M. Porcius Cato

I guess you could argue that Rome's success in defeating Carthage sent Rome on an expansionist binge that was bound to be destabilizing. The only problem with that theory is that it doesn't explain why the previous 100+ years of successful expansionism wasn't similarly destabilizing, similarly 'inspiring' to would be dictators, and similarly fertile for the creation of private armies, etc. No, I just don't think this explanation works.

But the last sentence is the issue under dispute, specifically whether the Hannibalic war necessitated the creation of private armies. If Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar had not provided land to their veterans, their veterans would still have left service far richer than they had entered it. These soldiers had been paid for their service; they were given leave to rape and pillage the provinces at their leisure; and their commanders grew monstrously rich from their campaigns. So, there's no point in pretending that the soldiers would have faced starvation upon leaving the service. Moreover, in every case, the commanders you mentioned could have patiently attempted to purchase land out of their own purse for their soldiers. But they didn't. They relied on confiscation, proscription, and civil war to evacuate speedily those Roman lands they wished to disburse to their veterans. In short, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar came to view Roman property holders in the same way that they learned to view non-Roman property holders--as de-humanized fodder for their own ambition. Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar weren't frustrated social workers--they were thugs who were accustomed to taking what they wanted, rights be damned. What is the relevance of the Hannibalic war to these affairs? The connection seems very slight to me. If I'm misunderstanding you, please let me know.

Finishing out the Polybius ends in ellipses above: ... The principal authors of this change will be the masses, who at some moments will believe that they have a grievance against the greed of other members of society, and at others are made conceited by the flattery of those who aspire to office. By this stage they will have been roused to fury and their deliberations will be constantly swayed by passions, so that they will no longer consent to obey or even to be the equals of their leaders, but will demand everything or by far the greatest share for themselves. When this happens, the consitution will change its name to the one which sounds the most imposing of all, that of freedom and democracy, but its nature to that which is the worst of all, that is the rule of the mob. This latter part is critical for understanding Polybius, who held that the aristocracy were not the "principal authors" for the decline of the state, but rather their competiton for the favor of the fickle and irrational mob. Agree or disagree, that was a very Roman view.

I agree wholeheartedly with Virgil. Instead of a 5-minute daily recitation of the pledge, just spend 25 minutes once per week talking about baby civics, including the basic mechanics and logic behind the operation of the government.

I don't see the connection between the expansion of the number of quaestors, the fall and rebirth of the tribunate, and the increased payoffs for military success. It seems that the last element was certainly important in explaining Caesar's rise to power, but I fail to see how that element connects to the other two reforms. OK, let's grant the premise for the sake of argument--still, what percentage of Caesar's army were proletarii? Does anyone have a firm, educated guess? After the Marian reforms, the proletarii only made up 5% of the new army (according to one source I read but have unfortunately forgotten). If that figure holds, then even if the landless in Rome doubled, it would still have only a small effect on the size of Caesar's army.

Updated data from EIA: 9/11 - US Avg (All Grades): $ 2.670 9/18 - US Avg (All Grades): $ 2.549 9/25 - US Avg (All Grades): $ 2.429 10/2 - US Avg (All Grades): $ 2.360 10/9 - US Avg (All Grades): $ 2.310 10/16-US Avg (All Grades): $ 2.274 10/23-US Avg (All Grades): $ 2.255 10/30-US Avg (All Grades): $ 2.264 11/6 - US Avg (All Grades): $ 2.246 11/13-US Avg (All Grades): $ 2.278 Data presently consistent with FC's hypothesis of oil company/GOP price manipulation in anticipation of early November elections. This hypothesis saw a gradual return to pre-election prices (when oil companies would feel free to 'gouge' consumers) once the election was over. The election is over, and the prices have risen a little bit, just as FC predicted. We agreed to re-assess in December, so we'll see whether prices really do return toward their pre-election levels or whether this is more of the same bumpiness seen on 10/30. Only time will tell...

Isn't it interesting how widely the Pledge is required of children--yet how seldom an adult has any reason to recite it?

I think there's an important distinction to be made between 'power' and 'influence'. A person who has great power can direct the actions of others without needing to persuade them; a person who has great influence can persuade many others easily. As a woman, Servilia might have had great influence (and she probably did), but she wielded no power. I've often wondered about her relationship with Cato. The picture of the relationship imagined by McCullough is a possibility, I suppose, though obviously others are equally well imagined. Does anyone have a good article or book on Servilia to recommend?

Good points. You're probably right.

Would you care to expand on your thesis? What, in your view, is the principal evidence supporting the idea that there were structural changes in the cursus honorum that benefitted Caesar? Isn't this based on the mistaken idea that Caesar was born in 100 instead of 102? Also, how exactly do you tie "personal armies" to the second punic war? I think I know where you're coming from, but I'd better not assume. Actually, I think Rome would have been more vulnerable to a time-ported Caesar prior to the second punic war if only because Hannibal hadn't yet taken Rome to school to learn to fight. Moreover, the Senate had yet had no experience dealing with anyone like Caesar, so he would have found still less opposition in the forum than in the battlefield. In any case, this is a matter of pure speculation.

