Roman battle tactics after Constantine's reform

[caldrail]

It needs to be borne in mind that battle tactics in the late empire were exactly what the Romans had become unused to. Whereas in the past the Romans tended to deal with a situation from one direction massed into a large force, by the late empire they were dealing primarily with a very long turbulent frontier, a security situation they had to adapt to. Their answer was to have more but smaller legions, and a two tier system of frontier guards and 'response' legions. They no longer fought set piece battles as a rule, but conducted low level warfare.

 

The situation in Afghanistan is an analogy if a somewhat poor one, but you get the idea?

 

Unfortunately the centurionate was no longer what it was. Partly by design, partly through the losses incurred in civil war, and noticeably the morale and discipline of late empire troops was sadly lacking - not something conducive tio performance on the battlefield.

 

The duplex acies may have been the most popular or the standard formation rather than the only one available. Roman commanders were rarely credited with much imagination and always, even from the earliest times, preferred brute force over clever plans - though that might also have a practical reason since the best laid plans... battlefield command was never easy.

 

Quality - a good question. Zosimus, Vegetius, and to a lesser extent Marcellinus indicate the majority of troops were very lacklustre indeed. Valens had to make a series of speeches just to get his men to march on campaign. However - and I say this advisedly - Sebastianus chose new recruits as the core of his elite advance guard. Men described as still keen to get fighting unlike the experienced soldiers that Zosimus sneers at for being effeminate - and his choice proved a good one, because before the battle of Adrianople his raiding tactics were having a very powerful effect on gothic movements. Zosimus tells us that "Heads were being returned to Constantinople every day".

 

In short, the capacity of the Romans to be excellent soldiers was still present, but that generally poor leadership and a persistent morale problem prevented Roman armies of the period from performing at what should have been their peak.

[barca]

In short, the capacity of the Romans to be excellent soldiers was still present, but that generally poor leadership and a persistent morale problem prevented Roman armies of the period from performing at what should have been their peak.

 

How would an individual like Julius Caesar perform? In his day he was able to take raw recruits and quickly transform them into an effective fighting force. Was it still possible in the 4th century?

 

When Theodosius used new recruits, many of them turned out to be unreliable.

[caldrail]

Actually no, he didn't. Caesar realised the importance of his centurions who were responsible for standards of training and such. He knew them all by name, which is an interesting insight into Roman senior command of his day. As it happens, whilst Caesar was a charismatic man and a gifted battlefield commander, his campaigning has been described as "careless".

 

But yes, it was still possible in the 4th century as Sebastianus proved. As for Theodosius and the poor quality of his recruits, this was an ongoing problem in the late empire. They were taking people where-ever they could find them because the public were much less interested in serving in the legions than they had in earlier times and people who would not have passed muster in those days were now signed on.

[barca]

Actually no, he didn't.

 

I was actually thinking about the action he took in 74 BC when he was a student at Rhodes. A group of Mithridates' troops attacked Roman allies. He set aside his studies and hastily raised troops from local communities and swiftly defeated the invaders, even though he didn't have the authority to do so,

[caldrail]

Fair enough. But I doubt the training these auxillaries received was extensive. Raising troops to repel an invasion does indicate a matter of urgency. Unfortunately I don't have any detailed commentary on that incident but I will look further.

 

---===---

 

Okeedokee. At the age of 26 Caesar decides to raise a local army to help fight Mithradates. It says a great deal about the character of the man and his ability to organise, but be careful, because it also tells us something about the character of the people he was raising an army from. After all, we don't read of any difficulties though I have to accept that may be a measure of bias in the story.

 

Had Caesar made the same initiative in the late empire he would have encountered the same difficulties as other leaders of the period. The quality of veterans and recruits would have been the same. Since the empire of that day was a different animal to late Republican Rome of Caesars time we have to make a lot of assumptions in this hypothetical situation.

 

Personally, I have no doubt Caesar could have done something like that but realise he was almost certainly utilising local help in doing so. There was far less willingness to assist a military venture in the late empire, and as we know from the circumstances surrounding the gothic wars of the 4th century, Caesar would have found himself struggling with petty politics as well.

