Rome's Disgrace at Adrianople

[barca]

A recent article by Adrian Goldsworthy describes the background and aftermath of Adrianople.

 

He stated that it is was vary hard for the Romans of the 4th century to put together a large field army for a battle even though the total number was estimated to be about 650,000, divided into frontier troops and mobile troops. If those estimates are correct, wouldn't the losses at Adrianople seem minimal?

Edited December 11, 2009 by barca

[Kosmo]

This one?

http://www.historynet.com/the-roman-empire...e-in-ad-378.htm

[barca]

This one?

http://www.historynet.com/the-roman-empire...e-in-ad-378.htm

Different title, but it appears to be the same article.

[sylla]

A recent article by Adrian Goldsworthy describes the background and aftermath of Adrianople.

 

He stated that it is was vary hard for the Romans of the 4th century to put together a large field army for a battle even though the total number was estimated to be about 650,000, divided into frontier troops and mobile troops. If those estimates are correct, wouldn't the losses at Adrianople seem minimal?

That figure is in the upper limit of the quoted range and probably a bit exaggerated, but in general terms your analysis seems to be perfectly right.

 

However, the loss of thousands of high quality warriors should probably never be described as "minimal", especially if it included so many high-rank officials and the Emperor himself.

 

In any case, the relevance of this battle for the demise of the Western Empire has been presumably highly overrated; after all, it was the eventually surviving Eastern Empire which was defeated here.

Edited December 11, 2009 by sylla

[barca]

That figure is in the upper limit of the quoted range and probably a bit exaggerated, but in general terms your analysis seems to be perfectly right.

 

However, the loss of thousands of high quality warriors should probably never be described as "minimal", especially if it included so many high-rank officials and the Emperor himself.

 

In any case, the relevance of this battle for the demise of the Western Empire has been presumably highly overrated; after all, it was the eventually surviving Eastern Empire which was defeated here.

 

I find it perplexing that the late Roman army with all of its 650,000 men had that much difficulty containing a relatively small group of barbarians.

It puts in to question wether Diocletian's "reforms" were really beneficial. They sounded good in theory. The total number of troops were increased, but the bureaucracy involved in maintaining them made them less available.

Compared to the late republic, which had a much lower total number of troops, Consuls had no trouble putting together one field army after another. For example, when a large force of Teutons invaded and destroyed more than one Roman army sent against them, Gaius Marius was able to move on them and defeat them decisively.

http://www.unrv.com/empire/cimbri-teutons.php

Edited December 12, 2009 by barca

[sylla]

I find it perplexing that the late Roman army with all of its 650,000 men had that much difficulty containing a relatively small group of barbarians.

Lower figures circa 400,000 were probably closer to the real stuff; you still have an excellent and quite valid point, which BTW also applies to the usually absurd statements on the fantastic numbers of Achaemenid armies.

 

IMHO, the quid is that you are looking only to an isolated picture of the whole film.

It seems the number of the Roman troops was actually a bit lower than the Goths they were facing.

The other thousands of Roman troops were not simply resting at their homes; virtually all of them were in the places required for defending the immense Imperial border.

Strictly speaking, the Roman army was constantly facing a myriad of groups of Barbarians in almost any point of the border.

 

BTW, the same has happened in virtually any empire; it's usually easier to conquer than to keep the conquests.

The problems for the powerful US army in dealing with a relatively small group of Afghan rebels are another good example.

It puts in to question wether Diocletian's "reforms" were really beneficial. They sounded good in theory.

And in practice too; they were a critical part of the military evolution that let the Roman Empire survive for a thousand-plus years (and the western half for a good two centuries).

It puts in to question wether Diocletian's "reforms" were really beneficial. They sounded good in theory. The total number of troops were increased, but the bureaucracy involved in maintaining them made them less available.

In all likelihood those were unavoidable inconvenients of keeping such a huge empire and not just Diocletian's caprice.

Compared to the late republic, which had a much lower total number of troops, Consuls had no trouble putting together one field army after another. For example, when a large force of Teutons invaded and destroyed more than one Roman army sent against them, Gaius Marius was able to move on them and defeat them decisively. http://www.unrv.com/empire/cimbri-teutons.php

Another excellent point; IMHO, you are essentially comparing apples with oranges, partially for some of the reasons already explained above.

 

Another reason; by the late II century BC most of the Roman conquests were not true provinces but client states, which were expected to fully defend by themselves.; in fact, the Cimbrii were first defeated by Iberian populations already conquered by Rome, not by the Romans themselves.

The subject is too extensive; you may require to review a lot of literature, particularly the works of Edward Luttwak.

 

In any case, the consuls mentioned above did have a lot of trouble putting together one field army after another, and a full reform of the Legions was required by Marius to decisively defeat the Germans.

Edited December 12, 2009 by sylla

[Northern Neil]

In any case, the consuls mentioned above did have a lot of trouble putting together one field army after another, and a full reform of the Legions was required by Marius to decisively defeat the Germans.

