Spartan JKM

Archelaus, a Cappadocian, was decisively defeated by Sulla twice, as Hamilcar Barca stated, but he did subjugate Bithynia and much of Greece during the 1st Mithridatic War. When commissioned by Mithridates do negotiate peace with Rome, he turned coat and aided Lucius Licinius Lucullus in the 3rd Mithridatic War, which lasted from 73-71 B.C. Lucullus had Pontus under Roman rule by 70 B.C. Mithridates VI 'the Great' (Eupator Dionysius) of Pontus was probably Rome's most dangerous enemy in the last century B.C. Exploiting Rome's vulnerability during the Social War (91-87 B.C.), he took over Cappadocia and Bithynia, and shortly afterwards overwhelmed the army of Manius Aquillius. He was admonished by Sulla to stay in Pontus, and to be 'Friend and Ally of Rome'. He responded by repelling Roman forces (he may have been provoked), precipitating the 2nd Mithridatic War, which he won after consolidating his hold on Pontus and territories to the north. He enlisted the aid of pirates in the Black Sea. It was during the 3rd War he collaborated with Quintus Sertorius, the redoubtable Sabine knight of Iberia. But Mithridates suffered from handicaps, of which a couple were of his own bad doing: he was reputedly too cruel, even for the standards of his time, to gain the unwavering support necessary to defeat, or even check, Rome. He was indeed passionate in his opposition to the Romans, thinking himself a liberator of Rome's Greek subjects, calling himself 'the Deliverer'. Pompey vanquished him in 66 B.C. at Dastira (later Nicopolis in NW Greece). He had himself killed by a slave 3 years later, as he couldn't dispatch himself poison; he was too injured form constant consumptions of antidotes. He was reputedly trying to enable his body impervious to poison - or something like that. Mithridatism would come to be known as the practice of taking increasing sub-lethal doses of the poison until one was able to tolerate lethal doses. Both the literary scholars Albert Housman and Jorge Luis Borges alluded to Mithridates in their poetry works. He may have been one of the many powerful classical figures who suffered from 'Alexander envy'. He spoke maybe 20 languages, and was a leader of mercurial talent, but his military ability was moderate at best. He set himself a goal that was not only beyond his ability, but beyond his resources. He was certainly a prominent figure in Roman history, but if he had never been given the appellation 'the Great', I would have never wondered why. Thanks, Spartan JKM

Outstanding hypothesis. I chose option 3 - but with a specific point (if I may); Carthage would not have been standing centuries after a Hannibalic victory. It still would have been Rome. Rome's innovations in naval warfare, specifically the corvus (basically, a boarding plank that couldn't be detached immediately), in the 1st Punic War illustrated she was the more martial of the two powers. In the 2nd Punic War, Carthage failed almost exclusively where Hannibal was not present. It's possible the Carthaginian Suffete never wanted all-out wars with Rome. They allowed Hannibal to involve them in what they possibly believed would be a defensive war for the protection of their monetary interests in Iberia, with the further likelihood of regaining Sardinia and even Sicily. However, to the Romans, any conflict was a life and death struggle; not only were they much superior in manpower and resources, but also resolve. It was but the genius of Hannibal that prolonged the struggle. As brilliant a commander Hannibal was, it's possible his initial whirlwind string of victories had the long term effect of welding the majority of Rome's allies closer to her. It seems that Carthage was not willing to make the necessary sacrifices, physical and economic, to come close for Rome to aquiesce. It is possible that Hannibal's immediate advance on Rome after Cannae might have punctuated their indomitable will just enough to tip the balance in his favor. He certainly couldn't have taken the city by force. I am inclined to think they would not have given up with his arrival at the gates of Rome in september 216 B.C., as an assault on the city would have obviously been plain suicidal, coupled with the fact they knew, as he did, he couldn't have taken the city by besiegement either. There were still plenty of Roman troops all over Italy, thus he would have been shut in. There were also no inside collaborators, so treachery or subterfuge was out of the question. Moreover, a march on Rome would have involved a complete reversal to his long-term strategy; if he impetuously marched away from the areas he would likely get support, as happened after Cannae, into the heartland of the Roman federation, where he previously had no luck gaining any defections, he would have risked throwing everything away, most notably the psychological effect of his great victory. The strategic purpose of his march on Rome 5 years later was entirely different, not to mention an excellent attempt - to draw the Romans away from Capua. It worked partially, as he was screened to the west by a force under Fulvius Centumalus. But the Romans didn't budge, to their credit. Fulvius' army would be destroyed by Hannibal a year later at Herdonea, the same town he defeated a Roman army under