Roman battle tactics after Constantine's reform

[auxilia]

I got the impression that the elite status you mention when extra latin titles are added to a Roman military unit automatically infer status. This isn't a dig at you, but please be aware that's it you awarding that status, not the Romans themselves.

I understand what you mean, but we can certainly agree that those titles, like the palatine, did mean something better than those poor G.I.s who served along the border. Even though they showed the multitude of shortcomings they still represented better part of what was available at the time. Indeed, the term of elite may not be the most accurate one, but regardless, I'm sure you know what I think of.

 

I do accept that cavalry tend to be regarded as elite (I do mean the independent formations, not cavalry attached to a legion as a scouting element - if such was still the practice in later times. Anyone know?)

As far as I know every field army had some kind of the scouting cavalry (it would have been very stupid if they didn't). Whether they were a kind of permanently attached formation of an ad hoc unit it's hard to tell. Most likely any conventional cavalry could have been used for this purpose, like equites promotii, equites scutarii, etc.

[caldrail]

Something better? Here's the problem. The Romans were extremely sensitive to social status. To imply one legion (or any other Roman unit type) was more elite than another was actually insulting to the others. Now, some units had titles attached - you mention palatinate in particular. This partly recognises the role the unit plays but also acts as an honourific. Does that make the unit elite? No, because the honour can be removed just as quickly. Whereas a modern regiment can be viewed as elite and has a fixed standard for recruits to attain (even if they fail to), in the Roman legions the standard required is set by the commander of the day and varies accordingly.

 

Although the legions were an organised body of men with certain qualities expected, they were not the professionally minded soldiers of the modern era and the Romans clearly didn't want them to be. They actually wanted these men to be hard as nails, willing to kill on demand, and if that meant tolerating a lot of macho and bad behaviour, so be it. Unfortunately the soldiers themselves were no less lazy and indifferent thean any other time and place, and we see this mentioned by Roman writers right from Republican times.

 

To pretend to enumerate the different nations so formidable of old, all which now are subject to the Romans, would be tedious. But the security established by long peace has altered their dispositions, drawn them off from military to civil pursuits and infused into them a love of idleness and ease. Hence a relaxation of military discipline insensibly ensued, then a neglect of it, and it sunk at last into entire oblivion. Now will it appear surprising that this alteration should have happened in latter times...

De Re Militaris (Vegetius

 

In other words, not only were Roman troops lazy by nature (as soldiers often are if not kept busy) but that their officers were worse. The worst failing of the Roman legions was that their commanders were not career officers (which was why the centurionate was so vital to maintain standards and why standards fell after the civil wars of the early 4th century, which disrupted the continuity of the centurionate) thus many were only doing enough to keep up appearances and preferred to enjoy their extra-curricular activities instead, at least when not campaigning. They were therefore not always quite as focused on discipline and training as the myth would have us believe, and indeed, the early performance of Roman legions in campaigns was usually pretty poor (after which some officers were replaced by one means or another)

 

The problem for the late empire officer is that he isn't well regarded anymore. Whereas his counterpart in earlier times was well-respected by virtue of his military service (essential for political success in Republican times), by the late empire military service was looked on as a dreadful chore. Local magistrates were bribed not to recruit locally, which meant they used the money instead to hire press gangs to enlist 'volunteers', which could hardly have improved the legions image at all.

 

How does a unit call itself 'elite' in a regime where such opinions would induce derision, scorn, or possibly even punishments for getting above themselves? In a regime where the general public view them as armed thugs? In a regime where the officers are promoted to command by virtue of their place in society rather than a respected career? Would an elite legion demand to be paid before it fought? Would it require lengthy speeches to consider beginning a campaign?

 

Noticeably, Vegetius refers to the troops of his time as lacking in strength and substance, a damning endictment from a man who wrote a manual to raise standards back to the levels referenced in former times. Certainly the elite status from the public eye wasn't evident. Roman soldiers were not entirely popular with civilians in their heyday, so much less praise would have been forthcoming in times when troops were billeted in private homes as a matter of course (and not at military expense either more often than not)

 

In considering whether troops were elite amongst each other - it was accepted that certain elements were (ie - the first cohort, or the horsemen) but be aware that the legion wasn't just a military unit, it was a familia to the Romans. A sort of extended family, with loyalty formed from the bonds between 'close friends' and the networks of bribery that got people promoted or out of menial duties. The legion was it's own little world and in many respects every legion viewed itself as elite in it's own eyes.

