Spartan JKM

Hello everyone. Arbitrarily lain theory upcoming! You all know the outline of this famous tale... At the onset of the first decade of the 2nd century BCE, in the course of the history of the ancient Mediterranean, plenty of intrigue was still rife amid the indefatigable career of Hannibal Barca, one of ancient history's most attractive figures of action, not to mention Rome's most feared enemy ever amid any era of her vast and varied history. Following the final defeat of Hannibal and subsequent dismantling of Carthage's entire realm of power beyond the city-state herself, the great Carthaginian still displayed remarkable poise after of his near single-handed attempt to enervate the power of the Roman Federation, in a grandiose attempt to ensure the commercial prosperity of Carthage in the Mediterranean, came up short after nearly two decades of warfare fought on an unprecedented scope. The Carthaginians represented the apogee of their Phoenician forefathers - the great middlemen of the ancient Mediterranean world. We read little of Carthage from the Greco-Roman literature simply because their ways of life revolved around mass production and frugality, not elegance and artistic merit. The practice of trade may be a boring topic to cover for detailed occurrences, but it has a remained a paramount sinew to daily life. Much of what does come up in connection to the Carthaginians, moreover, is indeed quite positive. The naturalist Pliny the Elder alluded to the Carthaginians as great merchandisers, and Aristotle and Cicero, of all figures, opined that in some respects the Carthaginian constitution was superior to that of the Greeks, and that their mixed policies reflected an enduring balance (respectively). Also, Strabo attributed to Eratosthenes the acknowledgement that the Carthaginians 'carry on their government so admirably' (cf. Ge?graphik

Thanks Paratrooper; I hope that post didn't seem scattered and too rife with prolixity. I put it together from past snippets I kept in my world documents. This is utter arbitrary twaddle, I'm sorry to state. Look, I'm all for different points of view (and a healthy exchange of them to broaden our views), criterion, specific angles, subjectivity. But this is fanciful. Please do not, without some extra consideration beforehand (do as you like, really), attempt to lecture me over an element thatmya ring with I'm not grasping something, or thematically delivered along those lines. I've identified and inter-acted with serious discourse before over what I deem as subtle forensic tactics of debate quite often in the past - which had no credibility, let alone basis. The Roman commanders cautious whom Hannibal would face?? By nature or by condition, they were without doubt disposed to quite the opposite. At Cannae the consuls exercised some patient vigilance, but still fell into perhaps the most subtle trap in battlefield history. One's personality is not mutually exclusive from skill and experience amid ancient generalship, as neither the commander's personality is from the military science of the day. The term science is merely a derivative of the Latin scientia, which merely denotes knowledge, skill and application. Anything is a science when carried out in comparable fashion to military invasions planned and executed like Hannibal's. Thus Vegetius' title Epitoma Rei Militaris, in which Hannibal comes up often as an exemplar of advancing military science (logistics, training, etc.). Please forgive me everyone, but...is this a joke in some raw or esoteric manner? I am half-serious! No modern commentator - at least one of any degree of repute - has ever believed the Roman troops were flexible against Hannibal; his audacious invasion was not formed from a notion of baseless optimism. He forged a unique precision instrument, geared to wheel and move in favorable conditions against Roman infantry cohesion centered around weight. This is what Hans Delbr

Great thread! Actually, the thread in mention was begun by...none other! I think the poster, an outstanding history aficionado/moderator on twc.net named Mimirswell, slightly misunderstood - or I wasn't clear enough amid my scattered thoughts being poured out on the keyboard over this fascinating and indeed deep, deep event of enthusiastic perusal: I never meant to argue that Maharbal didn't exist. That Polybius mentions him in a substantial fashion amid the Trasimene campaign should erase any doubts of his existence; there he exercised initiative independent of the main field army. He pounced on and crushed the Roman-led cavalry force sent ahead from the east by the consul of 217 BCE Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, a seemingly capable leader who held up his duties before perishing at Cannae. I think it is very likely, however, that Livy's famed imputation to Maharbal of "Hannibal, you know how to win a victory but not use one" is romantic literary presented ben-trovato at its most affecting. It's a tidy and lifting detail which raises the stakes of the Great Event in Roman History. It arose throughout congregating peoples in day-to-day life, presumably, and from many from many opinions, probably, which permeated the social circles of Roman society - the quintessential boogeyman, Queen Dido's 'avenger', never came when he had us in dire straits! What a wimp! What a coward! Perhaps an influential feature was that Hannibal was a Carthaginian nobleman; the 'attractive Greek Pyrrhus was in a weaker position in 280 BCE as a battle victor to strongly suggest terms, yet at that backdrop (following the Battle of Heraclea) the SEnate considered accepting Cineas assembly, the envoy from the Epirote king. It took the exhorting tenacity of Appius Claudius Caecus the Blind to stamp out the extant misgivings among the body-politic in Rome. With Hannibal's war, we never even remotely get an intimation of a peace party in Rome. Was Hannibal stupid, Paratrooper, for his inaction immediately Cannae?? On the contrary, he was a master of military science, thus became one of the most instructive leaders for posterity. I feel Hannibal was smarter than all his stern critics, and his applications of circumspect moves were based on exigent circumstances. Too cautious, in a broad sense? The leader who undertook the responsibility to direct Carthage;s entire war effort in this clash of unprecedented proportions? The man who crossed over from Spain in the manner he did with his crack soldiers' whole-hearted support under privations they could not have imagined (in all, 1,272 is the total amount, on two occasions in which one was without his presence, of deserters who forsook Hannibal, at least on record: surely, many Iberians must have skipped out at the onset of the expedition when it left NE Spain, as the lines developed which separated the true army-goers under the son of Hamilcar)? I don't think so. What is often 'stupid', forgive me (IMHO), are the somewhat vilifying critics' comments which ring of 'he was a good tactician but terrible strategist.' That can reach levels of utter twaddle when not followed by at least an explanation of why the charge is so full of conviction. One could even desperately reach with a based alternate scenario that had he marched for Rome in August of 216 BCE, the culmination would have been no worse than what actually and ultimately ensued. But the events which have shaped our political and social world were not ever truly inevitable; occurrences are generally just more surprising or even seemingly eminent. But I guess that sounds arbitrary. Because Polybius didn't mention something we read elsewhere in the record does not automatically discard it's plausibility is very tenable (albeit doesn't exactly help it's credibility) - as is the verdict that because a Captain-General ultimately failed does not automatically render him a flawed strategist. Some 'excuses' are actually good ones. As the strategos of Carthage when war broke in 218 BCE, Hannibal shouldered the bearing and responsibility for practically his home government's entire war effort, in effect building a broad alliance system (yes, very loose, but still all having a common ground which was prioritized by all) ringing Italy by 214 BCE. Macedon shared a common enemy in Rome with Carthage, as did Syracuse, where the ongoing civil strife was skillfully exploited by Hannibal's picked agents to gain Carthage's alliance with the great city-state. Rome easily could have (not 'should have', mind you) been compelled to acquiesce hence we could have looked back with a viewpoint of Roman character of 'they were unrealistically obtuse' rather than the ubiquitous 'the Romans were singularly tenacious and brave' judgments. Hannibal became increasingly limited with what he could do as he remained determined in southern Italy, but he also increased the demands of his own innate leadership skills while placing a serious strain on Rome's proximate resource-bases. Twice, probably in 215 and 211 BCE, respectively, she had to ask (supplicating the second time) Egypt for grain. In 215 BCE - three years after the start of the seventeen-year struggle! Rome needing outside aid for her food-supply: however specific, however possibly superficial in the relevant Polybian and Livian works of it relaying it as so severe, this speaks volumes for the effect of a strategy based on attacking an enemy's capacity to fight back. But Hannibal still had to play the hand he was dealt, and amid the historical terrain concerning the events when tensions blew in 219-218 BCE, he was, to reiterate, caught between a rock and a hard place (no pun intended!). The unaccustomed condition of Carthaginian naval inferiority as of the end of the First Punic War, the economic limitations which befell Carthage following the Treaty of Lutatius (241 BCE), and the subsequent and horrific Truceless War (ironically, an event which did enhance the prestige of the Barcids, due to the success of Hamilcar Barca) almost certainly precluded her from building an armada in the immediate years prior to the invasion which would necessitate the transport of Hannibal's invading army onto Italian shores to actualize his aims. Moreover, the island relay points for such operations could be launched were now lost to Roman possession, thus the Romans could, contrarily, use these same invaluable conduits to undertake troop landings onto Carthage's regions of influence; even if the Carthaginians could have substantially built up their navy amid the Iberian enterprise begun by Hamilcar (the economic sinews certainly increased into the 220s BCE), Roman attention would have turned to vigilance (it already was, albeit mildly). Moreover, I feel Hannibal did not have various alternative luxuries seemingly alluded to by some of his critics regarding his elaborate plan: he couldn't arbitrarily 'leave earlier' for Italy or 'wait until next spring', etc. Rome's power needed to be inexorably reduced (at the very least), not merely defeated in a battle or two, a situation which worked in prior conflicts in Greece and the Hellenic East. His grand design could germinate only from the ruggedly landlocked Po Valley. Hannibal saw the enterprising challenge discerningly: Italy had to be attacked when Rome declared war (or compelled it for the Carthaginians to 'accept', if one prefers) - and it had to be carried out while the iron was hot, given the traditional wavering nature of the Gauls, among whom the most powerful tribes who inhabited the lands constituting a vast and fertile region, a requisite for the point of berth of the bold attempt to tear apart the fabric of Rome's military federation in the Italian Peninsula, showed enthusiastic support if he could soon arrive in the Po Valley. For Hannibal's aims, attack was the best defense in a real sense (unlike the 'we're fighting them over there so we don't need to over here' nonsense of recent events); he had to arrive in the Po Valley where enthusiastic allies awaited him, and get there before the weather would close his ability to arrive there over the mountain passes;he arrived in November, probably, near modern Turin, where the Taurini resided. In terms of weather in the alpine regions of southern Gaul and northern Italy, late fall by the calender was early winter by the conditions. However, he couldn't hastily leave too early (he wasn't really in a hurry); the eastern rivers of Iberia were dangerously in spate until the end of spring, and by arriving in northern Italy as late as possible in the late autumn, he would be able to appropriate the full harvests of the regions there. Also, he needed to prevent the Romans from getting wind of his designs too early, for obvious reasons (the element of surprise can quickly become counter-productive). A case in point regarding the harvests - right before the Battle of the Trebbia was fought, one Dasius, a Latin commander (from Brundisium, we are told, which was a Latin colony) handed over the valuable supply-depot of Clastidium to Hannibal, enabling the latter to open his first bouts of propagandized diplomacy against Rome by honoring the commander and his garrison, all presumably Latins as well (Polybius, Book 3.69.4; Livy, Book 21.48.10). Thus the loyalty of the Latin communities, hopefully for Hannibal, was not totally solid to Rome, the aspect Fabius would admonish when a proposal was set forth to allow two Latin dignitaries a place in the Senate, to fill the spots left by those who perished at Cannae. Fabius sternly opposed this, exclaiming that the Latins 'were already hesitating and wavering in their allegiance' (according to Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, Book 23.22.8). In addition, the garrison of Casilinum refused Rome's offer of citizenship following the stronghold's fall to Hannibal in the spring of 215 BCE (the Romans regained it the following campaign season), indicating a likely compromising plausibility to Rome's fabric of power (it may have been more isolated than reflective of a likely course elsewhere with other communities). But no Latin leader or community would henceforth receive Hannibal in a conciliatory manner after Dasius, but as late as 209 BCE the inner ring of the Latin community (twelve of the thirty colonies) - ie, those which Rome drew directly on for the war effort - withdrew from Rome's war effort because they were bled white from Hannibal's grinding and assiduously implemented strategy. Hannibal knew full well the greatest difficulties would be with his commissariat, and he addressed this issue with the calculating care of a diamond cutter: it was indeed the straightforward issue of food which limited Hannibal's capacity to act more freely and widely in Italy. Perhaps the initial paramount aspect of Hannibal's opening gamble, if one need be pinpointed, lay with his sagacious correspondence with the powerful Insubres and Boii of Cisalpine Gaul. Hannibal could not go by sea - not necessarily because the crude nature of shipping at the time would allow for a high rate of success in reaching Italian shores, but because no allies could be guaranteed along any of the littorals of Italy, and, probably most precluding, he had only 37 ships in commission in his Iberian flotilla in 218 BCE. Soon, it appears, Carthaginian ships were being produced, but not in Spain, not now, and there was no time for a 'project' of ship-building at this opening juncture (in terms of inhibiting mobilizations and availed funds, etc., to pay largely mercenary forces which Carthage relied upon). Hannibal probably had spies in Rome; a Carthaginian spy was indeed caught in the Capitol in late 217 BCE (Livy, Book 22.33.1). I doubt this was the only one. The more streamlined coastal route for travel was out of the question: the tough Ligurian bands could not be risked being tested, and a look at the topography reveals a precarious and narrow position along the coast of southern Gaul and northern Italy (see how he would have been trapped in Roman territory, separated from the Po Valley by mountains?). However, the Ligurians are stated as part of Carthage's allies in Hannibal's covenant with Philip V of Macedon (Polybius, The Histories, Book 7.9). But that was four years later, when a possible tipping point seemed to favor Hannibal's cause for a while. In 218 BCE, the fertile Po Valley had to serve as the launch-pad for the grand design, and it had to be effectuated in full swing before the weather blocked any army's arrival into the western regions of the Po Valley. Hannibal certainly weighed his options and chose his course, with an auspicious outlook, following intelligence (modern language, but elucidating nonetheless) procured from his surveyors and diplomatic messengers sent to northern Italy earlier ('the messengers arrived and reported that the Celts consented and awaited him, at the same time saying that the crossing of the Alps was very toilsome and difficult, but by no means impossible', Polybius tells us in Book 3.34.6), outweighing any of the potentially serious liabilities. Assuming the Renaissance MSS didn't construct horrendously inadequate translations of the original wording of The Histories, Polybius does specifically write at a certain point in describing Hannibal's preparations in Spain: in charging his younger brother Hasdrubal with the duties of how to manage the footing in Spain, he also bade him to prepare to resist the Romans if he himself happened to be absent. I do not find these words, although but a few, 'ambiguous'. The invasion of Italy was not plan in the works going back years whatsoever; it certainly was conceived should war with Rome occur as it did, but the 'wrath of the House of Barca' is a Roman tradition placed, among other natural reasons, to obscure the Romans' unjust (legally, even in the ancient context) acts over Sardinia and again in Spain two decades later (I hope nobody seriously thinks that Carthage was planning to utilize a retaken Sardinia in 238/237 BCE to actually strike at Italy, and/or that Saguntum lay north of the Ebro, or that the Iber we read in the ancient literature is really another river which would lend justification to certian Roman claims over war-guilt, such as the Jucar). He came very close... The wisdom of the great Theodor Mommsen explicates for us, R

You might be thinking of the disaster that befell a Roman army in the winter of 216/215 B.C., Lost Warrior. If Rome was ever going to lose in the Punic Wars, it was in the critical years from Cannae to Hasdrubal's defeat on the Metaurus, more so in the earlier stages. The political situation Hannibal was attemting to molest was working slowly, and Rome even had to lower the wealth-qualification by perhaps 60% for service in the army - an indication that her manpower was indeed being lessened. But even if this is accurate (see Peter Brunt's Italian Manpower 225 B.C. - A.D 14, Pgs 66-75), Rome may not have been as strained as Livy implies, whose genius was literary, not critical. But it could have been. The one event that may have altered the outcome occured in late 216 B.C. When the Roman army of Cannae was assembled, one Lucius Postumius Albinus was sent north with a legion to divert the Gauls away from Hannibal's army. It came to nothing for that purpose, but the size of Postumius' army had reached that of a standard consular army, a paper-strength of 25,000 or so men. Postumius was elected consul for 215 B.C., but sometime in the winter of 216 B.C., perhaps November (a guess), he and his force were thoroughly ambushed and cut down almost to the man by the Boii, in what Livy calls the Litana Forest, probably near modern Modena in northern Italy, just south of the Po. Livy says '10 men' escaped, an illustration of the magnitude of the disaster, despite a certain overstatement (maybe it was 15 who escaped!). It was an impressive military display by these Gauls: they had cut trees to a point so they still stood, but could be toppled upon the road with a little force. When the Romans entered the path through this wooded area, the Gauls indeed pushed the trees upon the marching column, and had surrounded the perimeter, cutting down the Romans who were trying to escape in the limited escape-routes. This disaster, at least as proportionately bad as Trasimene or the Teutoburger Wald, was serious because, at this juncture, Rome had no standing army to immediately replace it. In the Senate, for the only time in the war, they had to acknowledge, following Livy, that a theater had to be shelved; the Gallic war was forced upon them to be left in abeyance - and not because they had options. Hannibal was supreme in the south, though Rome itself could certainly not be taken by assault. Livy tells us of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus' speech, Book 23.25, "..."We," he said, "who were not crushed by the overthrow at Cannae must not lose heart at smaller calamities. If we are successful, as I trust we shall be, in our operations against Hannibal and the Carthaginians, we can safely leave the war with the Gauls out of account for the present; the gods and the Roman people will have it in their power to avenge that act of treachery. It is with regard to the Carthaginians and the armies with which the war is to be carried on that we have now to deliberate and decide..." 'The gods will have it in their power'? If the Gauls, Hannibal's 'looser' allies, had swooped down from their close proximity in the regions around Rome, she would have been in deeper trouble than any time during the actual events of the war. They did it in 390 B.C. - with an open road to Rome, and would revolt again in 200 B.C. This is what makes this so peculiarly fascinating. We cannot blame the Gauls for carrying a grudge with Hannibal; they had beared the brunt of his victories, and were more interested in forage and loot. But the diversionary attempt by the Senate to deplete Hannibal of his Gauls in the south didn't even work slightly. But the Gauls in the north, surely galvanized by their crushing destruction of a Roman army, with no other one coming, did nothing; they didn't even attack the primary colonies of Placentia and Cremona. A Roman army, under one Marcus Pomponius Matho, would not arrive in Gallic territory for more than two years. The inactivity of the Gauls at this point not only enabled the Romans to concentrate fully against Hannibal in the south, where they would slowly and inexorably gain operational superiority, but Etruria and Umbria, showing signs of revolt in the years to come, were given no reason to do so now, as they could conform to Rome's war effort with no interference. People don't realize (not that they should) how close Hannibal came to breaking the federation - with his political strategy. He was a lot smarter than many of his critics, including perhaps even B.H. Liddell Hart and Bernard Montgomery. Comparing Polybius' enumerations for Roman potential manpower reserves and Livy's list of defections after Cannae, we can conclude that Hannibal broke the federation by about 40% (though all the least firmly attached protectorates) by 212 B.C. The majority of Campanians, whom were calssified as citizens, were also unavailable. Again, 40% of the Latin community was bled white, and there were hints of disaffection had been growing in Etruria and Umbria since 212 B.C. Livy even tells us that, after the victory at the Metaurus, enquiries were made as to which cantons in Etruria had intended to desert to Hasdrubal as soon as he appeared, and also which of them had assisted him with supplies, or men, or in any other way (Book 28.10). I realize we must be careful with Livy: his writing is beautiful, but not Thucydidean. But still, he didn't pull his information out of the air, and he wasn't writing fiction. Hannibal, directing the entire Carthaginian war effort almost soley by himself, came darn close! Rome won, for all in all, because of the sound decisions of the Senate, and the utilization of her tremendous manpower reserves - more importantly, where and when to exercise that manpower. But despite the amazing spirit of the Romans and those loyal to her, without the resources she would have perished. Hannibal tapped into this considerably, even if it meant that he didn't make use of those resources for himself. I have mentioned before about the 12 Latin colonies who would no longer, perhaps because they didn't have the capacity to do so, supply Rome with men and money; the Roman disaster at Herdonea (210 B.C.), at the hands of Hannibal's wily genius, probably had an affect on the 12 colonies - the closest of the Latin colonies surrounding Rome. Remember, the Latin colonies were the largest and most important colonies, strategically placed ringing Rome. But that's not all: including the recalcitrant 12 colonies, Livy also tells us of the critical situation, in 209 B.C., for Rome regarding her federation, "The deportation of the soldiers to Sicily, most of whom belonged to the Latin and the allied nationalities, very nearly caused a great rising; so often do small occasions involve serious consequences. Meetings were held amongst the Latins and the allied communities in which they complained loudly that for ten years they had been drained by levies and war-taxes; every year they fought only to sustain a great defeat, those who were not killed in battle were carried off by sickness. A fellow-citizen who was enlisted by the Romans was more lost to them than one who had been made prisoner by the Carthaginians, for the latter was sent back to his home without ransom, the former was sent out of Italy into what was really exile rather than military service. There the men who had fought at Cannae had been for eight years wearing out their lives, and there they would die before the enemy, who had never been stronger than he was today, quitted Italian soil. If the old soldiers were not to return, and fresh ones were always being enlisted, there would soon be nobody left. They would be compelled therefore, before they reached the last stage of depopulation and famine, to refuse to Rome what the necessities of their situation would very soon make it impossible to grant. If the Romans saw that this was the unanimous determination of their allies, they would assuredly begin to think about making peace with Carthage. Otherwise Italy would never be free from war as long as Hannibal was alive. Such was the general tone of the meetings. There were at the time thirty (Latin) colonies belonging to Rome. Twelve of these announced to the consuls through their representatives in Rome that they had no means from which to furnish either men or money. The colonies in question were Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba, Carseoli, Sora, Suessa, Cercei, Setia, Cales, Narnia and Interamna. The consuls, startled by this unprecedented step, wanted to frighten them out of such a detestable course, and thought that they would succeed better by uncompromising sternness than by adopting gentle methods. "You colonists," they said, "have dared to address us, the consuls, in language which we cannot bring ourselves to repeat openly in the senate, for it is not simply a refusal of military obligations, but an open revolt against Rome. You must go back to your respective colonies at once, while your treason is still confined to words, and consult your people. You are not Capuans or Tarentines, but Romans, from Rome you sprang, from Rome you have been planted in colonies on land taken from the enemy, in order that you may augment her dominion. Whatever duties children owe to their parents, you owe to Rome, if indeed you feel a spark of affection for her or cherish any memories of your mother country. So you must begin your deliberations afresh, for what you are now so recklessly contemplating means the betrayal of the sovereignty of Rome and the surrender of victory into the hands of Hannibal." Such were the arguments which each of the consuls advanced at considerable length, but they produced no impression. The envoys said that there was no reply for them to take home, nor was there any other policy for their senate to consider since there was not a man left for conscription nor any money for his pay. As the consuls saw that their determination was unshaken they brought the matter before the Senate. Here such general consternation and alarm were felt that most of the senators declared that the empire was doomed, other colonies would take the same course, as would also the allies; all had agreed together to betray the City of Rome to Hannibal." The fact that some senators thought this was the case reveals how serious the situation had become. But cooler heads prevailed, and the Senate was reassured by the consuls, Fabius and Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, that the other 18 Latin colonies would remain loyal - Signia, Norba, Saticula, Fregellae, Luceria, Venusia, Brundisium, Hadria, Firmum, and Ariminum; the Tyrrhenian ports of Pontia, Paestum, and Cosa; and the inland colonies of Beneventum, Aesernia, Spoletium, Placentia, and Cremona. A simple glance of a map of Roman Italy at the time shows us that the 12 colonies who could no longer furnish Rome were, for the most part, in closer proximity to Rome. Thus they beared the brunt of the strain of the war against Hannibal, and, as Excelsior told us earlier, their soldiers probably were composed of the men who fell at the recent few disasters at Hannibal's battles. If this is true, Hannibal's strategy of destroying Roman armies to detach the allies certainly showed signs of viability. But no major battle in history has been more tactically devastating then Cannae (Subotai's destruction of the Hungarians, at Mohi in 1241. comes to mind), and his great victory cemented, not detached, Rome's core allies. But this all gets even more interesting: in 200 B.C., a major uprising broke out, in which all the tribes, stirred up by the Cenomani, Insubres and the Boii, sacked and burned Placentia, and then proceeded towards Cremona. They were led by a Carthaginian named Hamilcar, who had stayed in northern Italy; he is believed to have been an officer of the army of either Hasdrubal or Mago, the invaders from the previous decade. Anyway, Roman forces, though dealing now with Macedon, where readily available to deal with this threat; Livy tells us some 40,000 Gauls were under Hamilcar. The threat was ultimately dealt with by a praetor - one Lucius Furius, under, of course, decisions made by the Senate. Livy tells this tense event, Book 31.10-11, and 31.48-49. Hannibal, in retirement at this time, must have been very disappointed, assuming he heard of this; why didn't they rise in late 216 B.C. Simultaneous serious threats from north and south might have doomed Rome in this critical time; operations in Spain would be forsaken, and things might have been different. Carthage could not have defeated Rome, but Rome might have been defeated by circumstances at the right ime favoring Hannibal. Much depended on the peoples of Italy, Sicily, and Spain - on whom, between Rome and Carthage, it was in their better interests to join. The Gallic threat following Postumius' destruction might have affected things greatly in Carthage's favor. Maybe he should have assigned an officer to the north to effectuate a resistence against the north, as he did in sending Muttines to Sicily in 212 B.C. Clearly, as events would show 16 years later, the Gauls coud be stirred up under a Carthaginian officer - and even when Rome had forces in the area to resist them; this wasn;t teh case in late 216 B.C. We have to wonder the degree of Hannibal's understanding of the Roman federation. In a letter to the people of Larissa, Thessaly, Philip V explained the nature of Rome's ability to absorb people into her realm. If Philip V understood this, why would Hannibal not have? There was no universal feeling of 'us' and 'them' amongst the peoples under Rome's domain; what had Latins in Spoletium have in common with Greeks in Apulia and Calabria? Even though Rome overcame the Gallic threat of 390 B.C. and Pyrrhus' invasion, they were nothing to what Hannibal threw at them. Unfortunately for him, the allies who did join him proved to be of little help in the field, and his strategy ultimately didn't work. Carthage's continued commercial dominance in the western Mediterranean was not to be; but she still prospered due in large part to Hannibal's later statesmanship. The Roman body-politic was just too strong, but a severe test had to be applied for us to realize this fully. History is full of twists that have shaped our world. Regarding the Battle of the Trebbia, I don't think we can call it an 'ambush'. A small but decisive part of it was. It was a major pitched battle involving more than 80,000 men. Yes, Hannibal effected a trap, as he had concealed with Mago 2,000 men in a water-course he found, one with with steep banks; after the battle began, this unti of infantry and cavalry attacked the Roman rear with precise timing, as Hannibal was destroying their flanks. This was an example of simple-bluff on the part of Hannibal. The Roman might have suspected the ambush from Mago if the terrain was more featured with wooded and hilly terrain, but none of them expected what happened (see Polybius Book 3.71). Remember, hindsight is 20/20. The massive ambush at Trasimene, which nobody has yet mentioned (did I miss it?), was a display of what we may call double-bluff on the part of Hannibal. This area was 'born for an ambush', as Livy remarks (Book 22.4), but Gaius Flaminius, not an inexperienced commander, may have thought this was too obvious, and Hannibal was whetting his appettite to fight with his scorching of the lands nearby. In any case, what commander in charge of some 25,000 men expects to be ambushed? Ambushes etc. hitherto had never occured on such an unprecedented scale; imagine the control Hannibal must have needed to exercise over his motley army, now swelled to perhaps over 40,000 men, to not reveal their position while an entire army marched yards away from them. It's just food for thought, though. I hope I didn't ramble too much off topic. Thanks, Spartan JKM

