Rome's Disgrace at Adrianople

[Maty]

It seems pretty unlikely that you may find hard evidence backing most of these premises.

I'm inclining to the difference coming down to geography.

One problem here is you're based on a geographical misconception (keep reading).

Simply put, you needed a much larger army to defend the western empire than you did the east.

Simply put, the main problem here is that nobody told it so to most Roman Emperors, from Augustus to Theodosius, which systematically stubbornly placed more soldiers in the East most of the time; amazingly enough, the whole empire survived for five centuries.

Asia Minor is almost an island, in that where it is not isolated by sea, mountains do a pretty good job (in fact north and south, you have both).

As Asia Minor was almost never a border zone, that was essentially irrelevant; in any case, Parthians, Sassanides and Arabs found all their way through Anatolia when they required so.

Macedonia is almost inaccessible from the north, and can't be reached from the west unless you go through Greece - as the Romans eventually did when they conquered the place -

 

Not sure where to start with this... But a couple of observations. firstly, the distribution of armies was a much to do with the internal political situation as the external threat. More so, if you accept the argument in e.g. Hughes' Stilicho and Goldsworthy's Fall of the West.

 

Secondly, Asia minor is important as it was a relatively stable heartland, and significant precisely because it did not have barbarian armies rampaging through its farmlands and infrastructure.

 

Thirdly, with Macedonia, just because you can go one way, it does not mean you can go the other. It's like saying because you can easily leave a fortress others can as easily walk in. Think secured mountain passes.

 

Finally, the point of the desert is not that its a barrier to an army but to a supply chain. The Persian/Parthian attacks were basically huge raids, because they lacked Roman logistical skill to support an army across these distances.

 

And that the Danube is in the eastern empire is largely irrelevant. Because Constantinople sits like a cork in a bottle guarding the eastern empire, invaders crossing the Danube tended to go west. As in deed did the Goths once they had had a look at Constantinople.

 

I'll address the other issues later I hope, but meanwhile let's not assume it's all based on misconceptions, eh?

[barca]

Are you saying that the armies of the 4th century were actually better than those of the republic and early empire?

Marius' army which destroyed the Teutons would have been easily beaten by Fritigen's or Alaric's army?

Short answer: all that is undeterminable, as any other anachronic comparison; period.

 

How about this for an anachronistic comparison. If I remember correctly, when the Byzantines recaptured Rome, Belisarius sent out a group of Roman citizens in some sort of phalanx formation that initially drove back the Goths, but they subsquently lost their cohesion and they had to be rescued by the Byzantine troops. Could this group of well motivated though undisciplined citizen troops be similar in effectiveness to those of the early republic? Good enough to defeat an Etruscan army but not good enough to defeat a Romanized Gothic army?

[sylla]

How about this for an anachronistic comparison. If I remember correctly, when the Byzantines recaptured Rome, Belisarius sent out a group of Roman citizens in some sort of phalanx formation that initially drove back the Goths, but they subsquently lost their cohesion and they had to be rescued by the Byzantine troops. Could this group of well motivated though undisciplined citizen troops be similar in effectiveness to those of the early republic? Good enough to defeat an Etruscan army but not good enough to defeat a Romanized Gothic army?

Anachronic is anachronic, = indeterminable; the number of immeasurable potentially relevant variables is simply too large.

 

You really should read the whole long answer from the link above.

 

Motivation is obviously critical, but only one among myriad critical factors; the French soldiers seem to have been rather well motivated when they were utterly massacrated by the British archers at Azincourt.

Edited December 16, 2009 by sylla

[sylla]

And that the Danube is in the eastern empire is largely irrelevant. Because Constantinople sits like a cork in a bottle guarding the eastern empire, invaders crossing the Danube tended to go west. As in deed did the Goths once they had had a look at Constantinople.

 

I'll address the other issues later I hope, but meanwhile let's not assume it's all based on misconceptions, eh?

Regarding this particular topic (Adrianople potential impact for the Fall of the Western Empire), that might not be required at all, as your specific argument is actually quite straightforward; i.e. the Roman casualties at Adrianople would have critically reduced the manpower reserve of the West.

 

IMHO, it would be difficult to find hard evidence for that argument; the 15,000 to 20,000 Roman casualties from that battle were in all likelihood absorbed by the 200,000 plus men of the Eastern army and local recruitment.

 

BTW, the only misconception that I pointed out was the localization of the Danube in the Eastern half of the Roman Empire, a point that is actually critical for your original argument as a whole, given the number of troops that were regularly there.