Edited July 10, 2010 by caldrail

[auxilia]

The situation in Afghanistan is an analogy if a somewhat poor one, but you get the idea?

Actually it's a very good comparison! I've recently watched an excellent documentary called "La guerra infinita" (infinite war) and the situation seem to be very similar to the late empire frontiers.

 

Quality - a good question. Zosimus, Vegetius, and to a lesser extent Marcellinus indicate the majority of troops were very lacklustre indeed. Valens had to make a series of speeches just to get his men to march on campaign. However - and I say this advisedly - Sebastianus chose new recruits as the core of his elite advance guard. Men described as still keen to get fighting unlike the experienced soldiers that Zosimus sneers at for being effeminate - and his choice proved a good one, because before the battle of Adrianople his raiding tactics were having a very powerful effect on gothic movements. Zosimus tells us that "Heads were being returned to Constantinople every day".

This is mostly true but don't go too far in elevating Sebastianus. Correct me if I'm wrong but I think there was a skirmish near the city of Dubaltium where Sebastianus lost many men and barely survived himself.

 

When Theodosius used new recruits, many of them turned out to be unreliable.

Excellent note! This is what struck me the most when reading about 4th c. Roman empire. Not only they lost to the Goths but they also proved unable to defeat them afterward. The Romans had been defeated before but eventually they would have crushed the enemy. In the 3rd c. all borders were penetrated and they suffered many defeats and yet they reasserted full control. Now, however, they failed to do so.

Can we hear a bit more about Theodosius' campaign? I think he drew some troops from Africa, they chased the Goths all over the Balkans but on every contact the Goths gained the upper hand. Indeed, did Theodosius ever defeat any Gothic band? Did he win a single victory? His campaign in military terms, although very energetic, seems as a complete failure.

 

Regards

[caldrail]

This is mostly true but don't go too far in elevating Sebastianus. Correct me if I'm wrong but I think there was a skirmish near the city of Dubaltium where Sebastianus lost many men and barely survived himself.

He also failed utterly to survive Adrianople if I remember right, and it was Sebastianus who was pressing Valens to fight that engagement ahead of the arrival of Gratians reinforcements. Right from the start, Sebastianus was motivated primarily toward his career. So much so that Valens was getting a little fed up of him despite the succeses he achieved, and Seb knew it, thus he gambled on the basis of flawed intelligence that the battle could be won without Gratian.

 

Bear in mind, it's our Roman sources that praise his efforts in that campaign. Even the scathing Zosimus doesn't criticise him overly. Sebastianus had been chosen by Valens to lead his armies because he'd gained a reputation as a capable commander, though you have to concede he did so because of the lacklustre performance of his existing senior officers, a state of affairs that was confirmed by the events leading to the defeat at Adrianople.

 

PS - Quick check - There are mentions of a Sebastianus dying in 413. He'd been captured by Visigoths and his head was returned to Honorius. But I don't think this was the same guy. Marcellinus tells us our capable general died at Adrianople.

Edited July 24, 2010 by caldrail

[auxilia]

PS - Quick check - There are mentions of a Sebastianus dying in 413. He'd been captured by Visigoths and his head was returned to Honorius. But I don't think this was the same guy. Marcellinus tells us our capable general died at Adrianople.

Yup, I don't think it's the same Sebastianus neither. How capable general he was is best illustrated by his death Just kidding, couldn't resist.

As for the post-Adrianople situation? How did the Romans perform then? If there's already another thread about that, please tell me.

[barca]

 

 

The impression about the Roman advance being like a phalanx isn't even close to correct.

 

Why not? It seems quite probable....If the army was presumably in the shield-wall formation then it's movement and appearance alike really looked like the phalanx.

And we know the shield-wall was regularly used (Julian also used it at Strasbourg).

 

 

 

Here's an artist's rendition of the late Roman army at Adrianople. Isn't it somewhat like a phalanx?

http://lh6.ggpht.com/_8WIjkzT4POU/S-rx18NkeMI/AAAAAAAAAr0/fNTbV4mUDGw/Infanter%C3%ADa%20romana%20tard%C3%ADa%20siglos%20IV-V.jpg

[caldrail]

The impression about the Roman advance being like a phalanx isn't even close to correct.