Hello Gladius. Great observation, and thank you for taking a look. You are absolutely correct: many of the leaders on TIER 3 were even slightly less than mediocre (Archelaus, Crassus etc.). If one had even a slight 'success', I decided, within my knowledge and research, to add them. You may have touched on one that possibly didn't even really qualify as a commander in war. He aided Vespasian with negotiations, but it seems, if we follow his works (yes, his veracity has been often questioned), he was instrumental in joining the Zealots and Sicarians, when they annihilated the Roman garrison at Jerusalem in c. 64 A.D. Militarily, it was perhaps one John of Gischala who was more the commander in Galilee. I just don't know enough to be conclusive. Perhaps someone else does. Indeed, the likes of Heraclius and Khalid ibn Al-Walid would rank at the top, if the list went further in chronology. Thanks, James

Hello everyone. This list is revised from an early one I put together. There really is no such thing as 'the greatest general'; it's like asking who's the best actor or what is the best doughnut. But if following this veritable rule, we couldn't have fun with these 'lists', which are always subjective. I had a lot of fun, my primary aim, in compiling my own 'top military leaders of antiquity' list. I would like to stress that I am merely an amateur, and my knowledge of military history is much more thorough with the West, so I apologize in advance if anyone feels I am too western-centric in my rankings, and/or if certain greats from the East are understated. I have done my best to mention Chinese and other Asiatic commanders, and many should add to the list etc., as well as suggest changes of all sorts to this piece of work. War is not something to be happy about, but it is a powerful reality of history. Thus, my fascination with the subject is indeed a morbid one. Messiahs, diplomats, intellectuals, and philosophers have contributed to the twists and turns of history every bit as much as military leaders, but they have flourished only when protected by those very military leaders who could ensure the survival of their way of life. For the most part, the most significant and affecting leaders in world history have come not from the church, the governments, or the scholastic centers, but from the ranks of soldiers and sailors. Of course, no man knows the extent of his long-term impact upon history until long after his death. Moreover, a vast list could be piecemealed under specifics: strategic, tactical, operational, revolutionary, naval etc. How much credit do monarchs, who weren't actually at the battlefield, and subalterns merit in certain campaigns? Obviously, we have to scrutinize each individual's work. But I think I will bunch it together; the circumstances of war may never be repeated, but the essence of major tactics and strategy have not changed. It is the methods of their applications, primarily due to the changes in technology, that have altered. Thus we can indeed compare the ancient commanders with the modern ones (IMHO), at least from this point of view. It must be understood, however, that modern commanders did not directly lead into action (modern meaning since, let's say, the time of Napoleon, and I mean this very broadly); they directed affairs from far away, and direct leadership was delegated to not just senior officers, but the junior ones. I will add that ones with autocratic power, such as Alexander, answered to no government, which certainly facilitated his situation for conquest, in terms of decision-making. What if the Barcid Clan had been the absolute rulers of Carthage? They would have merely ordered the preponderance of supplies and troops to be sent to Hannibal in southern Italy (rather than Spain), something that proved could be effectuated, if not in huge landings, after his devastating victory at Cannae. The pressure might have been too much for even the indomitable Romans; no general has ever been so brilliant, against an enemy he figured would quail after devastating them so convincingly, as Hannibal - a flawed valuation any good commander could have made. It's hard to choose between him and Alexander. Hannibal simply attacked a state with a stronger political union. So, what makes a great general? Many things, of course, and no man is infallible. Adaptation? Improvisation? Panache? Implementing sound policy (a morale objective) etc.? Magnanimity in winning over allies? Non-hesitation? Flexibility? Decisiveness? Exerting discipline and iron will into his troops? A balance of skillful execution of strategy and tactics? When not to be too rash and hectoring amid policy-making? A political understanding to support one's war? Luck? Advancing one's state's cause for many generations to come? All great ideas are simple (at least to a genius). Perhaps the biggest, if one is most paramount, attribute to a great battlefield commander is his ability to identify a 'simple' solution to victory before his opponent in battle. Logistically, exploiting the terrain and weather is invaluable. The greats had them all. B.H. Liddell Hart, the renowned theorist (among many things he was), says the most important quality is to strike at an opponents' Achilles Heel. But one must find that weak point, and a good commander will conceal his weak point the best he can. For the most part, the great generals possessed the vision to identify the obvious and most viable situation to achieve victory more than his opponent. With all things considered, such as the the tactical brilliance of Epaminondas, Hannibal, and Narses, the acute understanding of building a brilliant instrument of war possessed by Philip II of macedon, the scope and diversity of Julius Caesar's genius, I consider Alexander the Great to be the towering military figure of the ancient world (my cut off point is the year 600 A.D., to include a couple of greats) - from a specific and broad criterion. His ability to successfully adapt strategy and tactics to virtually every branch of warfare sets him apart from every other great commander, perhaps in all of history. He took his army some 20,000 miles in 13 years, not once suffering a major setback, let alone a defeat. His opponent always chose the battlefield and ususally heavily outnumbered him. For what it merits, no other has successfully 'linked' the East and West, thus he was an immense cultural reformer, which is what he wanted to do. He indeed commanded an army much superior than what he faced, but he was outnumbered considerably, and his battle dispositions at his great victory at Gaugamela were perfectly planned to accord with what Napoleon described as 'a well reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive followed by rapid and audacious attack'. Besides, the advantage of a superior force is merely potential. It is the commander that must effectively utilize what he/she has and lead it to victory. In this regard, Alexander shined as well as any other in military history (IMHO, of course). The military machine left to Alexander from his father Philip II was the world's first standing army and raised by the world's first universal military service - a scientifically balanced machine in which the phalanx became the tactical base of cavalry action. But Philip II's son took his machine and succeeded, perhaps, beyond Philip's wildest dreams. A brilliantly constructed army is just potential; it is the commander that must lead it to victory, and advantages in troop quality and technology only produce advantages if used effectively. Alexander innovated the efficacy of combined arms to a much further degree than his great father did, and he introduced the use of reserves on the battlefield that could take advantage of any unforeseen opportunities or reverses against the front lines. He also was the first great commander to use catapults tactically on the battlefield on a substantial level (it may have actually been Onomarchus, the Phocian leader, who first used battlefield catapults against Alexander's father). In the Balkans, Alexander lined the machines hub-to-hub along the bank of the Apsus River to cover the crossing of his withdrawing troops against the attacks upon him by the Illyrian tribes under Cleitus and Glaucius. Contrarily, six years later in 329 B.C. on the other side of the 'world', he effectively used catapults to drive the Scythians from the riverbank of the Jaxartes as he conducted an amphibious assault against them, and then created a sophisticated situation by which their steppe-style tactics were neutralized. Alexander's siege of Tyre was an incredible display of military engineering, including an amphibious assault upon an island-city via a constructed causeway. There has perhaps been no greater practitioner of a great system than Alexander. Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, Chinggis Khan, Subotai, Marlborough, and Napoleon were certainly comparable in thier great works throughout history; Hannibal and Scipio made fine use of offensive reserves in their great victories at Cannae and the Great Plains, and the first 'true' reserve ever deployed may have been Hannibal's retention of his third line at the Battle of Zama. Two great generals squared off that day, with both neutralizing what the other tried to do (Scipio handled the elephant charge but Hannibal thwarted Scipio from using his novel tactics with his infantry; the superior army simply won that day). Though Alexander's empire did not endure as Rome's did, nor was as vast as that of the Mongols, his legacy probably outlasts any other military figure, other than the great Prophet Mohammed, and possibly Constantine I (Augustus can probably not be considered a military commander). Alexander's work was one of near cosmogony. He was a genius. He was a madman. He was a visionary. He was a mass-murderer. He was a liberator. He was intoxicated with power. He was chivalrous when not opposed. Was really he all of these? Was he really any of these? Militarily, he could smash his enemy. Diplomatically, he could win over numerous peoples with his panache. But he was not singular in possessing these attributes; no man is infallible, and his story indeed reveals the darker side of human nature to the fullest; power is a dangerous asset if not handled judiciously. If used as an end rather than a means to accomplish something, it will destroy those who are seeking those ends. But the fact we speak of him today in a manner of attraction and fascination means he got his wish - he will live forever. "If anyone has the right to be judged by the standards of his time, and not by the standards of our time, it is Alexander". -Hermann Bengtson This is the list of whom I think were the ten greatest commanders, from Sargon to Narses. I decided to integrate naval leaders into the third TIER; Themistocles could be raqnked # 1 as the Classical World's greatest leader at sea. I decided to present an assessment of only Alexander, and why I think he would be ranked # 1, if one must be chosen. I will gladly discuss the other greats (and not so greats) amid possible discussions. These I rank in the first TIER; ranking is a sterile pursuit, if trying to be conclusive; there really is not such thing as 'the greatest general of all time'; it's like proclaiming which is the greatest doughnut. But I think it's just fun to present an opinion of who is 'the best', which is conducive to forming a base to trigger entertaining debates. I guess my point is - this all trivial fun. TIER 1 This is my 'top 10' list. Alexander III (Alexandros III Philippou Makedonon) King of Macedon 'the Great' (Gaugamela, 331 B.C.) Hannibal (Hannibal Barca) (Cannae, 216 B.C.) Publius Cornelius Scipio Scipio Africanus Major (Ilipa, 206 B.C.) Gaius Julius Caesar (Pharsalus, 48 B.C.) Belisarius (Flavius Belisarius) (Dara, 530 A.D.) Epaminondas (Leuctra, 371 B.C.) Philip II King of Macedon (Chaeronea, 338 B.C.) Narses (Narseus) (Busta Gallorum, 552 A.D.) Gaius Marius (Aquae Sextiae, 102 B.C.) Han Xin (Jingxing, 205 B.C) TIER 2 These commanders are the next level. I do not rank these; they are listed chronologically by their deaths. If leaders are not specified as being a monarch or 'something significant', then they were generals. I realize this is all very debatable, and many could be replaced by others etc. It's difficult to judge whose accomplishments were more important than those of others, and/or why a leaders can be placed above another. Much has do to do with issues not indicative of an individual's ability. Sargon King of Akkad 'the Great' Tuthmosis (Thutmose) III Pharaoh of Egypt Cyrus Achaemenid King of Persia 'the Great' Iphicrates Seleucus I Diadochi and Seleucid Founder 'Nicator' Pyrrhus King of Epirus Hamilcar Barca Lightning Philopoemen the Last of the Greeks Sulla (Lucius Cornelius Sulla) Felix Quintus Sertorius Lucius Licinius Lucullus Ponticus Pompey (Gnaeus Pompeius) Magnus Surena (Eran Spahbodh Rustaham Suren-Pahlav) Publius Ventidius Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa Nero Claudius Drusus (Decimus Claudius Drusus) Germanicus Julius Caesar Germanicus (Nero Claudius Germanicus) Tiberius (Tiberius Claudius Nero) Roman Emperor Trajan (Marcus Ulpius Trajanus) Roman Emperor 'Optimus Princeps' Cao Cao (Cao Mengde) Emperor of the Later (Eastern) Han Dynasty and King of Wei Zhuge Liang (Chu-ko Liang) Founder of the Shu Kingdom 'the Hidden Dragon' Aurelian (Lucius Domitius Aurelianus) Roman Emperor 'Restitutor Orbis' Shapur I Sassanid King of Persia Constantine I (Flavius Valerius Constantinus) Roman Emperor 'the Great' Julian (Flavius Claudius Julianus) Roman Emperor 'the Apostate' Flavius Stilicho Attila Khan of the Huns 'the Scourge of God' Flavius Aetius the Last of the Romans Clovis I King and Unifier of the Franks Theodoric (Flavius Theodoricus) King of the Ostrogoths 'the Great' These are the rest, listed in chronological order by their deaths. TIER 3 BEFORE CHRIST Lugalzagesi Sumerian King of Umma, Sargon King of Akkad 'the Great', Naram (Haram)-Sin King of Akkad, Hattusili I (Labarna) Hittite Founder, Mursilis I Hittite King, Tuthmosis (Thutmose) I Pharaoh of Egypt, Tuthmosis (Tuthmose) IV Pharaoh of Egypt, Tudhaliya I Hittite King, Suppiluliumas Hittite King, Mursilis II Hittite King, Muwatallis Hittite King, Rameses II Pharaoh of Egypt, Merneptah Pharaoh of Egypt, Gideon (Jerub-baal) Judge of the Israelites, Wu Wang (Chi Fa) Founder of the Chou Dynasty 'the Martial King', Tiglath Pileser I King of Assyria, Chou Kung (Chi Tan) Duke of Chou, David King of the Kingdom of Israel, Ashurnasirpal II King of Assyria, Shalmaneser III King of Assyria, Tiglath-Pileser III King of Assyria, Sargon II King of Assyria, Sennacherib King of Assyria, Esarhaddon King of Assyria, Ashurbanipal King of Assyria, Ji Zhonger Duke Wen of Jin, Nabopolasser King of Babylonia, Cyaxeres King of Media, Nebuchadnezzar II King of Babylonia, Wu Zixu, Sun Tzu (Sun Wu) Honorable Sun, Cleomenes I King of Sparta, Darius I Achaemenid King of Persia 'the Great', Artaphrenes the Elder, Aristodemus, Miltiades, Leonidas I King of Sparta, Gelon Tyrant of Syracuse, Myronides, Pausanius, Leotychides, Xerxes I Achaemenid King of Persia, Themistocles, Cimon, Leosthenes, Cincinnatus Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, Gaius Servilius Ahala, Phormio, Sitalkes Odrysian King 'the Great', Pagondas, Brasidas, Demosthenes Son of Alcisthenes, Hannibal Son of Gisgo, Gylippus, Alcibiades, Agis II King of Sparta, Himilco, Lysander, Agesilaus II King of Sparta, Conon, Dionysius I Tyrant of Syracuse, Marcus Furius Camillus, Pelopidas, Datames, Artaxerxes II King of Persia 'Memnon', Xenophon, Philomelus, Onomarchus, Dionysius II Tyrant of Syracuse, Sun Bin, Marcus Valerius Corvus, Titus Manlius Torquatus Imperiosus, Timoleon, Memnon of Rhodes, Parmenio the Old General, Coenus, Craterus Diadochi of Alexander, Perdiccas, Antipitar Diadochi of Alexander, Antigonus I Diadochi of Alexander 'Monophthalmos', Chandragupta Maurya Mauryan Founder 'Sandracottus', Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus, Agathocles Tyrant of Syracuse, Ptolemy I Diadochi of Alexander 'Soter', Demetrius I (Demetrius Poliorcetes) Diadochi of Alexander, Publius Cornelius Dolabella, Lysimachus Diadochi of Alexander, Olympiodorus, Ptolemy King of Macedon 'Ceraunus', Spurius Carvilius Maximus, Appius Claudius Caudex, Manius Curius Dentatus, Antiochus I King of Syria 'Soter', Bai Qi, Xanthippus, Marcus Atilius Regulus, Asoka Mauryan Emperor, Adherbal, Gaius Lutatius Catalus, Gaius Duilius, Wang Jian, Ming T'ien, Chou T'o, Lucius Aemilius Papus, Gaius Atilius Regulus, Lucius Caecilius Metellus, Cleomenes III King of Sparta, Publius Cornelius Scipio the Elder, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, Gaius Flaminius, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, Titus Otacilius Crassus, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, Hasdrubal Barca, Gaius Claudius Nero, Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator, Mago Barca, Syphax King of the Masaesylii, Titus Manlius Torquatus, Marcus Valerius Laevinus, Marcus Livius Salinator, Attalus I King of Pergamum 'Soter', Hsiang Yu (Xiang Yu), Gaozu (Liu Bang) Han Founder, Manius Acilius Glabrio, Muttines (Mottones), Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes, Manius Acilius Glabrio, Antiochus III King of Syria 'the Great', Prusias I King of Bithynia 'Cholos', Marcus Fulvius Nobilior, Mete Han Shanyu of the Xiongnu 'Maodun', Lucius Valerius Flaccus, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, Philip V King of Macedon, Antiochus IV King of Syria 'Epiphanes', Judas Maccabaeus the Hammer, Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus, Gaius Laelius, Eumenes II King of Pergamon 'Soter', Masinissa King of the Massylii, Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Minor, Viriathus, Aristonicus, Lucius Caecilius Metellus Dalmaticus, Wei Qing, Ho Qu-bing, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Decimus Junius Brutus (Callaicus), Gaius Tuditanus Sempronius, Liu Che (Wu Di) Han Emperor, Jugurtha King of Numidia, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Spartacus, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, Mithridates VI (Eupator Dionysus) King of Pontus 'the Great', Ariovistus Chief of the Suebi, Ambiorix Chief of the Eburones, Tigranes II King of Armenia 'the Great', Cassivellaunus (Cassibelanus) King of the Catuvellauni, Gaius Scribonius Curio, Publius Licinius Crassus, Marcus Licinius Crassus Dives, Vercingetorix King of the Arverni, Pharnaces II King of Pontus, Juba I King of Numidia, Titus Labienus, Orodes II (Hyrodes) King of Parthia, Pacorus I King of Parthia, Mark Antony (Marcus Antonius), Marcus Licinius Crassus, Titus Statilius Taurus, and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. ANNO DOMINI Marcus Silvanus, Publius Sulpicius Quirinius, Arminius (Hermann der Cherusker) Chief of the Cherusci, Gaius Silius, Juba II King of Maueritania, Publius Cornelius Dolabella, Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus, Quintus Junius Blaesus, Cunobelinus King of the Catuvellauni, Caratacus (Caradog) King of the Catuvellauni, Publius Ostorius Scapula, Liu Xiu (Han-Guang Wu Di) Han Emperor, Aulus Plautius, Boudicca (Boadicea) Queen of the Iceni, Gaius Paulinus Suetonius, Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, Vespasian (Titus Flavius Vespasianus) Roman Emperor, Eleazar ben Yair, Cerialis (Quintus Petillius Cerialis Caesius Rufus), Gnaeus Julius Agricola, Flavius Josephus (Joseph ben Matthias), Decebalus Dacian King, Bar Kochba (Simon bar Kochba), Marcus Aurelius, Sun Jian (Wentai) the Tiger of Jiang Dong, Yuan Shao Benchu, Severus (Lucius Septimius Severus) Roman Emperor, Zhang Liao (Wenyuan), Liu Bei Shu Emperor, Maximinus I (Gaius Julius Verus Maximinus) Roman Emperor 'Thrax', Ardashir I Sassanid Founder of Persia, Lu Xun (Boyan), Sun Quan (Zhongmou) Founder of the Wu Kingdom, Gallienus (Publius Licinius Egnatius Gallienus) Roman Emperor, Publius Septimius Odaenathus Prince of the Roman Colony of Palmyra, Postumus (Marcus Cassianius Latinius Postumus) Emperor of Gaul, Iberia, and Britain, Claudius II (Marcus Aurelius Claudius) Roman Emperor 'Gothicus', Zenobia Queen of Palmyra, Shi Le Great Chieftain, Constantius II (Flavius Julius Constantius) Roman Emperor, Ran Min Daowu, Shapur II Sassanid King of Persia, Maximianus (Magnus Maximus), Fritigern (Frithugairns) King of the Visigoths, Theodosius I (Flavius Theodosius) Roman Emperor 'the Great', Alaric I King of the Visigoths, Ataulf King of the Visigoths 'Father Wolf', Wallia King of the Visigoths, Rua (Rugila) the Hun, Bleda the Hun, Majorian (Julius Valerius Maiorianus) Western Roman Emperor, Ricimer, Geiseric (Gaiseric) King of the Vandals and Alans 'the Lame', Childeric I King of the Salian Franks, Odoacar (Odavacer) King of the Heruli and Rex Italiae, Ambrosius Aurelianus (Aurelius Ambrosius), Riothamus (Riotimus) King of the Brittones, Arthur Dux Bellorum or 'King Arthur' (yes, the legendary figure we know so well, and perhaps the same leader known as Owain Ddantgwyn (Owain Danwyn)), Mundus, Priscus General Priscus, Totila (Baduila) King of the Ostrogoths, Ceawlin Saxon Bretwalda of Wessex, Bayan Avar Khagan, and Rhydderch Hael Brythonic hero 'the Generous'. My cut off point is the year 600 A.D. Thanks and enjoy, James

I think that's a very good point, sonic. Obviously, people could ride and fight on horses just fine before the stirrup. I think it enabled people to learn to maneuver on horses quicker than before. The Romans did develop good horned saddles by the 4th century, and they apparently used spurs. One book titled The Roman Cavalry, by one Karen Dixon, states on Pg.110, "...Throughout the whole of the Imperial period the Roman cavalryman, be he on horse or camel, was provided with a secure seat from which to fight. The lack of stirrups for most of the period under study is neither there nor there. The importance of the stirrup has been over-emphazised, as the Roman cavalryman was perfectly able to engage in shock combat with spear and sword without them. Indeed it has been asserted that the main initial impact of the stirrup was to reduce fatigue on long distance rides..." However, it is quite a debate that the stirrup is 'overrated', depending on the degree of the importance of it being claimed. It definitely gave the horsmen greater stability, regardless how 'natural' one was growing up on a horse. The basic tactics of mounted warfare were certainly affected, as mounted warrior supported by stirrups was less likely to fall off while fighting, and they could satnd while mounted. They could deliver blows with his weapon that more fully employed the weight and momentum of himself and the horse. If the saddle solely allowed for that, Persians, Macedonians, and every other bridled cavalrymen, I would think, would have used their thrusting weapon under-handed. Peculiarly, the invention of the stirrup occurred relatively late in history, considering the fact that horses were domesticated around, what, 4,000 B.C.? Great stuff, Spartan JKM