 

You can easily verify that for any reason from Augustus to Theodosius there were almost always more Roman troops deployed in the East (Danubian border included) than in the West.

Edited December 16, 2009 by sylla

[sonic]

Are you saying that the armies of the 4th century were actually better than those of the republic and early empire?

Marius' army which destroyed the Teutons would have been easily beaten by Fritigen's or Alaric's army?

Short answer: all that is undeterminable, as any other anachronic comparison; period.

 

How about this for an anachronistic comparison. If I remember correctly, when the Byzantines recaptured Rome, Belisarius sent out a group of Roman citizens in some sort of phalanx formation that initially drove back the Goths, but they subsquently lost their cohesion and they had to be rescued by the Byzantine troops. Could this group of well motivated though undisciplined citizen troops be similar in effectiveness to those of the early republic? Good enough to defeat an Etruscan army but not good enough to defeat a Romanized Gothic army?

 

Actually, the troops 'deployed' by Belisarius were an untrained citizen volunteer force, which he used to pin those Gothic forces to the West of the Tiber by the classic ruse of having them 'form up' as if regular Byzantine troops. (And please, no comments about the historical accuracy of calling them 'Byzantine' - it's only to differentiate between them and the citizens of the city of Rome!) It was through fear of superior numbers that the Goths withdrew, not 'military effectiveness'. In fact, the Roman forces instantly lost all discipline, sacked the Gothic camp and then were routed when the Goths realised what was happening and counterattacked. (PS they were not rescued: they ran back to the city.)

 

There was a large difference between the 'trained' early armies who fought the Etruscans and the citizens who fought Witigis. Not least was the fact that warfare had changed and this was no longer at a 'city-wide' scale against equivalent 'farmers'.

 

And that the Danube is in the eastern empire is largely irrelevant. Because Constantinople sits like a cork in a bottle guarding the eastern empire, invaders crossing the Danube tended to go west. As in deed did the Goths once they had had a look at Constantinople.

 

I'll address the other issues later I hope, but meanwhile let's not assume it's all based on misconceptions, eh?

 

Regarding this particular topic (Adrianople potential impact for the Fall of the Western Empire), that might not be required at all, as your specific argument is actually quite straightforward; i.e. the Roman casualties at Adrianople would have critically reduced the manpower reserve of the West.

 

IMHO, it would be difficult to find hard evidence for that argument; the 15,000 to 20,000 Roman casualties from that battle were in all likelihood absorbed by the 200,000 plus men of the Eastern army and local recruitment.

 

I think that the major factors for the West in the loss of Adrianople wasn't really the number of Roman troops killed.

 

One massive factor was the fact that the Empire had lost an emperor during the course of a major defeat. The morale implications were huge for the East, since they were never really to defeat the Goths in a manner that caused morale to return to normal. The troops in the West likewise feared the enemy that had defeated the Empire. Therefore, the first major factor at Adrianople was morale.

 

Secondly, the loss confirmed to the tribes along the Danube that the Empire was weak. The largest and most devastating attacks on the Empire crossed the Danube and ravaged the Balkans. At this point, they were all forced to the conclusion, as were the Goths, that Constantinople was impregnable and that it was either cross the sea or head West. History notes that there were attempts to cross the sea to Asia Minor, but these failed. Therefore, the 'barbarians' headed West.

 

Thirdly, when the nature of the defeat was recognised by Gratian, he immediately placed the Prefecture of Illyricum in the hands of Theodosius to ensure that tehre would be no division of forces in the area. This resulted in the loss of the area to the West, and, when the East refused to defend it properly, it was to prove a thorn in the side of Stilicho, as not only was there no defence there, but the West received no taxes nor recruits.

 

I hope that explains my personal take - such as it is when I'm exhausted! - on the impact of Adrianople. Sorry if there are masses of spelling mistakes and grammatical errors - it's been a long day!!

[barca]

Actually, the troops 'deployed' by Belisarius were an untrained citizen volunteer force, which he used to pin those Gothic forces to the West of the Tiber by the classic ruse of having them 'form up' as if regular Byzantine troops. (And please, no comments about the historical accuracy of calling them 'Byzantine' - it's only to differentiate between them and the citizens of the city of Rome!) It was through fear of superior numbers that the Goths withdrew, not 'military effectiveness'. In fact, the Roman forces instantly lost all discipline, sacked the Gothic camp and then were routed when the Goths realised what was happening and counterattacked. (PS they were not rescued: they ran back to the city.)

