M. Porcius Cato

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. Presumably so--which is further evidence that Catiline's attempted putsch derived its support from losers and brigands, and not even ordinary populares. Look, even scoundrels like Caesar and Crassus found Catiline's course to be radioactive. Now why is that? If the cause were so just, why did it require someone as rotten as Catiline to lead it? And if the cause were simply populare, why was the Senate so suspicious of Cicero's charges for so long? Why were people like Cato--Catiline's natural enemy-- arguing that Cicero was exaggerating the threat? Why wasn't the defeat of Catiline mourned in later years, like the fall of the Gracchi? The thesis that Catiline was some sort of popular hero opposed to the senate makes no sense. Isn't it possible that the senate was opposed by agents who weren't carbon copies of the Gracchi? Must the understanding of every social upheaval and every agrarian law be twisted so that it fits just one prototype? So, in the time period you cite as a decline in popular rights (say, the end of the Punic Wars and Cicero), which laws restricting the role of the popular assemblies in government were operative in 63? Since this decline was "clearly" the case, I'm sure you'll have no trouble finding them--just be careful not to stumble on all the laws that actually expanded popular rights between the Punic Wars and Cicero (e.g., the Leges Porciae of 199, 195 and 184, Villia Annalis of 180, Calpurnia de repetundis of 149, Gabinia of 139, Cassia of 137, Papiria of 131, Coelia of 107, Iulia of 90, Plautia iudicaria of 89, Plautia Papiria of 89, Pompeia of 89, and the repeal of Sulla's anti-popular legislation in 70). To help you out, here's a list of laws. I'm waiting with baited breath to hear about the DECLINE of popular sovereignty after the Punic Wars, a period which is typically recognized to host the decline in senatorial power, the expansion of civil rights to non-Roman Italians, the rise of the secret ballot (the most important pillar of real democracy), and the rise of the novitas.

I can be more critical of the Second Catilinarian, but not on this issue. The reason is that the evidence is quite firm that Sulla's troops had been lavished with gifts from Sulla, so much so, that Sulla's epitaph "No greater friend, no worse enemy" acquires the first half of its meaning. The testimony on this issue comes from Cicero, Sallust, Plutarch, etc. Moreover, Cicero's description is totally credible. These men--who could never have earned by farming as much as they were given as gifts--were asked to become country squires, diligently managing a profitable farming enterprise with little to no experience in such a role. Yet as anyone ought to know, farming is an inherently risky business that has to be taken seriously to earn a steady return on investment. Now how could professional butchers of men suddenly become growers of cabbages, managers of slaves, forecasters of seasons, and all the other roles required of country squires? No wonder some of them (whether 20, 200, or 2000--it's impossible to know) went into the debt! It's the alternative that's unbelievable. (Can you really imagine some Titus Pullo running a country estate?? Vorenus, perhaps, but not Pullo.) Given that some soldiers are just rotten farmers, to whom would such men look? Presumably they would look for another Sulla (or Cinna)--and that was exactly how Catiline presented himself. Now, if you want to know what the "social contributors" to the rebellion were, it was the initial distribution of unearned farmland to soldiers. This whole idea of giving public land to vets--land that the vets couldn't unload if they were rotten farmers, and land that they couldn't flip if they were decent ones--was a bad idea from the start, and the only dividends it ever paid was the destabilization of the state. Catiline's program would have only made matters worse. If Cicero were to have addressed any "social contributors" to the rebellion, it would have been a law making it a crime to give public land to veterans.

This whole digression came about from the claim, "Cicero & co. got a complete military victory without any corrective measure for the likely social contributors for this rebellion (ie, veterans impoverishment)." To which I replied that Sulla's vets had been amply rewarded and that any poverty in their ranks was their own fault. Were Sulla's vets "amply rewarded", as I maintained? Here's Cicero: "these are colonists, who, from becoming possessed of unexpected and sudden wealth, boast themselves extravagantly and insolently; these men, while they build like rich men, while they delight in farms, in litters, in vast families of slaves, in luxurious banquets, have incurred such great debts, that, if they would be saved, they must raise Sulla from the dead." Thus, as I said, these vets were indeed amply rewarded, yet--like the poor trash who waste their lottery winnings--the veterans overspent even that. The only "corrective measure" for these personal failings is to let the spendthrifts go bankrupt so that their irresponsible behavior doesn't spread.

Here's what Meier wrote (p. 4, English translation from German original): With the words 'The die must be cast' he crossed the Rubicon and, having made a good headway and reached Ariminum before dawn, led his soldiers into the city. These words are quotation from a comedy by Menander. The version 'The die is cast' is incorrect, for until then there had been no dicing. The game was just about to begin -- the game of war, in which the highest stakes were involved and fortune was an important player. Meier's point was not about the correct translation of alea iacta est, but about what Caesar had said. But didn't Caesar say, "iacta alea est"? Depending on the ancient source, Caesar either (1) quoted Menander in Greek by saying,

What general impoverishment?? You have yet to cite any evidence that the Sullan vets were generally impoverished except to repeat the claim.

Where is the evidence that Sulla's soldiers were not amply rewarded for their "service" (if you can call the slaughter of innocent Romans "service")? They were not only paid their salaries (which should have been more than sufficient payment for their crimes), they were also given the lands of the innocents proscribed by Sulla. If their appetites were so large that even Sulla could not sate them, then to hell with them!

This seems like the most random thread ever. Why was 157 picked? And shouldn't this thread be in the Res Publica Sub-folder?

Propaganda implies that there was some campaign against Caligula, yet Caligula was long dead at the time of Suetonius' writings. Seems likely to me that Caligula was just as bad as Suetonius depicted him.

