M. Porcius Cato

I have a hard time believing that Carthago's wealth is what motivated Rome to destroy her. Rome never destroyed wealthy cities like Alexandreia, Delos, Palmyra, Sidon, Tyre, and Athenae. Even cities that had been allied with Carthago, like Emporion and Utica, were spared, so the motivation wasn't simply cultural either. My theory is that the problem, as far as the Romans were concerned, was that Carthago failed to submit to Roman rule: they did not accept that their entire foreign policy was to be dictated by Rome through her patrons in the Roman senate. When Carthaginian interests were threatened, she didn't ask Rome for permission to defend herself: she acted independently. Had Carthago instead played the same political game that had been played by all the Hellenistic has-beens of the Mediterranean, by guess is that Rome would have been perfectly content to have Carthago rise to be First Lapdog. Granted, this isn't a perfectly benevolent solution, but after the Hanno faction failed to restrain Hannibal, Roman paranoia wasn't entirely irrational, and Carthago's self-preservation required a generation or two of kissing Rome's ... ring.

I'm tired of quoting primary sources that you ignore. Feel free to make up whatever nonsense you like since you're apparently unconstrained by any facts. Next up: Cato eats babies!

Ave, Simon Scarrow! Aside from your own, what novels set in ancient Rome most inspired you? Are there any exemplars of historical fiction more broadly that you would recommend?

That's not what the primary sources say happened. The election in 60 is described in Ascon_91'b; Plut:CatMin_31'5,Caes_14'1-2, Pomp_47'5, Crass_14'1-2; Suet:Caes_19'1-2; Appian:BCiv_2.9'b, 3.88'a. Of all seven accounts, only one (Suetonius) even mentions Cato in connection with the election, and all Suetonius says of Cato is that "Many of them [opponents of Caesar] contributed to the fund, and even Cato did not deny that bribery under such circumstances was for the good of the commonwealthh." The juxtaposition of clauses suggests that while Cato did not contribute to the slush fund, he didn't deny that it might be practical. Now to go from not denying that it was good for the commonwealth to "gathering a great fund to carry by bribery" is simply a leap of bad faith. Your total reliance on secondary sources really is troublesome.

But what kind of pressure? The kind of social pressure that keeps civilized people from spitting on the sidewalk and keep conformists in step with the herd? Or is it the kind of pressure that a mobster exerts when "protecting" local businesses. If it's the latter, I don't see why bribery wouldn't also work just fine, especially when we're talking about a huge number of anonymous people from all over Rome. Moreover, why wouldn't the secret ballot counteract the effect of social pressure, physical threats, and economic pressure? We had a long thread on this sometime ago, but the original use of the term "Optimate" long post-dates the introduction of the secret ballot, and when the term was used by the Romans themselves (mostly by Cicero) it was never meant to distinguish reformers from non-reformers but to distinguish those who used political violence and illegal practices from those who did not. The wider, modern sense of the term as an antipode to populare is not to be found in the ancient sources. Wait a second. Cicero's complaint is about influence, not threat of force, not promise of rewards, and nothing about clientele. Further, where is the evidence for this client system working in Rome? We have evidence of client kingdoms and client kings, which makes sense since these people could attain no representation in Rome. But where is the evidence that this system generalized to Rome itself? It's not that I "have forgotten a very impotant part of Roman society's structure", but that I deny an insidious myth that blinds us to how the Roman system really worked. (Again we have a thread on this somewhere.) Most of your argument is directly toward the need for secret ballots, which I think is probably self-evident. The key move in your argument is that the provision of secret ballots increased bribery. But you never address my counter-argument that--at least for the actual vote--secret ballots counteract the effects of economic pressure, social pressure, and physical threats. I would suggest that there were many aspects of Roman politics that were not secret at all--for example, how senators voted, what legislation was introduced by tribunes, what measure tribunes vetoed, how praetors conducted their affairs, etc. In all of these cases, bribery and threats could be very effective. THIS is where people ought to hyper-ventilate about bribery. But when it comes to how the "head count" voted in secret, the bribery and threats become ineffective.

As you can read in the sources, far from engaging in any kind of embezzlement in Cyprus, Cato won over the Cypriots with his just administration and managed to obtain a province for Rome at the cost of no Roman life. For this, he was offered a triumph (which he refused). This whole digression on Cato has been for nothing.