Why not? It seems quite probable....If the army was presumably in the shield-wall formation then it's movement and appearance alike really looked like the phalanx.

And we know the shield-wall was regularly used (Julian also used it at Strasbourg).

 

Shield walls are defensive formations. The late roman units made large scale use of spears,not long pikes, and it wasn't possible for them to arrange their men with overlapping ranks of polearms as a phalanx might. Further, the Romans at Adrianople did not advance in an ordered attack. They were defensive from the start, suprised by the sudden appearance of gothic horsemen, startled to discover the number of adversaries was much larger than expected, and the Roman line collapsed quite quickly, becoming disordered and merging into a large mass of men hemmed in by the Goths.

 

A phalanx-like advance is not probable at all.

Edited September 28, 2010 by caldrail

[Gaiseric]

All right then.......let's have a word on this.

Elite crack troops. Yes, that's exactly what I meant. And I still do.

 

Elite crack troops? That's a modern phrase, and not entirely correct when dealing with the legions since the whole point of a legion was that they were all intended to have the same capability. If you accept some legions were elite, then what set them apart? Why were they 'elite'? Why did the Romans not describe units as elite (other than the usual pride in arms)?

I don't really see which part you don't get it.......I mean ''If you accept some legions were elite, then what set them apart? Why were they 'elite'?''????????

Isn't it obvious? Ever heard of terms like Limitanei, Pseudocomitatense, Comitatenses, Palatine? What set them apart?????? Oh, come on man are you serious?

Billion of things set them apart.........Quality (and quantity!) of weapons, armour. Then a level of logistical support. Then their salaries. Their status and privileges. Their training-should I mention that many of those limitanei soldiers were known for having additional duties (which they usually performed with greater will and look upon them as even more important to their military duty) besides military one. Some of them were definitely better farmers than soldiers. There were such ''soldiers'' who only appeared in their posts during ceremonial duties (''raising of flag'' sort of thing) while the rest of their time worked something else.

 

Do you really think they can be compared to the Cornuti, Brachiatii, Petulantes, Iovianii, Herculianii or Scholae?

It's more than obvious what the ELITE CRACK TROOPS means. Also, for your convenience, many units (if not all) that fought at Adrianople had fought on the east before and were by all standards regarded as the veterans.

 

Quite why the author of the osprey guide believes the army at Adrianople was elite is beyond me, unless he's been swayed by Marcellinus's description of the second phase of the battle in which they resisted strongly (which of course they had little choice but to, if they were to survive, and notice the Romans, for all their stubbornness, did not break out until nightfall made it possible under cover of darkness.

Maybe you should check the book. He gives a detailed breakdown of both Roman and Gothic forces (especially consulting the Notitia Dignitatum). You would be surprised how deep and objective his assessments are.

 

There is a tendency to believe the Romans were expert soldiers, regimented, disciplined, unbeatable, and so on. We see this on these forums all the time, but the truth is that the Roman legions were beatable and at Adrianople they were defeated soundly however well they defended themselves after they were herded into a trapped mass. Partly this also explains the desire to describe the Goths as fantastic warriors, which they clearly weren't, having been whittled down by Sebianus's attacks to the point of staying together in large numbers for fear of Roman ambush, and in a somewhat desperate state.

Yeah, it turned out as ''soundly'' defeated (since 1/3 of the force survived, I wouldn't really say ''soundly''), however, you certainly know it was due to terrible blunder during reconnaissance phase and greatly over-eager behavior.

I completely agree with your view on the Goths. I'd just say that the success of those Sebastian's operations is perhaps exaggerated since Ammianus only mentions one ''major'' action on the Maritsa river.

 

In fact, the Roman troops are described as indifferent and ill-motivated, and noticeably Sebastianus doesn't bother with most of them, preferring to use the less experienced troops who were less used to sitting on their backsides in activities "better suited to women".

This sounds as an exaggeration as well. The limitanei troops certainly can be described like that (though not all of them!) but I doubt that the palatine-class soldiers, scholae or domestici et protectores can be described as ''indifferent and ill-motivated''.

