The Saxon Shore Fort Network.

[sylla]

Fiction? Fiction is storytelling for the purposes of entertainment.

Coldrail dialect? Not English, for sure.

Beware! We have dictionaries and we are not afraid to use them; from good ol' Merriam-Webster (SIC):

 

"1a: something invented by the imagination or feigned; specifically : an invented story b : fictitious literature (as novels or short stories) c : a work of fiction; especially : novel

2 a : an assumption of a possibility as a fact irrespective of the question of its truth <a legal fiction> b : a useful illusion or pretense

3 : the action of feigning or of creating with the imagination"

 

Now, if you really think this is worth our time and/or that it will benefit anyone, let just create another thread for the arena... because we are getting now as far from any Saxon Shore as it can get.

[caldrail]

Scylla, seriously, I know you like having the last word but defining fiction for us was pointless, and yes, it does take us away from the Saxon Shore and the Adventures of Olaf. I especially love the bit where he tries to pay his tavern bill in sestercii. Classic stuff. Incidentially, for all Saxon Shore fans, it's worth pointing out that the forts were protecting strategic landing places and who knows?....

 

Warning: This is a speculation. Anyone suffering from speculative allergies should see their doctor before reading

 

Whilst we obviously see the Saxon Shore in purely defensive military terms, isn't that a bit limiting?. You see, although these forts covered strategic landing points they couldn't offer continual protection along the coastline. Given the normal Roman policies for securing territory, I would have to speculate that like other forts these constructions were used as bases for patrols. On sea as well as land? Bear in mind that coastlines and estuaries change significantly over two thousand years. In other words, rather like the modern day, these were immigration patrols more often than military defenses. After all, why would the Romano-British administration want a load of Saxon hooligans setting up camp?

[sylla]

Just for the record, the main original question was:

The one quote that I found on the internet said, "The Saxon Shore Fort Network depleted man power from Hadrian's Wall". But I have not found any more evidence to support that.

Some units may have been indeed redeployed from the Caledonian border to the Saxon Shore, notably the Numerus exploratorum, but I have found no evidence of significant manpower depletion previous to Honorius calling back to the Continent; in any case, both defensive complexes were left undefeated by the Romans. Britannia was essentially lost against the Goths and Huns in the Continent, not the local menaces.

 

Now, on the extremely basic operative issues, the following warning is wrong:

Warning: This is a speculation. Anyone suffering from speculative allergies should see their doctor before reading

 

Whilst we obviously see the Saxon Shore in purely defensive military terms, isn't that a bit limiting?. You see, although these forts covered strategic landing points they couldn't offer continual protection along the coastline. Given the normal Roman policies for securing territory, I would have to speculate that like other forts these constructions were used as bases for patrols. On sea as well as land? Bear in mind that coastlines and estuaries change significantly over two thousand years. In other words, rather like the modern day, these were immigration patrols more often than military defenses. After all, why would the Romano-British administration want a load of Saxon hooligans setting up camp?

Nope, Coldrail; this is not speculation (at least in English); it's just an overstatement of the obvious. There's some fiction in some of your posts and some valid speculation in Melvadius'. Dictionaries are there for a reason. Not your last word on the issue, I hope...

 

The original posting did specify 'Saxon Shore Fort network in Britain' ...

Frankly, I guess that might have been so because some of us didn't know there were other Saxon Shores to begin with; that may have changed by now.

... the British shore based defensive network - however extensive a system the Romans actually considered it to be due to the different sources of possible attack - not just Germanic -

To be rigorously and unnecessarily precise, I don't think the Garamantes would have been welcomed in the Litore Saxonico or the Saxons in the Limes Tripolitanus; any Barbarian would have been considered as such by any Roman defensive system.

The underlying question of how integrated a system it was in reality, without much more documentarty evidence than we will probably ever have, will probably remain open to continuing discussion.

Really??? Just to mention one line of evidence, is the geographical distribution of the forts from both sides of the Channel not eloquent enough to consider them as an "integrated system"? Edited October 26, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

Nope, Coldrail; this is not speculation (at least in English); it's just an overstatement of the obvious. There's some fiction in some of your posts and some valid speculation in Melvadius'. Dictionaries are there for a reason. Not your last word on the issue, I hope...

I don't have documentary evidence or information on that subject, therefore I speculated. Sorry if it's too obvious for you, but the whole point is to continue a discussion on the subject, not to have it thrown in the bin. I'm not your student. I'm on this site to discuss the subject with anyone who's interested - that's what a forum is for.

