terms of strong point defense and preferring head on engadgements in the field, it wasn't until very late the romans grew smarter in the west.

 

It needs to be emphasized subject populations are rational, but not merely rational, they are also emotive, so their pacifism and willingness to cooperate with the occupation forces will fluctuate on emotional norms. A population long subjected yet not positively attached to the occupation forces will of suffered quite a few painful repercussions from asserting themselves, but would none the less not enter into rebellion save in cases roused by hysteria. It tends to take more than a good speech from a tribal leader.

 

If the romans made a good show of force before setting out, and chose a peak low in the emotive oscillation, and kept their rear detachments in each fort mutually in touch and ready to mutually support one another, then I see no issues, other than distance and weather.

 

Especially if a native auxiliary, full of the native auxiliary with its Nobles and loudest mouths recruited, and a few political hostages kept in rear.

 

The romans managed all of this, had a intuitive understanding of the oscillation pattern in some places, but in others seemed oblivious as to why the rules, traditions, and statecraft were structured as such, and ineptly ran their operations without thinking much about it, assuming the myth of roman might and power was a force of nature in and of itself, and they could whatever, whenev