According to Smith, Catilina was a common name among the Sergii, but I can't find another one.

If Cato had robbed Cyprus (which ALL the sources say he did not), overturning Clodius' legislation wouldn't have returned a plumping denarii to the treasury, and it would have had no effect on Cato's riches whatever. Why not look back to Everitt's source material so you can see the whole context? The sources support my interpretation and directly contradict yours. SOURCES (from Attalus.org): 58: Clodius proposes to send Cato to Cyprus. Cic:Dom_20-23, 52-53, 65, +:Sest_56-64; Sall:Hist_1'6; [Liv]:Per_104'b; Strab_14.684'e;(6.6) Vell_2.45'4; ~Plut:CatMin_34'1-7;* Flor_1.44'1-3;L !Appian:BCiv_2.23'b; +DioCass_38.30'5; Festus:Brev_13'1; AmmMarc_14.8'15 58: Ptolemaeus Auletes visits Cato at Rhodes. Plut:CatMin_35'4-7 57: Ptolemaeus, king of Cyprus, commits suicide and Cato takes over the island without resistance Strab_14.684'e;(6.6) Vell_2.36'6, 45'5; ValMax_9.4e'1;L Plut:CatMin_35'2-3, 36'1, :Brut_3'2; Flor_1.44'4-5;L Appian:BCiv_2.23'b; DioCass_39.22'2-3;* Festus:Brev_13'1; AmmMarc_14.8'15. 57: Cato scrupulously collects the wealth of Cyprus, in order to remove it to Rome Cic:Dom_23; ValMax_4.3'2;L Lucan_3'164; Plut:CatMin_36'2-38'4,* :Brut_3'1-4; DioCass_39.22'2-4. 56: Cato returns to Rome with the treasure he has collected from Cyprus Vell_2.45'5; ValMax_8.15'10;L Sen:Dial_6.20'6; Plin:HN_7'113,L 34'92;L ~Plut:CatMin_39'1-5;* Festus:Brev_13'1; AmmMarc_14.8'15; 56: Cato defends the legality of Clodius' acts as tribune, including his own appointment in Cyprus ~Plut:CatMin_40'1-4;* +DioCass_39.22'1 Here's the relevant passage (and surrounding context) from Dio Cassius: For a season, then, Milo served as an excuse for their taunts and assassinations. But about this time some portents occurred: on the Alban Mount a small temple of Juno, set on a kind of table facing the east, was turned around toward the north; a blaze of light darted from the south across to the north; 2 a wolf entered the city; an earthquake occurred; some of the citizens were killed by thunderbolts; in the Latin territory a subterranean tumult was heard; and the soothsayers, being anxious to find a remedy, said that some divinity was angry with them because some temples or consecrated sites were being used for residence. 3 Then Clodius substituted Cicero for Milo and not only attacked him vigorously in a speech because the site of the house he had built upon was dedicated to Liberty, but even went to it once, with the intention of razing it to the ground; but he did not do so, as he was prevented by Milo. 21 Cicero, however, was as angry with him as if he had actually accomplished his purpose, and kept making accusations. Finally, taking with him Milo and some tribunes, he ascended p337the Capitol and took down the tablets set up by Clodius to commemorate his exile. 2 This time Clodius came up with his brother Gaius, a praetor, and took them away from him, but later he watched for a time when Clodius was out of town, and going up to the Capitol again, took them and carried them home. 3 After this occurrence no quarter was shown on either side, but they abused and slandered each other as much as they could, without refraining from the basest means. 4 The one declared that the tribuneship of Clodius had been contrary to the laws and that therefore his official acts were invalid, and the other that Cicero's exile had been justly decreed and his return unlawfully voted. 22 While they were contending, and Clodius was getting much the worst of it, Marcus Cato came upon the scene and restored their balance. He had a grudge against Cicero and was likewise afraid that all his acts in Cyprus would be annulled, because he had been sent out under Clodius as tribune; hence he eagerly took the latter's side. 2 For he was very proud of his deeds and anxious above all things that they should be confirmed. For Ptolemy, who at the time had been master of the island, when he learned of the vote that had been passed, and neither dared to rise against the Romans nor could endure to live deprived of his kingdom, had taken his life by drinking poison. 3 Then the Cypriotes readily received Cato, expecting to be friends and allies of the p339Romans instead of slaves. 4 Over this fact, however, Cato had no reason to vaunt himself; but because he had administered everything in the best possible manner, and after collecting slaves and large amounts of money from the royal treasury, had incurred no reproach but had turned over everything unchallenged, for these reasons he laid claim to valour no less than if he had conquered in some war. So many men were accepting bribes that he thought it more unusual for a man to despise money than to conquer the enemy. 23 So at that time Cato for these reasons had created some expectation that he would receive a regular triumph, and the consuls proposed in the senate that he be given the praetorship, although by law he could not yet hold it. And though he was not appointed, for he spoke against the measure himself, yet he obtained greater renown from this very circumstance. 2 Clodius undertook to name the slaves brought from Cyprus Clodians, because he himself had sent Cato there; but he failed because the latter opposed it. So they received the title of Cyprinas, although some wished to call them Porcians; but Cato prevented this too. 3 So Clodius became angry at his opposition and proceeded to attack his administration; he demanded the accounts of the transactions, not because he could prove him guilty of any wrongdoing, but because nearly all of the documents had been destroyed by shipwreck and he expected to gain some advantage from this circumstance. 4 And Caesar, although not present, was again aiding Clodius at this time, and according to some was sending him in p341letters the accusations brought against Cato. One of the attacks upon Cato consisted in the charge that he himself had persuaded the consuls (so they affirmed) to propose the praetorship for him, and that he had then pretended to give it up voluntarily, in order not to appear to have lost it unwillingly.

