M. Porcius Cato

A few points about the evolving attitude of the senate (who were mostly non-nobiles, btw). First, it seems there was initially a deplorable attitude of peace-at-any-price. In Dec 50, the senate had voted 370-22 for Curio's motion that both Pompey and Caesar should give up their provinces and armies, which would have peacefully resolved the conflict, though our sources--Appian (ii, 27-31) and Plutarch (Pomp. 58)--strongly imply that the senate preferred that Caesar alone give up his provinces since his term had expired whereas Pompey's term had not. Cicero reports a similar attitude for appeasement among the senators and Equites south of Rome, who were reluctant to raise the required conscripts for fighting off Caesar's invasion (Att. vii. 13.2, ix.2a.2). This attitude had the effect of emboldening Caesar. Consequently, this initial attitude towards appeasement was subsequently undermined by two polarizing developments. First, as Caesar's demands grew more audacious, his hirelings Curio and Caelius began making ominous warnings to neutrals like Cicero, who began to fear Caesar as another Sulla (Att. x 9a). Second, once Pompey left Rome, he too began warning neutrals that they would be treated like Caesarians (Caes., BC i.33.1; Dio xli. 6), an attitude that escalated in its bloody-mindedness as the defense of the Republic grew more desperate (again, see, Cicero's letters to Atticus while in camp with the Republicans). Thus, by the time Pompey was at camp in Thessalonica, he could count some 200 senators in his midst (Dio xli. 43). Thus, it seems that the senate was initially bending over backwards to thwart civil war, but as Caesar's demands grew more ludicrous (esp in Apr 49) and Pompey's position requiring greater support, the senate was won over to Pompey. This is a very different state of affairs than is often made out, which depicts the senate as initially opposed to Caesar but slowly won over to him by his saintly mercy and grace. Of course, this is pure hooey. It's also worth emphasizing that the nobiles were not only divided between Caesar and Pompey, they were also divided within families. Divided families included Aurelii Cottae, Cassii Longini, Cornelii Sullae, Iunii Bruti, Pompeii Bithynici, Sulpicii Rufi, and Terentii Varrones. This division within families still further emphasizes that the Caesarian Civil War was not a class conflict--if it were, all noble families would be united.

Judging by their ethnic stereotypes, it appears the Romans saw inferiority in every direction they looked. Looking eastward towards Greece and Syria, the invective became progressively more caustic. "The words of Greeks issue from their lips; those of Romans from their heart" (Plut. Cat. Mai., 12.5). Phrygians, Cicero tells us, are best improved by whipping; 'worst of the Mysians' was the ultimate insult; Carians were so worthless as to be fit only for human experiments; Cappadocians were paragons of stupidity, tastelessness, and beastliness (Cic. Flac. 65; Cic., Red. Sen., 14). Asiatic Greeks, Syrians, and Jews were born for servitude (Cic. Flac. 67, Livy 35.49.8, 36.17.4-5). Looking southward, the Punica were considered paragons of treachery, with Sardinians being so rotten that they were abandoned even by the Punica (Cic., Scaur. 42). Egyptians, of course, were animal-worshipping degenerates (Cic. Tusc. 5.78, Nat. D. 1.16.43). Looking westward, the Romans saw nothing but barbarism: Gauls and Spaniards were hairy, cruel, ferocious monsters (Cic. Font 31, 33, 41, 43-4; Cic Q Fr 1.1.27), and Spaniards brushed their teeth in piss (Catull. 37.20, 39.17-21). Legally, all of these peoples--even piss-drinking Spaniards--could be admitted as citizens, it is true. However, the only gateway to citizenship was slavery. Moreover, the passage from foreign slave to free Roman--with all the rights attendant thereto--was often purchased by the slave himself, who then lived in perpetual obligation to his former master. It was a good system for Rome (until Augustus put the brakes on it), and even the Greeks admired it: Phillip V himself commended it in a letter to the Larissans (Syll. 3, 543: 29 - 34). I think the bottom-line is that the Romans, though inclusive politically, still never doubted their superiority over other ethnic groups, whom they showered with slurs, stereotypes, and slavery. Really, there is simply no meaningful distinction between Roman ethnic chauvinism and racism.