Very elucidating caldrail. Thank you. Indeed; forgive my brevity, but I was thinking of the tactical concept of stirrups allowing for the full momentum of a horse behind a lance. 'Heavy cavalry', before the 7th century or so in Europe or Asia (Near and Middle East) couldn't deliver the shock the likes of the Carolingians could; the energy transfer from the horse to knight to lance was enabled primarily by the coupling of the stirrup. It connected the horse's 1,000 pounds and 40-mile-per-hour speed to the end of the couched lance, held under-arm, by way of the knight. This massive momentum was used much like a tank to take down massed foot troops or mounted warriors. The entire major social system, it seems - the feudal system - evolved around this simple mechanical device. This triggered debates, however, as scholars argued that it couldn't be that simple. The Parthian and Sassanid (and Byzantine?) 'heavy cavalry' were noted as such due to their armor, both on horse and man; basically, to deliver 'hammer blows', they needed to be supported by horse-archers, akin to what you were describing about the missile weaponry of the Goths at Adrianople. Egyptian Mamelukes defeated the Mongols in part because of superior heavy cavalry. Of course, this subject is very debatable and potentially comprehensive. Thanks, Spartan JKM

Great thread. I think this connection with Adrianople to Medieval feudalism/chivalry seems, indeed, to be a myth. It seems, quite possibly, that Charles Oman and cavalry officers etc. of the 19th century were seduced by a tidy idea that a superiror style of horseman brought the Roman Empire down. It may have been primarily with Charles Martel and his Franks who began encouraging cavalry to the degree that created and influenced European chivalry. Threats came from all directions upon their kingdom, and infantry, though effective in a set-piece battle if properly utilized, was too slow to deal with potential enemies from different directions. Cavalry is simply far more mobile, whether for raiding and/or repulsing raids. This doctrine, not a swift process, probably did not start with Adrianople. It came much later. The cavalry-cycle, heavy cavalry that could ride down infantry, can be claimed to have begun with the Carolingians some 500 years later; they were the first Europenas to substantially utilize the metal stirrup. I have Stephen William's and Gerard Friell's (Friell is the archaelogical expert of the duo) Theodosius: The Empire at Bay; they state on Pg. 19, "In terms of military history, it has been commonly assumed that the outcome of the battle demonstrated the superiority of cavalry over infantry; which lasted until the late middle ages and the development of more effective projectile weapons. In our view this is a flawed approach, arising from a misunderstanding of the battle itself and the nature of the opposing forces, which ignores the vast bulk of evidence to the contrary, both in the later fourth century and in other periods. Adrianople was an infantry battle, decided by a series of tactical moves and accidents, and was no different in its troop composition and maneuvering from most of the set-piece warfare of the day..." As I see it, one primary reason the Battle of Adrianople was significant was because it irrevocably changed the conditions on which barbarians and Romans would deal with each other in the future, and Rome might have been sacked sooner if not for the diplomatic astuteness of Theodosius I; his offer to the vagabonding Goths in the Balkan regions of allied status (foederati) with Rome, while retaining their own sovereignty, proved very efficacious until his death in 395 A.D. There was something more appealing for many barbarian chieftains about leading their warriors to fight along the ranks of the Roman military system than merely leading their own federated mobs (somewhat) into battle against Romans. They were probably thinking along the lines of stature, such as gaining war ministries in the empire. Moreover, Theodosius paid them higher than the Roman troops (reputedly), and showed them greater consideration. Trained units were also transferred from Egypt to replenish Thedosius' ranks. The result of the battle also seemed to signify the reality to the Eastern Empire's military that efficient cavalry must be adopted more fully. Part of Theodosius' foederati was perhaps 40,000 conscripted Gothic warriors, many being cavalry. This must have been instrumental in the vanquishing of Theodosius' rivals, Magnus Maximus and Eugenius by 394 A.D. Actually, Alaric was part of the campaign that crushed Eugenius. Was the battle of Adrianople the advent of the cavalry cycle - the so-called tactical revolution in the relation between cavalry and infantry which would influence the period when heavy cavalry, typified by the Medieval knight, dominated the battlefields of Europe for another 1,000+ years? Contrarily, was the battle simply a battle lost catastrophically by the emperor Valens because of his tactical and intelligence failures, combined with a swift tactical surprise from the Gothic horsemen? But remember, it wasn't an ambush akin to what Hannibal achieved at Trasimene, Scipio's 'Burning of the Camps' (night ambush), or the Teutoburger Wald. The clash at Adrianople was fought on an open plain. Did the Gothic cavalry contemporaneously send the Roman horsemen into flight and aid their infantry in the destruction of their enemy? Or was it really a battle won by Gothic infantry over Roman infantry, who were already thrown into disorder (terribly tight-packing of their ranks) by the initial salvo of Gothic cavalry, who all left the field chasing Roman cavalry, thus being merely a preliminary supplement? Some reputable modern sources state unequivically 'no' to the cavalry-cycle issue. I agree; this battle led to a Roman catastrophe due to faulty intelligence and tactical surprise from the Gothic cavalry. The arms and tactics employed were nothing new from both sides. This wasn't like Crecy of 1346. I think, basically, both armies at Adrianople numbered between 15-20,000 men at most, with Valens having an edge in quality and quantity (slight edge in numbers). But Valens thought he was approaching an enemy force, primarily Fritigern's footmen housed in their wagonlaager (wagon-fort), composed of slightly more than 1/2 of what it actually was. Fritigern had sent for his allied horsemen, out foraging 'far away', and was 'begging' a truce with Valens, sending out envoys of 'low origin' initially, whom Valens refused to see. Valens wanted to be sent a suitable chieftain to execute a lasting treaty. Fritigern then sent a 'common' soldier as a herald, requesting that picked men of noble rank among the Romans be sent to him as hostages, and he would tolerate the anger felt by his warriors because of his virtual overture of peace. But, in actuality, he was purposely delaying, hoping that amid the pretended truce his cavalry might return. Valens approved, but may have been also buying time to deploy efficiently (Ammianus Marcellinus, our original main source, doesn't say this on the part of Valens). This makes sense, as the wagonlaager was, presumably, well situated and difficult to assault, and Valen's men were weary and the day was extremely hot. Perhaps the Romans could hav eset the wagonlaager ablaze. But they didn't. As already mentioned, Fritigern also set the surrounding land afire, thus exposing further with time the Romans to such horrid conditions in the 'fiery summer', exhausting them by heat and thirst. Valens had already imposed a forced march on his men to get here. Hunger began to set in for the Romans, too. Marcellinus tell us of Valens' emissary, one Richomeres, "...As he was on his way to the enemy's rampart, the archers and targeteers, then under the command of one Bacurius of Hiberia and Cassio, had rushed forward too eagerly in hot attack, and were already engaged with their adversaries; and as their charge had been untimely, so their retreat was cowardly; and thus they gave an unfavorable omen to the beginning of the battle..." This untimely action, perhaps one of insubordination, is believed to have been instigated by the right (we don't know for sure) Roman cavalry. Then, like a 'thunderbolt does near high mountains', the cavalry under Alatheus and Saphrax arrived, and threw themselves into the 'confusion'. This is the Marcellinus' overview of the entire battle, Book 31.13 (Loeb Classic Library), "All the Goths united, namely, the Theruingi under the command of King Fritigern, and the Greuthungi led by Alatheus and Saphrax, and engaged with the Romans in the open, routed their cavalry, and put to flight the infantry, thus left unprotected and crowded together, with enormous losses; Valens was killed, but his body could not be found." 'All the Goths united', with no specific mention of all of the Gothic cavalry leaving the field. Thus, in my opinion, the revised theory that this was a battle of mainly infantry over infantry is not incontrovertible. But Marcellinus' account does carry some gaps. Right from the beginning, Marcellinus states, "On every side armor and weapons clashed..." A few sentences later, "...the lines dashed together like beaked ships, pushing each other back and forth in turn..." (could infantry alone, of no more quantity, cause this?) He then tells us that the left cavalry wing of the Romans, deserted by some of their comrades, was hard pressed by the enemy's numbers, crushed, and overwhelmed, the infantry now unsupported. Again, he does not say the Gothic cavalry left the field. But he doesn't say the stayed either. Gosh, I wish he had specified! He continues, "...Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen, and echoed with frightful cries. Hence the arrows whirling death from every side always found their mark with fatal effect...But when the barbarians, pouring forth in huge hordes, trampled down horse and man...no room for retreat..." Now, I hope the 'picking and choosing' doesn't signify a taking out of context, but think it is plausible, though the word 'cavalry' doesn't come up from Marcellinus after the initial charge of the Gothic horsemen, that phrases such as, "On every side", and, "Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen", and, "arrows whirling death from every side", and, "barbarians, pouring forth (not 'out', as out of their wagon-fort), in huge hordes, trampling down horse and man", and, finally, "no room for retreat", can not mean only the Gothic infantry itself surrounded the Romans, which has been a major belief of the current appraisals of the battle (Thomas Burns and Stephen Williams, to name a couple). These beliefs have been accepted, and are very credible (I have skimed Williams' excellent Theodosius: The Empire at Bay) on many issues (IMHO). This is definitley not a black & white issue. Much of the Gothic cavalry vanquished the Roman horsemen with great celerity, mainly because of the element of surprise, but some seemingly swung inwards to aid in the envelopment of the body of infantry, already thrown into disarray. Men alone do not "trample down horse and man" (do they?). Perhaps I am being too academic, and ancient accounts can suffer from 'static' with the translations down the timelines. One of the eminent and panoramic works of Roman history, especially of this period, says this of the battle of Adrianople, "On the 9th of August 378 A.D., a day which has deserved to be marked among the most inauspicious of the Roman Calender, the emperor Valens, leaving under a strong guard his baggage and military treasure, marched from Hadrianople to attack the Goths, who were encamped about 12 miles from the city....The event of the battle of Hadrianople, so fatal to Valens and to the empire, may be described in a few words: the Roman cavalry fled; the infantry was abandoned, surrounded, and cut to pieces. The most skillful evolutions, the finest courage, are scarcely sufficient to extricate a body of foot encompassed on an open plain by superior numbers of horse..." -Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. III, Ch. XXVI. Gibbon did could not make scientific extrapolations from examining the field etc., and certain sources he used have been declared advanced since his time (he wrote his masterpiece throughout the 1770s-1780s ), but he drew from the same sources our contemporaries do. Actually, he is constantly used for a source. Another is Theodor Mommsen, whose famed work I don't have with me. Thanks, Spartan JKM

Actually, I find Dodge and Hart an excellent 1-2 punch for studying Scipio and Hannibal. It is in the biography section, 5th floor under the S section. It is not in the famous library (you know, the statues of the two lions), now one for purely research, but located in the branch across 5th Avenue (entrance on the SE corner of 40th st and 5 Avenue). It is one of the best biographies I have ever read! His analysis of Zama is an outstanding postulation, in my opinion. I keep my photocopied copy 'safe' and binded. If anyone has questions with anything specific about Scipio from professor Scullard's work, I'll be happy tp provide quotes etc. Thanks, Spartan JKM

The Augusta, the strategic narrative of B.H. Liddel Hart's work is outstanding, as it sheds valuable light as to why Scipio was a remarkably balanced commander. However, when it comes to comparisons with Hannibal, the opinions of Hart seem quite tendentious. In my opinion, all his downplaying of Hannibal can be countered, such as the supposed 'inability' to siege cities and undertake pursuits. We can talk about this if you would like. I must stress the value of professor Howard H. Scullard's Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician. The study is longer, more balanced, and overall more objective than Hart's work, which is certainly terrific to counter the Hannibal biographers. We need a level of balance and opposing views to form deep conclusions of our own. History has simply found Hannibal more romantic than Scipio, though the two were very much alike as generals and men who understood that policy is what wins wars. The book is out of print though. You'll have to go to a major library. I spent hours photocopying it at the NYC Public Library, being that I wanted it so badly. I had to put it on reserve, too. If you can't find it let me know; maybe we could work soemthing out. You must study Scullard's work, judging by your inspiration regarding Scipio. It is a must!! Let me know how your search goes. Thanks Spartan JKM

