M. Porcius Cato

After reading your essay, I'm wondering if you've changed topics. You've discussed two competing theories on the rise of Roman imperialism, but you've not explained how particular individuals were crucial to the creation of an overseas empire.

I listed four specific lines of contemporary evidence undermining Brunt's thesis that the wars of expansion in the middle republic led to an economic displacement of Italian small-holders and thereby unraveled the cultural and political fabric of the republic. If you want to dispute the evidence, I'm all ears. Otherwise, what's the point of quoting authorities at me? I happily admit that the evidence suggests conclusions that contradict the conventional wisdom--indeed, since I celebrate the fact that the evidence contradicts the conventional wisdom, quoting authorities at me is worse than useless. Also, let me clarify my unconscionably vague claim that the proposals of the Gracchi were not "as revolutionary as is commonly believed" (vague because what exactly is 'as revolutionary as is commonly believed'???). First off, I'm not saying that the Gracchi's proposals were totally uncontroversial, conservative, and without popular support. That would be absurd. My point was that there were precedents to the bills put forward by the Gracchi (and I'd be very happy to discuss them in another thread if someone wants to discuss the matter). The reason for my somewhat vague claim was that I wanted to dispute (1) the notion that the Hannibalic War in particular led to some extraordinary set of circumstances that led to the need for their agrarian laws, and (2) the notion that Marius and Caesar are in any meaningful sense continuing to address the problems that the Gracchi sought to address. To bring this whole digression back to its original topic. My (working) thesis is that the Hannibalic War did not cause the fall of the republic; the Gracchi did not cause the fall of the republic; it was caused chiefly by the long civil wars that lasted from Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon to Octavian's victory at Antium, which were themselves partially an outcome of Sulla's reactionary politics paradoxically weakening the authority of the senate and thereby leaving it vulnerable to Caesar's talent and lust for power.

Spes ultima dea est.

Yes, he probably would be appalled. But I'm asking how you think Polybius would classify the Augustan constitution given the definition he proposed, and how you think he would reconcile his theory of the rise of Rome with its later history? To the put same question somewhat differently: Had Polybius been able to view events from the time of Diocletian, say, would he have stuck to his original claim that the historical source of Roman dominance was its mixed constitution?

I certainly don't think one should dispense with the general opinion of experts casually. However, when a substantive new body of evidence has grown up to challenge the previously conventional wisdom, it's time to question and possibly reject the conventional view. Brunt's thesis has been on the receiving end of nearly a generation of scholars' criticism, and I think it's intellectually dishonest to ignore the archaeological, statistical, and demographic evidence that they present. I'd also add that one of the most refreshing things about ancient history is that it has been amenable to advances in other fields: simply knowing how to read sources in the original Greek and Latin won't cut it anymore, and it's the advances in these fields that have made it possible to account for both the sources and the archaeological evidence, rather than only one or the other. One can't know what was in the minds of the Gracchi, but one does know that they were just as I claimed: blue-blooded aristocrats whose proposals, if enacted, would enhance their powers by expanding their base of supporters and Italian clients. By expanding their base of support, they would have been propelled further than the other tribunes and aristocrats of their year. Many non-revolutionary acts had the effect of bringing the statesman more power, more fame, and more glory. There was nothing revolutionary in the careers of most Romans (by definition)--yet they increased their power. There was nothing revolutionary when Cincinnatus returned to his plough--yet it increased his fame. There was nothing revolutionary when Dentatus defeated Pyrrhus and all the other enemies of Rome--yet it brought him glory. Perhaps you'd care to redefine 'revolutionary' such that everything and nothing becomes revolutionary? Ha?

True and important. But notice that these same offices existed under the principate. Do you think Polybius really would have considered the principate a republic as well? Why not?

Isn't the veteran the same captain whom Vorenus bribed/threatened on behalf of that 'friend' of every soldier, Gaius Julius Caesar? Also, I think you're right about the slave being a potential instrument of Servilia.

I think there might be a simple explanation for why Cicero's actions didn't live up to his Stoic ideals: the embrace of Stoicism came after most of Cicero's career was already over. In pro Murena of 62, for example, Cicero actually pokes fun at Stoicism, especially the earnest Stoicism of the young tribune Cato. In contrast, Cicero's arch-Stoic Tusculan Disputations were not written until 45, right after Cato's suicide. Cicero's philosophical bend toward Stoicism and Platonism occurred late in his life, were largely reactions to his removal from politics, to the deaths of so many of the best men in Rome, and were his attempt to make sense of that insane civil war that had come over the Rubicon. Moreover, I think the Stoicism (though it may bore you) did Cicero some good. After his period of philosophical study, Cicero finally grew a backbone and stood up to that lap-vomiting wretch Antony. Thus, it's not that Cicero was a born Stoic and only lived up to his principles in his final moments; it's that Cicero adopted Stoicism after the death of Cato, and he became the more Catonian for it--perhaps suicidally so.