 

No, I don't accept the Romans at Adrianople were 'elite'. They just weren't.

Well, I'm not saying they were elite like the US Army's 75th Rangers or the British 22nd SAS but they WERE elite for the Roman army. Simply put, many troops that fought on that faithful day on the Roman side, were among the best that Rome had. Otherwise, the Romans surely wouldn't have regarded this defeat as such a disaster if they had known there were some better troops just around the corner.

But, there were no better troops around the corner. That was the problem and that's why this defeat was seen as the utter disaster. Rome lost some of the best and most experienced troops that day, that's all it is.

Listen to this for comparison: THE LARGEST SINGLE DEFEAT ANY-I REPEAT-ANY ROMAN ARMY EVER SUFFERED WAS AT ARAUSIO AGAINST THE CIMBRI AND TEUTONES BACK IN 105 BC! UP TO 120,000 dead! After it, the very heart of the state was in danger and Italy faced an imminent invasion. Eventually G. Marius saved the situation. But guess what-HARDLY ANYONE EVER HEARD OF THIS BATTLE! The causalities were far greater than at Cannae or Teutonburg or Adrianople.

The difference is that Romans were able to come up with an even stronger force after Arausion, however, after Adrianople-they weren't.

 

Hope this clarifies.

 

 

But, please, I'd like your expertise on something else (this isn't ''Adrianople" thread after all).

What evidence we have concerning the PRIMARY infantry close combat weapon?

A thrusting spear or a sword? Which was more common? And in which units-legions or auxilia?

Is it possible that auxilia palatine used the spears since they appear to form up the front lines (and perhaps deploy in the shield-wall?)?

 

Regards

 

Tactically, the heart of the state was in danger after the disaster at Arausio. But realistically as an immediate invasion...no. The Germans always turned away when they faced opposition, which is why they never settled in Spain or in Gallic territory where the Romans wouldn't have probably cared about them. After such a great victory, why did they turn around?.

[caldrail]

Germanic tribes were raiders by cultural preference - they always had been, a very typical situation for aggressive european cultures, and we have accounts from Julius Caesar of Germans arriving two to a horse (suggesting a speedy attack) and dropping the passenger off to fight on foot. They set a larger number of gauls to flight by throwing stones.

 

By the late empire the Germans had become more organised. Technically the phrase 'German' is a Roman invention, because it means an amalgam of tribes the Romans considered 'genuine celts'. This is of course a ntaural development. Having encountered Roman organisation for themselves, and with some tribesmen having Roman military experience, there would be a tendency for that diluted experience to make itself felt. Also, the increasing cooperation of tribes (leading toward thwe "Barbarian Conspiracy") illustrates a change in balance.

 

We can see the increasing division and apathy of Rome against a rising sense of germanic identity inspired by Roman attitudes, and a sense of weariness in constantly meddling in germanic affairs to set one tribe against another as the Romans did in the past, on the principle 'divide and rule'. Hadrian after all set a trend by setting Rome apart from the barbarian lands beyond - his focus was internal, to create a Rome fit for arts and whatever else he thought was desirable Roman culture, without the intrusion of foreign influences.

 

It is also true that the later germanic raids were inspired not for some desire to destroy Rome as rampaging barbarians, but to snatch their slice of the action, or in other words, greed. To the germanic tribes, Rome was still a wealthy place full of transportable luxury goods. I'm not sure if financial inflation caused this increase in desire (as the germans might have struggled to pay the prices asked for, and we know from later sources how rapacious the merchants of the day could be) but certainly there was a change from 'Keep the Romans out' attitude to one of 'Raid the Roman wallet'.

[Gaiseric]

Germanic tribes were raiders by cultural preference - they always had been, a very typical situation for aggressive european cultures, and we have accounts from Julius Caesar of Germans arriving two to a horse (suggesting a speedy attack) and dropping the passenger off to fight on foot. They set a larger number of gauls to flight by throwing stones.