Asclepiades, I think you could follow up on some of your suggestions simply using Smith's dictionary (on line) and Nephele's list.

Your quote from Everitt has nothing to do with a charge of ambitu against Cato. Instead, it claims that Cato didn't put up a fight against the annexation of Cyprus. (He did, but the voters passed Clodius' legislation and Cato complied with the law.) As much as Everitt's claim might be relevant to understanding Cato, it sheds no light on the laws against ambitu.

Can we not hijack this thread on Ambitu to talk about Cyprus? I'm happy to talk all about Cato's exemplary tenure there, but there are already threads on that that topic where we can do so without repeating ourselves.

Seneca's tragedies were not meant to by played, but readed. Intriguing. Why do you say this?

I'm not certain that MPC was stating that patrician families were larger than the plebian, when he wrote: "What the patricians lacked in numbers, however, they more than made up for in productivity, with the average patrician family producing nearly 5 times the number of magistrates as the average family." I may be wrong, but I interpreted "productivity" to mean contributions of existing family members to the magistracies -- not "productivity" as in generating more offspring. Asclepiades had me right, but he was referring to another of my comments: "Possibly, this large patrician/plebeian disparity comes from the fact that patrician gentes (with their many branches) were larger than plebeian ones. It would be interesting to see the breakdown by branch."

No, did I say that? Did you even read my post? Do you know what events Gruen is describing? Did you follow up on his references to source material? Have you finished his book? If you would these things, you would see that my suggestion that Cato "indulged bribery" rather than "indulged in bribery" is exactly right and not a play on words. Not that that will make any difference to you, which is a shame. For all my criticism of Caesar, at least I go to the trouble of learning everything there is to learn about him, down to the details of the debate regarding whether he was born in 102 or 100 (it's 102), why he might be interested in the flamenate, what sources corroborate his story about the pirates, etc etc. For all your criticism of Cato, you make one factual error after another, from mistaking the province he annexed (again, it was Cyprus, not Crete), to mistaking the legislation he sponsored or allegedly failed to sponsor, to missing whether he was at Pharsalus or elsewhere. I'd love to debate Cato with you, but you really should bother to study him first.

I don't mean for this to sound rude, but No--your comments aren't useful. But they could be very useful IF you would follow up your own suggestions with specific contributions. For example, we all know that patrician names cover plebeian branches as well, so if you want to be helpful, go make a list of the patrician and plebeian branches of the 16 patrician gentes, publish the list here, and compute what the new numbers should be. That would be helpful. Similarly, we already know that the consulship was closed for the plebs until 376 but that other magistracies were open to them. This comment really doesn't change anything in our list or commentary. If you want to turn this observation into something useful, then go look at the magistracies between 509 and 376 and between 376 and 31 and report back how many plebs (and from which gentes) were represented in each of the non-consular magistracies in each of these two time periods. That would be helpful. You're also right that we can't assume family size from the list of magistrates alone. Again, if this comment is going to improve our knowledge rather than just fret about its epistemological status, then there has to be a list of non-magistrates as well, coded for year, for family, and for patrician/plebeian status. Compiling this list would also be helpful.