I'm so glad you followed the argument (which required comparison of several counter-factuals!). To answer your question--Yes. The sources of the names come largely (maybe mostly) from Cicero, though not only from Cicero of course. Some of the attributions come from epigraphy. For example, we occasionally know of some of Caesar's men from coins they issued. Other attributions come from Caesar's own writings. Yes, that was one part of my argument. The other is that even if Cicero had no eye toward showing that the nobiles followed the Republicans more than Caesar, he might have been more familiar with the Republican side since they were his friends, and this would have had an unintended bias in the same direction. Thus, since the list relies largely on Cicero's sympathies, memory, and familiarity, it should be biased toward finding Republican nobiles rather than finding Caesarian nobiles. Ooops--I didn't mean population in the sense of "the populace". Rather, I was intending to draw the distinction between the population of the nobiles (i.e., all the nobiles who existed) and our sample of the nobiles (i.e., the particular nobiles of which we are aware). I was using 'population' in a statistical sense. For example, if you have a bag of 300 marbles and I draw 95 marbles from the bag, the population of marbles is 300, and the sample is 95. If there's a better term for 'population' (i.e., one with greater currency), I'm happy to use it instead. Yes, the cf does mean confer (id est, compare), but the 209 is the RE #.

Hold on--how do you know as a "fact" that Caesar felt cornered by the union of Optimates (whoever they were) and Pompey? Moreover, we have a record of what the senate wanted with respect to Caesar. They voted overwhelmingly (like 95% to 5%) in favor of a motion that Pompey and Caesar lay down their arms.

Two important issues here. First, in determining whether the nobiles were biased against Caesar (the view I'm attacking), the total number of nobiles is irrelevant IF the probability of a nobile being sampled is not greater for the Republican versus Caesarian cause. For example, if we had obtained all or most of our names from Caesar, who would naturally be more likely to mention his own legates and friends than some relatively obscure Pompeian, then we would have a sample that is biased toward finding more Caesarian nobiles than non-Caesarian nobiles. In contrast, if we had obtained all or most of our names from Republicans, who would naturally be more likely to mention their own allies rather than some nobody like L. Aemilius Buca, then we would have a sample that is biased toward finding more Republican than non-Republican nobiles. Thus, given the finding of predominantly Caesarian nobiles, all that has to be established is that we didn't draw our names chiefly from Caesarians. And, in fact, this is the case--we have Cicero. (Also, if there were a bias, it could be eliminated by simply restricting the analysis to names that were mentioned both by Caesarians and by Republicans.) Second, in determining whether the nobiles were biased against Caesar (the view I'm attacking), I needn't provide evidence that the nobiles were biased for Caesar. It's possible that the nobiles were equally likely to go for Caesar or for the Republic. As you rightly point out, the limited data don't support a pro-Caesarian bias with much certainty, but the 55-40 plurality for Caesar strongly disconfirms the hypothesis that the nobiles were all lined up against Caesar. The probability of drawing a plurality for Caesar when the population was against him is infinitesimal. That's the RE number, a conventional identification code (like a Social Security number) for keeping individuals straight. With, for example, some eight guys named "Marcus Porcius Cato", Roman historians needed something, so they invented this code. I meant to take all of those out, but I missed the one for Lentulus Vatia.

Jan 49

I have read many "representatives of that genre of context-heavy biographies", and the author didn't do a disservice to Goldsworthy. As I've remarked, Meier's biography is very context-heavy (almost more about Caesar's Rome than about Caesar, really), but Meier's biography is forceful, coherent, and integrative in ways that Goldsworthy's is not.

The total number of nobiles is impossible to know with certainty, but S-B lists a number of nobiles who were also neutral and whose allegiance simply wasn't known. These latter two groups were comparatively small, but included Caesar's own father in law L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus and his kinsman L. Julius Caesar (cos 64). The important point is that this list puts to bed the simplistic nonsense that Caesar was some sort of champion in a class war between the nobiles and people. If anything, the nobiles were (as in the case of Sulla) on the side of a patrician marching on Rome to put an end to a popularly elected government. Indeed, scanning the list, it looks as if Caesar has not only more nobiles on his side but more patricians on his side as well (but I haven't counted them yet). Moreover, that citadel of inherited privilege--the augury--was overwhelmingly Caesarian (8/11).

