M. Porcius Cato

Why are you misstating the results of the very poll to which you link? At least 63% of Iraqi are OPPOSED to the US withdrawing now. Iraqis were asked, "Which of the following would you like the Iraqi government to ask the US-led forces to do? Withdraw within: 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, only reduce as security situation improves". Overall, only 37% said Americans should leave within 6 months. The remaining 63% said that Americans should remain longer than 6 months, but leave within 1 year (34%), 2 years (20%), or only when the security situation improves (9%). How you get that "71% of all Iraqis want the US out now" is beyond me--wishful thinking perhaps? Moreover, as the Maryland researchers clearly state, the poll deliberately over-sampled Sunni Arabs rather than collecting a true probability sample (i.e., one that is representative of the nation). This is important because there are vast differences among Iraqis on whether the US should stay. For example, 91% of Sunnis would like the US to leave within a year, whereas only 35% of Kurds would like us to leave within a year (about as many as who favor an open-ended commitment from the US). The same disagreement among Iraqis is also evident regarding attacks on US troops: only 8% of Sunnis oppose attacks on US troops, whereas 85% of Kurds oppose attacks on US troops. (The 'good' news is that the number of Sunnis who "strongly support" attacks on US troops has fallen from 77% in January to 55% today.) In any case, the majority of Iraqis are opposed to US troops leaving any sooner than 6 months from now.

I agree. Since the original question was about the US, I'd say the following elements were designed to avoid the problems that Rome and Athens faced: federalism, a written constitution, a longer list of individual rights, and civilian control and oversight of the military. Additionally, in the 200 years since the constitution was framed, Americans made enormous strides in expanding civil rights and establishing safeguards to protect them, suggesting that the American constitution was flexible enough to continue the general trend that gave rise to it. But Phil is right that emergency powers can vastly and permanently increase the power of the state and concentrate those powers into the hands of a single individual. As a few simple examples: the vast civil service that was created to deal with WWI continues to this day; the length and scope of Roosevelt's powers were increased largely to deal with the Depression and WWII, with most of Roosevelt's policies continuing unchanged; and who knows how much Bush has permanently changed America with his responses to 9/11. In each case, however, the US Constitution and American voters have provided a check on the continuation of emergency powers. For example, both Roosevelt and Bush lost vast numbers of Congressional allies in midterm elections; both witnessed their unconstitutional power grabs invalidated by the Supreme Court; despite overwhelming popular support for the two Presidents during the emergency crisis, that support rapidly eroded when they went too far beyond their mandates (e.g., when Roosevelt attempted to expand the number of Supreme Court justices after many of his programs were found unconstitutional, he faced such a massive popular backlash that he had to abandon his court-packing scheme). Of course, over the course of centuries, the rise of an expansionist dictator in the US is possible. But it would be a real tragedy. With a vast nuclear arsenal and complete dominance in the international commons (air, space, and sea), an American dictator could do more far more damage than any other dictator in history. For America, the tragedy would be great; for the rest of the world, vae victis.

It sounds interesting--I'll post back when I get a chance to read it. (Also, glad to hear that Pipes--a Harvard historian--wasn't involved!)

What political ideology was behind Bremer's decision to disband the Iraqi Army and fire former Baathists? It seems to me that this decision was simply following the example of de-Nazification that Truman followed to much success. Are Truman and Bremer ideological bed-mates? Not that I can tell. Clearly Shinseki was right, and Rumsfeld was wrong. But I don't see how this disagreement has a basis in political ideology. As I understood it, Rumsfeld was a champion of the apolitical notion that low numbers of high-tech forces were more effective than high numbers of low-tech forces. This is surely a debatable issue, but isn't this a purely military debate? I don't see why Wilsonian idealists or Kissingerian realists would necessarily have opposing views on this matter. Again, I don't see the relevance of political ideology here. I completely agree that ignoring regional expertise and dismissing military advice is a recipe for disaster, but given these two ingredients in the recipe for disaster, the political ideology was just for garnishing the dish! FWIW, I do think that a wrongheaded political ideology--namely, the notion that democracy cures all ills--is responsible for some the mess that's going on in Iraq. In my opinion, popular support for Sadr should not have prevented the US from trying the firebrad cleric for his murdering political rivals, and his ability to act unchecked and with legitimacy has been the source of remarkable instability to this day. To my mind, letting popular criminals go unpunished is a clear example of political ideology getting in the way of reconstruction. Much of the rest of the disaster can also be explained by bad ideas (like our needing only 130k troops), but those bad ideas are no more consistent with one political ideology than another. Simply put, incompetence always enjoys widespread bipartisan support. I've not read Fiasco, but from your review, it sounds like the author dislikes Wolfowitz and Pipes, and he wants to discredit them on the basis of what Bremer and Franks did. That's not fair. Pipes, for example, isn't anywhere in the chain of command.

Correct me if I'm mistaken, but didn't the lex Gabinia specifically avoid mentioning any particular general by name? As I understood it, no laws were allowed to name specific citizens. Parenthetically, I always thought this prohibition was another instance of the genius of the Roman constitution, and I'm almost positive the same principle was not applied by the Athenians.

Welcome Arminius. Look forward to your continued participation.

In today's NYT, David Brooks discusses how Edith Hamilton's "The Greek Way" helped Bobby Kennedy to overcome his grief after JFK was shot and to re-enter the political arena. Money quote: The story of Kennedy

I feel like I've been told there's no Santa Claus.