 

The honour system of the Roman military replaces our own modern elitism. Whereas we have units with fixed reputations to which all entrants must rise, the Romans had a system of honour where a legions reputation was only as good as its last battle. What we might assign elite status to might only be a description of function in the more specialised late empire world. Let's be very clear about this. Whilst the Romans had developed vague and mutable versions of national armies by this later period, if any unit started calling itself 'elite' then the Roman command of the day would certainly insist on that unit proving they were worthy of such high status, especially since the troops were largely foreigners by that time and certainly not of noble blood.

[auxilia]

In other words, not only were Roman troops lazy by nature (as soldiers often are if not kept busy) but that their officers were worse. The worst failing of the Roman legions was that their commanders were not career officers (which was why the centurionate was so vital to maintain standards and why standards fell after the civil wars of the early 4th century, which disrupted the continuity of the centurionate) thus many were only doing enough to keep up appearances and preferred to enjoy their extra-curricular activities instead, at least when not campaigning. They were therefore not always quite as focused on discipline and training as the myth would have us believe, and indeed, the early performance of Roman legions in campaigns was usually pretty poor (after which some officers were replaced by one means or another)

I agree with your view on this, especially regarding the centurionate issue. And indeed, those extra-curricular activities are well attested.

 

 

The problem for the late empire officer is that he isn't well regarded anymore. Whereas his counterpart in earlier times was well-respected by virtue of his military service (essential for political success in Republican times), by the late empire military service was looked on as a dreadful chore. Local magistrates were bribed not to recruit locally, which meant they used the money instead to hire press gangs to enlist 'volunteers', which could hardly have improved the legions image at all.

This is more or less true, however, keep in mind there were periods during the Republic when the military service had been regarded as a dreadful chore as well. After the second punic war in particular, the recruits were also attested as having mutilated themselves in order to avoid the military service. So, this isn't something exclusively bad for the late empire.

 

In a regime where the general public view them as armed thugs?

This is a little bit too harsh, don't you think so.

 

Would an elite legion demand to be paid before it fought? Would it require lengthy speeches to consider beginning a campaign?

Well, this had always been a problem. Even Caesar had to hold lengthy speeches to encourage his troops to fight Ariovistus, then there were many problems during the invasion of Britain, etc.

 

Noticeably, Vegetius refers to the troops of his time as lacking in strength and substance, a damning endictment from a man who wrote a manual to raise standards back to the levels referenced in former times.

No! Forget about Vegetius, I've already spoke about him. Yes, I agree that discipline dropped in the course of the 4th century onwards but this man wrote a completely Principate-nostalgic sort of manual . And it isn't manual at all. All we know about him is that he was a writer, an educated man-NOT AN OFFICER OR EVEN A SOLDIER! He perhaps never saw any major field army, perhaps he only wrote considering some totally poor city's garrison troops. Furthermore, he perhaps lived and wrote his work sometime in the 5th century when all hell broke loose. Especially in the west. Do not take Vegetius for granted, that's my advice to you.

 

We shouldn't doubt that the late army was the effective force. If you don't believe me then take a look at this:

Constantius the Great-defeated Goths and launched a pre-emptive strike on their territory forcing them to sue for peace.

Constantius II-severely defeated the Goths, Quadi and Sarmatians in many campaigns on the Danube.

Julian the Apostate- destroyed Alamanni and completely defeated the Franks in many campaigns on the Rhine.

Valentinian-also fought successfully on the Rhine.

Valens-defeated the Goths and launched a pre-emptive strike on their territory forcing them to sue for peace (from 369-371).

Gratian-utterly destroyed the Alammani in some campaigns.

 

There are more examples.

 

 

...since the troops were largely foreigners by that time and certainly not of noble blood.