Great thread! May I add some stuff? There is no question Cannae was an abject failure for Rome that day, and the legionnaires who fell suffered horribly because of the reversion to the stiffness of the phalanx. Final victory over Hannibal would become a powerful source of pride for the subsequent generations of Rome, and it was sweet justice for Rome that many of the Cannae survivors formed the core of Scipio's victorious army in Africa. I do not believe the Second Punic War was a personal war for Hannibal. He was simply ready for war when it broke. He was a general in the service of Carthage. Hannibal recieves much praise and criticism, and a remark from the great Helmuth von Moltke ('the Elder') carries much weight, "No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy. The commander is compelled...to reach decisions on the basis of situations which cannot be predicted." Hannibal's grand strategy to defeat Rome was as brilliant as it was audacious. His strike into Cisalpine Gaul, which the Romans deemed an impossible task, was a classic display of attack is the best defence. I am certain he knew the risks, and he never wavered from the only strategy that would have worked - that of detaching Rome's allies from her, thus reducing by as much as half her material and military strength, including the maritime units. No foreigner could have known, with in-deep thoroughness, the intricate nature of the Roman federation, which was a complex amalgam of peoples throughout Italy who didn't necessarily carry a universal feeling of 'us' and 'them' with regards to their Romans masters; what had a Latin from Clastidium have in common with a Samnite, or a Greek from Tarentum or Locri? Remember, as Livy tells us (Book 23.5 and 24.47), the Romans were perplexed that disaffected allies would choose to side with 'foreigners' and 'barbarians' against a people of Italy like themselves. Hannibal's diplomatic work must have had some validity. We can never be completely sure his war was a fanatical 'war of revenge'. That he was ready when war broke out is what we are sure of. The wrath of his father did not completely absorb him; Hannibal was also rubbed upon by the sensible sense of diplomacv of his older brother-in-law Hasdrubal, whom he immediately succeeded. Hannibal's actions throughout his career do not witness any acts of gratuitous cruelty, and none of his decisions were reached by any tempestuous behavior on his part. Interestingly, the one man of action in antiquity who perhaps matches him in possessing such a determined yet composed temperament was his eventual conqueror, Publius Cornelius Scipio, later Africanus. Anyway, his insistence that Carthage make peace after Zama (Polybius 15.19) does not suggest a fanatic. He could have skillfully organized a stiff resistence within Carthage itself, in which the Romans would have been forced into a long, grueling siege, which would have taken years. Moreover, before the upheaval at Saguntum in 219 B.C., his campaigning in northwest of Iberia, in which he achieved a smashing Alexandrian-style victory over a tribal army numbering about 100,000 men (according to Livy) on the banks of the Tagus, could have been nothing more than the continuation of the prosperous empire-building begun by his father and brother-in-law. No doubt he hated Rome, and if they began jostling against Carthaginian interests here in Spain, which had they did begin to do, he wouldn't back down to their admonishments. Not because of any wrath or megalomania on his part, but because backing down over Saguntum, whom Rome never came to help once he besieged them (perhaps indicating they were bluffing all along), but because he had an acute understanding of Rome's imperialistic nature, which involved the fact they wouldn't have ceased with Saguntum. It would have been merely the thin edge of the wedge. If the Roman challenge over Saguntum was not taken up it would not only cause irreparable damage to Punic prestige amongst the Iberian peoples, but would also ruin all the work of the past two decades which renewed Carthage's prosperity. When should he have fought? What if New Carthage followed, or Gades, or Utica? Polybius tells us in Book 3.33, "...next he instructed his brother Hasdrubal how to manage the government of Spain and prepare to resisit the Romans if he himself happened to be be absent..., which possibly suggests he was not yet totally decisive about invading Italy. Thus, we cannot be absolutely certain he would have invaded Italy if the Romans had chosen to turn a blind eye regarding Saguntum. Hannibal had informed himself that he could count on allies in the regions which Rome had fought a desperate war against the Celts as recently as 222 B.C. The area of northern Italy could serve as a viable starting point of operations, with an excellent source of abundant recruiting material, upon Rome's lands to the south, once he quickly established himself there. The founding of two new Latin colonies in the Po Valley in around 220 B.C. (Placentia and Cremona) certainly influenced Hannibal's thinking that trouble could be stirred up, as indeed turned out to be the case. His preparations which preceded his departure from New Carthage included sending envoys to the Alpine regions through which he intended to pass. As Polybius tells us in Book 3.34, "...He had informed himself accurately about the fertility of the land at the foot of the Alps and near the river Po, the denseness of its population, the bravery of the men in war, and above all their hatred of Rome ever since that former war with the Romans...". Though it was dearly bought in losses, the crossing of the Alps was a tremendous strategic success, as it could not have been chosen at a better time; Hannibal knew he had to move quickly, as a victorious war in Italy would have been improbable later on. The Romans had indeed recently aflamed the Cisalpine Celts, mostly the Boii. But the power of the Gauls was not yet broken (the Insubres were subjugated). Hatred of the Romans was extreme, and Rome had scarcely begun to establish themselves in these 'conquered lands' centered around the Po. Hannibal's initial success on the Ticinus, and more so at the Trebbia galvanized the Gauls to a common cause. But the Gauls had a legitimate beef with Hannibal, as they noticed he was more concerned for the lives of his African and Iberians, using them as pawns to be sacrificed to his tactical choices. They certainly paid the heaviest price for victory against the Romans. But their expecations lay in trampling the ager Romanus itself, and under him they probably saw their best chance, especially in the prospect of booty. Hannibal knew he had to get moving soon to keep them under his leadership, but he also had to get a message across to Rome's allies that would be very clear from afar - that he wasn't in Italy to directly attack them. It's too bad for Hannibal's cause the Celts of northern Italy didn't come charging down upon Roman territory after Cannae. The force sent north under one Lucius Postumius didn't seem to work in creating a diversion, as they destroyed his force in the late winter/early spring of 215 B.C. To what point can we sustain Classical historians' suggestions that the Gauls were a fickle, wiseless people? Hannibal wisely concluded that the only way Rome could be checked (at the least), and for Carthage's hegemony to be ensured, was to break the Roman confederation up and Rome to be isolated from a significant portion of her alliance with the peoples of Italy, even if they didn't actively join Hannibal in arms. A defensive war fought in Spain, or taking personal command in Sicily when the island became an important theater of the war, however long drawn out, would do nothing more than make Rome's allies feel weary. They would never turn against Rome until they could be assured that a rebellion was plausible, and this only applied to the ones whose loyalty was less-reconciled, most notably in the south, where Hannibal spent the rest of his time after Cannae. This is why he disposed his battle-lines at Cannae the way he did - to achieve a battle of annihilation, not just a subtle victory. This is what would induce the allies to listen, if Rome was shown to be threatened significantly. That he failed in the end, even after achieving a dissolution of the confederacy by 40%, illustrates why the dour Romans became, well, whom they were - a people that would dominate the western world for the next 7 centuries. His entire strategy to bring Rome down was based on flawed valuation, but it was inevitable, as he couldn't have known the granite solidarity of the core of Rome's confederation, the Latin colonies, which had never been tested, except sporadically and not as thoroughly against Pyrrhus 6 decades earlier. But Hannibal certainly believed he could do it, and he came very close. There is no reason to think added pressure on Rome after Cannae with more forces at his disposal would have compelled the Romans to come to the table. The solidarity of the confederation had nothing to do with the folly of Carthage's generals in Spain and Sicily, where the Romans flat out beat them, despite being vastly outnumbered, and in Sicily, where nepotism ruined a resurging Carthaginian effort under a brilliant cavalry leader named Muttines, who was personally sent to Sicily by Hannibal in 208 B.C. Regarding the important factor of seapower, well, the easiest way for Hannibal to reach Italy would indeed have been by the sea, which would have avoided the losses he surely expected to incur on the overland march. It would have been much quicker, too. He couldn't known exactly the strength of Roman seapower, but he must have known it was superior now to Carthage's. Rome had 220 quinqueremes in commission in 218 B.C., 60 under Publius Cornelius Scipio (the Elder) in the north, ready to strike at Spain via Massilia, and 160 under Tiberius Sempronius Longus, in the south, ready to strike Africa from Sicily. The figures we have from Polybius and Livy for the Carthaginian naval strength illustrate how inferior they were to the Romans, in terms of quantity: Hannibal had 50 quinqueremes in Spain, but only 32 were fit to put to sea (Livy 21.22), along with 5 triremes. Livy tells us (21.49) that 20 vessels were sent to raid Italy, 35 were sent to western Sicily, and Polybius tells us (Book 3.96) 70 were sent to Sardinia in 217 B.C., but part of these were probably from the squadrons sent to Sicily mentioned by Livy. Basically, it looks like Carthage had 100 or so fewer ready warships at the beginning of the war. According to Livy (Book 21.17 and 21.22), the Romans knew this, and Hannibal's dispositions to safe guard Africa and Spain with the prudent cross-posting of roughly 35,000 troops, which would weave solidarity between disparate troops from Spain and Africa in the testing times ahead, indicates he knew it too. Sure, it's possible he could have slipped through, as 'control of the sea' hardly carried the same definition as in modern times. A Carthaginian fleet did reach Sardinian and Pisa in 217 B.C., as Bomilcar did to Locri in 215 B.C., and as Mago did to Liguria in 206 B.C. But these were smaller detachments than his army of Italy, and being caught at sea by a superior Roman fleet would have meant the end of his campaign - actually, this would have meant it never really began! Such an attempt would not have been a calculated risk, but a foolish one. It was not that Hannibal was some landlubber who didn't understand seapower; he understood it all too well, as his undertaking to procure Naples, the closest major port pointing directly southwest to Carthage in a straight line just west of Sicily, as his first priority after Cannae, indicates. He knew the Carthaginian navy was a broken reed by 218 B.C., a fact vividly realized when Bomilcar failed to even fight a numerically inferior Roman fleet (for the only time in the war) off the southeast tip of Sicily. If Bomilcar had fought and won, which was a distinct possibility (the Carthaginians were still probably better seamen and, as we have stated, the corvus was no longer in use), Syracuse would have been at least received ample supplies, as the Roman naval forces would have been scarce in the harbor, and he had 700 merchant ships with him, thus raising the siege would have been practicable. Sicily could have been recovered as a whole for Carthage. Roman apologists, understandably, scoff at all these 'what-ifs' of the 2nd Punic War that could have gone Hannibal's way, but they seem plausible to me. However, Rome was indeed always going to win in the very long run. Events such as what happened off cape Pachynon in 212 B.C., along with Hasdrubal Barca's victory in Catalonia against Ganeus Scipio in 215 B.C., or his victory over Gaius Claudius Nero at the Metaurus in 207 B.C., would merely have delayed Rome's dominance of the Mediterranean. As we look back, they were unrelenting in colonizing and expanding, and were never accustomed to involuntarily drawing away due to fear. Hannibal's subtleties were simply watsed on such a resilient state, whose bonds with her subjects made up a form of nationhood far superior than where Hannibal came from. But he realized this fully only after he applied such a stern test. Perhaps only the Soviets of WWII have been so pummelled initially yet able to hang on for final victory. Many critics of Hannibal seem to allude that he could control the whole Carthaginian war effort; he must be held responsible for engineering this war, though he didn't technically break any treaties and the Romans actually declared war, but his ultimate failure was a result of the force of circumstances. I think he made all the best decisions in the exigencies of the moments. His failure to take towns meant he couldn't win them over, or detach from Roman suzerainty, not that he couldn't siege strongholds. What good would assaulting towns, except for a means of punishment etc., achieve? Certainly not the appeasement he hoped for. In all the towns of Italy there existed a conflict between the ruling nobility (loyal to Rome) and the commons. Hannibal's attempt to foster a democratic cause, thus detaching these towns, particulalry in Campania, was the astute thing to strive for. If not for the stout intervention of Marcus Marcellus at Nola, Hannibal might have won over the town, as there were indications of the popular party wanting detachment from Roman rule, in this very important city, which commanded a main route near Capua. Now, for the issue about the Barcid 'palapinate', if we can call their faction as such, it is incorrect to think of them as viceroys in Spain independent of the Carthaginian government. Yes, they opposed the policy of appeasement favored by the home government, but Hannibal, as well as his father and brother-in-law, were not military entrepreneurs/adventurers akin to the likes of Memnon of Rhodes or Quintus Sertorius, or later ones such as Albrecht von Wallenstein or Raimondo Montecuccoli. They were generals of a Republic, and their policy had to take account of the views they completely didn't share with the Carthaginian sphere of aristocrats who held the power and final decision-making. Hannibal did indeed send to Carthage for instructions at the onset of the Saguntum problem, and they indeed refused to give him up to the Romans, thus certainly authorizing him to take steps he saw fit. Actually, Appian tells us that Hannibal demanded the Saguntines and local tribes whom they were at odds settle their dispute. But it didn't materialize, and Carthage became commited to war, one they were willing to risk for the sake of their interersts in Spain. This could only be saved by Hannibal's grand plan to defeat Rome in her own yard. Again, there was definitley much enmity on the part of Hannibal concerning Rome, but the 'wrath of the house of Barca' and 'the revenge of Hannibal' perhaps belongs to Roman historiography which attemts to obscure the extent to which the Roman seizure of Sardinia and her interference in Spain drove Carthage to war. Please don't misunderstand me; the Romans were certainly not unilaterally the 'bad guys' in this great conflict. Their interests and security were threatened, so they felt, by Carthage's new found prosperity. The Massiliotes and Saguntines clearly preferred a Roman to a Carthaginian friend, and the Romans, an expanding state, couldn't ignore such valuable 'friends' located in strategically important locations. In the broad scope, however, and though Hannibal's attack on Saguntum precipitated the war, which was carried out with his full knowledge of the consequences, we must conclude (or decide) that, being that attack and defence have a meaning in such a tussle between two powerful states relativley close to each other, the balance of aggression, in my opinion, must be ascribed to Rome. Polybius makes it clear the allies were wavering just before Cannae, and makes it clear in Book 3.106 that the Senate ordered Gnaeus Servilius to avoid battle with Hannibal, and to train and condition the new recruits, as they were convinced their recent losses to Hannibal were the result of raw levies. They were ready for this upcoming great battle at Cannae. The Roman strategy after Cannae entailed a huge sacrifice in men and money on her core allies, not to mention a level of indomitability few peoples could sustain, and the strain it caused took quite a toll by 209 B.C., when much of Etruria was on the verge of revolt, and 12 of the 30 Latin colonies were bled white, unable to meet their quota to the Republic in arms and men. These unsettling situations among the allies were exactly the primary elements Hannibal hoped to achieve to break the federation. He simply couldn't quite achieve it enough. Who knows what added pressure with Hasdrubal's arrival could fostered in 207 B.C. It still may not have been enough. We must rely mainly on Livy for the war beyond Cannae until Polybius' works re-appear in the African campaign, and even if he exaggertaes the scale of some of these smaller battles, Hannibal clearly destroyed Roman forces twice around Herdonea (212 and 210 B.C.). Livy credits Marcellus with a victory over Hannibal at Numistro in 210 B.C., but Julius Frontinus credits Hannibal with the victory here. The clashes around Canusium were doubtless tactically won by Hannibal: a victorious army does not 'billet' for months after a battle, and with Hannibal subsequently holding the field and successfully raising the siege of Caulon a far off distance in Bruttium, in a relatively short time; nor does one's government scourn a commander for 'twice having his army cut to pieces' if he had won even a stalemate (Livy Book 27.21). Regardless of the absurdity that Livy would intimate a defeat of Hannibal, then construe more light to the contrary with his subsequent narrative, the words are there. Hannibal fought a battle with Nero near Grumentum, which seemingly ended with Hannibal maneuvering to give Nero the slip while positioning himself awaiting news of Hasdrubal's situation. It's certainly all debatable, and depends on what one wants to believe. We'll never know for sure. Actually, a bit of trivia: Tiberius Sempronius Longus and Gaius Flaminius, the losers at the Trebbia and Trasimene, are deemed by some to have been horrible generals. But they had some success during their tenures. If we can sustain Livy, Longus defeated a Carthaginian force under one Hanno near Grumentum in 215 B.C. (Book 23.37), and Flaminius achieved success before the Second Punic War, leading his army across the Po in 223 B.C., defeating the Insubrian Gauls. How horrible could they have been? As for Varro at Cannae, the People did not elect him and Aemilius Paullus as consuls, and didn't provide them with a huge force, to wait it out amongst the hills watching and hampering the dreaded invader Hannibal, if the opportunity arose. Attempting to seek a decisive battle was hardly a foolish move, and any waiting around would result in a loss of morale. The attritional strategy of Fabius, though quite astute, had failed in whole; Hannibal marched where he wanted and when he wanted, and moved faster than Fabius' army. If the Romans would not face him, he would plunder and destroy what he didn't need or couldn't carry, and appropriate everyhting else. Hannibal's breakout at the Ager Falernus against Fabius was a mastepiece of stratagem. Unlike Alexander, Hannibal did not come to Italy to conquer, but to ensure the prosperity of his own people; his strike into Italy was a classic example of, again, attack is the best form of defence. The Romans headed to Hannibal's position carefully, heading along the coastal plain, eliminating any chance of a terrible ambush. Livy describes an elaborate plan of Hannibal's to ambush them, and when Roman intelligence knew of this, he was compelled to make a dash for Gaul with his cavalry, abandoning his infantry. In view of Polybius' silence, this is unlikely. Hannibal needed a great victory to forward his political goal here in Italy, and judging by his tactical conduct displayed at Cannae, he was confident of victory. A few days before the Battle of Cannae, Varro took command and marched eastwards towards Hannibal's position. He bested an attacking party of Hannibal's upon his van, in which he disposed some cavalry in support of his foot. Varro had showed discretion in his leadership, but many feel Hannibal was doing what he had done to Sempronius Longus at the Trebbia: attacking his forces and withdrawing, ostensibly being beaten, thus whetting an inexperienced commander's appetite for increased action. Anyway, Paullus has been credited by Roman historiography for refusing the challenge of Hannibal's for battle due to unfavorable ground on August 1, but Varro, in command the day before, was obvioulsy just as willing to wait. On August 2, Varro was ready to fight, as the morale of the men wouldn't increase with more harrassing from the swift-moving Numidians, and Hannibal's superior cavalry would make foraging easier for the Carthaginian side. Many constantly stress the suitability of the flat terrian for Hannibal's cavalry on the banks of the Aufidus River, but we shouldn't discard the fact that the Roman infantry required level ground to take advantage of their sheer weight of numbers. After both he and Paullus decided not to fight on the left bank, Varro chose to engage Hannibal in full on the right bank of the Aufidus. Hannibal remarked to his men that the left bank was perfect cavalry country (Polybius Book 3.111), but Varro clearly saw that on the right bank the ground rose steadily from the sea, and with a raised area along the river bank. It still provided good terrain for cavalry, but provided more hope for infantry. Varro deserves credit for spotting this, and there is no reason to believe Livy that Varro ordered the army to deploy for battle without consulting Paullus, who clearly was more or less in agreement, if we can judge by the movement. We are a little more sure of Hannibal's enemy's size than that of Alexander's at Gaugamela, but not without uncertainty. Basically, the Romans had 80,000 infnatry and more than 6,000 cavalry to face Hannibal's 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. As with Darius III against Alexander at Gaugamela, Varro's plan was simple and based on prior experience; in defeat, the 10,000 Roman infantry in the center at the Trebbia smashed throught Hannibal's center, and the vanguard broke through amid the disaster at Trasimene. Varro was not unjust in his confidence that the Roman legions could repeat this, but this time via a huge offensive battering ram. Varro and Paullus knew full well they were not going to outfight or maneuver Hannibal's cavalry, but by placing themselves personally at the helm of the two cavalry units, they clearly hoped to uphold enough spirit to hold their ground as long as possible while the infantry crushed Hannibal in the center. Regardless of what happened on the wings, crushing Hannibal in the center would decide the outcome; much of his cavalry would certainly get away, but would soon be in trouble wandering around hostile land after Hannibal's defeat, and Rome resurgent. Varro chose the field, hoping to nullify Hannibal's superiority in cavalry on ground impracticable for enemy horses to ride around them, and with the sea at their backs, no ambush could be implemented upon them from behind. Hannibal no longer had any elephants, which he used efficaciously at the Trebbia, the river was on his left and uneven ground on his right. Varro's plan was not subtle, but anything more sophisticated would have been counter-productive with such a huge force. He has been severely criticized for substituting flexibility for power, but a shorter front with more depth allows for a smoother marching order with so many men; a deeper, narrower deployment allows for the army in whole to move quicker and maintain order more easily than a wider formation. Varro needed his superior numbers of foot to come into play, and the battlefield was limited. For what he was attempting, the narrower front with deeper ranks was the best formation. Please don't misunderstand me, fellow posters; Gaius Terentius Varro was a moderate commander at the very, very best. I just don't think he was completely incompetent. It was simply his misfortune he went up against one of the greatest battlefield commanders of all time that terrible day on August 2, 216 B.C.. Regarding Cannae, it can be concluded that every tactical masterpiece was probably the result of supreme generalship on the part of the winner and some form of crude management by the loser, but I do not agree that with Cannae it was more the latter. It is incredible what Hannibal achieved here. The amazing 'reverse-refusal' he administered with his infantry maneuver constituted a giant trap. His center was deployed in a convex manner, so as to entice the advancing Romans (aggressive by nature) to attack them, and the placing of 2 strong blocks of African infantry on either wing and further back meant not only would the enemy tend to suck into the center, but if things went amiss fugitives from his Celtic and Iberian units would also be funnelled into the center where they could bunch and slow the Roman advance - even if they didn't want to. Hannibal personally commanded the center, as he intended his troops at this point to stage one of the most difficult maneuvers a unit could be asked of by their commander to pull off in battle - they were to fall back under the pressure of the Romans' advance, but not break. In these battles of antiquity, most of the casualties were suffered as the defeated fled in rout. Of course, those who fled first had the best chance of getting away. For an army to fight effectively, particularly under these circumstances, each soldier had to trust that his comrades would not leave him in the lurch. This paramount level of trust was tested to its fullest when their battle line started to bend backwards. This was an amazing display of leadership at the helm of polyglot contingents. Hannibal's unusual placing of the more numerous shock cavalry on the confined flank near the Aufidus River, with the Numidians on the other side, actually slightly outnumbered by the Roman allied cavalry, meant that the Roman contingent would most likely be checkmated by the maneuverable Numidians, while the heavy cavalry would dispose of the Romans easily on their side, and be available for other tasks. Varro, the Roman consul, should be at least credited for realizing the right bank of the river was less suitable for cavalry, but Hannibal came up with an answer. The only way to significantly seduce Rome's allies was to destroy Roman armies, not just best them. No victory could have been greater for this purpose. But in the long run, Cannae simply cemented the loyalty of Rome's core allies - something nobody could predict without applying such a test. Part of Hannibal's genius lay in his ability to transcend the traditional ability of many soldiers of Iberian and Gallic heritage etc. With the great struggle with Hannibal, Rome produced a corporate heroism of contributors - Fabius, Nero, Marcellus, and Scipio were the main commanders that achieved the greatest Roman successes. But the likes of Publius Cornelius Scipio (the Elder), Gnaeus Scipio, Marcus Silanus, Gaius Laelius, Tiberius Fonteius, Titus Manlius Torquatus, Marcus Valerius Laevinus, Titus Otacilius Crassus, Quintus Naevius Crista, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (d. 213 B.C.), and Appius Claudius Pulcher, all contributed greatly for Rome to finally win in the end. In all, Rome had better commanders, and outnumbered Carthage by about 6 to 1 in total manpower reserves. She also had command of the sea, which Hannibal was initially able to circumvent. The Romans successfully played the Greeks of each other, thanks mainly to the Aetolians, were triumphant in Sicily, and thwarted the Carthaginians on the Iberian Peninsula from getting to Italy, despite the efforts of Hasdrubal Barca, and no thanks to the lack of co-opertaion of the other commanders, who failed dismally to vanquish the Romans at the Ebro in 211 B.C. when they had just 9,000 beleaguered soldiers hangin on. The Carthaginian navy failed to take advantages off Cape Pachynon, the south-east tip of Sicily, when Bomilcar actually had a superior fleet than the Romans (no mention of the corvus at this time). Hannibal has to be held accountable for something, as he engineered this great conflict, but these significant Carthaginian reverses were simply not his fault. Lastly, I do not agree with the story of Hannibal's 'oath' - to the point it clouded his judgment. That story, if not altogether apocryphal, came from Hannibal himself, told to Antiochus III of Syria to convince the Seleucid king of his hatred of Rome, and within the context of trying to convince the king that Rome could only be defeated by fighting them within Italy; part of Hannibal's grand strategy against Rome, which many critics seem to miss, was that he planned to fight the war not in which Carthage relied on her resources and the Romans on theirs, but increasingly he would fight Rome with her resources, while depleting her reserves in manpower by detaching her allies, even if they didn't join his cause for Carthage directly. It's a mistake to assume he was banking on Italian peoples joining him in arms. As Livy tells us, Book 34.60, "...Hannibal, a fugitive from his native country, had reached the court of Antiochus, where he was treated with great distinction, the only motive for this being that the king had long been meditating a war with Rome, and no one could be more qualified to discuss the subject with him than the Carthaginian commander. He had never wavered in his opinion that the war should be conducted on Italian soil; Italy would furnish both supplies and men to a foreign foe. But, he argued, if that country remained undisturbed and Rome were free to employ the strength and resources of Italy beyond its frontiers, no monarch, no nation could meet her on equal terms..." Just a point of view, and I hope I didn't ramble too much. I find this historical chapter fascinating. Thanks Spartan JKM

I am inclined to agree with you, Pantagathus, but only in the sense of Maharbal's vilifying of Hannibal for not marching on the Capitol. Polybius mentions Maharbal in his accounts of the Trasimene campaign (Book 3.84-86). In all probability, Maharbal did exist. Thanks, Spartan JKM

