Rome's Disgrace at Adrianople

[sylla]

In any case, the relevance of this battle for the demise of the Western Empire has been presumably highly overrated; after all, it was the eventually surviving Eastern Empire which was defeated here.

 

The battle was on eastern territory, but the Romans' loss made the Goths a permanent fixture in the empire, and we all know where they eventually ended up. I do think that had they been beaten, the West's fall would have been postponed.

Maybe (just maybe) postponed at best; we agree.

 

The number of both internal and external variables potentially involved in the demise of the Western Empire was so immense and they were so heterogeneous (military, political, social, economic, ecological and so on) that the specific fate of some thousands of Gothic warriors (that were in any case eventually defeated just by the early 380's) seems like a drop of water in the ocean.

 

Even the exact relevance of Adrianople for the "permanent fixture" of either the Visigoths or the Ostrogoths at the fifth century is quite disputable, especially again because it didn't directly affect the Western half of the Roman Empire.

Edited December 14, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

It did affect the western half. The Roman state was at that time a single entity, albeit ruled in two halves by different emperors both out of political ambition and expedience. The fortunes of either affected the other to a large degree, and notice that despite the religious and personality differences between the leaders, there was still a modicum of co-operation if offset by personal motives of those involved.

[sylla]

Any objective evidence on the hypothetical effect of this battle over the Western half would be welcomed.

 

(Aside from the mere theory of Chaos, I mean)

 

Thanks in advance.

[JGolomb]

Any objective evidence on the hypothetical effect of this battle over the Western half would be welcomed.

 

(Aside from the mere theory of Chaos, I mean)

 

Thanks in advance.

I've written a review of "Day of the Barbarians" which hasn't been posted yet. But I wrote a paragraph on the impact to the Western Empire:

The most severe pressure from this barbarization was in the Eastern Empire, and yet it was the East that ultimately survived (as the Byzantine Empire) and the West that didn't. Barbero explains why:

[sylla]

I've written a review of "Day of the Barbarians" which hasn't been posted yet. But I wrote a paragraph on the impact to the Western Empire:

The most severe pressure from this barbarization was in the Eastern Empire, and yet it was the East that ultimately survived (as the Byzantine Empire) and the West that didn't. Barbero explains why:

Edited December 15, 2009 by sylla

[Maty]

I'm inclining to the difference coming down to geography. Simply put, you needed a much larger army to defend the western empire than you did the east. Asia Minor is almost an island, in that where it is not isolated by sea, mountains do a pretty good job (in fact north and south, you have both). Macedonia is almost inaccessible from the north, and can't be reached from the west unless you go through Greece - as the Romans eventually did when they conquered the place - and the Middle East and Egypt have the desert.

 

The west on the other hand has only the Rhine and Danube between it and the barbarian hordes. It's easier for the barbarians to get in and stay in, and when the empire exerts too much pressure its easier to get out and stay out until -as inevitably happens - the empire is distracted by another emergency. So because the west needed more soldiers, the loss of a field army at Adrianople inevitably hurt them more. The strain of getting and supplying replacements fell disproportionately on the west because the east could afford to do so more gradually, and where replacements could not be found to hold the line, the danger and long-term damage was not as severe.

[sylla]

It seems pretty unlikely that you may find hard evidence backing most of these premises.

I'm inclining to the difference coming down to geography.

One problem here is you're based on a geographical misconception (keep reading).

Simply put, you needed a much larger army to defend the western empire than you did the east.

Simply put, the main problem here is that nobody told it so to most Roman Emperors, from Augustus to Theodosius, which systematically stubbornly placed more soldiers in the East most of the time; amazingly enough, the whole empire survived for five centuries.

Asia Minor is almost an island, in that where it is not isolated by sea, mountains do a pretty good job (in fact north and south, you have both).

As Asia Minor was almost never a border zone, that was essentially irrelevant; in any case, Parthians, Sassanides and Arabs found all their way through Anatolia when they required so.