Do you base this claim on Gibbon's work, it seems to me you do. His work is totally outdated and his "barbarisation" theory is well rejected by modern scholars.

No one seriously thinks anymore that the 4th century army was composed largely of foreigners.

Edited February 16, 2010 by auxilia

[caldrail]

So Theodosius didn't enlist 40,000 Germans/Goths to secure his borders after Adrianople?

 

In a regime where the general public view them as armed thugs?

This is a little bit too harsh, don't you think so.

I wouldn't have written it if I didn't think so. Times had changed since the glory days of the legions. The general public had a love-hate relationship with them even bacjk then, depending on whether the legionaries next door had 'requisitioned' stuff from them, legal or not, and as many bruised citizens discovered, complaining to the legion commander wasn't as clear-cut a judicial procedure as they would have liked. Later the increase in germanic peoples enlisted without Roman training and billeted in private homes can't have done anything to improve the military image.

 

As for Vegetius, no, I won't forget him. He did write a manual, as any read of it will show, but I agree it wasn't intended as a detailed document, rather a template of what legionary practice should be. If it wasn't considered necessary, why did he write it? Vegetius may not have been a soldier but at least he looked on from the sidelines and decided to do something about the shabby performance of his day. One might argue he too was dreaming the dream of Roman invincibility, but can you really blame him?

 

He is after all one of the sources for his period. If you ignore the Roman writers completely all you get is fantasy. Now I do understand that some people enjoy the myths about the Roman legions - it's an enduring image that's been in place for two or three thousand years and appeals to some corner of the human psyche - but the study of history is based on their evidence surely?

 

Well, this had always been a problem. Even Caesar had to hold lengthy speeches to encourage his troops to fight Ariovistus, then there were many problems during the invasion of Britain, etc.

Agreed. However, Caesar was leading superstitious soldiers across open seas to a mysterious island on an amphibious offensive, whereas the later campaign (mentioning no names ) was a defensive action against Gothic rebels running riot in their own back yard.

 

This is more or less true, however, keep in mind there were periods during the Republic when the military service had been regarded as a dreadful chore as well. After the second punic war in particular, the recruits were also attested as having mutilated themselves in order to avoid the military service. So, this isn't something exclusively bad for the late empire.

You'll always find those avoiding military service, and serving legionaries were only too keen to find sinecures and safe havens (well, perhaps they had good reason. For all its romantic associations, life at the sharp end of Roman military service might easily have a big drawback).

 

Tiberius was sent by Augustus to check on people hiding in rural slave barracks to avoid theirs for instance. It isn't that this went on, but the scale of this behaviour and the attitudes involved in it. Republican armies were composed of volunteer levies. Late imperial armies by conscripts and press ganged 'volunteers' more often than not.

 

However, this unwillingness to get involved was mostly a post-Marian situation when soldiers, despite a career to look forward to, were making the best of a twenty-five year liability. Prior to that the Romans used a militia rather than a professional standing army, relying on citizens volunteering to do their bit for the cause. That identifies a martial spirit dominating Roman culture. By the late empire, people were doing everything possible to avoid it.

[auxilia]

So Theodosius didn't enlist 40,000 Germans/Goths to secure his borders after Adrianople?

You know very well that he did

All I wanted to say that largely is the wrong term. Even in the auxilia palatine units there was hardly more than 40% of foreigners.

 

If it wasn't considered necessary, why did he write it? Vegetius may not have been a soldier but at least he looked on from the sidelines and decided to do something about the shabby performance of his day. One might argue he too was dreaming the dream of Roman invincibility, but can you really blame him?

This is a problem. Who says it was necessary? You? "shabby performance of his day"? Read my previous post again, I took some examples of a thoroughly successful campaigns. During the entire 4th century the Roman army was by all means successful against all enemies. No border was lost. No territory was lost. It's as simple as that. Indeed, they suffered against the persians and Adrianople was a bitter defeat. But how we define what is a successful army, that seems to be a problem? I have impression that people sometimes expected the Roman army to do incredible things. Can we say that just because they didn't conquer the whole world it implies automatically they were ineffective????? They preserved the vast territory amid serious pressure on all sides, despite occasional defeats. What more did you expect them to do? To land on the Moon perhaps....

