barca

OK, I came into this thread late and it's hard to catch up with all of the discussion. Polybius stated it best when he said that the Roman soldier was adaptable to function effectively any time, any place, and for any purpose. They actually functioned better as individuals when compared to the hellenistic phalangites who were totally ineffective when out of their formation. I believe it was their exposure to a variety of opponents (Gauls, Samnites, Carthaginians) and their willingness to adapt that made them effective. So yes, they did function well as individuals, although not at the same level as a Samurai or Western Medieval Knight.

The Samnite Wars took place in hilly terrain, for which a manipular legion was better than a phalanx. However, gradual changes in the legion makeup probably began sooner with the reforms of Camillus after the Roman phalanx was soundly defeated by the Senones at the battle of Allia.

I was pleased to see that the Kindle version was much cheaper, so I ordered it. I'll submit my impressions when I get a chance to read it.

At some point I'm going to go back to those original sources that you mention above. It seems to me that there are different opinions on the failure of the late Roman military. For example Goldsworthy believes that the barbarian tribes had not progressed that much, and were essentially not much more powerful than they were at the time of the early empire. It was the change in the Roman military organization and the continuous outbreak of civil wars that weakened the army. Heather seems to favor the idea that the barbarians had gradually become more sophisticated from continuous contact with the empire. It seems to me that the latter theory has some merit when it applies to the Goths. Consider that they had already occupied Dacia for about 100 years when Aurelian evacuated the province. There were no doubt some Romano-Dacians left behind who were subject to the Goths, perhaps providing them with a better understanding of the Roman system. Most of the Germanic warriors encountered by the Romans during the late republic and early empire had very poor equipment. Very few had armor. Typically they had a shield, a long spear, and some sort of small sword or dagger. They were most effective in small skirmishes with hit and run tactics, as Varus discovered. Fritigen's Goths may have been short on equipment when they first crossed the Danube, but I suspect that by the time of Adrianople they were better equipped. They would have to in order to stand up to heavy Roman infantry. It wouldn't surprise me if a large percentage had armor and Roman swords. And let's not forget that the Romans showed that they were still able to function effectively in pitched battles, when led by a competent general. e.g Julian defeating the Alemani at Strasburg.

I agree. I did go off topic, but I didn't see the new thread which you mentioned.

It is true that Sebastianus was successful with small skirmishes, and in retrospect that may have been their best option. However, I was referring to their strong showing earlier against Lupicinus around Marcianople.

Does this mean Goths were unsophisticated fighters who avoided using formations and combined arms, instead choosing to stupidly charge at their enemies without a battle plan like Barbarians are stereotypically portrayed in movies? Where they can do well in disorganized chaotic fighting when formations broke apart and its one man for himself but do horribly when fighting pitched battles with formations and and tactics such as manuever and flanking the enemy? I don't think that anyone knows the exact makeup of Fritgen's Gothic army. What percent had armor? How army of them had previously served in the Roman Army, and were familiar with military formations and tactics? We do know that they were joined by Roman deserters and other disenfranchised individuals. We also know that they had help from Alans, Sarmatians, and Huns who were highly skilled cavalrymen. Regardless of their makeup, they certainly gave a good account of themselves in the smaller battles leading up to Adrianople.

Adrianople is usually considered as the worst Roman Military disaster since Cannae, and Fritigen's army was like Hannibal's, not prepared for a siege. I believe Fritigen said something like "i don't make war with walls", indicating that a siege is no easy task. Eventually Alaric's Goths were able to mount a successful siege of Rome about 30 years later, but one has to consider that they had been allowed to remain within the empire as foederati, frequently fighting alongside Roman regulars, so they no doubt had access to Roman military equipment, not that they needed it, because as I recall someone let them in through treachery.