Fulvius Flaccus in 212 B.C., according to Livy. Livy was not known for sharp accuracy, but I don't think he would exaggerate anything that would favor Hannibal's image. It's difficult to say, but think Hannibal applied the most viable strategy; it seems nothing was going to work without the more assistance from his allies. In 209 B.C., 12 of the 30 socii announced they could not provide Rome of material and men. His plan was bearing fruit, but Rome could sustain their war effort at 60% strenght. Much of what weighed against Hannibal was circumstantial and beyond his control, and the oeprtaions under his control with his forces was sublime, but one problem that has always stuck in my head of Hannibal's strategy of breaking the Roman confederation was his incorporation of so many Celts and Numidians into his army. True - he transcended their traditional abilities, and under him they were as great as they ever were. They were also utilized brilliantly under his tactical wizardry against a foe that was stronger as a group. But beyond the battle victories, why would the peoples of Italy leave Rome for a 'liberating' army composed of 'barbarians' who had been plundering Italy for previous generations. The Numidians were notoriously cruel, and their reputation preceded them in their conduct when Hannibal ordered them to appropriate and destroy property which was valuable to Rome's lifeline. But who else could he incorporate into his army? 'Civilized' Latins and Greeks? he was able to levy with success in Bruttium. His entire grandiose attempt makes for fascinating study. Basically, the Romans simply beat Carthage where Hannibal had no control of events. Events in Sardinia and Sicily were instrumental, and the Romans bested the Carthaginians on both islands. In 215 B.C. Titus Manlius Torquatus repulsed a revolt in Sardinia before the locals could link up with a Carthaginian landing force, which he also overwhelmed. Sardinia would have been paramount to the Carthaginians at this time. Roman control of the island remained intact for the rest of the war. Marcus Marcellus attacked Syracuse before the Carthaginians could take advantage of the pro-Carthaginian faction that had taken control of the city when Hiero, a longtime Roman ally, died. After Syracuse was taken by the Romans, Hannibal had sent a small number of reinforcements under Muttines, a superb cavalry leader, to help some 11,000 Carthaginian forces who had just landed in Sicily. Muttines wrought havoc on Roman outposts, who were mostly the exiled Cannae and Herdonia legions. Hanno, the commander in Sicily, relieved Muttines of command and replaced the Liby/Phoenician officer with his son. Muttines joined the Romans, which facilitated ultimate Roman victory in Sicily. This was pure foolishness on the Carthaginian side. The very reason why the Mongols of the 13th century were probably the most efficient fighting force ever was Chinggis Khan's policy of his chain of command being distributed by ability, not blood. Philip V was checked in Illyria by Roman forces in 215 B.C., and he was out of the picture very quickly. He opted to attack his Greek enemies than apply pressure on Rome in the Adriatic, which would ahve helped the Carthagininas in Sicily. Hey, to each their own. The Romans acted quickly, not waiting for anything that would render them in a defensive position, which they had against Hannibal a this time. Gnaeus Scipio's defeat of Hasdrubal Barca at Dertosa (Ibera), near Tarraco, in 215 B.C. was huge! Hasdrubal was trying to break through to Italy, and surely would have linked up with Hannibal at this time, being the route was established, and the Gauls had recently ambushed and destroyed the sole consular army in northern Italy. Reinforcements intended for Hannibal in Italy went to Iberia instead because of this reversal for the Carthaginians. The Scipio brothers cut their way into a good position into Iberia, gaining many allies, and though they were defeated and killed (due to treachery), a certain Lucius Marcius saved the Romans cause in Iberia by skillfuly maintaining his position just north of the Ebro with less than 10,000 men. The 3 Carthaginian armies, numbering maybe 50,000, should have, in theory, rid iberia of Roman presence in 211 B.C. Each commander had to hold his region, but they certainly could have combined to vanquish Marcius. There seemed to be much dissension and a lack of co-operation amongst the Carthaginian armies. Hannibal must have been fumed when he learned of these events. The brief but clear opportunity for the Carthaginians to recover the invaluable north-eastern section of Iberia cama and went, as Nero arrived with some 12,000 foot and 2,000 horse. The Roman lines were strengthened and Nero crossed the Ebro and inflicted a minor defeat on Hasdrubal. At the end of 210 B.C. Scipio, later Africanus, took over in Iberia with a solid base, and went to work. His campaigns here and in Africa were among history's most efficient and decisive. Aside from Hannibal's part, Carthage dispathed some 80,000 troops throughout the war. Only 4,000 reached him, when Bomilcar sailed into Locri in 214 B.C. The Roman navy prevented a huge landing force from reaching him, but 'control of the sea' was not the same as today; ships could not