This is a common view, most notably voiced by P. A. Brunt, but I think it has some fatal problems. First, family farms were worked by several generations, not just one married head-of-household, and farm work often leaves much free time during the summer months; therefore, the temporary conscription of young unmarried men into the legions was unlikely to have single-handedly led to the demise of the small-holders (aka "peasants"). Second, although there have been extensive excavations of Roman farms from the middle republic, the archaeological evidence shows no decline in the number of small-holdings during the period in question, nor a remarkable increase in the number of latifundia or associated artifacts (e.g., the large amphorae that were used to haul wine). Third, there was significant chattel slavery available to work the farms due in part to the abolition of debt bondage which had brought a substantive end to the "struggle of the orders" of the previous generations. This fact would further buffer Italian agriculture against the effects of the longer campaigning seasons that became more commonplace after the Hannibalic War. Finally, while the mortality rate in the army was very high during the Hannibalic War, this death rate also opened up opportunities for returning veterans, much like the lucky survivors of the Black Death many centuries later, who found more land, more women, and more wealth than they had ever expected prior to the deaths of their friends and countrymen. Given these facts (see Rosenstein's "Rome at War" for a more complete discussion), I think the reform bills of the Gracchi should be completely rethought. Rather than being a rational response to a legitimate set of new conditions, they were simply political maneuvers designed to bring two blue-blooded aristocrats more power, more fame, and more glory than they could have achieved otherwise. Nor, indeed, were the proposals as revolutionary as is commonly believed (see Lily Ross Taylor's article on the subject in the Journal for Roman Studies), and they certainly shouldn't be viewed as contributing substantively to the crises that Marius, Sulla, and (above all) Caesar brought on the republic. Funny. Isn't yours too a single, simple answer?

They weren't. You're fighting a losing cause on behalf of a multiculturalist nincompoop. BTW, have you heard that nincompoop is derived from the Latin non compos mentes? You can learn this and many other exciting factoids (some even true) by using wikipedia. Seriously, the Han vs Rome debate has been discussed on a previous thread.

A popular and victorious general, charged with illegal behavior for his war activities and opposed by a Senate united against him... sound familiar? It should--it's Andrew Jackson, the second founder of the American Democratic Party. Great article here. To think this bastard worked for a (diminuitive) titan like James Madison... unbelievable.

Nice review, Augusta. I haven't fully formed an opinion on the historical Livia, but it sounds like this book might be a good place to begin looking for a fresh perspective.

Here's what Astin writes (p. 38): Although in the course of the year Marcellus was to become involved in a dispute about Roman policy in Celtiberia, it is unlikely that this had arisen as yet or that it influenced the outcome of the election. Marcellus is much more likely to have won his consulship on the strength of his military reputation; for he was clearly one of the foremost generals of the day. With the possible exception of Ti. Gracchus, who may still have been alive but would have been nearly seventy, Marcellus was almost certainly the only man living who had celebrated two triumphs, and the second of them was as recent as 155. Moreover he had had some experience in Spain, since as praetor he had governed both provinces together and had engaged in at least some successful warfare. It is probably that no one in Rome seemed more suitable for the command in Celtiberia in 152. But in Rome a man needed to be not only suitable for an appointment but eligible in law. A considerable variety of conditions of eligibility had been laid down, and among them was the rule that one individual should not hold the consulship twice within ten years; yet Marcellus' second consulship had been in 155, only three years before. If it is easy to understand why many were willing to vote for him, it still remains to be explained how a man who by law was ineligible came to offer himself as a candidate, to be accepted as such by the presiding magistrate, and to be declared elected. [emphasis added] Thus, the situation in Spain may have played some role in Marcellus winning, but a precedent was needed even to allow him to enter the race.

If Caesar is Jesus, where do I sign up for Satanism?