 

 

He is after all one of the sources for his period. If you ignore the Roman writers completely all you get is fantasy.

Of course, you're right. It's just that so many variables surround his work that we cannot rely on him completely.

 

Agreed. However, Caesar was leading superstitious soldiers across open seas to a mysterious island on an amphibious offensive, whereas the later campaign (mentioning no names ) was a defensive action against Gothic rebels running riot in their own back yard.

Yes, I give you the credit for this. Good point.

Edited February 17, 2010 by auxilia

[Northern Neil]

All I wanted to say that largely is the wrong term. Even in the auxilia palatine units there was hardly more than 40% of foreigners.

Indeed, Ammianus refers to Legions comprised of Gauls and Pannonians, all of whom would have been considered citizens of Romania.Moreover, his description of their conduct in Julian's Persian campaign would seem to suggest that they were high -morale units. One Gaulish legion had to be ordered to the rear after they sustained a lot of casualties from constantly wanting to be in the thick of the fighting. They grudgingly complied. This account seems to run contrary to the view that late empire soldiers viewed military service as an onerous and undesireable task.

[caldrail]

It isn't military service that was onerous, it was actually doing something for the money that wasn't popular. That was always a Roman problem. As I mentioned, the younger recruits were mentioned by Marcellinus as being keener.

 

I have impression that people sometimes expected the Roman army to do incredible things.

That's the entire problem. They still do. The mystique of the Roman legion is still with us. Partly this stems from the capability of the soldiers back then, who for all their faults (and they were very faulty!) were sometimes extremely impressive for their day. Perhaps it would be more accurate to emphasise the ruthless and stubbornness of Roman legions. No matter what you do, they just seem to keep on coming. That creates an image we rather like, on the basis that they appear strong and that we'd like to stand with them (like hangers-on around a playground bully).

 

The second problem is that the Roman obsession with organisation identifies with our modern age rather too much, and as Adrian Goldsworthy points out, we shouldn't foist modern values upon them. Our skill at pattern recognition sometimes draws parallels with the Romans that really weren't there, and as you no doubt know by now I'm a firm believer in drawing the distinctions between us and them, because I believe these distinctions exist. They really didn't quite do things the same way as we do. People, just like us, but playing the same games to different rules.

[auxilia]

That's the entire problem. They still do. The mystique of the Roman legion is still with us. Partly this stems from the capability of the soldiers back then, who for all their faults (and they were very faulty!) were sometimes extremely impressive for their day. Perhaps it would be more accurate to emphasise the ruthless and stubbornness of Roman legions. No matter what you do, they just seem to keep on coming. That creates an image we rather like, on the basis that they appear strong and that we'd like to stand with them (like hangers-on around a playground bully).

Good summary

[Northern Neil]

Just another tangential insertion to this discussion; one particular innovation at this period being the use of PLUMBATAE instead of the Pilum. Obviously the concept of disabling the enemy with some sort of missile prior to engagement was still a standard Roman military technique, but instead of two heavy Pila, the late period legionary had five of these lead weighted darts held in a sort of rack inside the shield. To me this is a very practical refinement - almost modern in concept, and shows to me that the Roman army was still 'going somewhere' as late as the 350's.

[auxilia]

Just another tangential insertion to this discussion; one particular innovation at this period being the use of PLUMBATAE instead of the Pilum. Obviously the concept of disabling the enemy with some sort of missile prior to engagement was still a standard Roman military technique, but instead of two heavy Pila, the late period legionary had five of these lead weighted darts held in a sort of rack inside the shield. To me this is a very practical refinement - almost modern in concept, and shows to me that the Roman army was still 'going somewhere' as late as the 350's.

Sure. According to all I know it was still the premier fighting force of their day. Not so superior to their enemies like before but still superior.

The so-called concept of fighting "at arms length" seems to be very popular. Offensive behavior of the Roman infantry was almost totally gone (though we have reports that the Julian's infantry performed very aggressively against the Persians at Ctesipon, i.e. they charged them). Instead it seems the shield-wall was the preferred method of fighting, i.e. they waited to receive enemy's charge. And missile fighting had undergone serious improvement. Not only plumbatae but also various missiles known as vertuae, lancae, spiculum were invited (though they all appear to be more or less similar) and all could be thrown if needed. Archery became the mainstream feature of any Roman army.