I've noticed many discussed issues about Hannibal's great campaign - yes, that very ill-fated enterprise of 219 - 202 B.C. This post is, as usual, merely a point of view of a subject I find fascinating. I hope we can all agree on that point I hope this isn't too long winded and choppy. My quotes of Polybius and Livy are from this valuable online service: http://www.uvm.edu/~bwalsh/RomanHistory/RomanHistory.html Titus Livius, The History of Rome Book 22.51, "...Hannibal's officers all surrounded him and congratulated him on his victory, and urged that after such a magnificent success he should allow himself and his exhausted men to rest for the remainder of the day and the following night. Maharbal, however, the commandant of the cavalry, thought that they ought not to lose a moment. "That you may know," he said to Hannibal, "what has been gained by this battle I prophesy that in five days you will be feasting as victor in the Capitol. Follow me; I will go in advance with the cavalry; they will know that you are come before they know that you are coming." To Hannibal the victory seemed too great and too joyous for him to realise all at once. He told Maharbal that he commended his zeal, but he needed time to think out his plans. Maharbal replied: "The gods have not given all their gifts to one man. You know how to win victory, Hannibal, you do not how to use it." That day's delay is believed to have saved the City and the empire..." So, was Maharbal right? The story, even if partly or wholly fanciful, is certainly well-expressed in dramatic fashion. However, Polybius, our more reliable source, makes no mention of Maharbal in his account of Cannae; he has one Hasdrubal and one Hanno as the primary cavalry commanders. I guess that trivia really doesn't matter, and no less an authority than Bernard Montgomery has claimed that Maharbal was indeed correct. This comes from another man of high repute, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, from Pg 12 of his Scipio Africanus: greater Than Napoleon, with regards to the Roman fugitives after Cannae, "...made their way to Canusium. Their situation was still perilous, for this place lay only some 4 miles distant, and why Hannibal did not follow up his success by the destruction of this remnant, isolated from succor, remains one of the enigmas of history, to all appearance a blemish on his generalship..." True, if the 10,000 Romans who made it to Canusium (another, 4,550 made it to Venusia) had been rounded up, they wouldn't have been available for Marcus Marcellus to incorporate with his own legions later on. They would prove very valuable in some slogfesting with Hannibal around Nola and Canusium. But despite the magnitude of Hannibal's astonishing tactical masterpiece at Cannae, his entire army, including a garrison for his firm base and wounded, was now around 40,000-45,000 men. But his effective fighting strength would have been no more than about 35,000. He had rounded up very swiftly 19,300 prisoners (this is where Livy is more reliable than Polybius), and from different directions. Any further military action, unless soundly based, would reduce these modest (given the numbers still available to his enemy) totals even more so, unless he could find the means to increase his numbers. Moreover, immediately following the Battle of Cannae, Hannibal learned he had lost many of his most senior and experienced officers. A period of consolidation was now required, and, of no minor importance, the battlefield was was covered with vast amounts of booty and military equipment - the very essentials behind the financing of his war. This bore very real implications; his soldiery were mainly mercenaries, and they had served him with the utmost vigor and loyalty, and it was primarily the prospect of booty that drove them to serve with him. They now deserved their moment of reward. He couldn't refuse them. In one respect, Maharbal was correct: Hannibal knew how to win a battle. Even Montgomery says in his History of Warfare, Pg. 96, "...indeed Hannibal's tactical genius at Cannae can compare with the conduct of any battle in the history of warfare...", and the great historian Will Durant states in his The Story of Civilization, Vol. 3, Book 1, Ch 3, Pg. 51, "...It was a supreme example of generalship, never bettered in history. It ended the days of Roman reliance solely on infantry, and set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years.... The Prussian General Staff of the late 19th century seemingly became obsessed with Cannae, and the 1914 Schlieffen Plan was inspired by the battle, though the scale was much different. Lack of manpower for a 'colossal Cannae' forced the substitution of a 'right hook' for Hannibal's 'double-envelopment'. Alfred von Schlieffen's scheme brought Germany close to victory early in WW1, but turned out not to be feasible with the arrival in France, among other issues, such as Schlieffen and von Moltke (the Younger) being at loggerheads with each other, of the British Expeditionary Force. Sorry, this isn't the place for this, but basically, Cannae would become an ideal of many future commanders, and the Wehrmacht's vast envelopments of the Soviet forces at the start of 'Barbarossa' were called 'super-Cannaes'. Gregori Shtern, the Far East Army commander under Georgi Zhukov, said of the great Soviet envelopment of the Japanese in 1939 at the Battle of Khalkin-Gol (Nomonhan), "...I think we have won the second perfect battle of encirclement in all history...". Norman Schwarzkopf, among many others, including Napoleon and Wellington, was an avid admirer of Hannibal's generalship. Hannibal's qualities as a general have been studied and admired since Polybius' time: Polybius, The Histories, Book 11.19, "...No one can withhold admiration for Hannibal's generalship, courage, and power in the field, who considers the length of this period, and carefully reflects on the major and minor battles, on the sieges he undertook, on his movements from city to city, on the difficulties that at times faced him, and in a word on the whole scope of his design and its execution, a design in the pursuit of which, having constantly fought the Romans for sixteen years, he never broke up his forces and dismissed them from the field, but holding them together under his personal command, like a good ship's captain, kept such a large army free from sedition towards him or among themselves, and this although his regiments were not only of different nationalities but of different races..." and, Book 15.15, "...But nevertheless to meet each of these advantages Hannibal had shown incomparable skill in adopting at the critical moment all such measures as were in his power and could reasonably be expected to succeed..." The 'advantages' Polybius means are those Scipio had over him at Zama, yet the battle was touch-and-go until the cavalry returned 'providentially' for Rome. If there was a single (double, actually) astounding key to Hannibal's military genius, it was perhaps those 'variations of a trap' - subtle uses of bluff and even 'double' bluff. Examples of simple bluff was his brushing aside the Volcae, at the Rhone, and the Allobroges at the Gorge de la Bourne (?). But his classic breakout at the Ager Falernus, where Fabius Maximus thought he had Hannibal trapped, was a paradigm of superb stratagem; Hannibal sent 2,000 oxen, their heads ignited by fire at night, up the pass near the 4,000 Romans guarding the exiting defile. The Romans rushed up the hills ready to engage what they thought were enemy soldiers trying to escape. Instead they found writhing cattle! I sure hope the movie includes that scene. Double-bluff was exemplified by the Battle of Lake Trasimene. Roman historiography has labeled Gaius Flaminius as a fool for marching into a trap in an area which Livy described as, "...a position eminently adapted for surprise tactics, where the lake comes up close under the hills...", but Flaminius, in reality a seasoned commander who had recently defeated the Cisalpine Celts (ie, he wasn't a stranger to ambushes), could very well thought this was too obvious - in any case, how could anyone in command of an army of 25,000 men or so expect to be ambushed? Hannibal's approach march to Tarentum in 212 B.C. was masterful - and another display of superb 'double' bluff. Instead of completely trying to conceal his movements, which would have been practically impossible, he dispatched 2 parties of Numidian horsemen, one on either side of his approach to scour the countryside. Thus anyone who spotted them would either be taken prisoner or simply report a Numidian plundering raid. The Battle of the Trebbia was an example of simple bluff. As Polybius tells us, Book 3.70-71, "...Such, then, was the purpose of Hannibal, who knew that Tiberius was sure to be aggressively inclined. He had long ago noticed a place between the two camps, flat indeed and treeless, but well adapted for an ambuscade, as it was traversed by a water-course with steep banks densely overgrown with brambles and other thorny plants, and here he proposed to lay a stratagem to surprise the enemy. It was probable that he would easily elude their vigilance; for the Romans, while very suspicious of thickly-wooded ground, which the Celts usually chose for their ambuscades, were not at all afraid of flat and treeless places, not being aware that they are better adapted than woods for the concealment and security of an ambush, because the men can see all round them for a long distance and have at the same time sufficient cover in most cases. Any water-course with a slight bank and reeds or bracken or some kind of thorny plants can be made use of to conceal not only infantry, but even the dismounted horsemen at times, if a little care be taken to lay shields with conspicuous devices inside uppermost on the ground and hide the helmets under them..." The consuls who were beaten badly by Hannibal have all been labeled fools, in some form or another, by Roman historiography. They certainly were not innovative thinkers, but these men were simply attempting to bring about decisive engagements, and waiting would not improve the situation. Much can be said for Tiberius Sempronius Longus' attempt to crush Hannibal before the Carthaginian's strength grew with Gallic aquisition, which was manifesting rapidly at the time. I feel it is also a mistake to think the 'professionals' under Hannibal were superior soldiers per se to the 'amateurs' of the Roman Republic's citizen militia. Despite the inexperience of the soldiers and stodgy concept of conventional warfare on the part of the Romans, we should not underestimate their fighting qualities. Once they found the measure of Hannibal's more mobile and flexible methods, they would prove themselves capable of supreme celerity and complicated maneuvers, evidenced under Gaius Claudius Nero and Publius Cornelius Scipio )(later Africanus). Remember that Rome was a nation-at-arms, and these 'amateurs' were trained for war from youth The amazing 'reverse-refusal' of Hannibal's infantry maneuver at Cannae even constituted a giant trap. His center was deployed in a convex manner, so as to entice the advancing Romans to attack them, and the placing of 2 strong blocks of African infantry on either wing and further back meant not only would the enemy tend to suck into the center, but if things went amiss fugitives from his Celtic and Iberian units would also be funnelled into the center where they could bunch and slow the Roman advance - even if they didn't want to. His unusual placing of the more numerous shock cavalry on the confined flank near the Aufidus River, with the Numidians on the other side, actually slightly outnumbered by the Roman allied cavalry, meant that the Roman contingent would most likely be checkmated by the maneuverable Numidians, while the heavy cavalry would dispose of the Romans easily on their side, and be available for other tasks. Varro should be at least credited for realizing the right bank of the river was less suitable for cavalry, but Hannibal came up with an answer. In final defeat at Zama, Hannibal showed he had lost none of his touch. He knew he was finally outclassed in cavalry, and up against a great general in Scipio. Though our sources don't imply this, he probably deliberately sacrificed his horsemen to lure the Romans and Massinissa off the battlefield, where he had greater chance with his infantry. By using his cavalry units as decoys, however, he was taking a risk by doing so, because it still involved their defeat, exposed his flanks, and the Roman/Numidian cavalry could return before he had finished off Scipio's smaller but better body of infantry. But he had to do something, and I don't think if they had held their ground they would have lasted long. The fact it was pretty close later shows Hannibal made a viable decision. Furthermore, Scipio had superior cavalry and proved his adeptness with 'boomerang' style tactics before. Hannibal was a student of war, and, as I said earlier, a master of simple and double bluff. He also knew his history, particularly that of the Hellenistic kingdoms (he had Greek tutors). He knew what happened to Antigonus when his son, Demetrius Poliorcetes, went off in pursuit of Seleucus' cavalry at the great battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C. It has been suggested that Seleucus did indeed have his horses feign retreat. But, unlike Hannibal, he had 400 elephants that day, so he could deploy some in reserve in case Demetrius returned. He never did. Did Scipio order his cavalry to merely ride out and ride back in the manner they did? Why didn't Scipio try a flank maneuver with his cavalry, as Hannibal had done at Cannae? He was certainly capable, and with superior material at his disposal. Scipio doubtless did not wish for the complete departure of his own cavalry. Having driven the enemy away, he no doubt counted on them to attack the flanks of the main Carthaginian body, instead of pursuing a fleeing foe. He has been justly praised how well he handled the elephants at Zama, but it shouldn't be forgotten that Hannibal certainly knew all about the tendencies and contingencies of elephants in battle. He surely hoped they would do their stuff, but he easily could have known they would do exactly what they did do - swerve out to the flanks and disrupt things, which would aid his cavalry deception. It is impossible that Hannibal thought things would go smoothly with recently levied war elephants, and it is possible they didn't do as much harm to his cavalry squadrons as the ancients imply (I stress 'possible', OK?) We have a scholarly point of view from H.H. Scullard, from his terrific Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician pg. 150, "...Since it would take longer to convert a nominal into an actual flight than to drive a defeated enemy off the field, and since in fact the Roman cavalry only returned in the nick of time, it seems more probable that the Carthaginians deliberatley drew them away. After getting rid of the Roman cavalry, though with little hope that his own could rally against them, Hannibal would throw all his weight against Scipio's numerically inferior infantry. The elephant charge, with which he had hoped to confuse his foe, miscarried somewhat, partly through Scipio's foresight in leaving gaps in his line for the animals to run through, partly because they were always of rather doubtful quality, and here fell afoul of the Carthaginian cavalry. However, they cannot have done great harm to their own side, since their drivers had the means of killing them if they got out of hand...". Scullard, more than any scholar of this period we're discussing, wrote a book about elephants in ancient warfare. I would like to believe he wasn't far-fetched with his research. Moreover, Polybius only mentions it was Hannibal's left flank that was disrupted by elephants sent out of control. On the right flank he tells us that the scattered elephants, "...while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight...". What confusion, Polybius, if the elephants escaped out of the field? How did Gaius Laelius so easily send the Carthaginian cavalry, though green but not outnumbered (assuming Masinissa's 4,000-strong was not interdispersed with the Romans), into flight? The flight seemed immediate. The answer is they quite possibly were ordered to give ground. His infantry dispositions at Zama were also unusual, probably becuase he knew he was at a disadvantage here too. He surely wasn't going to try to repeat his tactics at Cannae against a brillaint general who had been there as a 17 or 18 year old, thus wouldn't be taken in. Moreover, Scipio favored flank attacks with his best troops. Hannibal adopted a Roman triple-line, but with his best unit, his veterans, the one unit who could match Scipio's troops, at a further distance than the one between the 1st and 2nd line - a 'true reserve'. Scipio could not do to him what he had so easily done to the other Carthaginian generals the past 7 years. Hannibal absorbed Scipio's legions, tiring them in the process, hoping to beat him head-on. It wasn't to be, as Scipio was too good not to lose his advantage, as Polybius said, and his army was too well-organized and well-drilled. But who knows what might have been if the 1st 2 lines hadn't turned on each other and Massinissa and Gaius Laelius hadn't returned 'providentially', as Polybius also said. An attack on Rome never was part of his plans. Assaulting Rome could only be practical with the total dissolution of the confederacy. For Hannibal, the swiftest and most economical method of taking a city was by treachery, something inconceivable in the case of Rome, as the Senatorial class was far too patriotic. Despite Roman scaremongering, there were plenty of troops for the immediate defence of the Capitol. 2 city legions had been raised at the beginning of the year, and Marcellus had a legion of marines at Teanum, as well as 1,500 men at Ostia. A considerable force was raised from the slave and criminal population, and 2 legions were to the north under one Postumius (who would shortly be ambushed and destroyed by the Boii in Cisalpine Gaul). The Romans were still dominant at sea, thus they would easily have returned many, many troops from Sardinia and Sicily to hemm in a besieging army - one which had no immediate siege machinery. Furthermore, his lively and imaginative strategy entailed mobility, and a static war, which a siege or besiegement of Rome would require (not to mention manpower he didn't possess), would hand the advantage back to them, in which their superior numbers would come into play. Rome's superiority in manpower would still come into play, but not for many years to come. Rome was protected by the Servian Wall, which had been enlarged and strengthened after the great Gallic threat in 390 B.C. In the 370s B.C., the walls were further solidified by bonded blocks of tufa from Etruria. At the time of Hannibal, the walls of Rome followed a line about 7 miles long, interrupted by flanking towers and enclosing about 1,000 acres (400 hectares ?). At its weaker points, between the Colline and Caelimontana Gates, the wall was matched evenly on both sides by a powerful fortification: on the city side, a broad landfill, the agger (?), sloped gradually up towards the top of the wall and formed a platform on which defenders could circulate and maneuver. On the countryside, a trench was dug that reached a depth of more than 30 ft. (10 meters). Now, it is quite possible he didn't know the information I just provided to the degree we now know, but he clearly wasn't coming for Rome, and probably enetertained all ideas, being the composed, sober calculator he was. Also, it would have taken Hannibal, with his exhausted army after Cannae, upwards of 2 weeks to get there - ample time for them to prepare. There was a strong risk that the fermentation of rebellion which began to seethe throughout southern Italy (and even beyond) might subside with his departure. I think Hannibal pursued the only strategy that would break Rome, that of severing her ties with her allies, who furnished her with the arms, troops, and resources that made her fomidable, even in the face of a crises like Cannae. By marching on Rome after Cannae, it would have involved a compete reversal to that very strategy. How could he gain the appeasement of the peoples of southern Italy, whose ports could provide a great rendezvous for his allies from Macedon, Sicily, and Africa, and the colonies whose loyalty to Rome was more in question, and amongst whom much defection from Rome would occur, if he suddenly marched away into the heartland of the Roman federation, largely populated by peoples who had already closed their doors to him on his march down from a year earlier? They would certainly have followed a policy of 'wait-and-see', as had happened with Roman allies after Trebbia and Trasimene. Perhaps it was Maharbal who didn't know how to use a victory. Furthermore, he didn't seem to be aiming for the destruction of Rome, as his treaty with Philip V of Macedon suggests (Polybius, Book 7.9). Many critical comments of Hannibal's strategy have included allusions that he was bound to lose in a protracted war. As Polybius tolds us, Book 3.89, "...those means in which the Romans had the advantage, confined himself to these, and regulated his conduct of the war thereby. These advantages of the Romans lay in inexhaustible supplies of provisions and men...". But part of Hannibal's visionary strategy, which many critics seem to miss, was that he planned to fight the war not in which Carthage relied on her resources and the Romans on theirs, but increasingly he would fight Rome with her resources, while depleting her reserves in manpower by detaching her allies, even if they didn't join his cause for Carthage directly. It's a mistake to assume he was banking on Italian peoples joining him in arms. After all, it was this very concept that Hannibal allegedly advised Antiochus III of Syria to undertake, as Livy tells us, Book 34.60, "...Hannibal, a fugitive from his native country, had reached the court of Antiochus, where he was treated with great distinction, the only motive for this being that the king had long been meditating a war with Rome, and no one could be more qualified to discuss the subject with him than the Carthaginian commander. He had never wavered in his opinion that the war should be conducted on Italian soil; Italy would furnish both supplies and men to a foreign foe. But, he argued, if that country remained undisturbed and Rome were free to employ the strength and resources of Italy beyond its frontiers, no monarch, no nation could meet her on equal terms..." Hannibal may have been somewhat naive as to the nature of Rome's relations with her allies, a misconception anyone could have made, but he certainly understood what gave Rome her strength, and it was that very strength he attacked. Maybe he understood all too well the nature of Rome's relations with her allies. Time perhaps was on Hannibal's side, and we shouldn't assume he was out for a 'blitzkreig-style' victory. Perhaps it was opportunism, not a need for 'blitzkreig', that resulted in such quick victories from 218 - 216 B.C. for Hannibal. Remember, the Romans came after him from Ticinus to Cannae (after Fabius'/b] policy fell out of favor). If Hannibal had learned anything from his father, he knew Rome was immensely resilient, not to mention stubbornly proud. The 1st Punic War lasted 23 years, with plenty of serious Roman setbacks. But Rome won and Carthage was drained. Maybe he was hoping his own war of attrition, with the appropriation of Rome's own resources, in which the allies Rome depended on would finally succumb from a constant devastation of fields and farms, mingled with with humbling battle losses inflicted upon their masters. Moreover, the loyalty of the Latins was not unquestionable. After all, it was a Latin, one Dasius from southern Italy who handed Clastidium (modern day Casteggio), a Latin colony, to Hannibal upon his arrival in the Po Valley in 218 B.C., and this certainly gave Hannibal's justified confidence he could drive a wedge between Rome and her alliance. Nobody could have guessed that it was likely no more Latins would join him. As Polybius says, Book 3.69, "...the town of Clastidium was betrayed to Hannibal by a native of Brundisium, to whom the Romans had entrusted it, the garrison and all the stores of grain falling into his hands. The latter he used for his present needs, but he took the men he had captured with them without doing them any hurt, wishing to make a display of leniency, so that those who were overtaken by adversity would not be terrified and give up hope of their lives being spared by him. He conferred high honors on the traitor, as he was anxious to win over those in positions of authority to the Carthaginian cause..." And Livy, Book 21.48, "...Hannibal had encamped not far from there, and in spite of his elation at his successful cavalry action he felt considerable anxiety at the shortness of supplies which, owing to his marching through hostile territory where no stores were provided, became more serious day by day. He sent a detachment to the town of Clastidium where the Romans had accumulated large quantities of corn. Whilst they were preparing to attack the place they were led to hope that it would be betrayed to them. Dasius, a Brundisian, was commandant of the garrison, and he was induced by a moderate bribe of 400 gold pieces to betray Clastidium to Hannibal. The place was the granary of the Carthaginians while they were at the Trebia. No cruelty was practiced on the garrison, as Hannibal was anxious to win a reputation for clemency at the outset..." Livy says, after Cannae, Book 22.61, "...How far that disaster surpassed previous ones is shown by one simple fact. Up to that day the loyalty of our allies had remained unshaken, now it began to waver, for no other reason, we may be certain, than that they despaired of the maintenance of our empire..." Clearly, the solidarity of the Roman federation cracked after the smashing victory at Cannae. Now, Hannibal's strategy, after they wouldn't discuss peace, was to be primarily intensely diplomatic. But more than Cannae, it was 7 years later in which Hannibal's grand strategy may have been succeeding: Livy, Book 27.9, "...There were at the time thirty colonies belonging to Rome. Twelve of these announced to the consuls through their representatives in Rome that they had no means from which to furnish either men or money. The colonies in question were Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba, Carseoli, Sora, Suessa, Cercei, Setia, Cales, Narnia and Interamna. The consuls, startled by this unprecedented step, wanted to frighten them out of such a detestable course, and thought that they would succeed better by uncompromising sternness than by adopting gentle methods. 'You colonists,' they said, 'have dared to address us, the consuls, in language which we cannot bring ourselves to repeat openly in the senate, for it is not simply a refusal of military obligations, but an open revolt against Rome'..." Not only did Hannibal render Campania unavailable to Rome, but there were hints of disaffection spreading elsewhere. Livy tells us, Book 27.21, "...In the middle of the elections considerable anxiety was created by the intelligence that Etruria had revolted. C. Calpurnius, who was acting in that province as propraetor, had written to say that the movement was started at Arretium. Marcellus, the consul elect, was hastily despatched thither to ascertain the position of affairs, and if he thought it sufficiently serious to require the presence of his army he was to transfer his operations from Apulia to Etruria...' and, regarding Etrutia, Book 27.24, "...Day by day the reports from Arretium became more serious and caused increasing anxiety to the senate. Written instructions were sent to C. Hostilius, bidding him lose no time in taking hostages from the townspeople, and C. Terentius Varro was sent with powers to receive them from him and conduct them to Rome. As soon as he arrived, Hostilius ordered one of his legions which was encamped before the city to enter it in military order, and he then disposed the men in suitable positions. This done, he summoned the senators into the forum and ordered them to give hostages for their good behaviour. They asked for forty-eight hours for consideration, but he insisted upon their producing the hostages at once, and threatened in case of refusal to seize all their children the next day. He then issued orders to the military tribunes and prefects of allies and centurions to keep a strict watch on the gates, and to allow no one to leave the city during the night. There was too much slackness and delay in carrying out these instructions; before the guards were posted at the gates seven of the principal senators with their children slipped out before it was dark. Early on the morrow, when the senators began to assemble in the forum, the absence of these men was discovered, and their property was sold. The rest of the senators offered their own children to the number of one hundred and twenty; the offer was accepted, and they were entrusted to C. Terentius to be conveyed to Rome. The report he gave to the senate made matters look still more serious. It seemed as though a rising throughout Etruria was imminent. C. Terentius was accordingly ordered to proceed to Arretium with one of the two City legions and occupy the place in force, C. Hostilius with the rest of the army was to traverse the entire province and see that no opening was afforded for revolutionary disturbances. When C. Terentius and his legion reached Arretium, he demanded the keys of the gates. The magistrates replied that they could not find them, but he was convinced that they had been deliberately carried off and not lost through carelessness, so he had fresh locks fitted on all the gates, and took especial precautions to have everything under his own control. He earnestly impressed upon Hostilius the need of vigilance, and warned him that all hope of Etruria remaining quiet depended upon his taking such precautions as to make any movement of disaffection impossible... Yes, Hannibal did ultimatley fail. But can we really think of him as a complete failure? I guess it comes down to one's impressionable nature, but in my opinion, Hannibal wasn't a complete failure at all. It took nearly 2 decades for Rome to overcome him, and although he had, at least in the first few years, an excellent war staff, he never had allies that succeeded. Alexander the Great had Antipitar, who successfully, unlike the Carthaginians in Iberia, secured the home base against the Spartans and sent the great one reinforcements when he needed them (after Gaugamela). In all, Alexander received about 47,000 reinforcements for his campaigns after Gaugamela. Hannibal received just 4,000 of the many that Carthage dispatched throughtout the war. Scipio had a secure base and indeginous allies to begin with in Iberia, never had to venture far into the Iberian and African lands, and certainly never faced the enormous reserves of manpower that opposed Hannibal. Julius Caesar, though brillaint, faced unorganized tribal levies in Gaul, and his veterans were more than a match for the bulwark of Pompey's raw recruits. Genghis Khan had Chepe and Subotai to conquer elsewhere, and Napoleon had his brilliant marshals, particularly the great Davout. How can we call him a complete failure if, after 7 years, his strategy resulted in the defection of the 2 largest cities in Italy after Rome itself, along with 40% of the Rome's allies rendered unavailable for her, and when he beat them many times in the field (don't be fooled by Livy's patriotic rhetoric when it comes to some of these clashes in 209 -208 B.C.), including smaller battles after Cannae? Please don't misunderstand me; Hannibal had plenty of trouble too, as the war dragged on. His allies became a liability the more he needed to protect them from Roman reprisals in his absence. He could never establish a 'no-go' area south of Capua, thus Rome could continually wage war amid the interior lines, and when he did attempt an assault on a city for strategic purposes, he failed. The strongholds of Nola and Neopolis (Naples) would have been paramount for his cause, and the Romans adopted a successful policy of an indirect approach against him. But it took time, and as late as 207 B.C. things could have gone against them with Hasdrubal's merging with Hannibal. Another issue which is important is the seemingly common criticism of his inability to 'siege cities'. I find this criticism, forgive me, misplaced. His siege of Saguntum, in which he had about 150,000 troops and no hostile standing armies in the lands near him, was resolute and skilled in siege tactics, not to mention replete with a variety of siege machinery. Taking Saguntum was no child's play; it lay a mile or so from the Mediterranean and commanded the entire country within its visual, and lay on a long and naked rock, some 300 ft. above the plain. It was well placed and equipped to resisit a siege and very difficult to approach. Only so many men could be put to work on the walls. The operation was not as ingenious as Tyre or Alesia, but it is simply not credible for people to allude that Hannibal could not siege a city. In my opinion, of course. It should be noted that Hannibal took the Iberian towns of Carteia, Arbocala and Salamantica, as well as Saguntum, and did capture Italian strongholds at Turin and Casilinum by storm, though without a lumbering 'siege-train'. Sieging strongholds in Italy would greatly impede his freedom of maneuver, and if he captured towns completely against their will, they would certainly not be reliable allies. Gaining allies, even loosely, could not be attained by assaulting their cities. He always attempted to appeal to the people first, as at Nola, in which the Popular Party favored his alliance with him. Marcus Marcellus' stout intervention at Nola was a supreme factor in the war for Rome's cause. Hannibal would also have had to garrison strongholds he captured by force, which he could ill afford to do, as Livy tells us, Book 26.38, "...Hannibal's principal cause of anxiety was the effect produced by the fall of Capua. It was generally felt that the Romans had shown greater determination in attacking than he had in defending the place, and this alienated many of the Italian communities from him. He could not occupy them all with garrisons unless he was prepared to weaken his army by detaching numerous small units from it; a course at that time highly inexpedient. On the other hand he did not dare to withdraw any of his garrisons and so leave the loyalty of his allies to depend upon their hopes and fears..." The last quote from Livy clearly illustrates Hannibal's need for reinforcements by a certain period, probably around 213 B.C. or so. Of the 77,000+ troops dispatched by Carthage throughout the war (not including his initial invasion), only 4,000 reached him, at Locri in 215 B.C. His defensive war became increasingly difficult without help from outside Italy. He had accomplished enough on his own for southern Italy to be a great rendezvous for the forces and fleets of Macedon, from the East, and the Carthaginian contingents throughout Sicily, Africa, and Iberia to be put forth and land here. That it could have been possible for substantial forces to reach him was demonstrated not only by the disembarkation of those 4,000 and Hannibal's successfull landing in Africa in 203 B.C., but also by Mago's arrival at and seizure of Genoa with some 14,000 troops as late as 206 B.C., coupled with the fact that supplies and troops numbering an additional 6,800 (and 7 elephants) reached him from Africa. I know - 'would have, could have, should have'. Polybius even records of a Carthaginian landing at Pisa in 217 B.C. before Trasimene: Book 3.96, "...Owing to this success the prospects of the Romans in Spain began thenceforth to look brighter. But the Carthaginians, on the news of their defeat, at once manned and dispatched seventy ships, regarding the command of the sea as necessary for all their projects. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisa in Italy, the commander believing they would meet Hannibal there, but on learning that the Romans had at once put to sea from Rome itself with a hundred and twenty quinqueremes to attack them, they sailed back again to Sardinia and thence to Carthage..." What else could Hannibal have done? Standing on the defensive in Iberia, where he certainly could have handled invading Roman forces? No, though he certainly could ahve handled Roman forces sent to Iberia initially, fighting Rome outside Italy would not have worked in the long run; Rome suffereed many disasters, on sea and land, in the 1st War, yet still won, and if Hannibal destroyed Roman expeditionary forces, more would have come. Besides, they would have simply struck at Africa. This is exactly what happened in the 2nd War, when, despite Hannibal's continued presence in southern Italy, the Romans decided not to cut their losses after the defeat of the elder Scipios in 211 B.C., but to send more forces, about 25,000 men, to Iberia between Nero and Scipio. Indeed, Hannibal did envisage attacking Roman forces upon Africa and Iberia, as he cross-posted some 30,000 Africans to Iberia and vice-versa. This was strategically prudent, as he menat to weave solidarity between Iberia and Africa in the testing times ahead. This action also lessened the chance of desertion, with soldiers not stationed in their native lands. Should he have not gone too war at all? Absolutely not; it may have taken a little while, but war was coming. The whole history of Roman diplomacy before and after Hannibal suggests that her demands would not have ceased with Hannibal laying off Saguntum. His great strike into Italy was a classic example of attack is the best defense. I think the arguments concerning Hannibal as a 'failure', despite credible points of view, amounts to saying that he shouldn't have gone to war in the first place. What if he had backed down with Saguntum? What next? Appeals to Rome from New Carthage? Gades? Utica? The outcome of acquiescing to Roman demands could have led to the abandonment of Carthage itself. In 150 B.C., Rome demanded that Carthage resettle not less than 10 miles from the sea. With the great struggle with Hannibal, Rome produced a corporate heroism of contributors - Fabius, Nero, Marcellus, and Scipio were the main commanders that achieved the greatest Roman successes. But the likes of Publius Cornelius Scipio (the Elder), Gnaeus Scipio, Marcus Silanus, Gaius Laelius, Tiberius Fonteius, Titus Manlius Torquatus, Marcus Valerius Laevinus, Quintus Naevius Crista, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (d. 213 B.C.), and Appius Claudius Pulcher, all contributed greatly for Rome to finally win in the end. In all, Rome had better commanders, and outnumbered Carthage by about 8 to 1 in total manpower reserves. She also had command of the sea. The Romans successfully played the Greeks of each other, thanks mainly to the Aetolians, were triumphant in Sicily, and thwarted the Carthaginians on the Iberian Peninsula from getting to Italy, despite the efforts of Hasdrubal Barca, and no thanks to the lack of co-opertaion of the other commanders, who failed dismally to vanquish the Romans at the Ebro in 211 B.C. when they had just 9,000 beleaguered soldiers hangin on. The Carthaginian navy failed to take advantages off Cape Pachynon, the south-east tip of Sicily, when Bomilcar actually had a superior fleet than the Romans (no mention of the corvus at this time). Hannibal has to be held accountable for something, as he engineered this great conflict, but these significant Carthaginian reverses were simply not his fault. In this titanic struggle of antiquity - a world war for its time - Carthage had but one man on her side who achieved anything significant (with the possible exception of his brother's defeat of the elder Scipios). He was one of the greatest field commanders in military history, one who indeed possessed strategic vision and fully understood that policy, not merely battle victories, will win a war. I think if we could have sat down and had a chat with Hannibal (he reputedly had a peculiar sense of humor) in 219 B.C. in Iberia, he would have agreed that his upcoming enterprise was quite a gamble. But I think he would have told us he would rather fail trying than to never gamble at all. So, I think no, Maharbal was not right. I think Hannibal was just as intelligent as his critics, and made the most viable decisions to bring Rome down. It just never was going to work. But his genius nearly pulled it off, and so stern a test was never applied again to a rising power by a weaker one (militarily speaking). Thanks, Spartan JKM