Which of Sulla's reforms do you think hindered Caesar's coup d'etat? The evisceration of tribunician power? Tribunes were typically a reliable check on Caesar's power-plays, so much so that Caesar typically resorted to force against the tribunes. I'll happily concede for argument's sake that Sulla wanted to prevent another one like him, but which of his reforms actually could have stopped someone like Pompey or Caesar?

It strikes me that the success of these two explanations depends very much on the time period we're talking about. In the early republic, Rome was constantly being attacked (directly and indirectly) by her neighbors, so the first explanation does fine for early Roman history. After the Hannibalic War and the Gracchi, however, Roman warfare appears to become increasingly imperialistic. It's difficult to see how Roman self-defense required her to sack Carthage or invade Britain, for example. Those two expeditions were pure warfare theater--i.e., war for the entertainment of the mob. BTW, any explanation for Roman imperialism has to account for the rapid rise in imperialist policy following the Hannibalic War. For this reason, I don't think that cultural explanations are going to cut it. Surely the Roman virtues that Ursus cited did not have their genesis after Hannibal, yet this is when the imperialism really picks up steam.

Didn't Carthage have three rings of walls to protect her city? Also, what is the name of that mountain range in the background?

Let me add my thanks to the UNRV legates and triumvirate. You've created and maintained an intellectual oasis for sincere Romanophiles, and I've enjoyed it immensely.

Hear, hear!!

I think there's some confusion on this thread about the question. 'Imperialism' refers to the expansionist system whereby the Romans governed provincial territories by means of proconsuls. The republic was imperialist in this sense. Many of the posts seem to address why the republic was transformed into the principate (i.e., an 'empire' vs a 'republic'); though 'empire' and 'imperial' and 'imperialism' are cognates, they have very different meanings, and I think WotWotius was asking about the rise of expansionist policies in Rome rather than about the fall of the republic (which has been discussed extensively elsewhere).

Whether republicanism will rescue Britain from an anachronism like Charles is an open question, but apparently it's one that has long frightened the legions of royal boot-lickers. So much so, in fact, that they passed the 1848 Treason Felony Act, which makes it "a criminal offence, punishable by life imprisonment, to advocate abolition of the monarchy in print, even by peaceful means." This law remains on the books in Britain to this very day, and when the Guardian began its 2000 push for the republic, it was forced to seek an official declaration from the government that it would not be liable to private prosecution under the Act. Unbelievably, the attorney general refused to issue such a statement! If there is an intellectual, principled case that can be made for the monarchy, then it must be a very flimsy case indeed--a case so poor that it requires special government protection from its intellectual competition. BTW, I agree with Phil that Charles will be a fantastic king--Britain surely needs someone to remind the British public that modern architecture is a scourge, that the meritocratic goals of public education are worse than the hereditary class system that puts a genius like him on the crown, and that cancer is best cured with coffee enemas. With this kind of monarch, Charles will truly fulfill his duty of proving once and for all that monarchy is a system by which in-bred fools govern their intellectual superiors (which in his case would be anyone who passed his O-level maths).

And for those who haven't read them yet, please do: Federalist 10 Federalist 51

And how exactly is this tale relevant to the question that WotWotius posed?

Too bad natives aren't required to take the test. Call me elitist, but I'd rather share citizenship with those who understand and appreciate the constitution than with natives whose only claim to citizenship is the location of their birth.

I'm not sure, but provisionally, I'd say it was the democratic elements of the republican constitution that led to imperialist policy. The people of Rome loved to feel superior to their neighbors and line their pockets with booty (see Livy). Consequently, they lavished honors and offices on aristocrats (like the Scipiones) who brought them victories, and they rejected aristocrats who were soft on foreigners and even allies (like Livius Drusus). This popular nationalism, of course, wasn't unique to Rome: look at how quickly Athens bent toward imperialism after she became a democracy, and consider especially the popular agitation for the disastrous Sicilian expedition and the shameful punishment of Mytilene that the people endorsed. As long as the people have power, they are allow themselves to be persuaded by imperialist demagogues like Alkibiades and Kleon. Contrast this with the Persian and Egyptian empires, which--lacking citizen armies that shared in spoils--could never sustain the advances that they made. Thus, at least in the ancient context, to the extent that a constitution incorporated popular rule the more expansionist was the state and the more capable was the state of maintaining its conquered territories.

You must be drunk. An English monarch in the US is about as likely as an Etruscan one coming to rule Italy or a Druid re-establishing rule over England.

Half-way through it--since I typically read these sorts of books while traveling, I'm hoping to finish it up tomorrow. So far Harris has been quite sympathetic to Cicero and his world-view.

Why do you think this sort of 'battle' is reported so very often, from the time of Homer to the time of Livy, and across so many different societies?

Let's not forget the recent intel errors in Iraq which had me, for at least a week's time, helping search for non-existent large numbers of WMD. Funny--I originally included a reference to the phantom WMD, but I excised it as being too off-topic. Nevertheless, I agree (though I fell for Colin Powell's presentation hook, line, and sinker).

You took the words right out of my mouth. I agree entirely: Verism was a style, not a verisimilitude.

One of the top 'hits' for "Roman Republic" in Amazon is Michael Crawford's work. I've read both the first and second editions of this work, and I don't think they are very good for a beginner. It's far too advanced for beginners to the period, plunging into far too much detail on topics that will seem simply confusing. For experts, it's not good for another reason entirely--it only glosses over issues that are known to be controversial. If you're just beginning to study the Roman republic, I think Philip Matyzak's "Chronicle of the Roman Republic" is nice way to begin. If you're more advanced, read it anyway and make sure there's nothing included that you didn't already know.