 

By the late empire the Germans had become more organised. Technically the phrase 'German' is a Roman invention, because it means an amalgam of tribes the Romans considered 'genuine celts'. This is of course a ntaural development. Having encountered Roman organisation for themselves, and with some tribesmen having Roman military experience, there would be a tendency for that diluted experience to make itself felt. Also, the increasing cooperation of tribes (leading toward thwe "Barbarian Conspiracy") illustrates a change in balance.

 

We can see the increasing division and apathy of Rome against a rising sense of germanic identity inspired by Roman attitudes, and a sense of weariness in constantly meddling in germanic affairs to set one tribe against another as the Romans did in the past, on the principle 'divide and rule'. Hadrian after all set a trend by setting Rome apart from the barbarian lands beyond - his focus was internal, to create a Rome fit for arts and whatever else he thought was desirable Roman culture, without the intrusion of foreign influences.

 

It is also true that the later germanic raids were inspired not for some desire to destroy Rome as rampaging barbarians, but to snatch their slice of the action, or in other words, greed. To the germanic tribes, Rome was still a wealthy place full of transportable luxury goods. I'm not sure if financial inflation caused this increase in desire (as the germans might have struggled to pay the prices asked for, and we know from later sources how rapacious the merchants of the day could be) but certainly there was a change from 'Keep the Romans out' attitude to one of 'Raid the Roman wallet'.

 

It is true that Germanic tribes gained a certain aspect of cohesion in the later empire. This seems to have affected the size of the raids, so that by the time of Julian what might have seemed like an army (30,000 Alamanni, for instance) was still just a raiding group. But the interesting thing is the emergence of 'overkings'. Rather than just being groups that set out from a muster under the auspices of a nobleman, there seems to have been a greater change towards a singular ruler in charge, so that by the time of the Germanic migrations being in full swing we see the rise of men such as Fritigern, Gunderic, Gaiseric, Clovis and Theodoric. One of the excerpts from Dexippus is interesting, in which he notes a Vandal invasion defeated by Aurelian, and notes their command structure as including kings and leaders (archons). Up until sometime in the period between the two wars there seems to have been a change from the dual kingship of tribes that was based upon foundation myths into a unifying under a single king/warleader.

 

Just a few thoughts.

 

Vale,

 

Craig

[caldrail]

The phrase 'overking' is our label rather than an actual rank. Fritigern wouldn't qualify for it anyway, because he wasn't the most senior goth at the time. Athanaric was his rival and the two squabbled - though I do accept that might be a dramatic inclusion to the history since not all Roman sources of the time refer to such a struggle, such that Fritigern had to ask for Roman aid. Athanaric on the other hand was the first foreign king to visit Constantinople, in it's new guise as Roman capital in the east, and concluded a peace agreement that lasted until 395.

 

The Goths were migrants, and in any case, Jordane's Res Getica, a summary of the now lost history of the Goths written by Cassiodorus, describes the goths as having kings for some time. The problem is that we understand the emergence of kings in terms of Roman interpretation. To them, kingship was a barbaric or tyrannical foprm of government by a strong ruler, and they used the term somewhat more loosely than we do. It might be worth pointing out then that leaders we refer to as 'kings' were usually no more than tribal chiefs by any other name, and such important personalities often do indulge in creating pecking orders among themselves.

Edited November 1, 2010 by caldrail

[Late Emperor]

It needs to be borne in mind that battle tactics in the late empire were exactly what the Romans had become unused to. Whereas in the past the Romans tended to deal with a situation from one direction massed into a large force, by the late empire they were dealing primarily with a very long turbulent frontier, a security situation they had to adapt to. Their answer was to have more but smaller legions, and a two tier system of frontier guards and 'response' legions. They no longer fought set piece battles as a rule, but conducted low level warfare.

 

There's something I don't understand: the romans became unused to large battles and fighting with large armies along the border marked by the rhine/danube rivers but along the border with the parthian empire, the situation was very different: the parthians weren't uncivilized raiders like the IVth century germanics but an organized and civilized state deploying large armies on the battlefied. The romans had still to mantain and use large old style armies along the middle-eastern border, otherwise the parthians would have wiped out the empire: so how is possible that they lost the expertise to manouver large armies and fight large battles?

Edited November 8, 2010 by Late Emperor