I apologize if the blue quotes I used for quoting sources was obscure in post on Zama; I have changed it. Thank you for your interest. I agree Pantagathus - Ilipa was a masterful win, and even surpasses Cannae in terms of tactical sophistication. But it was a form of defensive and deadly simplicity infantry control with which Hannibal excelled against a foe he knew was aggressive. Could Scipio have destroyed the yet uncommited African infantry by wheeling inwards with his cavalry? Where were Hasdrubal Gisgo's cavalry throughout the battle? Polybius does not tell us where they were and what they did. They must have been circumvented somehow by Scipio's brilliant maneuvers. One of Scipio's victories scarcely gets mentioned - one I find significant (not to imply any engagement is trivial). In 206 B.C. after the Battle of Ilipa, Scipio averted a dangerous situation when 8,000 of his men stationed on his lines of communication at Sucro, between New Carthage and Saguntum, mutinied; they were demoralized from long inactivity and deprived of the plunder needed to pay them etc. Scipio handled the whole thing splendidly, showing forgiveness to the men and dealing with the ringleaders accordingly. Scipio had to turn north to the Ebro where a huge incursion was brewing with the Iberian chieftains Mandonius and Indibilis. They collected a force of some 20,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, and marched south into the territory of the Edetani, who were loyal to Scipio, who could now also use this act, on a secondary benefit, of defiance by the chiefs to restore a sense of unity to his forces. Livy provides the figure for the numbers of the Iberian force, but no figures are given for Scipio's army. This force under Mandonius and Indibilis (or Andobales) endangered the Roman lines of communication with Italy through Tarraco. Scipio had never mastered the interior of Spain, which would require years of guerilla warfare, but gained allegiance without fighting from many in the northern interior. The hostile native tribes in this area, now becoming somewhat united, would have been quite a problem with their skill in guerilla tactics. It was essential that the Iberians not be allowed to protract the rebellion by guerilla tactics. Scipio brilliantly forced a pitched battle on them on level ground by driving cattle into a level space between the opposing camps, and then sent his velites in to attack them when they started to round up the cattle. he then launched his cavalry which he had concealed. Infuriated, the Iberians deployed for battle the next day. This is exactly what Scipio wanted. Polybius, The Histories Book 11.31-33: "...Scipio, calling a meeting of his troops in New Carthage itself, addressed them on the subject of the daring design of Andobales and his perfidy towards them. Dealing at length with this topic he thoroughly arouse the passions of the soldiers against that prince. Enumerating in the next place all the battles in which they had previously encountered the Spaniards and Carthaginians together under the command of the Carthaginians he told them that as they had in all cases won the day, they should not now have a shadow of apprehension lest they should be beaten by the Spaniards alone under Andobales. He had therefore not consented to call in the aid of a single Spaniard, but was going to give battle with his Romans alone, that it might be evident to all that it was not due to the help of the Spaniards that they had crushed the Carthaginians and driven them out of Spain, but that they had conquered both the Carthaginians and Celtiberians by Roman valour and their own brave effort. Having said this he exhorted them to be of one mind, and if ever they marched to a battle in a spirit of confidence, to do so now. As for victory he himself with the aid of the gods would take the proper steps to secure it. His words produced such zeal and confidence in the troops, that in appearance they grew all of them like men who had the enemy before their eyes and were about to do battle with them at that instant. After making this speech he dismissed the meeting. Next day he set out on the march. He reached the Ebro on the tenth day and crossing it took up on the fourth day after this a position in front of the enemy, leaving a valley between his own camp and theirs. On the following day he drove into this valley some of the cattle that followed the army, ordering Laelius to hold his cavalry in readiness and some of the tribunes to prepare the velites for action. Very soon, upon the Spaniards throwing themselves on the cattle, he sent some of the velites against them, and the engagement which ensued developed, as reinforcements came up from each side, into a sharp infantry skirmish round the valley. The opportunity was now an excellent one for attacking, and Laelius, who, as he had been ordered, was holding his cavalry in readiness, charged the enemy's skirmishers, cutting them off from the hillside, so that most of them scattered about the valley and were cut down by the horsemen. Upon this the barbarians were irritated and being in extreme anxiety lest it should be thought that this reverse at the outset had created general terror among them, they marched out in full force as soon as day dawned and drew up in order of battle. Scipio was ready for the emergency, but noticing that the Spaniards had the imprudence to descend en masse into the valley and to draw up not only their cavalry but their infantry on the level ground, he bided his time wishing that as many as possible of them should take up this position. He had great confidence in his own horse and still greater in his infantry, because in a pitched battle hand-to-hand they were much superior to the Spaniards both as regards their armament and as regards the quality of their men. When he thought that conditions were as he desired he opposed his velites to the enemy who were drawn up at the foot of the hill, and himself advancing from his camp with four cohorts in close order against those who had come down into the valley fell upon the enemy's infantry. Simultaneously, Gaius Laelius with the cavalry advanced along the ridges which descended from the camp to the valley and took the Spanish cavalry in the rear, keeping them confined to defending themselves from him. In the long run the enemy's infantry, thus deprived of the services of the cavalry, relying on wos support they had come down into the valley, found themselves hard pressed and in difficulties. The cavalry suffered no less; for confined as they were in a narrow space and incapacitated from action, more of them destroyed each other than were destroyed by the enemy, their own infantry pressing on their flank, the enemy's infantry on their front and his cavalry hovering round their rear. Such being the conditions of the battle nearly all those who had come down into the valley were cut to pieces, those on the hill escaping. The latter were light-armed infantry forming the third part of the whole army, and Andobales in their company succeeded in saving his life and escaping to a strong place. Having thus completely executed his task in Spain, Scipio reached Tarraco full of joy, taking home as a gift to his country a splendid triumph and a glorious victory. He was anxious not to arrive in Rome too late for the consular elections, and after regulating everything in Spain and handing over his army to Junius Silanus and Marcius he sailed to Rome with Laelius and his other friends..." Livy, The History of Rome Book 28.33: "...Ten days after leaving New Carthage he reached the Ebro, and within four days of his passage of the river he came within view of the enemy. In front of his camp there was a level stretch of ground shut in on either side by mountains. Scipio ordered some cattle taken mostly from the enemy's fields to be driven towards the hostile camp in order to rouse the savagery of the barbarians. Laelius was instructed to remain with his cavalry in concealment behind a projecting mountain spur, and when the light infantry who went to guard the cattle had drawn the enemy into a skirmish he was to charge from his hiding-place. The battle soon began, the Spaniards on catching sight of the cattle rushed out to secure them, and the skirmishers attacked them while occupied with their plunder. At first the two sides harassed one another with missiles, then they discharged light darts, which are more likely to provoke than to decide a battle, and at last they drew their swords. It would have been a steady hand-to-hand fight if the cavalry had not come up. They not only made a frontal attack, riding down all in their way, but some galloped round the foot of the mountain so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy. There was more slaughter than usually occurs in skirmishes of this kind, and the barbarians were infuriated rather than disheartened at their want of success. In order, therefore, to show that they were not defeated, they marched out to battle the next morning at daybreak. There was not room for them all in the narrow valley, described above; two divisions of their infantry and the whole of their cavalry occupied the plain and the rest of their infantry were posted on the slope of a hill. Scipio saw that the confined space would give him an advantage. Fighting on a narrow front was more adapted to Roman than to Spanish tactics, and as the enemy had brought his line into a position where he could not employ all his strength, Scipio adopted a novel stratagem. As there was no room for him to outflank the enemy with his own cavalry, and as the enemy's cavalry which was massed with the infantry would be useless where it was, he gave Laelius orders to make a detour along the hills, escaping observation as far as possible, and keep the cavalry action distinct from the infantry battle. Scipio led the whole of his infantry against the enemy with a front of four cohorts, as it was impossible to extend further. He did not lose a moment in beginning the fight, for he hoped that in the heat of battle his cavalry might execute their maneuver unnoticed. Nor were the enemy aware of their movements till they heard the sounds of battle in their rear. So two separate contests were going on through the whole length of the valley, one between the infantry and the other between the cavalry, and the narrow width of the valley prevented the two armies from assisting each other or acting in concert. The Spanish infantry, who had gone into action trusting to the support of their cavalry, were cut to pieces and the cavalry, unable to stand the attack of the Roman infantry after their own had all fallen, and taken in rear by Laelius and his cavalry, closed up and for a time stood their ground and kept up their resistance, but at last all were killed to a man. Not a single combatant out of the cavalry and infantry which fought in the valley remained alive. The third division which had been standing on the mountain side, looking on in safety instead of participating in the fight, had room and time enough to make good their retreat. Amongst them were the two chieftains, who escaped in the confusion before the entire army was surrounded..." The detailed accounts of this battle are pretty acceeding between our 2 primary sources. By brilliant tactics Scipio and Gaius Laelius, his great lieutenant, administered a severe defeat on this seditious force, and then won their friendship - at least nominal friendship. Indibilis and Mandonius, who had escaped with some light troops, threw themselves on Scipio's mercy. Scipio granted the Iberians security, and demanded no hostages. He did exact some indemnity, sufficient to supply the arrears of pay for his troops. Harshness would have alienated them, leaving festering sores. By granting easy terms, Scipio left an Iberia not embittered. He clearly saw the paramount strategic importance of the land, even long term, and an angry Peninsula would have been improbable to subdue if he were to get to the other needs in Italy and Africa. Iberia was practically now completely Roman; the empire, in essence, was veritably under way. Moreover, it was shortly after the Battle of the Ebro (if we may call it that) that Masinissa pledged his support should Scipio come to Africa. Thanks, Spartan JKM

Virgil, I disagree with you - respectfully, of course - on your disagreements with me. Firstly, I don't think Polybius can be placed on par with Thucydides, in terms of objectivity. But the great Greek historian covered a conflict between enemies who were more akin to each other than Rome and Carthage. But that's very basic. Polybius was a fine historian who wanted to establish the truth of events, but his criticism of Sosylus, the historian who actually was with Hannibal (and whose works have conspicuously 'not survived'), does not necessarily mean he was judicious and Sosylus negligible. Remember, Polybius' implication that Hannibal contravened the Ebro covenant remains a problem. This can be discussed at length if you would would care to do so. Look, we all have our opinions and gut feelings, but we must keep, at least a little, an open mind. We might expect Polybius to have been hostile to the Romans for causing him to be exiled from his own country, but he did come to work and live under the patronage of the Scipionic circle (as you stated). This indeed meant he was in a very favorable situation to understand how the Roman political and military systems worked. He could be critical of Roman actions, such as their seizure of Sardinia in the wake of Carthage's 'Mercenary War', but his absorbing interest as to why Rome came to be the dominant power in his world certainly led him to see things through Roman eyes, and I'm sure he could not be completely 'neutral' and 'objective' when writing about the Scipios etc. For example, Polybius does give Hannibal some praise concerning the Battle of Zama when he wrote in his Book 15.16, "...Hannibal had shown incomparable skill in adopting at the critical moment all such measures as were in his power and could reasonably be expected to succeed...". However, a couple of sentences later he writes, "...For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, 'A brave man meets another braver yet', as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal..." Scipio BRAVER than Hannibal? BRAVER??? Is that a fair, objective thing to state? Fabius' policy was sound, but only appreciated after the catastrophe at Cannae. It was an unpopular scheme, because the Romans were accustomed to breaking the ability of their enemies by direct action on the battlefield - aggressive action. I don't think you're correct about Minucius; he was infuriated by Fabius' policy. Yes, it seems Fabius saved him at Gerunium, where his rashness almost led to disaster in fron t of a Hannibalic trap. I find it very reasonable in the context of the time, that the people wanted revenge and the expulsion of Hannibal from Italy as soon as possible. Fabius merely shadowed Hannibal while the countryside was ravaged. Hannibal was not 'hindered' as many claim (unless I'm wrong). He provided for his men and marched where he wanted to. If Fabius' trap at the ager Falernus had worked, things would have been different, but Hannibal's classic breakout, one of history's famed ruses (with the oxen) showed why he was, well, who he was. Fabius was possibly not going to win the style of war he advocated, as the solidity of the federation would start to crack, which was Hannibal's strategic purpose. The Roman people did not vote to give Varro and Paullus a huge force to stick to the hills and wage a war of attrition. They expected Hannibal to be brought into a decisive engagement and the war to come to a close. However, the wiser minds probably appreciated Fabius from the get-go, and the weakness of a popular government is that things are understood the hard way. The army assembled for Cannae was not intended to do anything subtle; it would have been impossible to maneuver with sophisticated flexibility, even if Varro possessed the skill to do so. Varro's plan of brute force might have worked. How could he have guessed that a concave line of infantry, composed of 'barbarians', screened by skirmishers, could have been so ingeniouslt utilized? The inherent aggressiveness of Rome played into Hannibal's hands. This is the mark of agreat general, too - to know your enemy. The historiographic tradition has blamed varro, and Paullus given the accolades of a fallen hero. maybe that is just, but all Varro did was simply attempt to seek a decisive battle. I think he handled his shame quite well, evidenced by his later actions, ones of minor importance, throughout the war. The forgiveness given to him by the Roman people also illustrates how their corporate cohesion and heroism was a factor in overcoming Hannibal in the end. Just my view. Thanks, Spartan JKM

How about the Battle of Zama, a crossroads of history and a clash of titans? With Rome's triumph in the 2nd Punic War, the empire beyond Italy was under way; all the wealth of Iberia, Sicily, and the African provinces subjugated would now provide funds (and luxuries) to conquer the Hellenized East. Trade was under the control of Roman ships and goods. However, democracy would weaken and the ultra stable agricultural infrastructure was inexorably disrupted. But that's another topic. The Battle of Zama (or Naragarra or Margaron), like much of antiquity for that matter, presents ground for modern speculation. Polybius was a fine historian who wanted to establish the truth of events, but though we might expect him to have been hostile to the Romans for causing him to be exiled from his own country, he did work and live under the patronage of the Scipionic circle. This meant he was in a very favorable situation to understand how the Roman political and military systems worked. He could be critical of Roman actions, such as their seizure of Sardinia in the wake of Carthage's 'Mercenary War', but his absorbing interest as to why Rome came to be the dominant power in his world certainly led him to see things through Roman eyes. Scipio was a brilliant general, evidenced here at Zama by the fact he knew he had the better army (particularly the cavalry arm), thus by not making any major mistakes, Hannibal could not exploit anything. His countering of the elephants was masterly, but the elephant drivers were trained to kill them if they became unmanageable. Killing an out-of-control elephant with a hammer and spike was no child's play, but it did not take years for men to learn this. Only Livy writes of this Carthaginian tactic, and only with regards to Hasdrubal Barca. But that doesn't mean Hannibal didn't undertake this countering practice. It would make sense that he did. However, I disagree with anyone who claims Hannibal did anything 'stupid' at Zama. Actually, it is quite the contrary. To use the hastily-levied elephants in such numbers as a shock force was, in my opinion, the most prudent decision. Please try to remember that Hannibal certainly knew all about the strengths and liabilities of these pachyderms - certainly more than Scipio. He probably hoped they would do their stuff, but he could easily have known they would do exactly what they did do - swerve out to the flanks and disrupt things, which would aid his possible plan of deception of sacrificing his inferior cavalry to lure the better Roman/Numidian contingent away from the battlefield. He had done such things before with feigned withdrawals etc. (the ager Falernus, the Rhone, Tarentum). Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that the 45-47 year old Hannibal had lost any of his touch. I'll explain in a bit. For the most part, I feel Livy and Appian take a back seat to Polybius. We don't know exactly the relative strengths of the 2 armies, but many feel that Hannibal did not outnumber Scipio as much as the ancients claimed. Remember, ths was a frontal engagement - no flank arttacks or oblique lines etc. - and though Scipio's army was more experienced (except Hannibal's 3rd line) and of higher quality, this wasn't Alexander against the motley levies of Asia, Caesar's X or XIII Legion against the unweildy Gauls, or even Belisarius' famed bucellarii against city mobs and Vandals. There is no way Scipio would have been hanging on in the final stages of the battle if his infantry had been outnumbered significantly, such as 50,000 vs. 23,000 or so as Appian claims. Basically the armies were as follows: Scipio: approx. 34,000 infantry and 6,100 cavalry. Hannibal: approx. 40,000 infantry, 80 elephants, and 4,000 cavalry. I'll be glad to explain how I surmised tese numbers if one asks. Both great generals took risks with their movements before the battle, Scipio to avoid fighting while without Masinissa (he endangered his communications and risked a flank attack), and Hannibal to bring on the battle in an attempt to interpose between Scipio and Masinissa (he wasn't fully prepared). Fortune was with Scipio when Masinissa arrived with 10,000 (10 Roman cohorts of infantry) men before Hannibal could intercept either one them. Let's take a look at the Battle of Zama from Polybius Book 15.12-15, "...When all was ready for battle on both sides, the Numidian horse having been skirmishing with each other for some time, Hannibal ordered the drivers of the elephants to charge the enemy. When the trumpets and bugles sounded shrilly from all sides, some of the animals took fright and at once turned tail and rushed back upon the Numidians who had come up to help the Carthaginians, and Massanissa attacking simultaneously, the Carthaginian left wing was soon left exposed. The rest of the elephants falling on the Roman velites in the space between the two main armies, both inflicted and suffered much loss, until finally in their terror some of them escaped through the gaps in the Roman line with Scipio's foresight had provided, so that the Romans suffered no injury, while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight. He pressed the pursuit closely, as likewise did Massanissa. In the meanwhile both phalanxes slowly and in imposing array advanced on each other, except the troops which Hannibal had brought back from Italy, who remained in their original position. When the phalanxes were close to each other, Romans fell upon their foes, raising their war-cry and clashing their shields with their spears as is their practice, while there was a strange confusion of shouts raised by the Carthaginian mercenaries, for, as Homer says, their voice was not one, but Mixed was the murmur, and confused the sound, Their names all various, as appears from the list of them I gave above. As the whole battle was a hand-to-hand affair, the mercenaries at first prevailed by their courage and skill, wounding many of the Romans, but the latter still continued to advance, relying on their admirable order and on the superiority of their arms. The rear ranks of the Romans followed close on their comrades, cheering them on, but the Carthaginians behaved like cowards, never coming near their mercenaries nor attempting to back them up, so that finally the barbarians gave way, and thinking that they had evidently been left in the lurch by their own side, fell upon those they encountered in their retreat and began to kill them. This actually compelled many of the Carthaginians to die like men; for as they were being butchered by their own mercenaries they were obliged against their will to fight both against these and against the Romans, and as when at bay they showed frantic and extraordinary courage, they killed a considerable number both of their mercenaries and of the enemy. In this way they even threw the cohorts of the hastati into confusion, but the officers of the principes, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist, and now the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the hastati. Hannibal did not allow the survivors in their flight to mix with his own men but, ordering the foremost ranks to level their spears against them, prevented them from being received into his force. They were therefore obliged to retreat towards the wings and the open ground beyond. The space which separated the two armies still on the field was now covered with blood, slaughter, and dead bodies, and the Roman general was placed in great difficulty by this obstacle to his completing the rout of the enemy. For he saw that it would be very difficult to pass over the ground without breaking his ranks owing to the quantity of slippery corpses which were still soaked in blood and had fallen in heaps and the number of arms thrown away at haphazard. However, after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the hastati who were still pursuing the enemy, he stationed the latter in the fore part of the field of battle, opposite the enemy's centre, and making the principes and triarii close up on both wings ordered them to advance over the dead. When these troops had surmounted the obstacles and found themselves in a line with the hastati the two phalanxes closed with the greatest eagerness and ardour. As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful, the men falling where they stood out of determination, and Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, arrived providentially at the proper moment. When they fell on Hannibal's army from the rear, most of the men were cut down in their ranks, while of those who took to flight only quite a few escaped, as the cavalry were close on them and the country was level. More than fifteen hundred Romans fell, the Carthaginian loss amounting to twenty thousand killed and nearly the same number of prisoners. Such was the result of the final battle between Scipio and Hannibal, the battle which decided the war in favor of Rome..." OK. Breakdown time We have to assign the motives of Hannibal and Scipio where Polybius does not. Hannibal was weaker in cavalry and numerically stronger in infantry. Thus he would aim at a decision by his infantry (for the first time). His cavalry would have little hope of success, so he would somehow want to nullify the superior Roman/Numidian cavalry while his infantry won the day. Hannibal's use of 3 independent lines compensated to a degree for the lack of time in which to blend the varied elements into a homogenous command structure. Scipio would need to handle the elephants first. He probably learned from Regulus' failure in 255 B.C., in which the elephants were attempted to be absorbed by infantry mass from doubling the intervals. The part that somewhat worked for Regulus, though probably inadvertantly, at Tunes was by abandoning the checkerboard formation, lanes were created, which created a line of least resistence for the elephants. But he was far outmatched in cavalry that day 53 years earlier. Scipio achieved the nullification of the elephant charge by creating lanes and deafening noise from bugles and trumpets (and probably exuding screams from his troops). Now he would doubtless attempt, in some form or another, his tactics which had worked brilliantly before, with increased efficiency, at Baecula, Ilipa, and the Great Plains. Overall, Scipio would attempt to expose Hannibal's wings with his superior cavalry squadrons, hold the enemy's first line, and send out his principes and triarii to outflank Hannibal. But Hannibal adopted a Roman-style triple-line, and placed his 3rd line, his best, about 200 yards behind the 2nd. When his first 2 lines advanced, he evidently ordered his 3rd to stand fast. This could be the very first 'true reserve' in the history of warfare, and this disposition immediately thwarted Scipio from any outflanking maneuver. I think Hannibal did indeed order his cavalry units to give ground in order to draw their counterparts off the field. Adrian Goldsworthy disagrees, but the likes of H.H. Scullard, J. Kromayer, and G. Veith all think so. J.F. Lazenby thinks it is likely. However, Hannibal was taking a risk by doing so, because it still involved their defeat, and the Roman/Numidian cavalry could return before he had finished off Scipio's smaller body of infantry. But he had to do something, and I don't think if they had held their ground they would have lasted long. Scipio had superior cavalry and proved his adeptness with 'boomerang' style tactics. Hannibal was a student of war, and a master of simple and double bluff. He knew his history, particularly that of the Hellenistic kingdoms (he had Greek tutors). He knew what happened to Antigonus when his son, Demetrius Poliorcetes, went off in pursuit of Seleucus' cavalry at the great battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C. Do you think Scipio ordered his cavalry to merely ride out and ride back in the manner they did? Why didn't Scipio try a flank maneuver, as Hannibal had done at Cannae? He was certainly capable. True, cavalry was notoriously difficult to control, but let me offer Professor H.H. Scullard's credible statement from his terrific Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician pg. 150, "...Since it would take longer to convert a nominal into an actual flight than to drive a defeated enemy off the field, and since in fact the Roman cavalry only returned in the nick of time, it seems more probable that the Carthaginians deliberatley drew them away. After getting rid of the Roman cavalry, though with little hope that his own could rally against them, Hannibal would throw all his weight against Scipio's numerically inferior enemy. The elephant charge, with which he had hoped to confuse his foe, miscarried somewhat, partly through Scipio's foresight in leaving gaps in his line for the animals to run through, partly because they were always of rather doubtful quality, and here fell afoul of the Carthaginian cavalry. However, they cannot have done great harm to their own side, since their drivers had the means of killing them if they got out of hand..." I would like to add to Scullard's theory - Polybius only mentions it was Hannibal's left flank that was disrupted by scattered elephants. On the right flank he tells us that the scattered elephants, "...at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight...". How did Gaius Laelius so easily send the Carthaginian cavaly, though green but not outnumbered (assuming Masinissa's 4,000-strong was not interdispersed with the Romans), into flight? The flight seemed immediate! The answer is they were most likely ordered to give ground. B.H. Liddell Hart says on pg. 179 of his renowned Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon, "...Both Hannibal's flanks were thus stripped bare. The decisive maneuver of Cannae was repeated, but reversed..." No, Sir Basil, with all due respect, Scipio's cavalry were off the battlefield too (Hannibal's cavalry squadrons never left the battlefield at Cannae), and Hannibal's disposed 3rd line prevented any outmaneuvering from Scipio's legions. This was entirely different from Cannae with the cavalry, as Scipio did not attempt any bold maneuvers. Perhaps he took the very open terrain into account. Scipio was not in a substantial favorable position whatsoever at this point. Back to the possible intentions of the 2 generals, Hannibal prevented any outflanking by Scipio's infantry because of his disposed 3rd line being held back. If Scipio did not realize this in time and was too imbroiled in the fighting to make any changes, then his attack would be against the first 2 of Hannibal's lines, and when that was spent, Hannibal could attack with his fresh veterans, hopefully delivering a decisive blow as his cavalry was holding off Masinissa and Laelius. Alternativley, if Scipio did realize Hannibal's trap of making him fight towards the 3rd line (thus blunting his energy and weapons) in time and forced to forget about any outflanking possibility, Hannibal was in no worse position, because Scipio would rely on the traditional Roman method of 3 supporting lines whose weight would fall on Hannibal's first 2 lines, after which the weary legionnaires would have to advance against Hannibal's intact 3rd line. In my opinion, with the exception of the elephants, things were not going badly for Hannibal. His 1st line, the remnants of Mago's army, fought bravely against the hastati. However, according to Polybius, they received no support from the 2nd line, who 'acted like cowards'. It is likely that Polybius is wrong, and the 2nd line didn't support the 1st not from cowardice but because they were ordered not to at this point. Hannibal was attempting to keep his 3 lines as distinct as possible, with each line being thrown in separately. It was a sound plan, but the mercenaries of the 1st line turned against the 2nd line. If Polybius' account of the fierce struggle between the first 2 of Hannibal's lines is taken at face value, this incident may have been, as Georg Veith suggests, a stroke of fortune that saved Scipio and wrecked Hannibal's plan. By this time, if not a little sooner, Scipio certainly knew that he couldn't outflank Hannibal in face of the Carthaginian's well-disposed 3rd line. Thus he was challenged by the task of fighting a purely frontal engagement, in which Hannibal's chances were greater. Hannibal's first 2 lines, in cooperation, would have forced Scipio to use all his ranks. But they turned on each other, which Scipio prudently exploited by not commiting the bulk of his principes and none of his triarii, and then breaking off the battle to reorganize. Presumably many of the remnants, perhaps just a handful, of his first 2 lines had fled to his wings and were regrouped and implemented into the 3rd line. Again, Hannibal was hoping that as many Romans as possible became involved at this juncture with his first 2 lines, so that he could use his 3rd line to deliver a devastating blow before Scipio's cavalry returned. A couple of diificulties about Polybius' account come up. What happened after the clash between the mercenaries (1st line) and the Carthaginian militia (2nd line)? Polybius says, "...the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the hastati...", in other words, only Hannibal's veterans were left? This is not possible because if Hannibal's veterans stood alone and uncommited, he would not have needed time to reorganize, as his accepting (or permitting?) of the pause suggests. Moreover, Polybius' earlier statement is now contradicted by his later claim that, "...As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful...", which could not have been so if nearly all the first 2 lines of Hannibal's had been scattered. Oh well, call me a nitpicker Maybe Polybius meant the mercenaries alone, or simply exaggerated 'the greater part' of the Carthaginians. What is probable is that the hastati, and but a small portion of the principes, did not completely defeat Hannibal's first 2 lines, numbering some 20,000+ men. The role played by Scipio's 2nd line, the principes, is a little cloudy. If Polybius means, "...the officers of the principes, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist..., that the principes aided the hastati in the normal manner, this would mean that both lines moved forward, which would explain the recovery of the hastati and the subsequent flight of Hannibal's first 2 lines. But Polybius later tells us, "... after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the hastati who were still pursuing the enemy...". Just the hastati. Mmmmm. Maybe we can asssume Polybius meant the principes kept close to the hastati during the intial advance, then halted and the hastati went on alone. The hastati seemed to have got into a precarious position in pursuing the broken lines of Hannibal's poorer troops, which Hannibal was forcing out to the flanks of his 3rd line. They were dangerously exposed upon coming face to face with Hannibal and his veterans. Scipio had to relieve them quickly! They didn't follow the scattered mercenaries and Carthagininas because we later find them in the center when Scipio extended his entire body of infantry. They were recalled and Scipio reorganized his line. This is where Roman cohesion and discipline came into play. But Hannibal showed sound judgment by not immediately attacking the isolated hastati (perhaps a few principes); this would have entailed committing his last troops into the fight while Scipio had nearly 2 lines intact, which could now outflank him. Thus he was ready for a pause to reorganize too. The battlefield impeded both armies as it was encumbered with bodies and slippery with blood. An advance now had to be carried out carefully. Scipio now lengthened his line by bringing up his rear ranks on the flanks of the hastati, with the gaps between the maniples closed up. There was now no need for Scipio to keep any intervals between his maniples, as the final blow with Hannibal's 3rd line should be as concentrated as possible, thus no seperate engagements were necessary. Depth was now of lesser value than maximizing his missile power upon Hannibal's last line. This was superb generalship, and Scipio was clearly making allowances for his (presumably) returning cavalry. He needed to be quick because Hannibal, solidifying his deeper line of veterans and remnanats of the 1st 2 lines, would have an advantage in a prolonged infantry clash at this point. Scipio could still not outflank him. The Carthaginian horse, whose commander we do not know, and Numidians under Tychaeus seemed to be (somewhat) achieving some success at keeping the superior enemy horses away from the infantry action. Remember, if it wasn't the case, and we'll never know for sure, that Hannibal did not sacrifice his horses to lure Scipio's cavalry units away, then this was not very measured leadership on the part of Scipio, Laelius, and Masinissa. It would have been similar to Rupert's pursuit at Naseby in 1645, who chased the Parliamentarian dragoons too far, thus his return was too belated to aid the Royalists' cause against Oliver Cromwell. The infantry clash commenced, with the 2 great generals at the helm of 2 great units in a front-to-front slugfest. We can never know for sure who had the 'upper hand' here, but Hannibal's line of his veterans was deeper, so via deductive logic, Scipio would have been broken up. But if he wasn't waiting for the returning cavalry, his dispositions would have been different. He must have smiled form ear to ear when the approaching sound of hooves and rising dust of the desert were being caused by the thundering return of Gaius Laelius and Masinissa. They took Hannibal's veterans in the rear, and rolled them up. Hannibal, with a small escort of cavalry, fled to Hadrumentum. It is very ironic that many of the Cannae legions, whom Scipio levied in Sicily some 4 years earlier, were involved in one of Rome's greatest victory. Polybius does give Hannibal some praise when he wrote in his Book 15.16, "...Hannibal had shown incomparable skill in adopting at the critical moment all such measures as were in his power and could reasonably be expected to succeed...". However, a couple of sentences later he writes, "...For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, 'A brave man meets another braver yet', as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal..." Scipio 'braver' than Hannibal? Is that a fair, objective thing to state? Maybe Polybius didn't mean that by a modern interpretation. This was written 2 1/2 millenia ago, so much distortion could have filtered in down the ages. Again, Scipio displayed brilliant generalship by not trying to do too much; he merely defending his advantage, but it worked. Hannibal tried to wear him down, but he was able to engage Hannibal's veterans with about 3/5 of his infantry hitherto uncommited. But like our own civil war (I am an American), the better general did not necessarily win, in my opinion. I am bias though; I think Hannibal was a remarkable leader, and his plight against such a dour foe for nearly 2 decades, in which he received only grudging support from home, was exemplary. Thanks, Spartan JKM

