Boudica's last battle: Was she naive?

[Hus]

Was Boudicca simply battle-naive in facing the Romans in pitched battle? Over-confident with victories and swelling numbers? Or had she lost control of her indisciplined army and maybe was overruled by Iceni commanders or possibly even rival royal factions?

 

As we know, this former Roman collaborator and now vengeful warrior-queen (she was flogged and her two young daughters gang raped, for her protesting about disarmament and her inheritance) almost battered the Romans out of the island.

 

But why did she risk the lives of her entire 100-250,000 army of British warriors & families on just one open plain at what was basically a choosing of the Roman Governor Paulinus, when she could at least have simultaneously tried to outflank the 10,000 enemy through the flanking woods & trackways known only to them, whilst facing them also?

 

With her united Iceni/Trinovante army growing by the day into a vast sea of ferocious British warriors and families, she had attacked and wiped out Colchester (home of Roman army veterans)- massacring the marching and unsuspecting IX Hispana legion en route from Lincoln to save a hopelessly undefended London.

 

Paulinus, with two legions in Wales (having massacred the Anglesey druids) dashed ahead on horseback to London but could only leave the vast civilian city to it's fate. He ordered his two legions to strike camp and march the two weeks from N.Wales towards London, commanding the II legion at Exeter to meet him on the Fosse Way (which, under Posthumus inexplicably failed to do so, and suffered great shame afterwards). Maybe he feared ambush and massacre in the same way the IX Hispana had?

 

Turning her army northwards Boudicca hoped to catch Paulinus, wiping out St.Albans on the way.

Somewhere between the current A5 road and the Fosse Way, Paulinus's 10,000 Romans - hedged in between woods and on a hill to their front- waited for Boudicca's c.230,000 warriors, chariots and families advancing on the open plain.

 

To their war horns, the British charged in typically disorganised but fierce fashion- into the Roman missiles, and as the Roman steamroller drove forward stabbing and crushing warriors underfoot, British wives, children and babies were also butchered as Boudicca's broken men fled in terror, until Paulinus ordered a halt.

 

80-100,000 Britons lay dead and mutilated according to the Romans, possible over-exaggeration. But need it have been so? A Caractacus or a Vercingetorix would probably have devised some cunning scheme to rout the Romans, or at least launched a double-envelop manoeuvre?

[GhostOfClayton]

I've heard people who know about these sorts of things say it was likely that Boudicca wasn't the sole leader, but just another senior 'name' in a coordinated rebellion. In that context, the whole story makes a bit more sense. Tacitus was the primary source, and it's perfectly possible that he overegged Boudicca's role.

[Hus]

Thanks, Ghost, it does indeed!

 

If we take Boudica as sole leader, though, with overwhelming numbers and morale, she could easily have ordered flanking forces to at least try to harass the Romans at Mancetter(?) through the woodlands?

 

Thus Paulinus would have deployed his meagre force accordingly, diluting it's forward strength?

[Centurion-Macro]

Is it possible that the Romans propagandized the battle, and that we do not have all the facts?

 

I must say myself (as an admirer of the Celts) that it was a mistake to face the Romans in a pitched battle without a clear strategy. The Romans may have been outnumbered, but they were a tough fighting unit, and charging them was a typical Celtic maneuver that failed many a time. So if indeed the Britons did attack the Romans in a disorganized charge as the historians tell us, then, yes, the British were very naive in thinking they could destroy the Roman force.

[Melvadius]

Our only almost contemporary written source is Tacitus who mentioned the revolt twice but had his own political and familial agenda. Cassius Dio provides a more 'colourful' but much later account so is probably a much less reliable secondary source. On this basis we very definately do not have all of the 'facts'.

 

The situation is not helped by archaeological evidence for destruction of towns difficult to pin down to precise dates and some additional Roman towns such as Silchester, not mentioned by either ancient writer, showing similar evidence for destruction in the same period.

 

The lack of a known battle site is not uncommon for ancient battles but for many researchers is very frustrating as without the precise site and timescales for location destruction it is basically impossible to work out plausible sizes of forces involved and their possible advance or retreat routes with any real certainty. To play devils advocate one unknown issue with mutiple ramifications is if the British forces were united or advancing along multiple routes. The consequence of this knowledge is identifying if really was all decided by one major deciding battle or if the reality was a series of skirmishes against different groups and leaders.

 

If Tacitus is correct as to the number of men brought to Britain after the revolt from Germany then the Roman battle casulties at least, so far as the legions are concerend, seems to be about correct for a vexillation of the Ninth being destroyed rather than the entire legion.

[Hus]

Hi Centurion, I certainly believe that the Romans wrote their own version of a 'barbaric' revolt- one led by a woman -which was abhorrent to them.

 

We don't exactly have a neutral version of events, nor the full story. But then, every ruling regime does this?

[Hus]

It's the tactics that baffle me- a switch from effective military guerilla strategy of ambush, to a pitched battle.

 

It sounds straight forward, but why would Boudica simply face Paulinus without ordering a flanking attack via woodlands known to at least some of them? Even if just to harass and divert?

[Gaius Paulinus Maximus]

Personally I think it's just a case of believing their own hype and completely underestimating the Romans proffesionalism.Tthe Britons recent successes over the romans would of more than likely gone to their heads plus the fact of their by far superior numerical advantage. The Brits would have been supremely confident of destroying such an "inferior" force and would have seen no need to use flanking tactics etc, an all out frontal assault would have been sufficient enough to ensure a comprehensive victory, numbers would win the day............Oh how wrong they were!!