Has anyone read this book? Interesting premise. It got my attention, but I gradually lost interest after reading about 1/3 of it. I found his very strong opinions more than I was will to suffer. http://www.amazon.com/Ruin-Roman-Empire-New-History/dp/0060787376 If I can sum it up O'Donnel is essentially saying the following "everything would have been fine if not for those evil Byzantines. If only they had been nice to those enlightened barbarians and let them have their way, everything would have been OK." He takes the bashing of Justinian to a new level. He also stated that Justinian's fortification of the Danube was a mistake because it created an "us against them" mindset and preventing the free flow of recruits for the military. He also attacked Boethius as no doubt plotting against Theodoric, and therefore deserving his fate. He describes Theodoric as more "roman" and less "barbaric" than the emperor Justin, Justinian's uncle. I will admit that Justin was not very well educated, but he had enough insight to recognize that about himself, and he delegated many responsibilities to his more educated nephew. These are only a few examples of the strong opinions expressed in the book. Has anyone else read it? Any thoughts?

I suppose the quality of their infantry varied depending on the time period. In the book about Belisarius by Hughes, there is a good description of Sassanid infantry of the 6th century "...these troops were highly respected and could be used to form the center of the Persian battle line behind the savaran. Armed with a spear and a sword, he is protected by a Sassanid-style spangenhelm, a coat of ring mail and a shield and is capable of facing Roman infantry in prolonged battle.'

Does anyone have any suggestions on a good English translation Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy? I found many different translations on Amazon, and it is hard to chose one. There can be subtle difference in the choice of words that can make a difference in the overall flow and meaning. I ordered this one to my kindle, since it was fairly inexpensive: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0199540543/ref=pd_lpo_k2_dp_sr_1?pf_rd_p=486539851&pf_rd_s=lpo-top-stripe-1&pf_rd_t=201&pf_rd_i=0192838830&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_r=1MY22KNYRYCAN0KFXTHQ There are many more choices out there. Any recommendations?

What was the Arminius' motivation? Wasn't he made a Roman citizen and given a high ranking in the Roman military? Didn't he see the benefit of remaining part of the empire? I also find it perplexing that the Romans changed their policy toward Germanaia, after one defeat, especially when you consider that previously military activity as led by Drusus and later Tiberius (pre-emperor) was very successful. They had actually marched as far as the River Elbe, defeating several coalitions on the way. It appears that they were well on their way to consolidating their gains and completing the conquest. It is clear that Varus committed a fatal blunder, which is something that happens; it certainly wasn't the first military blunder on the part of the Romans. The humiliating defeat of the Romans to the Teutons was subsequently avenged by Marius. Julius Caeser was able to systematically put down rebellions in Gaul, and even venture into Germania. Germanicus had some limited success in his punitive expedition, which was ultimately inconclusive.

OK, when I used the term, I didn't mean it to infer any sort cohersion on the part of the Romans, but more of an encouragement, as the subject peoples saw the benefits of adopting Roman ways. And I agree that it worked both ways, i.e. the Romans adopting some of the cultural attributes of the conquered, as in "captured Greece held Rome captive"

And yet being Roman was less of a birthright and more of an adoption of the Roman Way or Creed (for lack of a better term). Upstarts aimed to be a part of elite Roman Society or 'the better part of humankind' . Being a part of this depended on an intense fund of knowledge in the Classics (Vergil, Cicero, etc.) and 'correct' latin. As soon as one of these educated individuals opened his mouth he would be identified as a member of the elite. During the early stages of the empire such Romanization had not fully taken hold, but by the 4th century, Gaul was extensively Romanized. Heather describes a certain Ausonius in Trier who was a teacher of Rhetoric under the auspices of the University of Bordeaux, which had emerged as one of the major centers of Latin Academics. Ausonius was of Gallic origin, and yet many of the Roman blue-bloods, such as the Senator Symmachus approached him with deference, because they valued his expertise in matters of Latin literature. The point is that Romans from Italy were seeking knowledge of Latin from individuals outside of Italy.

I have not fully understood why the Romans weren't able to do with Germany what they did with Gaul, i.e. romanize them. Peter Heather pointed out that many of the Gallic Romans in the 4th Century were in some ways more roman than the Romans themselves. Of course there were a number of Germanic individuals who became Romans, but the vast majority remained out there as an ever present threat, never fully subdued.