intercept others in a time with primitive technology (looking back, of course). Moreover, Mago sailed to Genoa from Iberia with about 15,000 men (via the Baleairic Islands) in 205 B.C., and Hannibal was able to reach Africa in 203 B.C. from Bruttium. This clearly shows Italy could be reached in detachments. The war in Italy was the primary theater of the conflict, and more attempts should have been undertaken to help him from Carthage. They possibly thought the war was won after Cannae, and that he didn't need the troops, which could be used to protect their monetary interests in Iberia. It is possible they never wanted this all-out war he engineered. He must be held accountable, though almost every Carthaginian setback was out of his direct control. Compared witht the other greats of history, Hannibal seemed to never have had an Antipitar, a Chepe (or Subotai), or a Davout. His officers were probably capable, but we don't have anyhting on record of their adeptness, a we do of Scipio's lieutenants in Gaius Laelius and Marcus Silanus. Julius Caesar had Titus Labienus, who was instrumental during the great conquest of Gaul. Excuses can go only so far, though, in my opinion. Hannibal knew the nature of the attitude of many of the Carthaginian aristocrats, who preferred a policy of appeasement, toward his family. He knew his attack on Italy was a gamble. No matter how we spin it, he lost in the end. Even if Rome agreed to terms with Hannibal, Rome would have simply won the next war, as Carthage had nothing as durable or resilient. They were an oligarchical plutocracy, which will always lose a protracted war with a state with stronger bonds with her subjects and a better system for nationhood. I hope my lack of succinctness wasn't too overbearing; to answer the direct question posed by Viggen with my view, the answer is yes - Carthage had a golden opportunity in 216 - 212 B.C. But only to prolong Roman hegemony of the Mediterranean. 'Prolong' could mean a century. I don't think there ever would have been Mediterranean and European basin derived from a Carthaginian/Phoenician inheritance. Carthage was not a nation-state, in terms of manpower, and was always dependent on others to fight her wars. I don't think the Carthaginians were an imperial-minded people. They were superb at what they did and cared for - they were merchants, craftsmen, and seafarers, who prospered from their talents in these endeavors. They did not care for other territories to colonize. Their venture in Iberia under Hamilcar was to gain the valuable mines for their economy. It was Hamilcar, Hasdrubal 'the Handsome', and Hannibal who developed their own kingdom (somewhat) and engineered the great conflict. I agree with Primus Pilus' opinion, and Julian's excellent assessment. If Rome had cracked and sought peace in the dark days of 216 B.C. (many in the Senate wanted this), I think it is almost a certainty that that the terms imposed upon her would have been sufficient only to ensure a situation which would resemble what had existed right before the 1st Punic War. Carthage, with the possible nominal heading of Capua, certainly would have exploited the trade etc. in southern Italy, and I am certain things might have been a little different in the short term, but Carthage could ahve never defeated Rome, especially after it reached a point when Rome wanted to completely destroy her. The Carthaginians were not some 'bad people', as the Romans would like us to believe. Remeber, we have no native accounts of Carthage and her history. Everyhting comes from the people that didn't like them. They had a stable government which, like Rome, eradicated the monarchy system early in her history, and they were brilliant entrepreneurs and middlemen, but had nothing as durable or resilient as Rome, and they had little to offer other races. On the flip side, if I may keep an open mind, it is possible Roman dominance would not have necessarily been for the better. Some feel it was one of the greatest tragedies in human history (in 3 acts) that Rome, and not Carthage, prevailed in this critical struggle. If the commercial and mercantile legacy of Carthage had set the foundations of future civilizations in Europe (with its stress on negotiation and compromise over war and empire), instead of the militarism of Rome, perhaps instead of a millennia of bloodshed and warfare we might have enjoyed a lot more peace and prosperity. The Greek cultural achievements would have been transmitted by the Carthaginians, too, as they had been influenced by the Greeks. Hannibal was a highly cultivated man immersed in Greek culture. Scipio was too, and is said to have admired his great adversary. However, I think we can safely say, for all its sharp-edges, especially that of imperialism, Rome layed down some wonderful achievements (the 12 Tables for eg) for the posterity of civilization. Thanks, Spartan JKM