Macedonia is almost inaccessible from the north, and can't be reached from the west unless you go through Greece - as the Romans eventually did when they conquered the place -

Why should going south have been more difficult than going north through the same way? In any case, that's exactly what the Goths and other northern invaders did.

... and the Middle East and Egypt have the desert.

Which didn't deter the Persians from constantly fighting the Romans and invading their eastern provinces for centuries.

The west on the other hand has only the Rhine and Danube between it and the barbarian hordes. It's easier for the barbarians to get in and stay in, and when the empire exerts too much pressure its easier to get out and stay out until -as inevitably happens - the empire is distracted by another emergency.

First, this is your main geographical misconception; the Danubian border (or almost all of it) was in the East, not the West.

Besides, such hypothesis simply ignores the obvious fact that the Rhin was a far more stable border than either the Danube or the Middle East all along the Roman Empire.

So because the west needed more soldiers...

Again, on average the West actually required less soldiers for centuries.

... the loss of a field army at Adrianople inevitably hurt them more.

Why?

The loss of 15,000 to 20,000 men from the Eastern units (no less than 200,000 men) was replaced with recruits from the East; why should this loss inevitably hurt more the no less than 200,000 Roman soldiers from the remote West?

The strain of getting and supplying replacements fell disproportionately on the west because the east could afford to do so more gradually, and where replacements could not be found to hold the line, the danger and long-term damage was not as severe.

Why would the strain have affected more the West? Why would the East have afforded to do so more gradually? Why was the danger not as severe?

 

Finally, why would the West have required to find replacements for the soldiers fallen in the East? That simply doesn't make sense.

Edited December 16, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

I think the problem here is that it's too hard to convince you of any evidence at all. You allude to criteria for acceptance but I sense a lot of goal post moving. If you dion't want to accept anyone elses view, fair enough, but at least have the honesty to say that instead of clicking your fingers at people to find more arguments for you to dismiss.

Edited December 16, 2009 by caldrail

[sylla]

I think the problem here is that it's too hard to convince you of any evidence at all. You allude to criteria for acceptance but I sense a lot of goal post moving. If you dion't want to accept anyone elses view, fair enough, but at least have the honesty to say that instead of clicking your fingers at people to find more arguments for you to dismiss.

If you can't understand what I'm talking about, don't worry; mind your own business and let people chat.

 

I think the problem here is that you don't have the honesty of sending me a PM instead of posting any personal issue that nobody else cares about.

[barca]

"After a while, the East decided it had had enough of the barbarian problem and wished to be free of it forever...the government in the East began working to transfer them a little farther west, making them promises and granting them concessions, provided that every time the barbarians took a few more steps westward. The West was governed badly, its energies consumed in the struggle to keep the barbarians across the Rhine at bay, and eventually it succumbed to this eastern policy...there, for a while, the western government managed to pay them and keep them happy; when it could no longer do so, in 410 the Roman general Alaric, a Goth, wishing to show that he was serious, marched on Rome and sacked it. From this time on, the flood of barbarian immigrants, which grew more and more violent and over which the weak western governments ceased to exercise any sort of control, began moving steadily westward.

Edited December 16, 2009 by barca

[sylla]

There are literally hundreds of hypotheses advanced to explain the Fall of the Western Roman Empire; there are tons of books on this issue , many of them excellent. I guess by now it's crystal clear for everyone that I'm a big fan of Ward-Perkins, mainly because he made an impressive thorough critical analysis of the updated relevant literature, and also because his book is quite accesible.