Shall we quote the whole passage then? From Gruen, p. 54: But Cato won the respect also of his contemporaries. He was a resolute Stoic, not only in pursuing the philosophic doctrines of that sect, but in applying them to his political behavior. Cicero twitted him once for his inflexible adherence to impossible dogmas. And the orator also could lament, in a private letter, that Cato always spoke as if he lived in the Republic of Plato rather than in the sewer of Romulus. But Cicero's fits of pique need not be taken too seriously. In general, he reserved the utmost praise for Cato: a man of great seriousness, incorruptible, and blessed with a noble spirit; none surpassed him in integrity, wisdom, courage, and patriotism. "Cato was worth a hundred thousand men." Similar sentiments were expressed by Sallust: Cato was pre-eminent in uprightness, self-control, and austerity; he preferred to be rather than seem virtuous. Moderns have too often written him off as espousing Utopian ideas, as obstinate and uncompromising. But motivation by high principles could coexist with practical politics. Cato was not averse to sponsoring grain laws, thereby outbidding his opponents, or to indulging in bribery, if this could bring supporters into power. And his firm opposition to Caesar and Pompey, it can be argued, was deliberately calculated to drive them to extreme positions and to undermine their own standing. A series of measures or attempted measures, reformist and progressive, stand to his credit. Politics, administration, the judiciary, foreign policy, legislative activity -- all areas felt Cato's presence. He was completely enmeshed in public affairs, not Utopianism. Cato policies, when properly analyzed, show a shrewdness and penetration which scholars have not always acknowledged. With the whole context, it now becomes clear what Gruen was arguing, not that Cato was a hypocrite, but that "high principles could coexist with practical politics." Indeed, there is nothing in Cato's grain bill, the Lex Porcia Frumentaria, which is against Stoic principles. Coming in the context of Catiline's putsch, the bill was a well-timed and moderate proposal for sharing the largesse of Rome with the people who stood by her. Gruen's statement about Cato "indulging in bribery" is off by one word--in. Cato was indulging bribery, not indulging in bribery. Specifically, Cato indulged Bibulus' bribery in his contest with Caesar. It's not hard to see why, if you've been following this thread at all: Caesar lavishly bribed voters (with borrowed and stolen money), and to nullify the effect of bribes on one side, both sides must engage in it. Thus, though I would have asked Cato to fight fire with fire, Cato's only involvement was in not prosecuting the husband of his daughter and father of his grandchildren. What a scoundrel!

To add a little context to Nephele's names, I did a quick analysis of the patrician/plebeian breakdown. Of the 2890 names on the list, about 70% (2018) were plebeian and 30% (871) were patrician. This proportion roughly corresponds to the proportion of republican history in which the consulship was open to plebeians (i.e., 345 of the 478 years between 376 and 31 BCE). Proportionately speaking, it is as if the first 133 years of Roman history were totally dominated by patricians, whereas the next 345 years were totally dominated by plebeians. What the patricians lacked in numbers, however, they more than made up for in productivity, with the average patrician family producing nearly 5 times the number of magistrates as the average family. For all the gentes listed, the average number of magistrates per family was 11 (i.e., 2890 magistrates divided among 62 families). For patricians, the average number was 54.5 ( 871/16) magistrates per family, with all but three patrician families (Nautia, Quinctillia, and Cloelia) producing more than 11 magistrates per family. In contrast, for the plebeians, the average number of magistrates was 8.2 per family, with only one family (Licinia) producing more than was average for the patricians. Possibly, this large patrician/plebeian disparity comes from the fact that patrician gentes (with their many branches) were larger than plebeian ones. It would be interesting to see the breakdown by branch. To better visualize the difference between the patricians and plebs, look at the top half of the distribution. Note how it follows the standard Pareto distribution (almost identical to individual differences in UNRV posts, btw).