Back to the topic of Quo Vadis, I really do heartily recommend the novel. It's written from a pro-Christian perspective, but it's very perceptive of the differences in worldview between classical Greco-Roman culture (as embodied by Petronius), the rising brutalism of the Imperial order (as embodied by Tiggelinus and Nero), and the new religion of Christianity (as embodied by Lygia). If you recall your Tacitus, you already know that Petronius isn't like the dour Stoic opponents of the Imperial order (who lionized Cato), but Petronius has no less integrity and honor--and considerably more wit and panache. Also, in terms of historical correctness, few novels set in the ancient world get so many details correct while still getting the big picture right too.

Why not?

I always loved what Aristotle said of pride: "the crown of the virtues".

No, but it's only mercantilism that depicts nations as competitors rather than businesses. Further, mercantilism blinds one to the more important issue, which is that nations contain customers as well as competitors. And killing your customers is bad business.

Right. Also, Sulla's restriction on the tribunate was abolished during (best I recall) the consulship of Catulus in 78, so the tribunate was again a stepping stone to highest office until Caesar. On further checking, it turns out that the restoration of tribune rights was accomplished by means of several laws, beginning with the Lex Aurelia (75).

The impoverishment of Sulla's veterans was a personal issue, not a social one. Sulla's were more than amply rewarded for their "service".

What a wimp--try ripping out your own bowels sometime!

If you're looking for a good survey of Western philosophy, W.T. Jones and Windelband's works are much better than Russel's (IMO). Jones especially is useful due to the lengthy excerpts from original sources.

Perhaps the greatest living ancient historian today, Fergus Millar, introduced his 3-volume work "Rome, the Greek World, and the East" with a telling title, "Polybius was right." It's easy to see why this evaluation could sum up an entire 3-volume work in as many words: Polybius' work was a sustained, coherent search for the cause of Rome's rapid pre-eminence, and the answer that Polybius gave is nearly given universal assent by today's scholars. In the searching of "causes for effects", Polybius has no better. There would have been a short-term profit from the selling of the loot, which would be more than offset by the long-term loss of a major market for Rome and a major producer of goods that Romans wanted to buy. This projection is against Mommsen's totally backwards, mercantilist economic theory. (Mommsen's economic ideas were primitive even for his day.) Mercantilism holds that one nation's economic loss is another nation's economic advantage, whereas in fact, rising prosperity in Nation A allows Nation B to specialize in B's most productive and profitable activities, thereby leading to increases in wealth in both Nation A and Nation B. Thus, in the long-run, no one would profit from the sudden disappearance of such a metropolis.

As a proto-socialist, Mommsen never fails to imagine a capitalist conspiracy lurking in the shadows, so it's not surprising he thinks the same about the suppression of the Corinthian revolt. From the Polybius I cited above, is there anything that directly supports this wild idea? I think not.

Before responding, please read Polybius' whole account: The Histories, Book XXXVIII, Chapters 3-11 I think Polybius makes it quite clear that Rome didn't sack Corinth because Corinth insulted Roman emissaries, or due to some unsatiable lust for blood. Roman intervention was quick and severe to prevent a war from overtaking all Greece. As Polybius aptly remarks, "though the disaster of Carthage is looked upon as of the severest kind, yet one cannot but regard that of Greece as not less, and in some respects even more so. For the Carthaginians at any rate left something for posterity to say on their behalf; but the mistakes of the Greeks were so glaring that they made it impossible for those who wished to support them to do so.... And, indeed, everybody at the time had the proverb on his lips, "had we not perished quickly we had not been saved.""

There is no just comparison between Mummius' handling of Corinth and Caesar's handling of Gaul or Hitler's "Final Solution". The Aedui in Gaul were not attacking allies of Rome; the Aedui WERE allies of Rome. The victims of Hitler were not attacking allies of Germany; the victims of Hitler were peaceful German citizens. In contrast, Corinth WAS attacking an ally of Rome--the Spartans. How could Mummius not respond?? I freely grant that Mummius' punishment was harsher than required, but a harsh punishment was required.

There are two separate (but related) issues here: Why was the republic not restored? and Why did the Senate fail to regain its power? I think the chief reason that the republic was not restored was that the men capable of running it were not republicans, at least not predominantly. The natural allies of the republic were the tribunes and the senate. Yet after Augustus, tribunician power had passed to the emperor himself and the senate comprised the emperor's most favored lackeys rather than the elected representatives of the people. Why would a magistrate and senator--who had achieved his position for free--want to replace the system with one that made the magistracies more expensive for him? Dispensing with elections would have seemed a boon to the senators, even had they had republican sympathies. Why did the Senate fail to regain power? Because the emperor wasn't about to hand it to them, and unlike the emperor, the senate had no secret police, no palace guard, and no armies. Armies were the hands of regional governors, whose rebellions were fought for their own power and not the power of the Senate or people. Their was simply no mechanism whatever for the Senate to attain power.

What drove Catiline was Catiline. His letter to Catulus spells out the reasons for taking arms against the republic. This haughty patrician scoundrel was upset that he couldn't get elected consul as a shield for his illegal behavior as a governor; his debts were so high that he couldn't even get a woman to cover them all; and, he was caught in an escalating conspiracy of revenge against Cicero. Are you joking? After an attempt had been made on Cicero's life, Catiline did indeed volunteer himself for house arrest--at Cicero's house! Obviously, this wasn't an earnest attempt to make amends. This is a highly imaginative reading of events. Why an army should have been assembled against debt collectors is beyond me. Had this army NOT been formed at Catiline's behest, how did Lentulus et al know it would be available for joining together with the Allobrogres??

Right. Also, Sulla's restriction on the tribunate was abolished during (best I recall) the consulship of Catulus in 78, so the tribunate was again a stepping stone to highest office until Caesar.