That's because they didn't have much in the first place. The Romans generally felt that Germania wasn't worth conquering. It was relatively backward and poor. Not a whole lot of plunder or money there.

It would be, except that the term 'German' was invented by the Romans as a term describing certain tribes as a group. The modern national identity didn't exist back then - Arminius had to bring the tribes together to cooperate against the Romans and the underlying differences still existed, especially since there was no significant germanic union until the 'barbarian conspiracy' of later times, and even that was only a temporary cooperation. The various Germanic tribes fought more amongst themselves than they did against Rome. I somehow doubt that the various raiders that crossed the Rhine for centuries viewed themselves as part of Arminius' legacy. The same goes for Fritigen's Goths and all the other groups that entered the subsequently.

The article is dramatic, but not entirely accurate: Pompey stayed in the Middle East for six years, establishing puppet regimes throughout the region, and turning himself into the richest man in the empire. Everyone knows that Crassus was the richest man in Rome, and a better example of the war on terror might be the slave war, i.e. Crassus versus Spartacus ( and Pompey also played a not so insignificant role). They certainly put more fear into the heats of the Romans, defeating several Roman Armies and rampaging up and down the peninsula until finally defeated by Crassus.

I agree, that statement has been made numerous times in many sources. I'm not sure you need a specific reference.

No surprise. The ancient world was no paradise. It is important to keep things in perspective. Infant mortality was high. There were no immunizations, antibiotics, IV's, ventilators, intensive care units, etc. Infants with congenital anomalies that survive today only with medical intervention would not stand a chance in the ancient world. We should distinguish what they called "exposure" or allowing them to die, from deliberate killing. It was survival of the fittest. This practice seems less abhorrent than the deliberate sacrifice of healthy children to the Canaanite God Baal, as practiced by the Carthaginians.

Here's an interesting article that I found recently. It describes the Fulcum, a late Roman modification of the Testudo. It is a long article that I just started reading. Briefly it appears that the front two ranks formed a testudo-like shield wall to protect the formation from enemy missiles: http://www.duke.edu/web/classics/grbs/FTexts/44/Rance2.pdf

It is certainly an excellent formation for protection against missile fire. Marc Anthony used it as a last resort against the Parhians. See pages 55-56: http://books.google.com/books?id=WadVUvp2qlAC&pg=PA55&lpg=PA55&dq=mark+anthony+testudo+parthia&source=bl&ots=m8aqI65bZi&sig=17WcoS-83mK7WtViDJuD9tTPUUs&hl=en&ei=lbiXTbO1H8matweu1NH_Cw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CC4Q6AEwBA#v=onepage&q&f=false

What one sees in a film doesn't always have much bearing on reality: Here's a clip from the recent movie Eagle showing the Romans breaking their testudo when confronted by war chariots. That made no sense to me. By turning and running they only made themselves more vulnerable. http://movieclips.com/9Swja-the-eagle-movie-testudo/ Not shown in the clip was the earlier use of the same testudo to advance against the Celtic warriors to rescue Roman POW's. Again the lack of mobility of such a formation would make it somewhat unwieldy for that purpose.

I don't think that the Roman Legion was any more susceptible than any other formation to guerilla warfare. Consider for example a Macedonian phalanx trapped in Teutoberger Wald - those Sarissas would be useless, getting tangled up in overhead branches. Would result in a much quicker victory by barbarians. The manipular legion which evolved somewhere between the battle of Allia and the Samnite wars was actually well suited for dealing with unexpected events. The ability hold maniples in reserve to deal with rapidly-occurring changes in the front lines and the flanks made it a very adaptable formation, but no system is perfect. I would say they suffered catastrophic events because of blunders, not an inherent weakness of the formation itself. As far as the depiction of the tortoise formation in a pitched battle, that is highly inaccurate. The Tortoise or testudo was only used in two situations: 1. for sieges 2. a modified form for receiving a cavalry charge The late Roman army was actually well-adapted for smaller skirmishes, since they frequently dealt with small barbarian raiding parties. There were few large-scale battles between Strassburg and Adrianople.

My mistake, see next post