 

But since speculation is defined as inadmissable, I'll have to resort to questions. So.... What exactly was Olaf doing in the haybarn the day before he dug the ditch?

[Melvadius]

The underlying question of how integrated a system it was in reality, without much more documentarty evidence than we will probably ever have, will probably remain open to continuing discussion.

Really??? Just to mention one line of evidence, is the geographical distribution of the forts from both sides of the Channel not eloquent enough to consider them as an "integrated system"?

 

Sylla,

 

I am a great believer in the Roman's ability to create unified signalling and consequently defensive networks - you just have to read Wooliscroft ' Roman Military Signalling to see how effective it could be.

 

I'm afraid however that you have read the line you have quoted out of context - I was referring to the whole of the British coastal system. Given that the forts on the British 'Saxon Shore' were built over a period of several decades AND the fact that from the archaeological evidence to date several appear to have had phases of being out of use. The phasing of use argues for periods when the coastal defences were not as complete as the geographic locations by themselves would argue for while the other shore based defences in Britain were presumably aimed at other potential threats.

 

I cannot comment in a simlar way on the construction and use dates for the Continental series as I don't have the appropriate references.

Edited October 26, 2009 by Melvadius

[Northern Neil]

Yes. Correct. It is speculative. So what? Northern Neil informed me of a possible saxon contingent I wasn't aware of, so I extrapolated for the purposes of speculation. Think about it Scylla. If you run a local community on a coastline at risk of raids or piracy, and the only real protection are foreign mercenaries, how do you get them to act in your name? There are only three ways. You pay them off handsomely, you could attempt to force them to do so, or you provide motivation and a cause to fight for.

 

There is nothing wrong with speculation, especially with regard to Roman remains which are so visible, and yet about which so little is known. If some regard speculation as pointless and irritating, there are others (myself included) who quite like to ponder and debate ideas. I am not so sure that shooting off on tangents and analysing each other's writing styles aids the debate, however.

 

The presence of Germanic military equipment at some Saxon Shore forts, particularly ANDERITVM, would seem to suggest that there were at least some Germans among the garrisons, even if they weren't Saxons.

 

Regarding the integrity of the system, some of the forts - particularly Nantes and Blaye, appear to be fortified towns and ports rather than purpose built forts, and so there is evidence there as well that the system was very ad - hoc and grew over time, rather than being part of an organised strategy. I suspect that the system only became fully integrated and organised up to a century after the first forts of the system were built, say around 340.

[sylla]

Latium antiquum a Tiberi Cerceios servatum est m. p. L longitudine: tam tenues primordio imperi fuere radices. colonis saepe mutatis tenuere alii aliis temporibus, Aborigenes, Pelasgi, Arcades, Siculi, Aurunci, Rutuli et ultra Cerceios Volsci, Osci, Ausones, unde nomen Lati processit ad Lirim amnem. in principio est Ostia colonia ab Romano rege deducta, oppidum Laurentum, lucus Iovis Indigetis, amnis Numicius, Ardea a Dana

Edited January 1, 2010 by sylla

[caldrail]

My only major objection would be the highly "speculative" (absurd, if anybody asks me) presence of Roman soldiers facing AElle at 491 AD.

 

Then there's no arguement, because we're not suggesting that's the case. What we're suggesting is the possibility of mercenaries retained either using 'Roman authority' in it's actual absence, or mercenaries pretending to have that authority for their own purposes.

[sylla]

Now, if new elements are required, we can always discuss on the only other possible textual mention of the Saxon Shore defensive system aside from the Notitia Dignitatum; the so-called "Great Conspiracy" narrated by Ammianus for 367-8.

Latium antiquum a Tiberi Cerceios servatum est m. p. L longitudine: tam tenues primordio imperi fuere radices. colonis saepe mutatis tenuere alii aliis temporibus, Aborigenes, Pelasgi, Arcades, Siculi, Aurunci, Rutuli et ultra Cerceios Volsci, Osci, Ausones, unde nomen Lati processit ad Lirim amnem. in principio est Ostia colonia ab Romano rege deducta, oppidum Laurentum, lucus Iovis Indigetis, amnis Numicius, Ardea a Dana

Edited January 1, 2010 by sylla

[caldrail]

Integrated system? I think that's overstating it. I agree the Romans were well organised, certainly better so than their opponents, but introducing modern concepts and ascribing them to Roman organisation is a common tendency amongst commentators which is historically suspect.