Great site fellow posters! When discussing military history on other sites, I always find myself immersed in threads concerning ancient Greece, Rome, Alexander, and Hannibal etc. I am happy to have found this site! Glad to be here. A big question is do we count Belisarius, Narses, and Heraclius as Romans? They were technically Byzantines in the initial stages of that identity in the 6th century. I'll assume these 3, wo would rank as 3 of the greatest commanders of all time, are not considered Romans. I agree with the majority that Gaius Julius Caesar was Rome's greatest military commander. Scipio Africanus and Gaius Marius probably matched him as a field commander, but in the overall sphere of war and politics, which were inseperably linked in Rome at this time, he may be the greatest of all time (certainly a tough call), in terms of legacy and success. He was as adept as any commander in history at seizing the initiative, launching counter-offensives in winter against the Gauls. Sure, they lacked the discipline and tactical order of his X and XIII legions etc., but his siege of Alesia was a supreme display in the art of siegery. The elaborate systems of circumvallation, which included concentric walls of earth to stave off a relief army and contain Vercingetroix within the city walls, was brilliant. Of course his handicap in numbers was probably exaggerated in his Commentaries, but it was a superb display of military generalship nonetheles, and his conquest of Gaul provided Rome with an immense security and a market of wealth that layed the foundations for the Empire. He also indirectly shaped french civilization, but he didn't know that was going to happen as substantially as it did. moreover, the personal devotion of his legions was established by his generosity towards them, when he showered them in the spoils of war. Crossong the Rubicon with 1 legion took brass huevos, and his bloodless march on Rome was a triumphal progress. His reforms of the living conditions of the people improved accomodations and housing (the Agrarian Laws). The Julian Calendar was one of the greatest contributuins in history, though he was certainly aided by the likes of Sosigenes. Honors were reaped upon him in the last few months of his life, and he was generous to fault a fault with everybody, from the common people to his enemies in politics and war. Caesar was both a man of the people and a despot. He made explorations to Britain, which facilitated the more significant conquests of Hadrian a century later. in the end, he may have been too good for his own good. A bit of trivia - he was not completely undefeated: he suffered setbacks at Gergovia against the Gauls in 52 B.C., against Pompey at Dyrrachium in 48 B.C., in which he couldn't break his rival's entrenchments, and Caesar, though not directly present, was defeated by the Numidians under Juba in a battle around the Bagradas Valley in 49 B.C. These few setbacks were offset by his subsequent boldness, superb ability, and the quality and fealty of one of the greatest forces any commander could have enjoyed, of which much was due to his tremendous panache. His vigor and determination resulted in ultimate victory throughout Greece, Asia Minor ("Vini Vedi Vici"!), Iberia, and North Africa in a span of just 4 years. His victory at Pharsalus over an over-the-hill Pompey, in which he was outnumbered more than 2 to 1 in infantry (approx. 45,000 to 22,000) and 7 to 1 in cavalry (approx. 7,000 to just 1,000), was sublime. His concealed oblique reserve infantry line held fast against the anticipated breakthrough of Pompey's much more numerous cavalry, and his legions were too much for their less resolute counterparts. The very able lieutenant Titus Labienus fought with Pompey at Pharsalus. He had led with distinction in the Gallic campaign under Caesar, but turned coat in favor of Pompey, taking command of the cavalry that broke through Caesar's. he was surprised his former commander's deployed reserve. We can only criticize in hindsight, but Labienus made a poor choice in selecting who to fight for. There were probably political considerations. Like him, are indifferent of, or hate him, Julius Caesar was one of history's greatest men, not to mention a very controversial one. Was his personal intoxication with power a reason for the destruction of the Republic? I don't think he was the raw military genius that Epaminondas, Philip II of Macedon, or Hannibal was. But he didn't need to be. How about the others? Augustus (b. Gaius Octavius) was one of the most brilliant and influential leaders in history. His skill as a military leader was moderate at best, but he brought the civil wars, that had caused much strife in the classes of the Roman sphere of life and destroyed the Republic, to an end and re-organized the Roman body politic to a more stable level. He administered great legislative and civil reforms etc., founding the Roman Empire and ushering in internal peace and prosperity which lastet some 2 centuries. Rome was the culmination of the Classical Civilization, and everything, for the most part, achieved by the Babylonians, Egyptians, Judaeans, Greeks, Carthaginians, and others was disseminated throughout the West by Rome. Augustus was the primary factor as to why that happened. It was his loyal friend Marcus Agrippa who was an outstanding commander, and provided the emperor with solid support in the military campaigns, and in times of potential crises. Augustus was not a sedentary military man, though; he joined the armies, at least in the beginning, at the front. Publius Cornelius Scipio, later Africanus, did not fight for glorified conquest, but for