Excellent work Vespasion. I share your interest in such a breathtakingly intense crossroad in history. The corporate heroism of the Republic overcame a commander who can be placed alongside any other leader in history; to his misfortune, he came from a state that was not a nation at arms. I would like to add some trivia concerning Fabius Maximus and Gaius T. Varro. As Fabius saw it, Hannibal could be overcome by wearing him down. The Carthaginian's weakness lay in the fact that he needed to plunder, and could only break the Republic by gaining the majority of Rome's allies to his side, or at least relinquish their loyalty to the federation. As long as the allies remained loyal Hannibal's operational ability would become crippled, but every time he achieved a battle victory the faith of the allies would weaken. Fabius' solution was very sound - avoid engaging Hannibal, though his army was larger (not in cavalry), but keep at a distance enough to hang on his rear and flanks, harassing him enough to limit his foraging capacity to gather food and fodder. Local populations were ordered to seef refuge in the fortresses and take with them as much they could their food and animals, and destroy what they couldn't haul with them. Fabius was certain that the longer Hannibal stayed in Italy, cut off from Iberian and Carthage, the weaker he would become. Sure, he was a nuisance, but he could never capture Rome or seduce her allies by this policy. The wisdom of Fabius would not be appreciated until after the disaster at Cannae, as it was the Roman custom to break their enemies' power by direct action on the battlefield. It was very hard to stomach watching this policy of inaction while Hannibal ravaged the countryside. This is where I believe Varro, who would go down as the ultimate scapegoat, had a point. How could Rome keep her allies, people she promised to protect in return for obedience, if she couldn't protect her own people here in the Latin locales of Samnium? Indeed, Fabius took measures to protect Rome should Hannibal march on the city. Walls and towers were strengthened, the bridges over the Tiber broken down, and citizens enrolled for defense. But Hannibal, after making no impression on the Samnite colony of Beneventum (Fabius was watching form the hills), quickened his pace and marched into Campania, specifically the rich ager Falernus plain. By threatening this area tilled by Roman citizens Hannibal figured Fabius would would have to come to battle, or witness fully how Rome could not protect her people. Campanian prisoners (the 3 knights after Trasimene, Livy 22.13.2-3) had already told Hannibal he might win over Capua, as he would a year later. But Fabius would still not be drawn into a major engagement, causing his subordiante, Minucius, and many of his troops to become restive and angry. But Fabius was willing to fall back on the factors that gave him the advantage - inexhaustible supplies of provisions and men. It was now late in the season and Hannibal needed to establish a base where his army could winter and enjoy their spoils. This was risky, as Hannibal would have to escape via 1 of the few passes in the mountains that ring around the plain. He chose to employ the same route he had used to enter,hoping Fabius would not anticipate which pass he would chose to exit from. But Fabius guessed right, who banked on, once Hannibal wintered, blocking the other passes by which he would have to leave. While Hannibal pitched camp in the Falernian plain beneath him, Fabius occupied the same pass with 4,000 soldiers, himself taking a close position on a hill in front of it (in back of Hannibal). Hannibal was seemingly trapped. He could not expect to winter in Campania, since once his army exhausted its supplies it could not stay. He had not a single fortress in his possession, and was encumbered with numerous prisoners and supplies. For all intents and purposes, Fabius had patiently locked him within this Campanian plain, shutting every door and barring every escape route. He had garrisoned Casilinum in Hannibal's rear and secured the other few paths with enough soldiers to block a quick escape before they could be reinforced. The river Volturnus prevented any retreat southwards, and the colony of Cales barred the outlet from the plain. The Carthaginian mad no move as the summer wore on. The Romans, greatly superior in numbers, watched closely from the heights. This was it! The war was over for Hannibal. Or was it? What Hannibal achieved in extricating his army was, as Adrian Goldsworthy puts it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding its way into nearly every historical narrative of the war and being used by later military manuals". Livy Book 22.16 - 22.18: ....."It now seemed as if Hannibal must be hemmed in. Capua and Samnium and all the rich land of Latium behind them were furnishing the Romans with supplies, while the Carthaginian would have to winter amongst the rocks of Formiae and the sands and marshes of Liternum and in gloomy forests. Hannibal did not fail to observe that his own tactics were being employed against him. As he could not get out through Casilinum, and would have to make for the mountains and cross the ridge of Callicula, he would be liable to be attacked by the Romans whilst he was shut up in the valleys. To guard against this he decided upon a stratagem which, deceiving the eyes of the enemy by its alarming appearance, would enable him to scale the mountains in a night march without fear of interruption. The following was the ruse which he adopted. Torch-wood gathered from all the country round, and faggots of dry brushwood were tied on the horns of the oxen which he was driving in vast numbers, both broken and unbroken to the plough, amongst the rest of the plunder from the fields. About 2000 oxen were collected for the purpose. To Hasdrubal was assigned the task of setting fire to the bundles on the horns of this herd as soon as darkness set in, then driving them up the mountains and if possible mostly above the passes which were guarded by the Romans. As soon as it was dark, the camp silently broke up; the oxen were driven some distance in front of the column. When they had reached the foot of the mountains where the roads began to narrow, the signal was given and the herds with their flaming horns were driven up the mountain side. The terrifying glare of the flames shooting from their heads and the heat which penetrated to the root of their horns made the oxen rush about as though they were mad. At this sudden scampering about, it seemed as though the woods and mountains were on fire, and all the brushwood round became alight and the incessant but useless shaking of their heads made the flames shoot out all the more, and gave the appearance of men running about in all directions. When the men who were guarding the pass saw fires moving above them high up on the mountains, they thought that their position was turned, and they hastily quitted it. Making their way up to the highest points, they took the direction where there appeared to be the fewest flames, thinking this to be the safest road. Even so, they came across stray oxen separated from the herd, and at first sight they stood still in astonishment at what seemed a preternatural sight of beings breathing fire. When it turned out to be simply a human device they were still more alarmed at what they suspected was an ambuscade, and they took to flight. Now they fell in with some of Hannibal's light infantry, but both sides shrank from a fight in the darkness and remained inactive till daylight. In the meantime Hannibal had marched the whole of his army through the pass, and after surprising and scattering some Roman troops in the pass itself, fixed his camp in the district of Allifae. Fabius watched all this confusion and excitement, but as he took it to be an ambuscade, and in any case shrank from a battle in the night, he kept his men within their lines. As soon as it was light there was a battle just under the ridge of the mountain where the Carthaginian light infantry were cut off from their main body and would easily have been crushed by the Romans, who had considerably the advantage in numbers, had not a cohort of Spaniards come up, who had been sent back by Hannibal to their assistance. These men were more accustomed to the mountains and in better training for running amongst rocks and precipices, and being both more lightly made and more lightly armed they could easily by their method of fighting baffle an enemy drawn from the lowlands, heavily armed and accustomed to stationary tactics. At last they drew off from a contest which was anything but an equal one. The Spaniards being almost untouched, the Romans having sustained a heavy loss, each retired to their respective camps. Fabius followed on Hannibal's track through the pass and encamped above Allifae in an elevated position and one of great natural strength. Hannibal retraced his steps as far as the Peligni, ravaging the country as he went, as though his intention was to march through Samnium upon Rome. Fabius continued to move along the heights, keeping between the enemy and the City, neither avoiding nor attacking him. The Carthaginian left the Peligni, and marching back into Apulia, reached Gereonium. This city had been abandoned by its inhabitants because a portion of the walls had fallen into ruin. The Dictator formed an entrenched camp near Larinum. From there he was recalled to Rome on business connected with religion. Before his departure he impressed upon the Master of the Horse, not only as commander-in-chief but as a friend giving good advice and even using entreaties, the necessity of trusting more to prudence than to luck, and following his own example rather than copying Sempronius and Flaminius. He was not to suppose that nothing had been gained now that the summer had been spent in baffling the enemy, even physicians often gained more by not disturbing their patients than by subjecting them to movement and exercises; it was no small advantage to have avoided defeat at the hands of a foe who had been so often victorious and to have obtained a breathing space after such a series of disasters. With these unheeded warnings to the Master of the Horse he started for Rome". Fabius had been outwitted and humiliated, but he alone saw the Romans could not beat Hannibal and refused to be swayed by persuasion or mockery from his decision not to fight a pitched battle. The Senate now resolved on mounting a major offensive to destroy the Carthaginian menace once and for all. Need I expound on this famous campaign in Apulia in July/August 216 B.C.? The elected consuls were Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus. They were given command of massive force of 80,000 infantry and slightly under 7,000 cavalry to face Hannibal's 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. There was now no need to continue Fabius' strategy, and such a large force could not be supplied for very long. This army was assembled for teh sole purpose of destroying Hannibal once and for all. It is true that the Roman citizen militia at this time was not composed of the highly disciplined, professional soldiers of later years. But their fighting qualities were no less than that of 'professional' mercenaries of alien armies, as they were trained from youth for war. The disasters Rome suffered at the hands of Hannibal were not due to any lack of quality of her militia, but the genius of Hannibal, the stodgy conceptions of her consuls and the rigidity of her infantry tatcics. Scipio would remedy all this later. The Romans advanced carefully in pursuit of Hannibal as they marched south down the coastal terrain, avoiding any suitable ambush positions. When they cmae to Cannae, they camped near Canusium, about 5 miles form Hannibal's position. The next day, Varro's day to command, the Romans marched out and offered battle to Hannibal. Hannibal attacked the Roman van of heavy troops with some light infantry and nearly all his cavalry, and threw Varro in to some confusion. But Varro prudently supported his line with his own cavalry, among which he interspersed with some velites and a few thousand other legionnaires. The opponents clashed until evening, with Hannibal being bested, leaving the battlefield. But being the Romans had a considerably superior force of line, this was doubtless Hannibal's ploy of whetting an inexperienced consul's appetite for battle. He had done the same thing with Sempronius at the Trebbia. The next day, Paullus did not like the flat terrain, and refused battle. Hannibal was compelled to withdraw, but sent his Numidians acroos teh Aufidus to attack the Roman foragers, cutting off as much water supply for the Romans as possible. On the morning of August 2, Varro had the red vexillum displayed outside his tent - the square Roman flag giving the signal for battle. I'm not going to give an account of Cannae, but I'll give a specific view regarding Varro: Hannibal's masterpiece at Cannae has resonated beyond its age as much as any other in history. The crescent formation. Double-envelopment. The elastically hinged wings of cavalry. Simply brilliant. Of history's great commanders, Hannibal was unique in being essentially defensive in his use of infantry. Even at defeat at Zama, the aging Hannibal, probably suffering from mental and even physical exhaustion, and no longer with a great cavalry force or adept lieutenants, skillfully used his inferior cavalry as a rearguard action to rid the cavalry squadrons of both armies of the field, giving him the advantage in a frontal infantry slogfest. This is conjectural, as the original sources state it was the scattered elephants which caused the rapid flight of Hannibal's cavalry. However, their mahouts were trained to kill them if they became a liability, so it is possible that Hannibal ordered his cavalry to give ground. Remember, it would take longer to turn a nominal into an actual flight than to drive a a defeated enemy off the field, and the Roman and Numidian (Masinissa's) cavalry returned only in the nick of time. Either way, Hannibal's horsemen would not be coming back. He then absorbed Scipio's legions toward his veteran line, which he placed in reserve, thus immediately thwarting Scipio's chances of using his tactics of pinning an enemy's center and sending his rear lines to envelop and crush that enemy. It may have been very fortunate for Scipio, who certainly generaled with great poise that day, that Hannibal's first 2 lines lacked co-operation and began fighting amongst themselves. The superior cavalry arm decided Zama (basically), and Scipio was very prudent to secure these allies before engaging Hannibal. True, luck always plays a factor in these situations. Let's get one thing very clear - Varro was no genius. But I don't think he was the fool everyone seems to make him out to be. remeber, we have the benefit of hindsight, and I doubt anyone before August 2, 216 B.C. could predict what could have happened. Every victory in history which was an illustration of superbly innovative tactics was one with the loser not being more than a moderate commander (I think). Roman writers and historians were, for the most part, either wealthy aristicrats or dependent on the aristocracy - in the case of Polybius, the Scipionic circle. My point, which is simply my humble opinion, when 2 consuls shared command, as was the case at Trebia and Cannae, the patrician was always the 'hero' and the plebeian the 'goat'. Gaius Terentius Varro was a plebeian. Praise has been showered upon Fabius Maximus for his policy of delayed inaction against Hannibal, but Varro's dispute with Fabius, which is what made him so bad in the eyes of the aristocratic writers, was very sensible; indeed, as I sated earlier, Fabius was a nuisance to Hannibal and his army, but Hannibal still marched where and when he wanted, devastaing the countryside and appropriating all the victuals and supplies for sustaining his ends. Varro's argument was how could the Romans expect to keep their federation intact, which relied on promising protection for obediance, if they couldn't protect their own people? Actually, Hannibal was indirectly enriching Fabius and his fellow aristocrats as farmers fled the land and crowded into Rome. Their farms were sold for a mere pittance, and the senators etc. were incorporating them into their already vast estates, known as latifundia, and working them with slaves. Sorry - this really isn't the point, but interesting trivia. Moreover, Fabius' style was not the Roman way. Varro did what was expected of him -be aggressive. Fabius' wisdom, though, was indeed appreciated after the lesson of Cannae. He certainly never 'outwitted' Hannibal, as many seem to feel. It was somewhat the other way around, as evidenced by the breakout at the ager Falernus. Hannibal had constantly outflanked the Romans before and even after Cannae with his cavalry, but here they had him in terrain that prohibited any outflanking maneuver. Much like Darius III at Gaugamela 115 years earlier, Varro's plan was not subtle but, on paper, quite practical. His cavalry was to be purely defensive against Hannibal's horsemen, designed to hold their ground for as long as possible as he crushed Hannibal's vastly smaller body of infantry with sheer weight (the more seasoned infantry were in the center). Both he and Paullus personally commaned the cavalry units, clearly to hold as much tenacity and spirit as possible. What took place on the wings would be of little consequence after an overwhelming victory by a massive concentration of force in the center. He had every reason to be confident; the spearheads of about 10,000 legionnaires had cut away at the Trebbia and, the 6,000 or so of the vanguard at Trasimene. They would now do so in an offensive manner and absolutely destroy Hannibal. True, he was robbing his army of flexibility, but was enforcing more rigidity. He had to bunch the legions together more than usual to create more depth. It must have seemed so simple. As I stated, Varro, a plebeian, has gone done as the ultimate scapegoat, but with such a huge army at his disposal, attempting anything complicated would have been improbable. Again, he was doing what was expected of him. Like Darius III, he went up against a man that day of battle who is to this day considered one of the greatest leaders in military history. Hannibal's cavalry at Cannae achieved shock tactics, as he placed his heavier cavalry in more numbers on one side, and the lighter Numidians on the other; the Numidians and their Roman allied counterparts fought equally against each other on Hannibal's right flank, but the force of Hasdrubal's heavy Iberian and Gallic horse, which outnumbered the Roman cavalry on this side, the Carthaginian left, by more than 2-to-1, quickly put them to flight and, employing incredible order, did not pursue too far and swung about 90 %, rode behind the Roman infantry, and before completely smashing into the allied cavalry, achieved the flight of that allied contingent, who were pursued by many of the Numidians. Hasdrubal then rode into the Romans rear, spelling doom for the poor legionnaires, who were already sucked into Hannibal's envelopment on three sides. We know what happened to poor Varro and his army that dreadful day for Rome, but he displayed admirable distinction in defeat, rallying survivors at Venusia and helping to keep order. He was relatively excused and given posts of command throughout the rest of the war. After the war, he was sent on diplomatic missions to Greece and Africa. Cannae was indeed a lesson in the art of war, as Will Durant, in his The Story of Civilization Vol. III, wrote, "It was a supreme example of generalship, never bettered in history. It ended the days of Roman reliance solely upon infantry, and set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years". But the Romans, wrote Polybius, "...were most to be feared when they stood in real danger.....Though they were now so overwhelmingly defeated, and their military reputation had been destroyed, yet, by the peculiar virtues of their constitution, and by wise counsel, they not only recovered their supremacy in Italy.....but in a few years made themselves masters of the world." Food for thought. Thanks, Spartan JKM

We are on the same page Virgil61!! I came back to edit that very issue - I far understated Pompey. Thank you for the replies -you and Tobias. Agrippa is on TIER 2. Vespasian and Corbulo are on TIER 3. Augustus was moderate enough a military commander, in my opinion. That is definitely debatable, particularly as I place Agrippa, his right-hand man, very high. I don't know Tiberius Caesar Augustus, unless by another name. Thanks, Spartan JKM

