146 BCE

[marcus silanus]

In the "Ides of March" thread, much has been said about the virtues and faults of the Roman Republic and its transition to the Principate. I am interested to know if members might agree with H.H. Scullard, that it was 146 BCE and the destruction of both Carthage and Corinth that saw Rome first recognising an incompatability with being a city state in dominion over the known world?

 

I do not particularly think that the Romans questioned, at this time, their systems and institutions or had any doubt about the Republic or its continued credibility. However, did the events of 146 BCE change the nature of Roman power in a way that made the transition to Principate inevitable?

[Ingsoc]

Could you explain why he think that? to me the transition from the Republic to the Principate was mainly due to internal political reasons that destabilize the Republic form of government. In 146 BC Rome has shown that she is the supreme power at the Mediterranean coast but this event had no internal political effect.

 

I think that Tiberius Gracchus term as Tribune in 133 BC was the crucial year for the Roman Republic:

 

It's the first time a Roman magistratus bypass the authority of the Senate and cancel his colleague veto right (by ejecting Marcus Octavius from office) thus Gracchus harm two princibles that were at the heart of the Roman Republican system.

 

Gracchus also use his veto to "shut down" the Roman state with his veto powers and his illegal election (even if it's was officially legal it's was still against the Mos Maiorum) has shown that the Tribunship could became a powerful tool to dominate the state.

 

And the worst thing in my eyes is the fact that in this year, for the first time in the history of the Republic, a magistratus was murdered as a result of political disagreement. I think that the peaceful ability to solve internal political disagreement is the basic requirement of stable government.

 

While I tend to believe Gracchus had more good intentions in his action than bad, the damage he done to the proper conduct of the Republic set a very negative precedent.

[sylla]

Could you explain why he think that? to me the transition from the Republic to the Principate was mainly due to internal political reasons that destabilize the Republic form of government. In 146 BC Rome has shown that she is the supreme power at the Mediterranean coast but this event had no internal political effect.

 

I think that Tiberius Gracchus term as Tribune in 133 BC was the crucial year for the Roman Republic:

 

It's the first time a Roman magistratus bypass the authority of the Senate and cancel his colleague veto right (by ejecting Marcus Octavius from office) thus Gracchus harm two princibles that were at the heart of the Roman Republican system.

 

Gracchus also use his veto to "shut down" the Roman state with his veto powers and his illegal election (even if it's was officially legal it's was still against the Mos Maiorum) has shown that the Tribunship could became a powerful tool to dominate the state.

 

And the worst thing in my eyes is the fact that in this year, for the first time in the history of the Republic, a magistratus was murdered as a result of political disagreement. I think that the peaceful ability to solve internal political disagreement is the basic requirement of stable government.

 

While I tend to believe Gracchus had more good intentions in his action than bad, the damage he done to the proper conduct of the Republic set a very negative precedent.

The road to hell is paved with good intentions. In any case, I don't think we have to believe TG's intentions were different from any of his nobile pairs: money and power.

 

Legal statements are categorical; it is or it isn't. If TG's election was "officially legal", it was Legal; period. The best evidence is that TG was not prosecuted for his actions; he was simply murdered. He was not acting against the "Roman state"; as an active part of that state, what he shut down was his opposition, entirely by legal methods. That's the way any more or less democratic state is supposed to run.

 

From Sallust onwards, virtually all relevant Roman historians agreed with your final statement: if 133 BC was so crucial a year, it was fundamentally because a magistratus was murdered as a result of political disagreement. TG was the victim, not the assassin. It is perfectly clear that his opponents were not particularly worried for the welfare of the Republic.

 

As the ancient Romans had a poor comprehension of sociological issues, it is understandable that they can attribute the fate of the World to the caprice of a fistful of characters.

We know better than that; the political instability of the late II century BC was largely due to complex social conflicts that were for real, with or without the Gracchi.

As far as we can tell, had the senate been able to satisfactorily dealt with the agrarian problem, Caesar and Augustus would in all likelihood never have a chance to get the autocratic power.