One of the more prevalent claims about the late republic is that Caesar was somehow forced to march on Rome because most of the nobiles were opposed to him and would have failed to give him a fair trial. The latter issue--whether Caesar could have obtained a fair trial (given his record of bribery, e.g.)--is a matter of pure speculation. The issue of whether the majority of nobiles was opposed to Caesar, however, is a matter of record. This record, compiled by Shackleton Bailey in a 1960 issue of Classical Quarterly, shows that the majority of nobiles supported Caesar in the civil war, not the republican cause led by Pompey. For those interested, Bailey provides the following list of nobiles for whom we have a record of allegiance. Of the 95 men for whom a clear identification can be made, 55 supported Caesar, 40 the Republic. REPUBLICAN NOBILES (40) L. Aelius Tubero (praetorius) Sex. Atilius Serranus M. (Aurelius) Cotta (praetorius) L. Caecilius Metellus (tr. pl. 49) Q.Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica (cos. 52, pont.) M . Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59) Cn. Calpurnius Piso (Frugi) (proq. 49) C. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 49) C. Claudius Marcellus (cos. 49) M. Claudius Marcellus (cos. 51) App. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54, cens. 50, augur) L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus (cos. 49) P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57, pont.) P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (augur) Faustus Cornelius Sulla (q. 54, augur) L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 54, pont.) C. Fannius (praetorius, pont.) L. Julius Caesar M. Junius Brutus (Q.Servilius Caepio Brutus) (q.53, leg. 49, pont.). Licinius (Crassus) Damasippus (senator) P. Licinius Crassus Dives Junianus (tr. pl. 53) L. Livius Ocella (praetorius) A. Maillius Torquatus (pr. 70?) L. Manlius Torquatus (pr. 49) Minucius Rufus Q.Minucius Thermus (praetorius) M. Octavius (aed. cur. 50) M. Opimius Otacilius Crassus A. Plautius (Silvanus?) (pr. 51) Pompeius Rufus M. Porcius Cato (pr. 54) M. Publicius (senator) M. Pupius Piso (senator) Sex. Quintilius Varus (q. 49) P. Rutilius Lupus (pr. 49) Ser. Sulpicius (senator) Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (cos. 51) M. Terentius Varro (praetorius) C. Valerius Flaccus (leg. 53-51) C

Are we still talking about the historical Rome, or are we talking about its fictional portrayal? If we're talking about the historical Rome, the Senate did not decide what was legal or not. The senate did not have the power to pass laws or sign treaties. The passage of legislation and treaties was conducted in Assemblies of the people via secret ballot. Whatever made you think otherwise?

I find it very difficult to believe that the wealth of the Roman empire depended very much on the trinkets plundered from barbarians. The whole wealth of Judea was scarcely sufficient to build just the Coliseum in Rome, let alone finance the defense and infrastructure of Judaea itself. Rather, the wealth of Rome derived from the economic specialization and free trade that was made possible by killing foreign kings, wiping out their inefficient armies, and tearing down (metaphorically) their useless borders. I think there is a good case to be made against many campaigns of conquest (Britain, e.g., was more trouble than it was worth--the tin mines could have been seized without wasting 1/4 of the state revenues killing dumb druids and picts), but imperialism per se wasn't the problem. It was irrational conquest that was the problem, and the reason this conquest was irrational is that it was no longer guided by the wisdom of the senate, which had previously been far more intelligent about what was and was not worth acquiring.

What is the evidence of Etruscan influences on the Roman pantheon? It all seems Greek to me.

This is true with respect to the acquisition of the Rhine- Danube angle, which reduced by two thirds the length of the frontier in that area. However, the acquisition of Dacia actually lengthened the frontier in that region threefold, as the border was so convoluted. The same can be said of Armenia and Mesopotamia. All these territories, acquired under Trajan, protruded from an otherwise straight frontier, greatly lengthening borders disproportionately to their actual area. The acquisition of Dacia did indeed increase the size of the frontiers, but unlike Britain, Dacia was rich in gold and may have been worth the conquest. The important issue is never border length per se, but proportion of military resources to surrounding enemies. If conquest affects that balance favorably, it is no drain to the empire.

As stated, this is exactly wrong. You can prove this to yourself quite easily. To make the math easy, assume a world of 12 equally sized, equally well-populated, square nations in a 3 x 4 grid. In such a situation, what is the best policy for Square Rome, that is smack in the middle of 4 hostile bordering states? In the beginning, Square Rome would have X manpower+resources ("defense units") to defend its 4 borders. That is, x/4 defense-units per border. If Square Rome can take a neighboring territory and its resources, it will have twice the resources (2x defense-units) but not twice the borders since one of those borders was shared by both territories. Thus, by conquering a neighboring territory, Square Rome would have only 6 new border-states and 2x defense-units, thereby giving it x/3 defense-units per border. If Square Rome, then takes another bordering state in our 3 x 4 world, its defense-units per border would be 3x/7. And every additional gain in territory continues to make border security easier and easier until Square Rome has no bordering nations. Clearly, the problem with conquest is not borders getting disproportionately bigger--ceteris paribus, the borders get proportionately smaller. The problem with conquest is that (1) even successful conquest reduces the available manpower and resources of both the conquering and conquered nations, and--most fundamentally--(2) any state with insufficient resources to defend itself (basically all conquered nations) will almost never manage to pay its own way. Thus, rather than Square Rome (in our example) moving from x/4 to x/3 defense-units/border, a real Square Rome would have less than 2x defense-units for its 6 borders. Generalizing this basic analysis to historical Rome, it becomes clear that Roman expansion sometimes proceeded to territories that were poor and had insufficient manpower for its defense (e.g., Gaul) and even expanded to nations that didn't even border newly acquired Roman territory (e.g., Britain), thereby failing to deliver the one benefit of conquest--border reduction. Clearly, no rational analysis would have ever permitted such stupid conquests of Britain and Gaul. But, then, these territories weren't acquired by a rational analysis at all--they were merely stepping stones in the career of Julius Caesar, a man whose victories were always synonymous with defeat for Rome itself.