But, I'm mostly puzzled about infantry's defensive stance and the shield-wall. We know that many troops had both a spear and a sword. However, reports from the battles of Marcianopolis, Ad Sailces, Adrianople all clearly imply the Roman infantry waited for the enemy to charge. The battle of Strasbourg also. So it might be possible that an entire front line used spears as their primary weapon. Perhaps, an entire army as well. Yet Ammianus gives somewhat confusing report in which he mentions that "tightly packed soldiers couldn't have wielded their swords". Unfortunately, he doesn't specify if those troops were the auxilium palatinum or the legions palatinum. And yet, we know that in those described battles the auxilium palatinum formed the front line while the legions held the rear line. Can we assume then, that the auxilium palatinum (many of whom were of barbarian origin and the barbarians mostly fought with spears) troops fought with spears while the legions perhaps used the swords?

Also, as for the tactics it seems the good old triplex acies was phased out and the Romans deployed as an author of an Osprey book stated: "in their customary two lines".

[caldrail]

But, I'm mostly puzzled about infantry's defensive stance and the shield-wall. We know that many troops had both a spear and a sword. However, reports from the battles of Marcianopolis, Ad Sailces, Adrianople all clearly imply the Roman infantry waited for the enemy to charge.

The manner in which the Romans had fought had changed since Constantine. The smaller legions leant themselves to a more flexible method of campaigning (something well understood by Sebastianus) and although Marcellinus implies the veterans were good at set piece battles rather than raiding, this doesn't explain the chaos of Adrianople, unless the the problem was entirely down to lacklustre leadership.

 

You seem to assume that the Romans were automatically aggressive. Armies, even Roman ones, are compelled to follow the orders of their generals, and at Adrianople Valens attempted to negotiate a peace with the Goths (a surrender?) before any fighting was to take place. Very nice of him, but it only played into the hands of Goths, who used the time to wait for their cavalry to return and to make the suffering of the Romans in the hot summer afternoon worse by setting fire to crops nearby, causing smoke to drift into Roman lines.

 

I personally think some Roman troops were good at large battles, provided they had experience of it and leaders who knew what they were doing. Since the Romans no longer fought organised armies as a matter of course (having conquered them all and now faced barbarian raiders for the most part, Persia excepted), there would have been little opportunity to learn how to perform in a large scale battle. It really isn't as easy as it might seem.

 

But about the shield wall. The late Romans still used the testudo for protected advances where appropriate (even with oval shields of the time), or the foulkon (a double line of shields, one raised higher than the other) for line of battle. One reason the infantry didn't immediately attack is because by then the Romans found it more economic to let the enemy infantry attack first. Shield walls are not easily manoevered and the days of heavy infantry advancing remorselessly toward the enemy appear to have subsided along with the legion size.

 

In any case, the Romans at Adrianople were waiting for orders, not for the enemy. Negotiations were still going on and Richomeres had gone back to the camp to fetch hostages for the Goths as part of this process when the fighting broke out, due mostly because the late arrival of Roman cavalry stirred the Goths into activity that the Romans in turn though was an imminent attack. The Romans attacked first (or at least one or two hot-headed and confused units did)

 

Unfortunately, he doesn't specify if those troops were the auxilium palatinum or the legions palatinum. And yet, we know that in those described battles the auxilium palatinum formed the front line while the legions held the rear line.

Marcellinus doesn't discuss this because he either considers the details a little anal for a public history, or perhaps more likely he doesn't know. At any rate, I don't recall any mention of who formed the lines, as the main thrust of his narrative in the deployment is how confused it was. In fact, the Roman army was still arriving when the fighting began. It had taken hours for the Romans to bring their column onto the field. In all, a shabby and drawn out effort.

 

Yet Ammianus gives somewhat confusing report in which he mentions that "tightly packed soldiers couldn't have wielded their swords".