The reforms of Marius were to make a better, more professional army. To have a larger pool of well-trained recruits that could be called upon for battle. Eligibility was extended to the lower classes and some of the newly conquered people. Is this not the beginning of what was done in the later Roman empire (including Diocletian's reforms) where eligibility was extended to barbarians, some of which had questionable loyalties? ... The later citizen armies did suffer major setbacks against the Teutons and Cimbri, which were probably because of poor generalship. I don't see how the armies themselves could have deteriorated since the time of Scipio or Paulus. Although they had devastating losses against the Teutons (much greater losses than at Adrianople), they were still able to put together additional armies against them.

Actually, the Romans ought to professionalize their army largely because any traditional citizen unit was inappropiate for any years-long remote campaign, where citizen soldiers were obviously unable to care for their farms as expected. The notorious poor performance of the citizen legions in Spain and especially against the Cimbrii & Teutons was the drop that filled the glass; the so-called Marian reforms (presumably attributable not just to Marius) were ostensibly effective even in the short term, given their evidet success against the Cimbrii & Teutons.

The classical works of Edward Luttwak are particularly informative on this issue; the Roman army evolved clearly because so did their enemies, ecology and requirements, not just for the caprice of a couple of rulers.

Prior to Marius' reforms the Roman Citizen army had completed an unprecedented series of victories and conquests. The eventual defeat of Pyrrus and Hannibal. The rapid defeat of the Hellenistic kingdoms. Even after significant losses in battle, they were always able to round up another army. ...On of the obvious advantages of a citizen army is self-sufficiency. A professional army is costly, and a very large professional army can be an economic drain.

Not to mention the obvious risk of rebellion. Even so, the Romans had really no other chance (read above). Anyway, both the pre- and post-Marian Roman armies had a long series of victories and conquests (and of defeats too); the armies of Sulla, Lucullus, Pompey, Caesar, Augustus & Trajan were indeed already professional. Up to the latter emperor, we are stilll in the first phase of Luttwak; i.e., the Roman armies were almost always attacking and conquering, not defending; the conquered territories were mostly client states, expected to be defended primarily by themselves. That's why relatively small armies were almost always enough; Augustus actually reduced the late Republican army to less than half its original size.

Besides, non-Romans (Barbarians) were admitted to the Roman Army snce the very beginning, as socii or auxilia; not to mention the permanent enfranchisement of new citizens from the conquered populations, reportedly since the Monarchy.

The citizen armies could have been rather costly too; aside from the inevitably required inversion, the farming productivity of the citizen-soldiers was obviously lost while in service. Later Imperial armies were extremely costly mostly for their size.

How would the legions of the republic have performed against Fritgen's Goths? I would say that even if they had lost at Adrianople, there would be another citizen army that would rapidly confront them.

How would the late empire deal with a massive invasion of Cimbri and Teutons? They were more accustomed to dealing with small raiding groups, and were not accustomed to dealing with a large barbarian army capable of inflicting massive casualties on the Romans (some estimates 80,000, although I believe these are exagerartions)

In general terms, Classical casualty figures were notoriously unreliable. Most of what I have expressed on anachronic comparisons of commanders & armies in this post would apply here too. My general impression (just that!) is that the general average performance of the armies of both the Romans and their enemies tended to progressively improve year after year, given the slow but real advance in tactics and weaponry. Besides, once the Roman conquest stopped (mainly for logistic reasons) and the Imperial borders became fixed, a permanent quasi-Darwinian selection of the Roman enemies took place there.

After the first phase, Roman armies ought to progressively increase as long as the emperors stubbornly tried to conquer even more and never retreat.

The more professional armies of the later Roman empire supposedly had a greater pool of trained recruits, but they weren't able to put together a field army to defeat a relatively small group of Goths...

So here is what I see as a paradox. The professionalization of the army was to make sure, that there were always available large numbers of well-trianed recruits, that could be called upon to deal with any threat that might arise. In reality, the old citizen army seemed more reliable in terms of responding to setbacks and always being willing to confront an enemy.

That apparent paradox is easily explained by the evolution of the conditions of the Empire and its enemies; in general terms it's harder to preserve any territory that to conquer it.