I hope this can be fun and elucidating!! I'll simply give my opinion why I chose whom I did as antiquity's greatest military commander, and we can work down from there. OK? I cut the list off at the mid 7th century. This may be too far along for the period known as antiquity, but I wanted to include a couple of greats from the A.D. 600s. It does seem the ancients were both the thinking and fighting head of their armies much more than modern commanders, whose junior officers played a more pivotal role. That may be debatable. I have added some admirals, and have done the best to my knowledge to include commanders of the Orient (a politically correct term for the timeperiod). In my opinion, Alexander the Great was the greatest military commander of the ancient age, possibly of all time. His ability to successfully adapt strategy and tactics to virtually every branch of warfare sets him apart from every other great commander. He took his army some 20,000 miles in 13 years, not once suffering a major setback, let alone a defeat. I'll be glad to expound on this. TIER 1 THE BEST COMMANDERS OF ANTIQUITY Alexander III Alexandros III Philippou Makedonon 'the Great' (Gaugamela 331 B.C.) Hannibal Hannibal Barca (Cannae 216 B.C.) Publius Cornelius Scipio Scipio Africanus Major (Ilipa 206 B.C.) Gaius Julius Caesar (Pharsalus 48 B.C.) Belisarius Flavius Belisarius (Constantinople 559 A.D.) Epaminondas (Leuctra 371 B.C.) Philip II King of Macedon (Chaeronea 338 B.C.) Khalid ibn al-Walid the Sword of Allah (Yarmuk River 636 A.D.) TIER 2 These commanders are the next level. I do not rank these; they are listed chronologically by their deaths. Tuthmosis III Thutmose III, Pharaoh of Egypt Cyrus Achaemenid King of Persia 'the Great' Shi Huang-ti Chao Cheng, Emperor of the Qin (unified China in 221 B.C.) Seleucus I Diadochi and Seleucid Founder 'Nicator' Pyrrhus King of Epirus Gaius Marius Quintus Sertorius Lucius Licinius Lucullus Ponticus Pompey Gnaeus Pompeius 'Magnus' Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa Trajan Marcus Ulpius Trajanus, Roman Emperor 'Optimus Princeps' Aurelian Lucius Domitius Aurelianus, Roman Emperor 'Restitutor Orbis' Constantine I Flavius Valerius Constantinus, Roman Emperor 'the Great' Attila the Hun 'the Scourge of God' Narses Heraclius Flavius Heraclius Augustus, Byzantine Emperor TIER 3 These commanders had some positive results in their careers. Some I have possibly underrated or overrated. BEFORE CHRIST Sargon King of Akkad 'the Great', Suppiluliumas Hittite King, Rameses II Pharaoh of Egypt, Gideon Jerub-baal, Wu Wang Chi Fa 'the Martial King', Tiglath Pileser I King of Assyria, Chou Kung Chi Tan, Ashurnasirpal II King of Assyria, Shalmaneser III King of Assyria, Tiglath-Pileser III King of Assyria, Sargon II King of Assyria, Sennacherib King of Assyria, Esarhaddon King of Assyria, Ashurbanipal King of Assyria, Ji Zhonger Duke Wen of Jin, Nabopolasser King of Babylonia, Cyaxeres King of Media, Nebuchadnezzar II King of Babylonia, Sun Tzu (Wu) Honorable Sun, Darius I King of Persia 'the Great', Artaphrenes the Elder, Miltiades, Leonidas I King of Sparta, Gelon Tyrant of Syracuse, Pausanius, Leotychides, Themistocles, Cimon, Leosthenes, Cincinnatus Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, Gaius Servilius Ahala, Sitalkes Odrysian King 'the Great', Pagondas, Brasidas, Hannibal son of Hanno, Gylippus, Alcibiades, Himilco, Lysander, Agesilaus King of Sparta, Iphicrates, Conon, Marcus Furius Camillus, Pelopidas, Dionysius Tyrant of Syracuse, Artaxerxes II King of Persia 'Mnemon', Xenophon, Marcus Valerius Corvus, Titus Manlius Torquatus Imperiosus, Timoleon, Memnon of Rhodes, Parmenio the Old General, Craterus, Antipitar, Antigonus I Cyclops, Chandragupta Maurya Mauryan Founder 'Sandracottus', Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus, Agathocles Tyrant of Syracuse, Ptolemy I Soter, Demetrius I Demetrius Poliorcetes, Lysimachus, Publius Cornelius Dolabella, Spurius Carvilius Maximus, Appius Claudius Caudex, Manius Curius Dentatus, Xanthippus, Marcus Atilius Regulus, Asoka, Adherbal, Gaius Lutatius Catalus, Hamilcar Barca Lightning, Gaius Duilius, Ming T'ien, Chou T'o, Lucius Aemilius Papus, Gaius Atilius Regulus, Lucius Caecilius Metellus, Publius Cornelius Scipio the Elder, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, Gaius Flaminius, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, Hasdrubal Barca, Gaius Claudius Nero, Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator, Mago Barca, Syphax King of the Masaesylii, Titus Manlius Torquatus, Marcus Valerius Laevinus, Marcus Livius Salinator, Attalus I King of Pergamum 'Soter', Hsiang Yu Xiang Yu, Liu Bang Kao-tse 'Gaozu', Manius Acilius Glabrio, Muttines (Mottones), Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes, Manius Acilius Glabrio, Antiochus III King of Syria 'the Great', Prusias I King of Bithynia 'Cholos', Philopoemen the Last of the Greeks, Marcus Fulvius Nobilior, Mete Han Shanyu of the Xiongnu 'Maodun', Lucius Valerius Flaccus, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, Philip V King of Macedon, Antiochus IV King of Syria 'Epiphanes', Judas Maccabaeus the Hammer, Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus, Gaius Laelius, Eumenes II King of Pergamum 'Soter', Masinissa King of the Massylii, Viriathus, Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Minor, Lucius Caecilius Metellus Dalmaticus, Wei Qing, Ho Qu-bing, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Liu Che (Wu Di) Han Emperor, Jugurtha King of Numidia, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Sulla Lucius Cornelius Sulla 'Felix', Spartacus, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, Mithridates VI (Eupator Dionysus) King of Pontus 'the Great', Ariovistus King of the Suebi 'Friend', Marcus Licinius Crassus Dives, Surena Eran Suren-Pahlev, Vercingetorix King of the Arverni, Juba I King of Numidia, Pharnaces II King of Pontus, Orodes II King of Parthia, Publius Ventidius, Titus Statilius Taurus, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, and Nero Claudius Drusus Decimus Claudius Nero. ANNO DOMINI Augustus Caesar Gaius Octavius, Germanicus Julius Caesar Nero Claudius Germanicus, Publius Sulpicius Quirinius, Cunobelinus King of the Catuvellauni, Arminius (Hermann der Cherusker) Chief of the Cherusci, Tiberius Tiberius Claudius Nero, Caratacus (Caradoc) King of the Catuvellauni, Publius Ostorius Scapula, Liu Xiu (Han-Guang Wu Di) Han Emperor, Aulus Plautius, Boudicca (Boadicea) Queen of the Iceni, Gaius Paulinus Suetonius, Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, Vespasian Titus Flavius Vespasianus, Eleazar bin Yair, Flavius Josephus Joseph ben Matthias, Decebalus Dacian King, Bar Kochba Simon bar Kochba, Marcus Aurelius, Yuan Shao Benchu, Severus Lucius Septimius Severus, Cao Cao Wei Wang 'Mengde', Zhang Liao, Chu-ko Liang Zhuge Liang, Liu Bei, Maximinus Gaius Julius Verus Maximinus 'Thrax', Ardashir I Sassanid Founder of Persia, Lu Yi Li Xun, Sun Quan, Gallienus Publius Licinius Egnatius Gallienus, Publius Septimius Odaenathus King of Palmyra, Claudius II Marcus Aurelius Claudius 'Gothicus', Shapur I Sassanid King of Persia, Marcus Cassianius Latinius Postumus Emperor of Gaul, Iberia, and Britain, Zenobia Queen of Palmyra, Shi Le Great Chieftain, Constantius II Illyricum 'Junior Emperor', Ran Min, Julian Flavius Claudius Julianus, Shapur II Sassanid King of Persia, Fritigern King of the Visigoths, Theodosius I Flavius Theodosius 'the Great', Flavius Stilicho, Alaric I King of the Visigoths, Ataulf King of the Visigoths 'Father Wolf', Wallia King of the Visigoths, Rua the Hun, Breda the Hun, Flavius Aetius, Geiseric King of the Vandals, Odoacar (Odavacer) King of the Heruli, Clovis I King of the Franks, Theodoric King of the Ostrogoths 'the Great', Arthur King Arthur (legendary), Mundus, and Totila (Baduila) King of the Ostrogoths. Thanks and enjoy, Spartan JKM

I don't completely understand the specificity of your comment Imperator Mazellius. It was clearly derogatory upon Hannibal though. The fact that he finally lost in no way militates against his genius. Hannibal attempted only once in his career at an all-out siege, on a substantial scale, of a city - Saguntum in 219 B.C., at which there no standing armies of close proximity that could have shut him in, which was the case in Italy. Saguntum does not rank with Tyre or Alesia as an example of the higher art of siegery in antiquity, but the successful taking of the Iberian stronghold clearly illustrated an understanding of what needed to be done - he set up lines of circumvallation, surrounded by numerous towers with battering rams, and assaulted the wall on which ground allowed for the best possible chance. The siege was no child's play, as the city, a mile or so from the sea (a Roman landing would not have gone unnoticed), lay on a naked rock, some 400 ft. or so above the plain. The Saguntines threw up a furiously determined and able resistence, making good use of the falarica, a kind of huge javelin smeared with tar (or pitch?) and sulphur, then launched from a catapult of some type. The tip alone of this terribly effective weapon was 3 ft. long. Silius Italicus offers an engrossing account of the falarica. After some 8 months, not much longer than it took Alexander to take Tyre in his brilliant amphibious-style siege of the island-city in 332 B.C., Saguntum fell. He probably could have taken the cities in Italy after Cannae by long sieges; he certainly could have built all the equipment needed during the winter months. Lack of timber would not have been a problem. Livy does mention vineae (mantlets) in his account of Hannibal's assault on Casilinum in 216 B.C., a huge wooden tower in the attack on Cumae in 215 B.C., and machinationes in the attack on Tareentum's citadel (which he never took) in 213 - 212 B.C. Besides, he won over plenty of communities, such as Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, Nuceria, Acerrae, Casilinum, Compsa, and others by either diplomacy, treachery, or starvation. He explained they would be autonomous from Carthaginian tribute if they broke from Rome, but who can blame them for being suspicious of Carthage's motives with a victory in the war. Remember, fellow posters, Hannibal knew full well that sieges were liable to be drawn out over months with the besieging, or sieging, army settled in, and this would curtail his freedom to maneuver. His strength lay in movement, his supreme generalship, and his superior cavalry, and his adroit marches and counter-marches throughout the years following Cannae at will were the best way to break Rome's bonds with her allies, not by taking their cities by extreme force. Remember, he was trying to gain the appeasement of peoples who had been under the hegemony of Rome for a long time beforehand. B.H. Liddell Hart wrote of Scipio's "political sagacity" of releasing Iberian prisoners after Baecula and Ilipa - but that is exactly what Hannibal was doing in Italy! The Iberian natives were much more wavering and easier to win over than the Italians under the Roman confederation. The cities he could not take he simply rode awy from when he realized they wouldn't budge. Remember, his policy depended most on diplomacy, and the fact that he always had the clear vision to realize that his ultimate victory lay in this very diplomacy, despite his dazzling military victories, is commendable that his hatred of 'inveterate' of Rome, as emphasized by Polybius, was not pathological. Moreover, if his goal was to siege cities considerably, Hannibal could not count on recieving all the heavy catapults, huge bows (ballistae), towers, battering rams, and other devices needed to attack and scale walls from Carthage because he didn't have control of the sea. He also lacked the manpower, as was not the case at Saguntum. But, again, he didn't come to Italy to siege cities; sure, if he could have successfuly taken Naples, a supremely important strategic port on the Tyrrhenian Sea some 320 miles form Carthage itself, making 'friends' with them would not be important. But, yes, in this case, lack of a siege-train and more men worked against him. The fact that he targeted naples so quickly after Cannae, and defeated their cavalry in a skirmish, showed that he fully did not underestimate the importance of seapower, as some critics suggest. He surely must have been dismayed when Rome wouldn't even discuss terms after Cannae, but the justification to his continuing of his original policy of breaking apart the Roman federation in the South (his pleas fell on deaf ears amongst the more centralized allies of Rome) was precisely that much of southern Italy began to come over to him. He would create strongholds, still defeat the Romans in battles, lay ambushes, and hold the ports of Tarentum (not the citadel), Thurii, Croton, Caulon, Metapontum, and Locri - all southern ports pointing at Carthage and Greece. I really don't view this as 'wandering'. His base at Mt. Tifata was very secure and centralized, and his alliance with Capua reflects his policy of not at all being far-fetched. After Cannae, and his alliance with Philip V of Macedon, his grand strategy entailed the encirclement and isolation of Italy, which now depended as much on his allies as his work in southern Italy beyond his own campaign. The Gallic peoples joined with him were in even more open revolt following the ambush and destruction of the lone consular army in northern Italy under Lucius Postumius within days of Cannae. Hasdrubal Barca was mobilized in Catalonia in 215 B.C. Syracuse, after the death of Rome's long time friend King Hiero, defected from the Roman alliance, and swayed towards joining Carthage's cause in this great struggle. It was not a certainty that Philip V's direct plans included landing his forces in southern Italy, but at least Hannibal and Philip V, who wanted to further his hegemony in Hellas, could divert Roman forces, thus relieving the activities of the other contemporaneously: Rome's pre-occupation with Hannibal in Italy would ameliorate his situation in Illyria, while Hannibal could count on Roman forces being diverted to Greece, particularly those of her navy, which would dissipate her naval presence surrounding Sicily and southern Italy. If a Macedonian army could have landed in southern Italy, from perhaps Apollonia, Oricum, or Lissus, all within approx. 100 miles form Italy's Adriatic coast and not garrisoned substantially by Roman forces at the time of the alliance, a mass desertion in southern Italy amongst the Greek peoples would be a near-certainty. It was plain bad luck for Hannibal that a Roman squadron intercepted the correspondence between he and Philip V, thus they assiduously and swiftly went to work in Greece, using their Aetolian allies to play the Greeks of each other, checking Philip V. Hasdrubal's linkage with Hannibal in 215 - 214 B.C. would have been probably too much pressure for Rome at the time, and Iberia would have collapsed for them with the certain changing of feeling of all the wavering and even pro-Roman tribes there. Gnaeus Scipio stopped Hasdrubal at Dertosa (Ibera) on the Ebro. This was huge for Rome! Reinforcements prepared for Hannibal went to Iberia instead becuase of this setback. It was also bad misfortune for Hannibal that Hasdrubal's dispatched messengers, who rode much the length of Italy in 207 B.C., were picked up by the Romans before they could get to him. The messengers carried Hasdrubal's written location and plans to join his brother. If Bomilcar and Hanno had not been so paltry in Sicily, in contrast to the conduct of Epicydes and Muttines, the Romans might not have won Sicily. Off Cape Pachynon (souht -eastern tip of Sicily), Bomilcar, with some 130 warships and 700 supply ships for Syracuse (hopefully), sailed away rather than face the numerically inferior fleet of Otacilius. Livy implied, "he lost his nerves". Bad blow for Hannibal and Carthage. The Cisalpine Gallic tribes presented a very strange situation during these decisive years. That they they didn't want to provoke a Roman reaction once Hannibal left their territories is understandable, especially as many joined him on his crusade south. But after their smashing defeat of Postumius, and the clear state of now Roman vulnerability, they didn't follow up their victory. Their pressure form the North would have greatly relieved Hannibal. However, all the tribes of Liguria and Iberia etc. were certainly shacky allies at best, for both sides. I realize this is hypothetical, but the defeat of Rome, after her refusal to come to the conference table after Cannae, necessitated beyond the resources of Hannibal and his Italian allies, with southern Italy positioned for a rendezvous for the forces of Carthage, Macedon, the Cisalpine Gauls, and Hasdrubal from Iberia. We cannot blame others if they didn't share his ambitious criterion, but they were on his side. To his misfortune, and with plenty of credit to Rome's resolve and sensible dispositions at opportune times, only 4,000 men ever reached him, when Bomilcar easily sailed into Locri in 215 B.C. Carthage, in all, dispatched nearly 80,000 men and 44 elephants throughout the war. More could have reached him. All hindsight and conjectural, of course. Food for thought. Thanks Spartan JKM

I'm pretty sure the extraordinarii was an elite reserve body formed from the socii (Italic allies). It comprised about 1,000 men, of which about 200 were cavalry. It also served as a body-guard to the Roman generals and formed the vanguard on the march. The extraordinarii was under the immediate commnad of the general. The finest troops of the extraordinarii were called the ablecti, and they were the immediate body-guard for the general. I think many were actually hostages, fighting for the welfare of their respective socii. Later on, Roman generals would form their own elite units called something like 'praetoria cohorts'. I'm not completely sure about this. A very good question, marcus brutus. To answer your question succinctly and directly, the cavalry arm of the extraordinarii were from Rome's Italian allies. I'm sure we can look it up somewhere, and Primus Pilus seems to know quite a bit. As we know, the cavalry arm was never a favorite of the Romans. It was a mere adjunct to the infantry, and because of the relative limited amount of horses in Italy, it was expensive, thus mostly only the nobility (the equites) were mounted. This is what Hannibal exploited so well in Italy during his epic years. The Romans were not the natural horsemen that the Macedoninas, Thessalians, Scythians, and Numidians etc. were. But the Romans were as pragmatic and determined as any martial people ever, and they improved on their cavalry in equipment and tactical order, most notably under Gaius Claudius Nero and Publius Cornelius Scipio, later Africanus, and came to rely more and more on the horsemen of their federated allies, such as the Campanians and Samnites. Masinissa and, to a lesser extent, Dacamas (if Appian was correct), and their Numidians, proved invaluble at Zama. Scipio indeed had the extraordinarii in his reserve. Thanks Spartan JKM

Appreciation all around everyone. Thank you for the comments. There is so much I would like to say - but no hurry!! I do agree with Primus Pilus; indeed, Hannibal's strategic aim that the core of Rome's federation - the peoples of Latium, Sabine, and most of Campania - would defect in masse upon his arrival was doomed from the beginning. I also agree with you Velociraptor; this misconception of his was borne from the belief that the Roman alliance system was similar to that of Carthage. However, the complex amalgam of of Latins, Italians, Samnites, and Greeks etc. by no means gave this federated system the appearance of togetherness, thus it is completely understandable why he determined it could be broken. Moreover, the Roman alliance was not without its divisions, and perhaps not as solid as it appeared. Nigel Bagnall, who wrote a judicious account titled The Punic Wars, wrote of the Italian peoples outside of the heart of the confederacy, "Hannibal's revolutionary appeal had aroused the aspirations of the people's party, aspirations which the aristocrats in Rome vigorously countered by calling upon their peers in the allied cities to unite against the subversive threat they represented." Food for thought. It appears the valuable stronghold of Nola was going to open its gates to Hannibal in 215 B.C., as the lower classes were beginning be sympathetic (or plain fear) with his cause against Rome. The stout intervention of the upper class under Marcus Marcellus repulsed Hannibal for the 1st of 3 times here. Hannibal would wind up going after bigger game at Tarentum. As they entrenched themselves more vigilantly against Hannibal, things began to fare better for the Romans. Livy would write, ".....for not to be defeated by Hannibal was a more difficult thing than it was later to defeat him". (Book XXIX.16) However, they would suffer badly twice at Heronea against him, not to mention beforehand in Lucania (Marcus Centenius), and Marcellus and his reconnaisance party were fatally ambushed in 208 B.C. Thanks, Spartan JKM

The great struggle Hannibal engineered against the Roman republic was a titanic clash in military history, and set in motion the identity of the western Mediterranean, and then beyond, into the Hellenistic kingdoms. From a certain (ie, Western) point of view, it was the first world war. Rome's ultimate victory was a defining moment in her history. In a nutshell, Rome's victory was due to the Roman citizens; they had faced a threat as never before with toughness and determination and had stood strong, as the Roman federation of alliances had held firm; while Hannibal had depended on the allies running to his side, which were the most remote Roman allies, those in the south and Siciliy. For the rest of Roman history, the character of being Roman would be distilled in the histories of this seemingly desperate war against one hated, but brilliant man. The Second Punic War turned Rome from a regional power into an international empire. ".....the Romans were most to be feared when they stood in real danger.....Though they were now so overwhelmingly defeated (regarding Cannae), and their military reputation had been destroyed, yet, by the peculiar virtues of their constitution, and by wise counsel, they not only recovered their supremacy in Italy.....but in a few years made themselves masters of the world." - Polybius It was so close, though; by 209 B.C., 40% of the socii was unable to contribute to the Roman war effort. Hannibal's strategy of breaking up the Roman confederacy was bearing fruit, and if he had received more aid from the Carthaginian suffete to apply more pressure on Rome, things might have been different. Hannibal's work from 219 - 215 B.C. was extraordinary, and when it was needed, he had hoped for detachments to reach him from Iberia and Africa, which had already been proven tenable (Bomilcar landed in Locri in 214 B.C. with 4,000 Numidians). This is not a simple topic, but the Carthaginians seemed more interested in their ventures in Iberia than sending Hannibal reinforcements, which he needed badly by around 212 B.C. The sustenance he displayed for the next 10 years was remarkable, though he failed in his ultimate aim. Hannibal and his father Hamilcar were probably correct that war with Rome was impending, as both sides were building up. Carthage would have no chance in a basic, protracted war against Rome in the 220s B.C. Hannibal had a plan. It was as brilliant as it was audacious, and I feel he always knew in his heart it would be a gamble. But he saw the feasibility of it, and he was the best judge of his own wisdom, despite what pro-Roman critics opine. I'm sure you all know the plan I mean - his incredible strike into Italy is military history's classic example of 'attack is the best form of defence'. It must have seemed insane at the time! Even if he could reach northern Italy, he could not rely on support from the dwindled Carthaginian fleet and a fortified harbor, for Rome was now mistress of the sea. An invading army would surely be crushed between the network of Roman fortresses and the firmly consolidated confederacy. If need be, Rome could field 700,000 men and some 70,000 cavalry. In all, Carthage could barely muster about 1/7 of that. Hannibal knew he was not going to win a long war of positional attrition. The Roman military system is what intrigued Hannibal, particularly the cavalry arm, which seemed to essentially to be soldiers trying to sit on horses. His horsemen were of the finest in the world at the time. This would figure very prominently in the war, from both sides. The Roman infantry, traditionally drawn up in 3 lines, relied on its weight and the strength of the group. It could advance with devastating force, or retire equally well. But it could not wheel easily and could be outflanked and surrounded by a more mobile army. This was all Hannibal's assessments, though. It had to be put to the test. Moreover, individual legionnaires, though trained and geared for war from youth, were not trained efficaciously to act seperately from the army's component parts; it must act as a whole. Perhaps Rome's greatest general ever, Publius C. Scipio, the Younger, later to be known as Africanus, would later remedy these liabilities, and implement sound strategic campaigns to defeat the Carthagininas in Iberia and Africa, culminating with the decisive defeat of Hannibal at Zama (or Margaron or Naraggara). But he did need a superior army and better positioning, something he did not ingeniously 'create', to vanquish the great Carthaginian in 202 B.C. He was already solidly placed in Africa when Hannibal, with a depleted army, arrived at Leptis Minor in 203 B.C., and too good a commander to not lose an advantage. This debtable topic can be discussed. I'll be glad to expound on it! I don't want to be too narrative, as I would like the thread to cover specific topics, but I will write a little overview on one of the greatest field commanders of all time. After his famous crossing, Hannibal descended into the Po basin with only 20,000 foot and 6,000 cavalry. But he knew from prior intelligence he could rely on some of the Gallic tribes for help, as they were recently aflame with Rome. Polybius tells us Hannibal began with 90,000 foot and 12,000 cavalry, after providing forces to strenghtem the defences of Africa and Iberia. A little more than 20,000 were relieved for logistical and security reasons. Hannibal faced some desertions and the Alpine crossing was certainly perilous, but he had no major engagements, though Polybius writes that the Catalonian subjugation was very 'severe'. But I doubt Hannibal's losses numbered as much as 55,000. He probably started with 70-80,000, still a large force for its day. We'll never know for sure. But that doesn't matter too much. Whatever the figures were and however they were composed, much can be admired for the stamina and recuperative powers of the survivors. But there was no time to rest; the campaign against Rome began immediately on the banks of the Ticinus and Trebbia Rivers. What is also significant is the measure of Hannibal's achievement in crossing the Alps; to this day it remains one of the most extraordinary and revered feats of military engineering and organization. It could not have been achieved without amazing inspired leadership. Hannibal's successful arrival in Italy was a smashing strategic success; he totally threw the Roman war-plans completely awry and wrested any initiative away from them. Despite Livy's roundabout claims, Hannibal was never defeated in Italy. He could never gain the headway required to defeat Rome, but his conduct in day-to-day operations was supreme, and his strategy to attempt a detachment of Rome's allies was the only viable one, thus any criticism he didn't 'adapt' to something new is erroneous (IMHO); it could have worked with unwavering help form his allies abroad. It never came. What happened to the Carthaginians in Iberia was beyond his control, as almost every Carthaginian reversal in the war was. He how to rapidly cut his losses and then retrieve a situation, as he did against Rufus Minucius in 217 B.C. He never allowed the enemy to pin him down for long, never squandered his men in useless engagements, and always could extricate his army intact from an inauspicious situation. He never attempted crudely to batter his way through a check or difficulty, and always kept his options open. He broke out of traps, and used varying types of harrassing tactics to whet an inexperienced enemy's appetite for battle. "Hannibal was like a boxer faced by a heavier opponent; he feinted, weaved and dodged, and kept out of range - but his punch was devastating when he saw the chance." -Professor John F. Lazenby His victory at Cannae resonates beyond its own time, and is the textbook example of tactical perfection. It illustrated to the letter how a defensive use of a convex-turned-concave infantry deployment complimented by elastically hinged wings of cavalry could destroy a huge army by the very means of its own strength. I disagree with assessments stating that the Romans were 'stupid' and Hannibal got 'lucky'. Nonsense. I'll address this readily if anyone wishes. Hannibal also excelled as a statesmen, personally bringing Carthage to a level of balanced prosperity and democracy with his brilliant reforms in the 190s B.C. He checked all the venality inthe government and relieved the citizens of the extra taxes that had been imposed on them for many previous years. The war endemnity to Rome could be paid in full 40 years early! But Rome refused, demanding a payment period. Moreover, he was not enclosed in a single culture - he was as 'internaional' as any other great of antiquity. Apart form his early childhood, he spent only a few years in Carthage itself - the very years he ushered in its greatest prosperity. He was effected from his times with Iberian societies, the Celtic world, the cultures of southern Italy, and later the cities of the Hellenized East. He apparently spoke both Latin and Greek. But his feeling and identity as who he was and where he came from never wavered, as his loyalty to his Punic homeland never did. Possibly not until Hadrian did Rome produce a man who would combine both pietas (loyalty) and a sense of the universal. That is arguable. All details of all the events etc. can come up amid the discussions. I'll be glad to address everything. Hope we can have a good discussion(s). Hannibal was a man, and no man is infallible. Any other great commander could have made the mistakes and misjudgments he did. No matter how I spin it, he did fail in the end, and must be held accountable, at least for the most part, for Carthage's defeat. Thanks, Spartan JKM