[Ingsoc]

The road to hell is paved with good intentions. In any case, I don't think we have to believe TG's intentions were different from any of his nobile pairs: money and power.

 

Yes, you could say the same thing about any politician in anytime. I think the fact that Ti. Gracchus stick to his ideals to the bitter end, even as he knew that all his political allies has abandon him show he was more of an idealist than power hungry.

 

Legal statements are categorical; it is or it isn't. If TG's election was "officially legal", it was Legal; period. The best evidence is that TG was not prosecuted for his actions; he was simply murdered. He was not acting against the "Roman state"; as an active part of that state, what he shut down was his opposition, entirely by legal methods. That's the way any more or less democratic state is supposed to run.

 

In any country there is unwriting laws on how public figures should behave (we call it "custom", the Romans call them "Mos Maiorum"), in fact in some states like Britain the entire government system is base on customs. By disregarding the Senate, his fellow Tribune and the wide use of his veto right Ti. Gracchus didn't break any laws but he did break century old customs that dictate the "rules" of the political game, in my opinion this much worst that simply breaking the law since it's much harder to stabilize a system of customs than a system of laws.

 

From Sallust onwards, virtually all relevant Roman historians agreed with your final statement: if 133 BC was so crucial a year, it was fundamentally because a magistratus was murdered as a result of political disagreement. TG was the victim, not the assassin. It is perfectly clear that his opponents were not particularly worried for the welfare of the Republic.

 

As the ancient Romans had a poor comprehension of sociological issues, it is understandable that they can attribute the fate of the World to the caprice of a fistful of characters.

We know better than that; the political instability of the late II century BC was largely due to complex social conflicts that were for real, with or without the Gracchi.

As far as we can tell, had the senate been able to satisfactorily dealt with the agrarian problem, Caesar and Augustus would in all likelihood never have a chance to get the autocratic power.

 

I agree with you, to a certain point. Obviously Ti. Gracchus actions didn't take place in a vacuum and were result of social changes in Rome, however quit often the underprivileged need a leader and usually this leader come from the aristocracy, if it's wasn't Ti. Gracchus in 133 BC who took upon himself the case of the declining agrarian land owners the outbreak of the problem would not have occurred in 133 BC but in another time (30, 50 or 100 years later, who could tell?...).

[caldrail]

In the "Ides of March" thread, much has been said about the virtues and faults of the Roman Republic and its transition to the Principate. I am interested to know if members might agree with H.H. Scullard, that it was 146 BCE and the destruction of both Carthage and Corinth that saw Rome first recognising an incompatability with being a city state in dominion over the known world?

 

I do not particularly think that the Romans questioned, at this time, their systems and institutions or had any doubt about the Republic or its continued credibility. However, did the events of 146 BCE change the nature of Roman power in a way that made the transition to Principate inevitable?

A lot depends on how you see the Roman Republic. The much illustrated excess of the Principate colours our view of Roman society as a whole (I've been just as guilty - MPC has whacked me over the head a few times regarding this point ) but somewhat unfairly. Now whereas some people regard the Principate as a turning point in Roman culture underpinned by the change in administration toward an autocratic style that would evolve toward monarchial emperors in the late empire, and expressed by the raw and decadent lifestyles of the Pax Romana, But I don't believe this was a sudden change. Instead, the evolution of Roman culture took place from it's lowest point, the disaster of Cannae.

 

Before that, Rome was identifiably a more moral place. I doubt it was a democratic paradise at all, but the Hannabalic War had squandered much of Rome's agricultural produce and indeed no small quota of the available workforce. An estimate of one seventh of working age males had died. Once the Romans had forced the fight into Africa by threatening Carthage directly, there was at last an opportunity, following eighteen years of campaigning, to restore Rome's economic strength. Evidently they succeeded, and by the time Polybius writes his history around 150BC he clearly sees Rome as a vigorous nation and one to be proud of in terms of political structure representing the needs of all voting classes (slaves of course need not apply).