[Kosmo]

Both the number of rebels and the roman initial losses are unrealistically high by at least an order of magnitude.

I very much doubt that the rebels, without much military training or experience, could have outmaneuvered a campaigning roman army that was aware of them. Given the topography of the area guerrilla was not much of an option and it would have meant to allow romans to bring reinforcements.

[Hus]

without much military training or experience,

I dunno- the Brythonic Celts had always waged war with one another, and a warlike status footing would have kept them in fine trim, able to fight very capably, which some Roman mentions state that they could.

 

Given the topography of the area guerrilla was not much of an option and it would have meant to allow romans to bring reinforcements.

That last battle was pitched, and the Celts, I'm theorising above, could have sent skirmishers around the back of the Romans through the woods?

 

I very much doubt that the rebels could have outmaneuvered a campaigning roman army that was aware of them.

They were fantastic guerilla fighters - didn't Boudica's army ambush and rout the IXth from Lincoln? And later the Silures also another legion?

[DecimusCaesar]

Like GPM I believe that the Britons got overconfident after having defeated one legion in battle, as well as sacking so many Roman settlements. They also had a 'heroic' culture, and I can't help but think that like Pompey at Pharsalus, the Britons were egged on to facing the Romans in an open battle rather than letting the Roman army get destroyed through lack of supplies or guerilla tactics. I'm sure that the Britons must have considered it cowardly to not face the Romans in open combat.

[Melvadius]

I very much doubt that the rebels could have outmaneuvered a campaigning roman army that was aware of them.

They were fantastic guerilla fighters - didn't Boudica's army ambush and rout the IXth from Lincoln? And later the Silures also another legion?

 

As I indicated above due to references in Tacitus to the number of replacements needed to be sent from Germany after the revolt the overall Roman military losses have been put at most to around 2,000 men. Even if this was only the legionary losses then it would indicate that only a vexillation of the IXth (possibly as many as half of the legion's full strength at around 2000 men) was initially sent to quell the rebellion - only the legion cavalry (probably @120 men) escaped from the ensuing rout. Again from Tacitus it appears that it was this 'relatively' small unit which suffered the majority of Roman legionary casulties.

 

Annals Book XIV 32 & 38 (curtesy of Bill Thayers Lacus Cirtius site)

 

Para 32

 

Meanwhile, for no apparent reason, the statue of Victory at Camulodunum fell, with its back turned as if in retreat from the enemy. Women, converted into maniacs by excitement, cried that destruction was at hand and that alien cries had been heard in the invaders' senate-house: the theatre had rung with shrieks, and in the estuary of the Thames had been seen a vision of the ruined colony. Again, that the Ocean had appeared blood-red and that the ebbing tide had left behind it what looked to be human corpses, were indications read by the Britons with hope and by the veterans with corresponding alarm. However, as Suetonius was far away, they applied for help to the procurator Catus Decianus. He sent not more than two hundred men, without their proper weapons: in addition, there was a small body of troops in the town. Relying on the protection of the temple, and hampered also by covert adherents of the rebellion who interfered with their plans, they neither secured their position by fosse or rampart nor took steps, by removing the women and the aged, to leave only able-bodied men in the place. They were as carelessly guarded as if the world was at peace, when they were enveloped by a great barbarian host. All else was pillaged or fired in the first onrush: only the temple, in which the troops had massed themselves, stood a two days' siege, and was then carried by storm. Turning to meet Petilius Cerialis, commander of the ninth legion, who was arriving to the rescue, the victorious Britons routed the legion and slaughtered the infantry to a man: Cerialis with the cavalry escaped to the camp, and found shelter behind its fortifications. Unnerved by the disaster and the hatred of the province which his rapacity had goaded into war, the procurator Catus crossed to Gaul.

 

Para 38

 

The whole army was now concentrated and kept under canvas, with a view to finishing what was left of the campaign. Its strength was increased by the Caesar, who sent over from Germany two thousand legionaries, eight cohorts of auxiliaries, and a thousand cavalry. Their advent allowed the gaps in the ninth legion to be filled with regular troops; the allied foot and horse were stationed in new winter quarters; and the tribes which had shown themselves dubious or disaffected were harried with fire and sword.

[Maty]

Returning to the original point of why a flanking movement through the woods was not attempted, I'd say the easy answer is that is was not possible.

 

Apart from the fact that the ground was broken in any case (access to the battlefield was through 'a defile'), those accustomed to managed British woodlands might find it difficult to get to grips with the sheer impenetrability of primaeval forest. In mixed deciduous forest, the amount of undergrowth, fallen logs and brambles makes it a machete job for a small party to move slowly forward. It would take weeks to move even a couple of thousand men across such terrain, even following meandering deer pathways etc.

 

Those who emerged would not be in any sort of order, making them easy pickings for any reception committee, and as it is impossible to move silently through such terrain, there would indeed be a reception committee.

 

I remember a few years back, a British army unit in the tropics on exercises wandered into a valley and could not get out. They were only a dozen or so men, yet they nearly starved to death. Thick forest and broken terrain will block an army even more effectively than a moat.

[Hus]

Thanks Melvadius and Maty, that all sounds feasible.

[Guest ParatrooperLirelou]

It appears that there are many misconceptions of Boudica.From what I learned recently, her name may not even have been Boudica(which was simply a title for "Bringer of Victory", not necessarily her name.

 

For anyone interested, here is an article I found online.

http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/theromans/Exploding-the-Boudica-myth.2398809.jp