 

I've seen this many times, with people describing Roman and modern units as "equivalent". This is a fallacy. There is no equivalence, because the organisation of Roman forces differs from that of modern pyramid-style armies. Granted, the unit sizes are conveniently close in some cases, but you will find this was down to Roman experience of handling men in combat - there's a limit to the practical leadership one man can provide over a host of soldiers (about a hundred men in Roman experience) and the Romans did not employ squad tactics in battle. The vexillations sometimes mentioned were ad hoc formations assigned to tasks, not to battlefield situations where you really would want to be there in substantial numbers.

 

It is true that in the late empire the Romans had established permanent armies with legions of a smaller size becoming almost the same as regiments as we see them today. The old strategies of large legions as independent armies in theior own right had long since gone, and indeed, one of the reasons for the defeat at Adrianople was that the Romans had simply lost the expertise required for controlling large scale battles. At that period, they had instead evolved a system of small scale actions designed to disrupt the enemy rather than defeat him outright in one place. The increasing co-operation of the barbarians and the extended borders made set-piece battles more difficult to conduct - the enemy might simply march around a large force rather than meet it head on and the increasing mobility of Rome's enemies also meant that a flexible defense was required.

 

Now it is also true that Roman signalling was well established. Although this wasn't a battlefield phenomenon, the Romans were able to send messages between stations with relative ease, though I should point out that a lot depended on line of sight, and that the evidence for the continuance of such signals in the later empire is somewhat sparse. However, the functionality of Roman command during the Saxon threat required that forces operate from stations on local patrols, be they land or sea. This does not require integration.

 

The signalling system of old was designed primarily to call for reinforcements in the event of an enemy attack, not necessarily to call to other stations on the line, which by the standards we see at Hadrians Wall for instance were lightly defended if at all, being essentially a customs obstacle rather than a military one. Further, the ability of Romans to conducy signalling from the small raiding vessels they employed on the British coast was effectively impossible.

 

Integration requires central command. Whilst the Romans employed a man to oversee operations, it had always been Roman practice to encourage local initiative in command. In effect, a station would respond to an incursion or situation as best it could (and the response might be very ineffective in some circumstances) whilst sending for help. This does not mean the man responsible was going to survey his maps and order units to seal a gap. Far from it. He might be elsewhere and out of touch, and without modern communications even Roman signalling couldn't compensate for this difficulty. Instead, whatever internal reinforcement station existed would have sent troops as required by circumstance and local initiative.

 

That's all very well, but in the late empire of Roman Britain the older system of depth defense had been replaced. In effect, the coastal stations of the Saxon Shore were patrolling for incursions with limited support and with little integration at all.

[sylla]

That's all very well, but in the late empire of Roman Britain the older system of depth defense had been replaced. In effect, the coastal stations of the Saxon Shore were patrolling for incursions with limited support and with little integration at all.

And I suppose you will be kind enough for sharing all your references with us, so we may be able to reach the same conclusions.

 

After all, as virtually no "maybes" and "ifs" were present in your long explanation, this should be something more than just mere personal unfounded speculation ...

 

You know, any argument ("speculation" if you like) is as valid as the evidence it is based on.

Edited October 28, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

I'd be happy to. Unfortunately... the Romans were inconsiderate regarding comparisons between ancient and modern tactics, strategy, organisation, and methodology, in that they never wrote any such treatise, at least as far as I can tell, so like everyone in the modern day, you'll have to rely on post-historical analysis, like wot I wrote. On the other hand, if you don't like mine, there are other authors as qualified if not more so currently in print who deal with such issues, and if they aren't to your taste, you might like to attempt an analysis yourself.

[Northern Neil]

That's all very well, but in the late empire of Roman Britain the older system of depth defense had been replaced. In effect, the coastal stations of the Saxon Shore were patrolling for incursions with limited support and with little integration at all.

And I suppose you will be kind enough for sharing all your references with us, so we may be able to reach the same conclusions.

 

After all, as virtually no "maybes" and "ifs" were present in your long explanation, this should be something more than just mere personal unfounded speculation ...

 

You know, any argument ("speculation" if you like) is as valid as the evidence it is based on.

 

A quick look at the Ordnance Survey map of Roman Britain will show that there were no reserve units placed towards the rear, inland of the Saxon Shore forts. Absence of defense in depth? certainly. Additionally there were no roads joining them together as there were with those on earlier frontier systems. This may hint at lack of integration, although of course the sea could convey traffic. The whole system seems to have developed and grown over about 80 years as opposed to being a planned system of defences. There seems to be enough evidence, available at a glance, to back up Caldrail's hypothesis, which to me appears to stand up pretty well.