 

It's entirely plausible that the Senate generally agreed with those sentiments. They had restored Rome's fortunes from the brink of disaster and had grown confident enough to look at their punic rivals was some scorn, as a nation that had withered from its great past, and one that merely stood as an obstacle to Roman peace. It is therefore, the weakening of Carthage that encourages Rome and it's growing confidence to embark on a campaign to end their rival permanently - to end the long running rivalry for good. In doing so, the rival sea-power had been extinguished.

 

In terms of politics then Rome had reached the point at which it could dominate the Mediterranean. Having fought a bitter series of wars to survive it no doubt felt justified in doing so. Further, the warfare of ancient times was profitable unlike the need for expensive technologically advanced forces of modern times. There was wealth and status to be had from large scale conquest.

 

Was it inevitable that Rome would become the Principate. Interestingly, Polybius said yes, it was inevitable, a step in the evolution of a state and he wrote that a century or more before Augustus assumed the power behind the Senate. Certainly the temptations of becoming a conquest state were huge and without the restrictions of a balance of power, what reason had Rome for not evolving that way? It should be remembered however that the generals and their private armies of the late Republic were not entirely vassals of the state - they were acting on their own initiative for political gain at the expense of the state if need be.

 

I have similar leanings to Polybius regarding this question. It was inevitable that Rome would change as a society at some point. Whether the Principate was inevitable or not is harder to justify. Rome was a competitive culture and with increasing wealth and status to be had from military ventures, the power struggles would have been difficult to prevent, especially by a Senate that had grown more self-serving and lazy on success.

 

The Principate may not have been inevitable therefore, but certainly it flourished in conditions that favoured it.

[sylla]

Yes, you could say the same thing about any politician in anytime. I think the fact that Ti. Gracchus stick to his ideals to the bitter end, even as he knew that all his political allies has abandon him show he was more of an idealist than power hungry.

You could say the same thing about any defeated politician in anytime. "Ideals" and "politician" in the same phrase is an oxymoron, at least regarding the Roman Republic.

 

In any country there is unwriting laws on how public figures should behave (we call it "custom", the Romans call them "Mos Maiorum"), in fact in some states like Britain the entire government system is base on customs. By disregarding the Senate, his fellow Tribune and the wide use of his veto right Ti. Gracchus didn't break any laws but he did break century old customs that dictate the "rules" of the political game, in my opinion this much worst that simply breaking the law since it's much harder to stabilize a system of customs than a system of laws.

Under such logic, any innovation would be against "custom", and any government would be entitled to punish it even more than "simply" breaking the law like, let say, killing a magistrate... sorry but I simply can't see any reason to believe the Roman Republic was all that fascist.

 

British and Roman legal systems are certainly dissimilar, but in any system the rules have to be defined in advance; you can't simply determine in hindsight that any action was illegal after all... unless we are talking about an Orwell's Animal Farm.

 

"Custom" or "Mos Maiorum" is a source for the law, not the law itself. Before being enforced, any law must have been decreed; simple as that.

 

I agree with you, to a certain point. Obviously Ti. Gracchus actions didn't take place in a vacuum and were result of social changes in Rome, however quit often the underprivileged need a leader and usually this leader come from the aristocracy, if it's wasn't Ti. Gracchus in 133 BC who took upon himself the case of the declining agrarian land owners the outbreak of the problem would not have occurred in 133 BC but in another time (30, 50 or 100 years later, who could tell?...).

We can tell; the underprivileged dissatisfaction with the traditional oligarchic rule of the Republican Noble families was the main explanation on why a populist autocratic regime could be introduced by the so-called "First Triumvirate". Edited July 13, 2009 by sylla

[Ingsoc]

You could say the same thing about any defeated politician in anytime. "Ideals" and "politician" in the same phrase is an oxymoron, at least regarding the Roman Republic.

 

But Ti. Gracchus wasn't simply "defeated", he was murdered. As Plutarchus write some before him try to pass agrarian laws but in fear of the opposition they backed down, Ti. Gracchus didn't even as all his political allies abandon him and this exactly the thing that make the difference between idealist and opportunist.

 

Under such logic, any innovation would be against "custom", and any government would be entitled to punish it even more than "simply" breaking the law like, let say, killing a magistrate... sorry but I simply can't see any reason to believe the Roman Republic was all that fascist.