...so imagine how much more difficult it would have been in the 4th century, when membership of the army was increasingly seen as an onerous task, there was no longer any plunder to be had from subjugating a nation, and recruits were well aware that they were as likely to fight other Roman armies as barbarians.

[Artimi]

Barca

 

A book you might find interesting is, The Day of the Barbarians by Alessandro Barbero which discusses Adrianople. And as I have said in a post in another thread, it is like 'watching' a train wreck. There is enough pre-battle and post-battle informaton.

[barca]

Speaking of books has anyone read this one?

 

http://www.amazon.com/Romes-Gothic-Wars-Co.../ref=pd_sim_b_4

[sylla]

Speaking of books has anyone read this one?

 

http://www.amazon.com/Romes-Gothic-Wars-Co.../ref=pd_sim_b_4

Only some extracts; it seemed like a nice general review.

[caldrail]

A recent article by Adrian Goldsworthy describes the background and aftermath of Adrianople.

 

He stated that it is was vary hard for the Romans of the 4th century to put together a large field army for a battle even though the total number was estimated to be about 650,000, divided into frontier troops and mobile troops. If those estimates are correct, wouldn't the losses at Adrianople seem minimal?

 

Marcellinus mentions a third of the army making an escape in darkness after hours of fighting. Personally, I think the estimate of 650,00 is a little large. Bear in mind legions of the day were considerably smaller than in the classic era, were very likely under strength in any case, and would have been subject to desertion en route. I do note that Valens had to make more than one rousing speech whilst parked up at Melanthia just to get his unwilling army to go with him.

 

If that number fought at Adrianople, then clearly this underlines the lack of ability of Roman command of the day to successfully handle such large set piece battles, which is incidentially a major contributor to their defeat. The commanders had little or no experience of running such a large army. Of course Sebiastianus was chosen to lead the campaign because he'd demonstraed ability in the first place, and Marcellinus tells us how he stressed small scale actions instead of a massive strike deep into unsecured countryside.

 

Zosimus does actually mention that 'heads were sent to Constantinople every day', which although a very defined point in his otherwise skimpy account, does illustrate the success Sebastianus had with newly raised and motivated troops. Both Zosimus and Marcellinus point at the 'effeminacy' and lack of will in the troops as a whole. Of course it doesn't take a genius to see that Sebastianus was employing a cadre of forces he considered up to the job of whittling down the Goths.

 

His policy clearly worked. Four days before the battle an advance party led ahead of the column at the instigation and personal command of sebastianus slaughtered a group of gothic foragers at the River Maritza, the Goths by that stage being forced to forage in large numbers for fear of ambush.

 

However, I must emphasise that this accounts for a capable minority of Roman troops used in a manner for which they were trained and best suited for. The rest of Valens army had nothing like the same willingness - at least one unit vanished into thin air once the fighting started.

 

But the initial question was whether the losses were minimal. A third of 650,000 surviving? Four hundred thousand casualties or deserters isn't exactly a minor problem. Neither was the loss of credibility of Roman leadership. They never fought another battle on that scale that I'm aware of.

 

Such was the difficulty of raising more troops to protect Roman terrritory that Theodosius later hired Goths on wholesale. Partly that gave them a reason to remain loyal, despite the rambuctuous nature of the Goths, but also it demonstrated an expedience forced upon Theodosius in dealing with threatened borders and manpower problems. The Goths had arrived in Roman territory both as a migration southeastward from their homelands, but also as an escape against the Huns. The walls built by Trajan (not the emperor, but a 4th century general) to protect against the ravages of those horsemen illustrating the preparedness the Romans sought in their defence against them..

 

With an enemy arriving on the borders capable of mounting fast attacks at long ranges, the matter of having enough troops to defend the borders was not inconsiderable, and a policy that failed, requiring the campaigns of Aetius to deal with the problem.

[Kosmo]

650.000 men it's the number of soldiers presumed for the entire roman army (East and West) not the size of the force at Adrianopole that was much smaller.

[sylla]

650.000 men it's the number of soldiers presumed for the entire roman army (East and West) not the size of the force at Adrianopole that was much smaller.

Far as I'm aware, most modern estimates are within the 20,000 - 30,000 range.

[Emperor Goblinus]

A recent article by Adrian Goldsworthy describes the background and aftermath of Adrianople.

 

He stated that it is was vary hard for the Romans of the 4th century to put together a large field army for a battle even though the total number was estimated to be about 650,000, divided into frontier troops and mobile troops. If those estimates are correct, wouldn't the losses at Adrianople seem minimal?

 

Late Roman armies were considerably smaller than the ones in the Principate. A loss of that many men, plus the emperor and other ccommanders, would have been devastating. Theodosius had a hell of a time putting together an army to stop the Goths.

[Emperor Goblinus]

In any case, the relevance of this battle for the demise of the Western Empire has been presumably highly overrated; after all, it was the eventually surviving Eastern Empire which was defeated here.

 

The battle was on eastern territory, but the Romans' loss made the Goths a permanent fixture in the empire, and we all know where they eventually ended up. I do think that had they been beaten, the West's fall would have been postponed.