Rome's salvation in her darkest hour. His reforms of the army, in which it could compete with enemies who had superior skirmishers and cavalry, were brilliant. He knew when not to be bold, and could gain the appeasement of others with his great personality. He was probably the greatest field commander Rome ever had. He had at his disposal very good lieutenants in Marcus Silanus and Gaius Laelius, who may merit some of Scipio's credit. Remember, it was his father and uncle who established Rome's position in Iberia that blocked the reinforcements from reaching Hannibal when Rome was practically bled white in Italy after Cannae. Scipio's victory over a much larger Punic army at Ilipa in 206 B.C. rivals even Cannae as a tactical masterpiece. At Zama 4 years later, Scipio commanded with poise and sensibility, merely conducting his battleplan so as not to lose his advantage in cavalry over Hannibal, which essentially decided the battle, coupled with his superb handling of the initial elephant charge. At Zama that day, Scipio's non-attempt at anything fancy proves his sagacity as a commander, not to mention he knew exactly who he was up against that decisive day. Scipio knew how to win the appeasement of defeated peoples as efficaciously as perhaps any commander in history. Before Scipio, another commander was sent to north-eastern Iberia with 12,000 troops and maybe 3,000 cavalry. This commander pushed Hasdrubal Barca back, returned to Italy, leaving a good base and fresh forces, combined with the beleaugured ones (but regaining improved morale) already there, for Scipio to begin his great Iberian campaign. That commander was Gaius Claudius Nero. His campaign of the Metaurus River in 207 B.C., in which he marched up and down Italy with incredible celerity, keeping Hannibal in the dark of what was commencing, and destroyed the invading army of Hasdrubal Barca, was a pivotal moment in military history, and a splendid achievement of tactics and logistics. Credit goes, to a lesser extent, to one Marcus Salinator, whose troops aided in the defeat of Hasdrubal. He should rank as one of Rome's greatest soldiers, as he, not Scipio Africanus, began the Roman use of cavalry on an effective scale. He fought Hannibal to a tactical draw in 208 B.C. in southern Italy. He became censor towards the end of the war and served in Macedonia. Nobody seems to know what became of him. The wisdom and skill of Fabius Maximus would become greatly appreciated after Cannae. The specific policy of inaction with harassing tactics would become adopted in almost every future military generation, most notably from the terrific Bertrand du Guesclin in the 100 Years War. However, it was Hannibal who outwitted the composed Fabius with the legendary cattle stratagem. Anyone know this story, in which Hannibal extricated himself from a Falernian valley from Fabius' trap? It was incredibly wily. Gaius Marius was a brilliant general, but he has been criticized for failing to fully exploit the power he could have had with such great reformed armies at his disposal. Maybe he didn't care, and his repulsion of the Gallic threats at the end of the 2nd century A.D. were inspiring. Sulla was not very admirable, in terms of anyhting selfless, but he died never have been defeated, militarily or politically. he certainly was more than capable as a general, but nothing astounding, in my opinion. Marcus Marcellus, Quintus Sertorius, and Lucius Lucullus (d.50s B.C.) deserve mention. Trajan and Hadrian were personally at the helm of superb military campaigns, including success in the East, which saw the Roman Empire at its greatest extent. Publius Vendetius, an associate of Caesar's, drove the aggressive Parthians, in the wake of their great triumph at Carrhae in 53 B.C., out of the Roman provinces in Asia Minor and Syria. he returned to Rome and celebrated a triumph in 38 B.C. (?). Septimius Severus, of Punic descent, put down his opponents and reduced the empire to relative peace in all corners, from Mesopotamia to Britain. The conquests of Constantine I have impacted human history tremendously, at least in the West, most notably because of his advocation of Christianity. One of the best was certainly Aurelian (Lucius Domitius Aurelianus), the emperor of the mid/late 3rd century A.D. Seldom has a reign been so short with so much brilliant success. He secured the Danube frontier to its former strength with a defeats of the Goths and Vandals. In 271 A.D. or so he destroyed the Alemanni at Rimini, who had invaded Gaul. He organized the defences of Rome with a new city wall. On his way to Syria, where he would put down the rise of Queen Zenobia, he suppressed more Gothic threats in the Balkan regions. He later again vanquished tribal armies across the Danube, and returned to the east to defeat the Palmyrian forces, who had rebelled. He would traverse hurriedly back to Gaul in 274 and defeat a revolting Roman army under one Tetricus (?). His triumphs worthily earned him the title Restitutor Orbis, or 'Restorer of the World'. We know, of course, there was a little more to the world then the Roman Empire at the time. All this is IMHO, of course, and I hope I haven't expounded too much, and will gladly join the 'greatest generals of antiquity' very soon. Thanks, Spartan JKM