[sylla]

A quick look at the Ordnance Survey map of Roman Britain will show that there were no reserve units placed towards the rear, inland of the Saxon Shore forts. Absence of defense in depth? certainly. Additionally there were no roads joining them together as there were with those on earlier frontier systems. This may hint at lack of integration, although of course the sea could convey traffic. The whole system seems to have developed and grown over about 80 years as opposed to being a planned system of defences. There seems to be enough evidence, available at a glance, to back up Caldrail's hypothesis, which to me appears to stand up pretty well.

Thanks. That is the kind of evidence I was looking for.

 

All that said, my guess is that the definitive proof of the integration of any system is how it worked, especially under critical conditions.

 

Under Count Theodosius, the system was perfectly able to bring the new units from the Continent in time and to bring a massive number of invaders all the way back from Londinium to the Caledonian border in a matter of weeks.

 

That seems pretty integrated and functional to me, irrespectively of the time required for reaching such level of integration between land and naval units.

 

Of course, that doesn't imply that the system described by the Notitia Dignitatum was wholely planned in advance, if that is what you mean by "integrated".

Edited October 29, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

It isn't proof of anything. Northern Neil has made some observations and linked them to a map - it's evidence, not a conclusion.

 

Since the prevailing strategic policy was defense in depth at the latter part of the empire, which presumably was the case in Britain as much as anywhere else, we then have a failure of an 'integrated system' regarding the Saxon Shore. The defenses had been in place since the 3rd century and had been under pressure from Saxons since that time. The evidence of Roman coin hoards in Saxon hands suggest succesful raiding (there's rather too many to indicate succesful trade which involves payment for goods as much as taking them) throughout the period, thus if integrated, the system had serious flaws.

 

As already observed, the defenses were designed primarily to discourage Saxon depridation rather than destroy it, which given the limited Roman communications network of the day was quite probably an impossible endeavour. What makes this situation worse toward the end of empire is the increasing use of Saxon mercenaries as defenders. Even feoderatii were used wholesale without Roman training under their own officers (or more accurately, tribal leaders), thus weren't rained in the Roman methods of waging war.

 

It is highly probable therefore that these mercenaries were not as keen defenders of the Roman state as might be imagined, since they would have been loyal to their pay check in this circumstance. It doesn't stretch the imagination to see the later Saxon defenders as somewhat lazy and indifferent.

 

Integrated systems of defense have one essential property. Communication. Without that, the disparate forces available to it have no means of central control. The Count of the Saxon Shore was functionally unable to control centrally. In any event, his was a primarily administrative task in that it would be his responsibility to organise the forces prior to the incursion, to ensure they were capable of meeting that threat. I concede that if close to a situation the Count would be required to lead a response personally, but this wasn't his primary task. That the system was failing (the Saxons were successfully raiding and remained an ever present threat even with any assumed co-operation from continental assets) rather points to a lack of co-ordination, a natural consequence of the limited command capability of Roman times.

 

It would be wrong to assume that a Count of the Saxon Shore could scramble a squadron of cavalry to counter any threat once detected by observation. Firstly, the forts were not closely spaced, the coastline offered many chances of making safe landfall in areas outside of direct observation, and that the Saxons weren't likely to announce their presence at all, preferring instead to mount suprise raids. We then must consider response times of the Saxon Shore. Since the defenders would be relying on patrols encountering incursions, or signals from other emplacements, or perhaps no more than hue and cry, the intelligence received of an enemy threat would be variable in scope, according to situation.

 

Again we return to the lack of Roman preparation in late empire forces. Untrained feoderatii may well have been slow to respond (that remains an assumption - those saxon defenders with more enthusiasm would have reacted quicker but then we have little evidence to gauge their motivations).

 

All in all, the lack of maintenance and operational ability in the defenders will have told heavily on the supposed 'integration' of the Saxon Shore. But what exactly is 'integration'? Boat patrols must, by their very nature, have operated independently. Cavalry patrols were orbital to their station, from whom the initial response would have started by word of mouth, without direct communication other than riding back to their station. In short, patrols were there to ward off the enemy, to discourage his arrival, as any attempt to fight them was by that patrol alone. There was little chance of immediate aid in the event of an encounter.