 

British and Roman legal systems are certainly dissimilar, but in any system the rules have to be defined in advance; you can't simply determine in hindsight that any action was illegal after all... unless we are talking about an Orwell's Animal Farm.

 

"Custom" or "Mos Maiorum" is a source for the law, not the law itself. Before being enforced, any law must have been decreed; simple as that.

 

An innovation that goes against the "spirit" of politics would certainly be illegal even if the dry law say it's legal. Take for example Britain, it's customary that the monarch appoint the head of the largest party in Parliament to the office of PM but she has no obligation to as strictly speaking it's "her majesty government" and the queen could appoint any citizen she like to this office, but if she do it's would be describe as "illegal" by most British because it's goes against the establish custom.

[sylla]

But Ti. Gracchus wasn't simply "defeated", he was murdered. As Plutarchus write some before him try to pass agrarian laws but in fear of the opposition they backed down, Ti. Gracchus didn't even as all his political allies abandon him and this exactly the thing that make the difference between idealist and opportunist.

TG didn't die for being an idealist, but for miscalculating the odds against him. It's hard to blame him; the law was on his side and centuries of precedents backed his personal security.

TG may in fact have been an idealist, but his actions can be equally explained as opportunistic maneuvers to get popular support for his personal ambition, as their enemies unsurprisingly stated.

 

An innovation that goes against the "spirit" of politics would certainly be illegal even if the dry law say it's legal. Take for example Britain, it's customary that the monarch appoint the head of the largest party in Parliament to the office of PM but she has no obligation to as strictly speaking it's "her majesty government" and the queen could appoint any citizen she like to this office, but if she do it's would be describe as "illegal" by most British because it's goes against the establish custom.

In fact, she can't do that; please check it out. Plainly, the United Kingdom is a democracy and their Kings are ruled by laws.

 

In Britain and in any other place of the word, now and ever, a law has to be decreed previous to be enforced.

The British Common Law means law created and refined by judges, rather than through executive action or legislative statutes (like in the Civil Law systems).

"Custom" is not law by itself, in Britain or anywhere else; custom may be used as a precedent for a law.

 

Who was supposed to define what was going "against the spirit of politics"? Let say Publius Satyreius or Lucius Rufus, TG's assasins?

If the Roman legislation had any distinctive trait, it was undoubtedly the protection of even the lesser citizen against the arbitrary exercise of power (ie, not backed by a juridical decision) from even the highest magistrates; just remember the Lex Portia.

 

If 133 BC was the point of no return in the way to the Civil Wars, as most if not all Roman historians believed, people like Satyreius, Rufus and their cronies were to be blamed and certainly not their victim.

 

Could you explain why he think that? to me the transition from the Republic to the Principate was mainly due to internal political reasons that destabilize the Republic form of government. In 146 BC Rome has shown that she is the supreme power at the Mediterranean coast but this event had no internal political effect.

I think MS is talking about HH Scullard's A History of the Roman World, 753 to 146 BC; the author explained in the Introduction section:

"During the period covered by this volume their success was unbounded, but before the end a change is perceptible. Foreign influences begin to mine the moral qualities and the ancestral discipline of the Roman people, lust of power at times superseded desire for law and order, foreign conquest appeared to many as a source of profit, the institutions of a city-state were strained to a breaking-point in an attempt to govern a far-flung Empire, the revolutionary era ushered by the Gracchi was approaching and the fabric of the Republic began to torter".

 

I am interested to know if members might agree with H.H. Scullard, that it was 146 BCE and the destruction of both Carthage and Corinth that saw Rome first recognising an incompatability with being a city state in dominion over the known world?... However, did the events of 146 BCE change the nature of Roman power in a way that made the transition to Principate inevitable?

Nope.

First, very few historic events have been strictly "inevitable" ever; I can't see a priori any reason why the Senatorial elite couldn't have been more adaptable and satisfactorily dealt with the new problems, eg. an effective agrarian reform. If the ruling noble families weren't up to the task, that's another story.