 

 

You're right, didn't recall all of the details correctly.

 

I did think it was interesting that these roman citizens who had grown accustomed to depending on mercenary armies were willing to take the initiative and go into battle. This seems contrary to the widely held assumption that citizens of the late empire tried to avoid military service at all costs. When this particular group lost its discipline and was forced to flee, Belisarius made no subsequent attempt to recruit them into service, since he regarded them as more of a liability.

 

How hard would it have been to take these willing citizens and train them to function effectively against the Goths? Perhaps this was not the time or the place to raise raw recruits?

[sylla]

First the first; regarding the original topic of this thread, one of the most relevant and problematic criterion indispensable for any of the literally hundreds of proposed mechanisms for the Fall of Rome is that they must explain why the West fell and the East survived; that critical and undisputable fact can't be just left aside.

 

Far as I'm aware, none of the proposed mechanisms (above or elsewhere) on the theoretical relationship of the Roman defeat at Adrianople and the Fall of the Western Empire (i.e., loss of manpower, moral effect, immigration of the Barbarians and so on) has been even remotely able to fulfill such criterion.

 

Plainly, the West fell and the East survived in spite of Adrianople.

 

For any of the above mentioned mechanisms (and maybe more [if they were indeed operative]) it was the East, not the West, which should have fallen.

 

In fact, Constantinople itself was attacked by the victorious Goths almost immediately after this battle; even so, the East most obviously survived.

 

Whatever factors may have most obviously made the Western Roman Empire ultimately even more vulnerable than the Eastern was, there's no reason to relate them to Adrianople at all; period.

 

I rest my case.

Edited December 17, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

You seem to be searching for some elegant and sophisticated answer. Sometimes there just isn't one. I'm not sure what mechanisms you're talking about but you might find it useful to read Polybius and his model of cultural life and death, which is very appropriate and prophetic. That really is the underlying cause, whatever the influences that dragged Rome toward it.

 

The western empire, as a zone of imperial control, had atrophied to the point where it couild no longer support itself. It died of old age, ill health, and more than one stab in the back. You can analyse it all with a microscope if you want, but until you step back and look at the bigger picture, the one Polybius himself underlined, all you do is swim around in a sea of detail and sometimes conflicting information.

 

It's rather like a glass of water. Viewed as such, you see it clearly. Zoom in on the brownian motion and all you see is chaos that has no definitive answer, since one molecule is merely interacting with another.

[barca]

.... one of the most relevant and problematic criterion indispensable for any of the literally hundreds of proposed mechanisms for the Fall of Rome is that they must explain why the West fell and the East survived; that critical and undisputable fact can't be just left aside.

 

 

Could it have anything to with fortifications? Wasn't Constantinople more fortified?

 

I could be wrong, but I get the impression that many of the cities in the West were less fortified because they felt confident that the army could deal with any incursions. Then when the army was unable to drive out the barbarians, many cities were left vulnerable.

[barca]

The western empire, as a zone of imperial control, had atrophied to the point where it couild no longer support itself. It died of old age, ill health, and more than one stab in the back.

 

Why didn't the East atrophy in the same way to where it could no longer support itself?

[sylla]

You seem to be searching for some elegant and sophisticated answer. Sometimes there just isn't one. I'm not sure what mechanisms you're talking about...

No, you are not. Thanks but no, thanks; EDIT Edited December 27, 2009 by sylla

[sylla]

Second the second:

(And please, no comments about the historical accuracy of calling them 'Byzantine' - it's only to differentiate between them and the citizens of the city of Rome!)

Yes, those good ol' times .

Sonic is naturally absolutely right; VII century Rome and its people were not longer the City (Urbs) i.e. a bona fide city-state, let say in the sense of a Classical polis; Rome had been a regular civitas (technically a colonia) at least since Aurelian.

We don't need to be utterly idealistic here; the plebeian patriotism of the old Republic was always mixed with ambition, as it was essentially the only way for most of them of improving their economic status and to even get a chance for introducing themselves to politics.

That is why the Plebeians actually fought internally for their right to fight externally, one of the most obvious explanations behind any hard facts under the semi-legendary accounts of the plebeian secessions.

On the other hand, those incentives were essentially absent at later times (Luttwak's 3rd phase), when there were no more new territories for being conquered and the political-military glory was reserved to the Emperor and his proxies.

