M. Porcius Cato

I don't even stipulate that Sulla had an insightful reading of Caesar's early character. Our sources on Caesar's early career (esp. Plutarch) are mostly exercises in backward extrapolation, perhaps not as gross as our pompeius' account, but a backward extrapolation nevertheless. Interestingly, side-by-side with the "Caesar-as-populist-godling-from-birth" account, there are also plenty of hints that Caesar was simply a late-blooming and otherwise ordinary aristocratic opportunist who made up his political program as he went along. In my view, the flaminate was the perfect position for an aspiring do-nothing playboy, so I'd be happy to put it on Caesar's resume, but the sources are simply contradictory on whether Caesar ever had the position. Thus, how can we possilby advance an informed judgment about why he might have been deprived of it?

Let's debate Caesar's adventures in Britain in another thread. I take it that no one knows what Napolean had to say about Caesar other than that which is contained in the press release above.

I see, the gospel of Caesar shall not be questioned. Sigh. Isn't it possible that Napoleon has something interesting to observe that you might have missed? If Caesar had a commentary on Alexander, wouldn't you want to read it?

I really hadn't formed an opinion on the matter and didn't know about the surviving wall paintings. On the assumption that wall paintings could not survive a fire, however much of the paintings survived puts an upper limit on the amount of the Palatine that burned. So, while it wasn't really all of the Palatine that burned, the archaeology (that I know) still doesn't make clear whether it was .9%, 9%, or 99% of the Palatine that burned. If it turns out that 99% of the Palatine were burned, chastising Dio for a mere 1% exaggeration would be pedantic; on the other hand, if it turns out that only 9% of the Palatine were burned, one would wonder where Dio got his information.

The wall paintings still being intact supports the argument that Dio was engaging in hyperbole. Presumably if there were a conflagration enveloping the whole Palatine Hill, the heat would have destroyed the paint even if it did leave the stone structures intact (though I admit I'm no fire marshal).

Dio says these locations were "burned" not "destroyed". I burned my hand once, but I've still got two. What about this is difficult to understand?

Very nice post, tm.

Since we're on the topic, does anyone know the earliest mention of the rumor about Caesar and Nicomedes? Was its author Catullus, or was he just the popularizer of the rumor?

Thanks for that Clodius. The upshot is that Caesar threatened to disband the Tenth, but he didn't. Still, the larger point about loyalty is that it depended very much on the personal attention of the commander. In a sense, this is simply an extension of Onasander's description of what the general's job was:

Yes, the 10th did fight at Thapsus and Munda, which were after the mutiny. I'll have to double check my source. Maybe he only decimated the 10th? Good catch.

Whether or not Persia realized its aim to reconquer Syria has no bearing on the strength of the Roman cavalry. Yes, Rome defeated many of her enemies. That's a given. But what is the evidence that the Roman cavalry deserves any credit for Roman military success?

Yes. First, Caesar disbanded all the troops, promised that the citizens would get what they were promised, but told them that they would have no share in the booty from the African campaigns. Then, when they howled that they wanted to be forgiven and have a chance for the loot, he accepted them, but left the 10th permanently disbanded. Thereafter, Caesar used the mutineers as cannon fodder so he didn't have to pay them anything. As you can see, troops and generals were oh-so-very loyal to each other.

Victory breeds loyalty for a time, but if victories were enough to secure a permanent loyalty, how do you explain the mutiny of the Tenth?

A profound political point to whom? The point being what? That the Romans can't plan a simple naval crossing with any competence and are easily turned away by the first sign of trouble? Yes, that's a profound political point to make. If Napoleon criticized Caesar's near-disastrous escapade into Britain, then I agree with Napoleon.

It would be helpful to indicate the time period you're talking about. From the early to late Republic alone, the finance regime changed enormously. Over this time, the taxes paid by Romans themselves were eliminated once the coffers were filled by wars of conquest and by the auction of farming rights to the rapacious publicani. Also, although much money was initially raised via rents paid to the state for use of public lands (just the lands in Campania raised 1/4 of the republic's money), these revenue sources were exhausted as the farmers' lands were slowly confiscated by political-generals (such as Caesar) to settle their troops. The form of taxes also differed by place and time. For example, Syracusa initially paid their taxes in grain, which was sold at auction (at least until the Gracchi started handing it out for free). In other locations, taxes were paid in metal. Finally, donatives by conquerors (such as Pompey) filled a large portion of the Temple to Saturn (i.e., the treasury), although this was completely emptied by Caesar after he marched on Rome.