What is this "aristocracy"? Are you referring to the elected magistrates of the Roman Republic or some equivalent to the House of Tudor? There's an important difference, you know? And how exactly could these "aristocrats" "continue to run wild"? What on earth are you talking about? Was the clearance of the Cilician pirates running wild? Was the prosecution of Verres running wild? Was the foiling of the plot by Catiline running wild? What events would NOT be running wild? And which--of all the events that you would like to call "running wild"--did Julius Caesar do anything about bringing to an end? I can think of none.

The differences between Gelzer and Gruen are too numerous to list, but you're right that no one disagrees that non-patrician families could gain access to the magistracies. Calling the magistrates of the Roman republic 'nobility,' however, obfuscates much more than it clarifies.

An imaginative etymology, but almost certainly wrong. "Patrician" is most likely derived from patres, meaning father, which was how the senate was collectively addressed.

But that's just not true. The consular fasti don't tell us whether the gens had died out, only whether they continued to gain consular imperium. If the old patrician families died out, we should hear no more of the Valerii (e.g.) from any of our sources-- letters, coins, histories, etc.

Most of the patrician families had died out? What's the basis of such a claim? And how many new patrician families did Augustus create anyway? Wasn't this mostly a reward for his cronies?

But what is a "nobile"? If a nobile is a magistrate, then--by definition--nobiles held a monopoly on magistracies. But this is totally uninformative. It's exactly synonymous with saying that magistrates held a monopoly on magistracies! If a nobile is a person hailing from a family that held the consulship, the category is open to new families, which wasn't true of the patrician class (Agrippa notwithstanding). Only a handful of religious offices (e.g., the worthless flamenate) were limited to patricians in the late republic. Cicero, for example, was an augur. But there were no blood lines to a class that could include Marius, Cato, Caesar, Sulla, Pompey, and Cicero. Indeed, of these six, only two (Sulla and Caesar) were descended from ancient Roman lines. It's not quite that simple. Although we talk about it as though it were a class to itself, being a "new man" really was a matter of degree. Between men whose families had never held any senatorial rank whatever (the prototypic new man) and men whose families had contributed consuls (the prototypic nobile), there were men hailing from families whose members had never risen above quaestor, aedile, tribune, and praetor. Between 78-49 BCE, 7 non-nobiles held the consulship (11.5%), 91 non-nobiles held the praetorship (51% of known praetors), 27 non-nobiles held the aedileship (56.25% of known aediles), 80 non-nobiles held the tribuneship (71% of known tribunes), and 154 non-nobiles were ordinary senators (77% of known pedarii). Thus, after Sulla, the majority of magistracies were held by non-nobiles. Before Sulla, I don't think we have enough names to do a similar statistical analysis, but I'd be happy to be corrected.

Presumably because patricians were more numerous among the regal magistrates and thereby held a collective hegemony on legal and political expertise. I understand that in the early republic this generalization does apply, more or less. Evidence? If the plebs were 'the poor' in the early republic, are we to assume that the entire manpower of the military was drawn from patrician families alone? It's hard to credit.

Yes. In fairness, I should say that Goldsworthy is a good writer, and the biography is quite accessible. Still, Meier's biography is the best yet written.

Goldsworthy is very good on Caesar's campaign in Gaul, but I found the rest of the biography to be boring, pedestrian, unimaginative, and non-comittal.

If one abandons the assumption that this was a popular revolution, the mystery evaporates. There are hints in the sources that the expulsion of the Tarquins was assisted by foreign powers, who would presumably not subscribe to parochial prejudices against plebeians. On a side note, it is absolutely imperative that one quit thinking of plebeians as poor and patricians as rich. This way of thinking about the distinction is not the way the Romans conceived of the difference, and it obscures the issues that were at stake. The plebeian/patrician distinction was a hereditary distinction (like Smiths versus Joneses), not an economic distinction.

What does being a patrician have to do with it?