Another charming and erudite submission, Andrew: educational, enjoyable, a pearl.

As I recall, the baths of Caracalla were free to the public, and they were frequented by free men and slaves, men and women, young and old. Most likely, it was considered in the public interest that everyone bathe, much as we consider it in the public interest that everyone be vaccinated.

Again, I think the Roman view was best expressed to Polybius by his Roman hosts (the Scipionic circle) and repeated by Polybius in The Histories. Briefly, that the republic rose to dominate the Mediterranean due to the competition of the aristocrats for poltical offices that were decided by the people of Rome, who believed in Roman greatness and its favor by the gods. Polybius' argument, essentially, is the view that Fergus Millar has endorsed. There were other explanations offered by the Romans, ones which Polybius did not affirm. For example, that the republic rose to greatness because of the moral superiority of the Romans; in this view, the Roman yeomen of yore valued thrift, austerity, severity, the sanctity of an oath, obedience to the law, dignitas, and so forth, and it was from these virtues that Rome became pre-eminent in power and majesty. Livy apparently clung to this view, and it was the source of his moral fables about ancient Rome (e.g., Horatius at the bridge holding off the Etruscans, "slaves of haughty tyrants who, careless of their own freedom, came to oppress the liberty of others"). There is also the standard Great Man explanation for the rise of the republic--namely, that Rome rose to greatness due to a long, thin line of Heroes, stretching back to Brutus and Poplicola and leading all the way up to Julius Caesar. I think the Virtues Theory and the Great Man Theory are too simple: the men of Rome were probably no more moral or great than those of Greece, yet the Romans dominated all Hellas within a short span of time. My own view is much closer to Polybius'. This view has a role for great men and moral values, but their impact on history is constrained by the political system itself. Under the republic, the competition between great men and mere dabblers tended to favor --over the long run-- those with military talent, legal ability, and the power to persuade, though only to the extent that the laws of the republic were actually upheld. In contrast, under the principate, great men (such as Agricola) were--as a matter of policy--subordinated to their political masters (and often moral and intellectual inferiors), whose latter power rested entirely on birth, adoption, and civil war rather than on political persuasion and military success.

I note that you have still failed to identify the elements that distinguished the republic from the principate and were responsible for the greater expansionism of the former. Millar's account (and that of Polybius) can deal with these facts. Tired cynicism about the republic -- which characteristically fails to cite any historical events or sources -- does not. EDIT: And, yes, I admit to being a romantic.

Yes, of course, I agree that Soviet Russia was not a democracy--the point of my question was to identify the feature(s) that distinguished it from being a democracy. And I'd agree that Rome was never a democracy--however, what distinguished the republic from the principate if not the democratic elements of the republic (e.g., free electoral competition, free speech in the forum, the ability to bring private lawsuits against magistrates, etc)?

Yes, with respect to the constitution, you're correct. But political parties play a very different role in the US and UK, and the role of political party in Rome was more like that of the US system. With that proviso, couldn't you argue that Soviet Russia--a nation that had intra-Party elections--was a democracy? It seems to me that your proviso undercuts the whole distinction between democracy, oligarchy, and 'mixed' (i.e., republican systems). Moreover, I think there's an important ingredient missing from the whole taxonomy, and those are the bills that limit what the state may and may not do to its citizens. For example, the lex Porcia (sponsored by Cato the Elder) forbade the state from flogging citizens without trial; the Magna Carta set limits on the what the king could and could not do to his nobles; the US Bill of Rights sets limits on what Congress may and may not authorize. These sorts of restrictions on state power are agnostic about the body over which they supervene--magistrate, king, or assembly--but they all share the characteristic of guaranteeing certain individual rights. It could very well be that these sorts of limits on state power were far more important than Polybius recognized in explaining the rise of Rome, which was the original purpose of his analysis of the Roman constitution.

Getting back to the original question... I think posters are correct that the "What if Caesar had lost?" question depends very much on WHO defeated Caesar and WHO--among the Caesarians--were left behind. Had Pompey defeated Caesar and killed him in battle, there could have remained a number of Caesarian partisans around, including even Antony. It doesn't seem difficult to imagine Antony goading Pompey into further civil strife, and Pompey--always looking for unprecedented honors--could have easily turned his back on the party of Cato. Indeed, a Pompey-Antony alliance isn't impossible to fathom. Had Pompey lost to Caesar and Caesar been defeated by locals in Egypt (which almost happened), the civil war would almost certainly have continued between the remnants of Caesar's army and the remaining forces of the republic. Antony was a capable commander and might have defeated Scipio. Under this scenario, Antony could have quickly proven himself another Cinna. Had Scipio defeated the last of the Caesarians, the situation in Rome would have been wide open to opportunists, to reformers, and to patriots. Rome's greatest and most powerful generals would be dead, and Rome would probably have found herself facing foreign, local threats around the empire--in Spain, in Gaul, in Asia, and in Africa. In short, there would probably have been so much work to do that the competition among aristocrats would have been re-focused on its traditional task of maintaining Rome's far flung territories and allies. In any case, that's my best guess: removing Caesar would have given Rome an opportunity, but as many opportunities are squandered as are taken.