I've been thinking about this thread for a long time, and re-reading it, it appears that there seem to be three separate issues under discussion: 1) whether Roman cavalry weakness contributed to the fall of the Western empire, 2) whether Roman cavalry weakness was the Achilles' heel of the Roman army (i.e., a critical weakness in an otherwise superb force), and 3) whether the Roman cavalry was the weakest arm in the army. On the first issue, the posts here and elsewhere strongly suggest that the contribution of Roman cavalry weakness to the fall of the Western empire must have been relatively small, espeically given the magnitude of the other problems that the empire faced. On the second issue, the posts here have made it quite clear that there were a number of hypothetical and actual defenses against a superior cavalry force, including the combined use of infantry and various missles. To that one might add the use of entrenchments and caltrops to protect the flanks of the infantry. Thus, although superior mounted troops were a constant source of danger to the Roman army, the lack of an opposing mounted force wasn't technically an "Achilles' heel" (i.e., a fatal weakness). On the third issue, though, the Roman cavalry seems to me to be the weakest part of the army, so much so that Fuller was right to say that Rome fought with a "one-armed army". Roman cavarly tactics were at times ludicrously ill-conceived. For example, at Pharsalus, Labienus had a magnificent number of horse that was sufficient to pre-occupy Caesar's horse, missle troops, detached infantry, and still have enough left over to roll up Caesar's line on the flank. Yet instead of dividing the horse into divisions, each with a specific task and overall obejective, Labienus formed them into a single small-front/large-depth unit, and he led them from behind. In consequence, when the front section broke, the whole cavalry routed, trampling Pompey's missle troops in their wake. Other examples are not difficult to find. The question I have is--WHY was the cavalry so ill-prepared? Were they not trained well? Was the lack of stirrups such a hindrance they couldn't develop better tactics? Did generals disdain to discuss strategy with auxiliary cavarly commanders? What was going on?

Furius, can you give an example of such a criticism?

Yes, I saw that via Google, but I don't have access to that issue of Military History. BTW, if you haven't read it, how do you know whether Napoleon's assessment of Caesar contained anachronisms?

The "evidence" of Carthaginian presence in the Ohio River valley is not credible by any archaeological standard whatever.

These are interesting questions. One factor though is undoubtedly simple greed. You back the guy that gets you booty. Even Caesar's oh-so-loyal Tenth ended up in mutiny when Caesar failed to deliver them what they were promised. For his part, Caesar punished the Tenth by disbanding their unit and (more trecherously) using up the troops carelessly in future battles so as not to have to pay them later.

So, basically, there is no credible evidence whatever that Carthage sailed to America, nor traded with the locals for tobacco, nor ventured as far as Roswell where they breeded with space aliens. And why would they? Who would finance an expedition like a trip to the Americas? For what purpose? By what means? Unlike the Vikings, whose ships and available routes could plausibly reach parts of North America, the Carthaginians possessed ships that were low-hulled vessals and thus wholly unsuitable for Atlantic waters. Two weeks outside the Pillars of Herakles, and they'd all be sacrificing puppies to Ba'al for a ride home!

I do--Titus provides good dramatization of the principle that power corrupts and that absolute power corrupts absolutely. BTW, I liked the movie, and I hope someone does a movie of Coriolanus with Hopkins in the lead role. In my opinion, Coriolanus was Shakespeare's best.

Although Aristotle and Plate talk *about* infinity, neither *used* infinity in any of their calculations. There's a big difference between having a concept and knowing what to do with the concept. That's what makes this discovery textual find important--it looks as though the ancients actually used the concept of infinity to solve problems.

FWIW, when choosing a grad school, you should keep in mind what your specialization will be (e.g., late Roman republic) and who the world experts are in that field. Ultimately, the quality of your grad school mentor is as important (if not more so) than the institution where you intend to do your work. It's entirely possible to go to a great school and burn out because you have no interest in the topics that interest your advisor and/or because your advisor's approach is so hopelessly dated/flawed/boring that you're not marketable in an academic job market.

Napoleon wrote (or dictated) a commentary on Caesar's adventures in Gaul, Britain, and the civil wars. I've seen this commentary cited several times (most notably by the great military historian, J F C Fuller) yet never had a chance to read a copy. Any information about how to get a copy (in English, please--je parle francais comme une vache espagnol)?