That wasn't a Roman army formed for battle, but a disordered mass of men surrounded and pressed against each other both for protection and by a natrual reaction of those on the outskirts to attempt to pull back from the incessant Gothic attacks. No confusion whatsoever on our part. Can't say the same for Valens men.

[Emperor Goblinus]

All I wanted to say that largely is the wrong term. Even in the auxilia palatine units there was hardly more than 40% of foreigners.

Indeed, Ammianus refers to Legions comprised of Gauls and Pannonians, all of whom would have been considered citizens of Romania.Moreover, his description of their conduct in Julian's Persian campaign would seem to suggest that they were high -morale units. One Gaulish legion had to be ordered to the rear after they sustained a lot of casualties from constantly wanting to be in the thick of the fighting. They grudgingly complied. This account seems to run contrary to the view that late empire soldiers viewed military service as an onerous and undesireable task.

 

Strasbourg was definitely a high point for the late legions, but since Julian's was defending central Gaul, the behavior of the Gallic legions may simply have been because they were defending their friends and family. A Pannonian or Spanish soldier might not have been so motivated.

Edited March 8, 2010 by Emperor Goblinus

[barca]

Here's an update. i just picked up a copy of ANCIENT WARFARE at the local bookstore Vol III issue 6. It is the first time that I've seen this magazine at a local store.

 

Page 44 has an article entitled Changing formations and specialists by Ross Cowan

 

The author states that there is some uncertainty about the specifics from these late sources, but he showed some evidence of the persistence of triplex acies, i.e. 3 battle lines as in the legions of the republic. He also suggests that even at Adrianople they used a triple battle line, but form a number of reasons, they were not deployed effectively, and they inadvertently became rolled up and compressed into a huge mass.

[caldrail]

There's no evidence that a triple line was attempted at Adrianople. But I agree, whatever deployment was arranged, the Roman column was drawn out and the late arrival of cavalty added to the confusion that set the battle off. However, the compression of the Roman troops into a disordered mass was the result of the Gothic attack and an inability to hold an effective line against a flank attack by Gothic horsemen and the subsequent containment of the legions.

[auxilia]

Here's an update. i just picked up a copy of ANCIENT WARFARE at the local bookstore Vol III issue 6. It is the first time that I've seen this magazine at a local store.

 

Page 44 has an article entitled Changing formations and specialists by Ross Cowan

 

The author states that there is some uncertainty about the specifics from these late sources, but he showed some evidence of the persistence of triplex acies, i.e. 3 battle lines as in the legions of the republic. He also suggests that even at Adrianople they used a triple battle line, but form a number of reasons, they were not deployed effectively, and they inadvertently became rolled up and compressed into a huge mass.

 

Hi there, I'd been absent for a while.

 

Yeah, I've heard some stories/theories about triple line being used at Adrianople. Indeed, there's no direct evidence. I don't know how Cowan interprets that triplex but in the book "Rome at War 293-696AD" there's a drawing of such triplex, according to the author-Michael Whitby, that had been used there. It's nothing special actually, he just places the light infantry in front of two heavy-infantry lines. If we assume, however, that such a light infantry line would naturally fell behind as soon as the enemy approached it would also imply Adrianople was fought in the customary late Roman two battle lines.

 

Regardless of Adrianople, I have the impression that late roman infantry formation generally declined (or perhaps just adjusted to the enemies?) in complexity. This may be due to cavalry rising in importance. Perhaps, as early as the 4th century, it was no longer expected from the infantry to win a battle. On the other hand we know that infantry saved the day at Strasbourg. But again, the infantry force at Marcianople was massacred by the Goths. More importantly the army fighting at Ad Salices was a high level force (actually composed of some eastern field legions-probably of the comitatenses level) and they also fought in duplex acies. As we know, they barely survived and ended the battle indecisively (although the Goths strategically won!).

 

Those few battle descriptions we have only suggest that duplex acies was the only way of deploying the infantry. Is it just because the armies of the day were just smaller (and therefore not adequate for triplex or quadruplex of the Caesar's time) or perhaps cause the foot troops were decreasing in importance and/or quality?

Edited July 4, 2010 by auxilia