Given that I've just put forward a long argument expressing the opposite view, could you please explain why it is that a secret ballot would make bribery more prevalent? If there is no way of figuring out who voted for whom, how would you know whether the bribe you paid wasn't wasted money? Well known by whom? You assume a consensus where there is none. At the risk of sounding like a broken record to regular Forum participants, I'll point out again that a great many scholars of the Roman republic--Millar, Gruen, Rosenstein, Morstein-Marx, Yakobson, et al--argue that Polybius' characterization of the Roman constitution is more accurate for recognizing the role of popular sovereignty than you let on. Of course, neither Polybius nor any of these scholars maintained that Rome was an Athenian democracy or some time of utopia, but the contention that Rome had a mixed constitution--with democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical elements--seems exactly right. What exactly is there to disagree with here? And--more importantly--what does it have to do with ambitu? Technically, no. There was no death penalty for bribery. Now how could Polybius have made such a mistake if bribery was rampant at the time of his writing? Given that I've now got 150 Asses, I'd vote for whoever I think will keep such lucrative (for me) elections rolling along!

Your unique way of formatting replies makes it difficult to reply to your point-by-point interjections.

I think it will be useful to put the names in some sort of historical context. Also, the order in which you enter the names doesn't matter, as long as there is a field in your spreadsheet or database for the year in which a given magistrate held his office. It's too bad the Broughton work isn't a searchable text file on a CD or the web. It's hard to believe that Oxford really makes so much money off these volumes that it's more profitable to distribute the information via paper, ink, and muscle than via electrons, phosphors, and fingertips.

I'm sure the Sullans thought Sulla was a swell guy too.

No, I'm saying that your "once pardoned, twice killed" rule doesn't (and can't) apply to most of the folks on my original list. In particular, Caesar didn't have a chance to pardon Ahenobarbus, Cato and Scipio a second time: Ahenobarbus died fighting at Pharsalus and couldn't be pardoned; Cato never surrendered to Caesar and couldn't be pardoned; and after losing at Pharsalus, Scipio was driven into the sea outside Thapsus and couldn't be pardoned. The same is true of Pompey, who being killed by the Egyptian cat-worshippers, also couldn't be pardoned. Again, all of this points to the broader issue here: Caesar didn't kill rivals in Rome like Sulla because most all his rivals died in the civil wars outside Rome. Thus, the notion that Caesar somehow won over his rivals by largesse and forgiveness is just wrong: the only difference between Sulla and Caesar is where their enemies met their end.

Aha! I think we have different questions in mind for the data. My question boils down to: "Of the known magistracies for a given time interval, what % were held by each gens {Valerii, Fabii, etc}." For this problem, it's OK that the number of known magistracies varies from year-to-year or even for data to be sparse in the early years since the data is sparse for ALL gentes across ALL magistracies. I think the question you had in mind in your calculations was, "Of the magistracies held by a gens, what % were held at each time interval" For this problem, it wouldn't be OK for the number of known magistracies to increase systematically, since the bias would lead families that held a stable number of magistracies to appear to rise in prominence, families that declined in prominence to appear stable (clearly what we're seeing the data for the Fabii and Valerii), families that rose in prominence to appear to rise faster than they did in actuality. Is this clear?

This is a wonderful list Nephele! Far more comprehensive than any other similar list that I've seen. When compiling this list, did you happen to preserve information (e.g., in a spreadsheet) about the dates of the magistracies of each magistrate? I ask because I wonder about the prominence of certain families, such as the Valerii and Fabii, who seem to be highly prominent in the early and middle republic, but much less so in the late republic. Depending on what information you preserved when generating the list, we could answer a number of interesting questions.

When he bought them off, how much did Caesar pay Ahenobarbus, Pompey, Scipio, Cato, and Labienus If you speak of Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, Consul in 32 BC(?), he was pardoned by Caesar and joined with the assassins. No, I mean his father L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and you're missing the point of my question. The point is that Caesar--unlike Sulla and Marius--had no need for a blood bath in Rome because Caesar's blood bath occurred outside Rome. The fact is that Caesar's civil wars killed far more of the experienced leadership of the Roman republic than the massacres and proscriptions of Sulla and Marius. Caesar's monarchy was achieved, not because he paid off his rivals and won them over through his mercy, but because his rivals were killed in the course of the civil war, a fact which Caesar celebrated in his triumph.