Additionally, as he himself stated (read above) and the same as most Roman historians, Ingsoc and I, Scullard also considered the Gracchi as the definitory moment that "ushered... the revolutionary era". Scullard might have had multiple didactic reasons for the selection of 146 BC, only 13 years before TG's death; presumably one of them was that such lapse would let him analyze the immediate factors that contributed to the Gracchi event in his following volume.

Edited July 14, 2009 by sylla

[Ingsoc]

In fact, she can't do that; please check it out. Plainly, the United Kingdom is a democracy and their Kings are ruled by laws.

 

In Britain and in any other place of the word, now and ever, a law has to be decreed previous to be enforced.

The British Common Law means law created and refined by judges, rather than through executive action or legislative statutes (like in the Civil Law systems).

"Custom" is not law by itself, in Britain or anywhere else; custom may be used as a precedent for a law.

 

Who was supposed to define what was going "against the spirit of politics"? Let say Publius Satyreius or Lucius Rufus, TG's assasins?

If the Roman legislation had any distinctive trait, it was undoubtedly the protection of even the lesser citizen against the arbitrary exercise of power (ie, not backed by a juridical decision) from even the highest magistrates; just remember the Lex Portia.

 

If 133 BC was the point of no return in the way to the Civil Wars, as most if not all Roman historians believed, people like Satyreius, Rufus and their cronies were to be blamed and certainly not their victim.

 

As far as I know the British monarch was never stripped by law from his powers, there just a tradition that he never use them contrary to public opinions. but I could be wrong about this.

 

The things that goes against the spirit of politics is the disregard to centuries old traditions on which the Roman Republic managed itself, in the case of Ti. Gracchus it's was his disregard of the Senate, his election for the tribunship for the second time and the disregard the veto of his fellow tribune by removing his from office. I'm sure all those things cause more panic than his agrarian law and in turn brought his opposition itself to disregard the customs of the Republic.

 

I think MS is talking about HH Scullard's A History of the Roman World, 753 to 146 BC; the author explained in the Introduction section:

"During the period covered by this volume their success was unbounded, but before the end a change is perceptible. Foreign influences begin to mine the moral qualities and the ancestral discipline of the Roman people, lust of power at times superseded desire for law and order, foreign conquest appeared to many as a source of profit, the institutions of a city-state were strained to a breaking-point in an attempt to govern a far-flung Empire, the revolutionary era ushered by the Gracchi was approaching and the fabric of the Republic began to torter".

 

The issue of the corruption in the late Republic was discussed here.

[Kosmo]

The problem of poor citizens that left their farms and were now living in Rome was not going to be solved with land distribution. As any traditional society romans wanted a return to a previous Golden Age of small farmers but this was gone forever. This was tried by Gracchi and their opponents as well. The solution eventually found was to give to the poor money, food and shows and this unfortunate solution could be applied equally well by a dictatorial princeps or by the democratic institutions of the Republic.

The end of the Republic came when power went to the commanders of the mercenary army. The quick succession between Marian Reform and Sylla's march on Rome it's proof enough for me.

[sylla]

The problem of poor citizens that left their farms and were now living in Rome was not going to be solved with land distribution. As any traditional society romans wanted a return to a previous Golden Age of small farmers but this was gone forever. This was tried by Gracchi and their opponents as well. The solution eventually found was to give to the poor money, food and shows and this unfortunate solution could be applied equally well by a dictatorial princeps or by the democratic institutions of the Republic.

It's clear that the agrarian problem was never solved by the more-or-less democratic institutions of the Republic.

The solution came with the Empire: land was granted for veterans, the only "poor citizens" that the state had really to deal with.

"Golden Ages" are retrospective idealizations from times of crisis, and they can be found in virtually every civilization and nation.

The end of the Republic came when power went to the commanders of the mercenary army. The quick succession between Marian Reform and Sylla's march on Rome it's proof enough for me.

We esentially agree, as long as you are using "mercenary" in a most metaphorical way.

The critical question here is why was the professionalization of the army required at all; ie, why were the traditional citizen levies not up to the task any more.