 

.... one of the most relevant and problematic criterion indispensable for any of the literally hundreds of proposed mechanisms for the Fall of Rome is that they must explain why the West fell and the East survived; that critical and undisputable fact can't be just left aside.

Could it have anything to with fortifications? Wasn't Constantinople more fortified?

 

I could be wrong, but I get the impression that many of the cities in the West were less fortified because they felt confident that the army could deal with any incursions. Then when the army was unable to drive out the barbarians, many cities were left vulnerable.

Not sure about that; this might be anyway closer to what Maty was explaining, i.e. geography as a contributor to the selective demise of the West as a whole, not specifically related to Adrianople.

 

Constantinople was definitely one of the best fortifications across all History, for both its natural and man-made defenses, even before the erection of the formidable Theodosian Walls (which were BTW "Theodosian" for the second, not the first Theodosius).

It would be indeed extremely hard not to perceive this as one of the most relevant factors that explained why the West fell and the East didn't, even in spite of Adrianople...

 

All that said, dealing with all the countless factors potentially involved in the Fall of the Western Roman Empire may very well get us quite far from the original topic of this thread.

Edited December 18, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

The western empire, as a zone of imperial control, had atrophied to the point where it couild no longer support itself. It died of old age, ill health, and more than one stab in the back.

 

Why didn't the East atrophy in the same way to where it could no longer support itself?

 

It did, or rather, was in the process of doing so. Human societies evolve, whether a small gang, commercial enterprise, or virtual website, to the greatest empires in history. What happens is that relationships are formed, ritual behaviour to some degree, and things get more and mmore structured, so that they become over complex and bloated. It loses the dynamism it had in the beginning. Now that process of formalisation sometimes takes a long time.

 

Witness though the Constantinople the crusaders discovered - huge, otherworldly, vastly impressive, beyond their imaginings, but a society they found was completely unable to cope with thousands of barbaric sworsdmen turning up on their doorstep, only too willing to shoo them away at the first opportunity, and ultimately, a civilisation that was robbed blind by those men's descendants (who ultimately got robbed blind by a blind doge of Venice, demonstrating above all else that competitive commerce breeds ruthlessly greedy and successful men, and underlines my point in that a wild and wooly commercial sector was the winner, not the semi-chivalrous thugs of europe or the the grandiose civilisation of Byzantium)

 

As for the fortifications of Constantinople - no, they were not responsible for Byzantine success in any way, and whilst fortification represented medieval power in a very solid and overt manner, that power was ultimately political and castles changed hands all too readily, plus the ability of the Crusaders to loot Constantinople proved how little value the walls had. You find that ever since mankind evolved a barrier you couldn't break through, it was the front door that usually let the enemy in.

 

Thanks but no, thanks; what we are looking for we are already finding. For some of us, nihilism is just not an option.

Erm... Okay.... Well when I figure out why nihilsm crept into this I'll happily destroy that argument Please don't try to explain it. I've run out of bandages. Anyhow, if 'we' are already finding stuff we're looking for, all it is a pile of bricks. Tell you what Scylla, why don't you stop making random piles of bricks and instead build something? Write an article. Not a list of events or random personalities - a reasoned constructed case for whatever subject pleases you. Can you? You might find people listen to you a little more. At the moment all you're doing is jabbering away in a foreign language, and as you know, us brits only reply with the same message but louder. How about Nihilism in Modern Revisionist Historical Constructs and Analogies - a subject you seem to have a lot to say about. Can't wait to read it.

Edited December 18, 2009 by caldrail

[sylla]

Have you ever tried to use PM for personal issues entirely irrelevant to the thread's topic and that no one else cares about?

We might well be purchasing a one-way ticket to Tartarus here

Anyway:

 

EDIT: This issue is relevant only for the directly involved.

 

next time, better try PM...

(Can't wait to read it!)

Edited December 27, 2009 by sylla

[sylla]

As for the fortifications of Constantinople - no, they were not responsible for Byzantine success in any way, and whilst fortification represented medieval power in a very solid and overt manner, that power was ultimately political and castles changed hands all too readily, plus the ability of the Crusaders to loot Constantinople proved how little value the walls had. You find that ever since mankind evolved a barrier you couldn't break through, it was the front door that usually let the enemy in.

In spite of his best intentions, the previous statement patently pointed out the indisputable fact that Constantinople remained unconquered in spite of countless attacks from some of the most powerful armies across all History for almost a full millennium; judge by yourselves. Edited December 18, 2009 by sylla