Popular opinion could cause Marcellus to receive many votes, but popular opinion wouldn't make Marcellus legally eligible to stand for candidacy--that's a matter for censors to decide. The question then is: how could Marcellus legally stand for election, given an express law against two consulships within 10 years? The key, I think, lies in the strange second consulships of C. Marcius Figulus and Scipio Nasica Corculum. In 162, there was a religious irregularity in the election of the two men, forcing them to resign their first consulships in vitio creati. Then, in 159, Nasica was elected censor, as if he had legally held the consulship; whereas Marcius and Nasica were elected consuls for 156, as if they had not legally held the consulships. How they argued that their initial consulships did not really count isn't preserved, but it's easy to imagine: since they didn't actually get to serve their elected roles due to a religious technicality, they ought not be barred for 10 years lest the religious officials become corrupted by competing political rivals eager to prevent one another from having their turn. Whatever their argument, however, their consulships--and not Marcellus'--were the ones to break with a half century of tradition. From here, Marcellus could cite their example as a precedent when he wished to stand for repeated consulships. After a third consulship, however, the reaction to this trend had grown sufficiently strong in the senate that the senate passed Cato's law which prohibited any imitation of Marcellus' course. Thus, there was a half-precedent for breaking the law; Marcellus tested the other half; and the Roman senate acted to re-assert the original law. BTW, there is a nice discussion of this episode in A. E. Astin (1967), Scipio Aemilianus.

If you're looking for a book that covers the same time period in a slightly more accessible fashion, you might care for Stephen Mitchell, A History of the Later Roman Empire (2007). The Harvard series (of which the Cameron volume is a part) is of uneven quality. For example, the Oswyn Murray volume, Early Greece, is superb; Crawford's Roman Republic is dreadful. Caveat emptor!

There's a nice review of the second season in this New Yorker.

I had many of the same thoughts as PP (e.g., expecting Cicero to represent Octavian, fearing the beaten boy would turn out to be Agrippa, etc). In the historical sub-plots, though, there were a couple of bright spots IMO. Cicero appeared to be getting fed up with Antony, and he even showed a modicum of vertebrae in this episode (i.e., refusing to endorse Antony's slate of candidates wholesale), giving me the faintest hope we'll see a sliver of one of Cicero's famous Phillipics. Also, the dark princeling Octavian showed some real mettle: in the catfight with Antony and Atia, it looked like the Sphinx had real claws. Perhaps we'll see more of his less bookish tendencies before his (short-lived) reconciliation with that thug Antony? In other sub-plots, Gaia was introduced in this episode and is slated to appear again in Phillipi (2x06); Vorenus made the startling claim to be a son of Hades, a contention that his presumably living parents might dispute; and Pullo seems to be concerned with Vorenus' dark turn, a point discussed here by historical consultant Jonathan Stamp. The intersection of the two sub-plots, where Antony met Vorenus, left me scratching my head. Antony tells Vorenus that no man is beyond redemption. Sounds like a Christian idea to me. Can anyone think of any tales of redemption from the pre-Christian era?

Several questions answered this episode: (1) Marcus Agrippa will be in the series, (2) Vorenus' children were not (permanently) dumped in the Tiber, and (3) Cicero just can't catch a break with the writers. Thoughts?

Might have been more entertaining than "King of Kings"...

Completely off-topic, but despite his formidable image, Cecil B. DeMille was reportedly a sweet and giving man with no violent history whatever (including any attached to his notorious riding crop). When he was an independent director, he was completely in control of everything, but he was also a master at motivating his actors through their pride rather than their fear. Anyway, sorry to go off-topic.

Apparently the unnamed, uncredited author of this story would have us believe that Pompey's change of fortune was caused by the god of the Jews. The theory is patent nonsense. The only thing worthwhile to learn from this nonsense is the fallacy of post hoc reasoning, which is the bread-and-butter of the superstitious. By the same line of thinking, we should believe that since the sun rises after the rooster crows, the sun rises because the rooster crows.

When you say, "With its expansion", when do you mean? Rome was expanding for hundreds of years, yet the number of slaves did not rise proportionately if only because the high mortality rate of slaves would make it impossible.

Come now, this is like crediting the Japanese for their spectacular defeat of the Americans at Pearl Harbor. Pompey was taken by surprise because he didn't believe that anyone sober would attempt to seize the republic. First, Pompey's "Fabian tactics" were the very tactics that gave him an overwhelming numerical superiority: he used the time not only to wear down the starving Caesarian army but also to bring in fresh levies. Second, Pompey's reliance on the cavalry per se was not the problem at Pharsalus. The problem was that the cavalry was so ineptly handled by Labienus that it stampeded in retreat over Pompey's missle troops, which should have given him an immense advantage even without the cavalry. Moreover, I'd also point out that Pompey's handling of the Cilician pirates was masterful and possibly a useful model for future wars against loosely organized bands of terrorists (which is what they were). Nevertheless, I agree that Pompey was no Alexander, whatever his flatterers (like Caesar at one point) would have had us believe.

Are you seriously asking me this question ? I am.