Later Imperial armies were actually able to put together immense armies against myriad ubiquituous bands of hostile Barbarians all along the immense borders of the Empire; there were only 20,000 to 30,000 Romans fighting the Goths & allies at Adrianople simply because most if not all of the other 400,000 plus soldiers were busy serving in garrisons required all across the Empire, and not just resting at their homes. In fact, even if the old Republican citizen army would have been ultimately able to satisfactorily adapt itself to years-long remote missions (extremely unlikely), analogous effectives (and money) would have been in all likelihood required to protect the colossal late Empire.

Edited December 16, 2009 by sylla

[barca]

Later Imperial armies were actually able to put together immense armies against myriad ubiquituous bands of hostile Barbarians all along the immense borders of the Empire

 

I can find very few descriptions of large pitched battles against Germanic Barbarians in the fourth century. The two that come to mind most frequently are Strassbourg and Adrianople. The former could easily have been a disaster similar to Adrianople. Julian showed good generalship, preventing and ambush and holding his reserves to counter a breakthrough.

 

The total numbers of troops involved, however do seem considerably smaller than in battles of the late republic and early empire.

[sylla]

Later Imperial armies were actually able to put together immense armies against myriad ubiquituous bands of hostile Barbarians all along the immense borders of the Empire

 

I can find very few descriptions of large pitched battles against Germanic Barbarians in the fourth century. The two that come to mind most frequently are Strassbourg and Adrianople. The former could easily have been a disaster similar to Adrianople. Julian showed good generalship, preventing and ambush and holding his reserves to counter a breakthrough.

 

The total numbers of troops involved, however do seem considerably smaller than in battles of the late republic and early empire.

Please note both of us are saying essentially the same with different words.

 

Large global Imperial armies of hundreds of thousands were required at the late Empire (Luttwak's 3rd phase) not because big pitched battles were a common ocurrence, but rather because they ought to permanently face myriad small local skirmishes all along (and even within) the imperial borders.

 

The distribution of the units of the Saxon Shores, mentioned in my posts from this Thread, are a good example of the distribution of the Roman garrisons; the full picture for the Theodosian empire can be appreciated on the Notitia Dignitatum.

Edited December 16, 2009 by sylla

[barca]

"My general impression (just that!) is that the general average performance of the armies of both the Romans and their enemies tended to progressively improve year after year, given the slow but real advance in tactics and weaponry. "

 

 

Are you saying that the armies of the 4th century were actually better than those of the republic and early empire?

 

Marius' army which destroyed the Teutons would have been easily beaten by Fritigen's or Alaric's army?

 

What really changed in terms of weapons? Gladius vs Spatha? Pilum vs Spears and/or darts? Scutum vs oval shield? Body armor? Lorica segmentata or mail vs other forms of mail? Helmets? Were there really any significant advantage of older versus newer armaments? Later in the middle ages there were certainly more significant advances such as more complete body armor, innovative weapons such as the halberd, etc.

[sylla]

Are you saying that the armies of the 4th century were actually better than those of the republic and early empire?

Marius' army which destroyed the Teutons would have been easily beaten by Fritigen's or Alaric's army?

Short answer: all that is undeterminable, as any other anachronic comparison; period.

Lomg answer may be found here.

 

What really changed in terms of weapons? Gladius vs Spatha? Pilum vs Spears and/or darts? Scutum vs oval shield? Body armor? Lorica segmentata or mail vs other forms of mail? Helmets? Were there really any significant advantage of older versus newer armaments? Later in the middle ages there were certainly more significant advances such as more complete body armor, innovative weapons such as the halberd, etc.

That question has been answered in many interesting related threads here at UNRV; besides, a lot of books have been written on this issue. For now, let just say there were indeed multiple significant changes, hardly restricted to weaponry alone. As usual, then and always, the Roman army outstandingly adapted to the most diverse conditions. Edited December 16, 2009 by sylla