The Romans don't talk about slave behaviour? What on earth are you reading these days, caldrail? Pick up some Plautus! No one who reads Plautus can continue to think the Romans regarded slaves as mere cattle. The Roman treatment of slaves was far more complex than you make out.

I wonder if you might care to define any of these terms--"democracy", "republic", "oligarchy", "monarchy"--that you so haphazardly toss around. If a democracy is direct rule by the majority of the citizens, I know of no modern democracies at all. If there's any guff out there, it's the notion that modern republics are democracies. Speaking at least for the US, whose constiution was written by classicists (like Madison) and debated hotly in the press by authors who signed their letters "Cato" and "Caesar"--our republic was very consciously inspired by the Roman system, and the US was absolutely not designed to be a democracy, which was considered a failed system by the framers of the constitution. For example, in the original US system, voters directly elected Representatives to the House, and they voted only indirectly for President via Electors; indeed, Senators were non-elected positions, appointed instead by state legislatures. There is not now or has there ever been a mechanism for a national referendum--which would be the closest thing to direct democracy. Moreover, under the simple-minded division "democracy"/"oligarchy"/"monarchy", it would be impossible to classify either the US system or the Roman one. Which is why Polybius said that the Roman system was another system entirely. The Roman system (like the US) is a "mixed" system with democratic, oligarchic, and monarchical elements. Cynics on this board and elsewhere would like to pretend that the democratic element in the Roman system was purely illusory. IMO, this is simply a convenient excuse for justifying one's favorite monarch (like Caesar or Augustus) while maintaining (implausibly) that one isn't really a fan of dictatorship. In fact the democratic element in Rome was very real--and not always healthy either. The Roman people wanted land--and the aristocrats gave it to them in one piece of agrarian legislation after another. The Roman people loved to share in the spoils of war--and the aristocrats gave it to them. The Roman people were jealous of sharing power with non-Romans and fervently opposed voting rights for the Italian allies--and for far too long the aristocrats gave it to them. Above all, the Roman people loved to give meaning to their little lives by strutting around as second-hand conquerors of the Mediterranean--and the aristocrats gave it to them, piece by bloody piece, until the Mediterranean was bled dry for the glory of the Roman PEOPLE. Now there's a simple way to see what influence the people really had--and that's to take it away from them. Which is exactly what the principate did--and look at the consequences: no record of meaningful agrarian reform, enfranchisement ultimately extended throughout the Roman world, and a rate of expansion that halted to a crawl. During the republic, these three trends would have been impossible--the people would have not allowed it, and they did not allow it as long they had some power. BTW, while you're tossing around insults against those who believe that there was a real democratic element to the republic (for good or ill), I'd better reveal my source here. Almost my entire argument above is derived from the published lectures of Fergus Millar, who is probably the world's most respected ancient historian. Like any authority, he could be wrong, but his position at least the deserves some respect from a board of pure amateurs.

The Soviet Empire. As a teenage admirer of "scientific socialism", I spent nearly two months in Soviet Russia (Moscow and Crimea). To say I was disillusioned would be an understatement--far from a worker's paradise, it was a paradise for the lazy, the drunk, the stupid, and the evil. Everyone good I met in Russia (and there were many intelligent, good, and wonderful people) loathed it; every rotten bastard I met loved it. My best friends who emigrated from Russia still talk about communism with a bitterness and loathing you can't imagine. How to destroy such a beastly regime? Turns out it should have been the easiest thing in the world. We didn't need James Bond and all the other instruments of the Cold War. All the West had to do was just to quit helping them--to quit handing over territories (like most of Eastern Europe), to quit claiming that something is morally superior about Communism (nothing is), to quit loaning them money, and above all to quit romanticizing them. Once Western sympathy and credit to the Soviets dried up, the crash was inevitable.

Happy Birthday, Pertinax! Can't wait to hear about your choice of libations.

I agree with Ursus. What's unpatriotic is religious leaders vandalizing my pledge to become an advertisement for their product--if religious leaders want to sell God to people, let them do it in church. How would you like it if the pledge were amended to read "one nation drinking Coke"?

Why is this question relevant? There's been seasonal fluctuation in US gasoline prices for over a decade. Has Lucent stock seen the same predictable fluctuations? Has anyone attempted to explain these season fluctuations by means of some other factor, such as a massive conspiracy? If not--the Lucent/GM cases are irrelevant. Nor is the claim that every price in the market can be predicted with 100% regularity. If anyone could do it, they'd be rich. But if you want to claim that prices are being kept artificially low by a temporary factor (such as a conspiracy to influence elections), then the claim has logical implications for price fluctuations. As far as I can tell, you're simply arguing that some prices are unpredictable. Well, duh.

I like the way you think Naso.

What is a 'serious' attempt?