Was it really the terrible performance of the Legions against the Germans the main (or only) cause of the so-called Marian reforms?

It is frequently forgotten here that the "poor people" were also the soldiers; the military service was their true and only political power, either under the Republic or the Empire, as it was so vividly illustrated by the story of the plebeian withdrawal to the Sacred Mount.

Edited July 14, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

Was it really the terrible performance of the Legions against the Germans the main (or only) cause of the so-called Marian reforms?

 

The main cause of the reforms was the personal experience of Marius while consul. Unable to raise a legion organised according to the traditional pattern by the lack of veterans available to him, he simply organised a basic legion armed more or less uniformly with swords as if they were all Principes. He found it a more convenient arrangement that simplified training, as he realises that only one training schedule was needed, that a uniform standard of training could be applied to all legions instead of the inconsistent tarining provided ordinarily, and that other legions were already being raised and treated in this manner increasingly.

 

The lack of performance was of no direct concern - that could could be remedied by one means or another in the Roman tradition, and the performance of their troops had varied over time anyhow - something Marius would have been keenly aware of. Although the current standard wasn't the issue, he saw that an improvement could be made to the legions generally instead by employing professional soldiers rather than annually and sometimes hastily raised levies.

[Kosmo]

Poor citizens were not part of the army before Marius as soldiers had to afford their equipment and to be able to take leave from their daily bread winning for long periods.

Also plebs were not necessary poor. Many of them were wealthy and powerful.

 

The road that led to the massive imperial assistance begun when competitors in elections started throwing games and gifts to win the urban poor citizens.

Also supplying the city with cheap grains was a task that the institutions of the Republic handled long before the Empire. Bringing this 2 processes together did not required a dictator even if it was eventually done by an authoritarian regime.

The Republic was not ended by the urban or rural discontent but by armies that were loyal to their commanders and not the Republic.

[marcus silanus]

Could you explain why he think that? to me the transition from the Republic to the Principate was mainly due to internal political reasons that destabilize the Republic form of government. In 146 BC Rome has shown that she is the supreme power at the Mediterranean coast but this event had no internal political effect.

 

I think that Tiberius Gracchus term as Tribune in 133 BC was the crucial year for the Roman Republic:

 

Although there were no constitutional changes associated with the events of 146 BC, they do, for me, demonstrate a change in the character of the Republic. It certainly wasn't the first time that Roman legions had sacked and destroyed cities, but their actions at Corinth and Carthage sent out an unequivocal message that Rome was now mistress of the region and would not accept even the prospect of disorder. Of course, there were many, many cases of serious disorder and rebellion after these events but this, I think, was the intention.

 

It was perhaps, in part, this change of character that allowed the acceptance of more autocratic styles of leadership; men whose ability to lead and keep or restore order ranked more highly than any orthodox Republican credentials.

Edited July 14, 2009 by marcus silanus

[marcus silanus]

Was it inevitable that Rome would become the Principate. Interestingly, Polybius said yes, it was inevitable, a step in the evolution of a state and he wrote that a century or more before Augustus assumed the power behind the Senate. Certainly the temptations of becoming a conquest state were huge and without the restrictions of a balance of power, what reason had Rome for not evolving that way? It should be remembered however that the generals and their private armies of the late Republic were not entirely vassals of the state - they were acting on their own initiative for political gain at the expense of the state if need be.

 

I have similar leanings to Polybius regarding this question. It was inevitable that Rome would change as a society at some point. Whether the Principate was inevitable or not is harder to justify. Rome was a competitive culture and with increasing wealth and status to be had from military ventures, the power struggles would have been difficult to prevent, especially by a Senate that had grown more self-serving and lazy on success.

 

The Principate may not have been inevitable therefore, but certainly it flourished in conditions that favoured it.

 

In mentioning Polybius, am I right in thinking that you are referring to the anacyclosis detailed in his theory of the forms of states? I understood that a large part of his admiration for the Republic was that he saw it not following the course of anacyclosis because of the mixed nature of the constitution. I wonder though, if by 133BC he may have felt that Rome was indeed following that theory of states and seen elements of an ochlocracy following a fragile democracy.