Spartan JKM

Hello everyone. Arbitrarily lain theory upcoming! You all know the outline of this famous tale... At the onset of the first decade of the 2nd century BCE, in the course of the history of the ancient Mediterranean, plenty of intrigue was still rife amid the indefatigable career of Hannibal Barca, one of ancient history's most attractive figures of action, not to mention Rome's most feared enemy ever amid any era of her vast and varied history. Following the final defeat of Hannibal and subsequent dismantling of Carthage's entire realm of power beyond the city-state herself, the great Carthaginian still displayed remarkable poise after of his near single-handed attempt to enervate the power of the Roman Federation, in a grandiose attempt to ensure the commercial prosperity of Carthage in the Mediterranean, came up short after nearly two decades of warfare fought on an unprecedented scope. The Carthaginians represented the apogee of their Phoenician forefathers - the great middlemen of the ancient Mediterranean world. We read little of Carthage from the Greco-Roman literature simply because their ways of life revolved around mass production and frugality, not elegance and artistic merit. The practice of trade may be a boring topic to cover for detailed occurrences, but it has a remained a paramount sinew to daily life. Much of what does come up in connection to the Carthaginians, moreover, is indeed quite positive. The naturalist Pliny the Elder alluded to the Carthaginians as great merchandisers, and Aristotle and Cicero, of all figures, opined that in some respects the Carthaginian constitution was superior to that of the Greeks, and that their mixed policies reflected an enduring balance (respectively). Also, Strabo attributed to Eratosthenes the acknowledgement that the Carthaginians 'carry on their government so admirably' (cf. Ge?graphik

Thanks Paratrooper; I hope that post didn't seem scattered and too rife with prolixity. I put it together from past snippets I kept in my world documents. This is utter arbitrary twaddle, I'm sorry to state. Look, I'm all for different points of view (and a healthy exchange of them to broaden our views), criterion, specific angles, subjectivity. But this is fanciful. Please do not, without some extra consideration beforehand (do as you like, really), attempt to lecture me over an element thatmya ring with I'm not grasping something, or thematically delivered along those lines. I've identified and inter-acted with serious discourse before over what I deem as subtle forensic tactics of debate quite often in the past - which had no credibility, let alone basis. The Roman commanders cautious whom Hannibal would face?? By nature or by condition, they were without doubt disposed to quite the opposite. At Cannae the consuls exercised some patient vigilance, but still fell into perhaps the most subtle trap in battlefield history. One's personality is not mutually exclusive from skill and experience amid ancient generalship, as neither the commander's personality is from the military science of the day. The term science is merely a derivative of the Latin scientia, which merely denotes knowledge, skill and application. Anything is a science when carried out in comparable fashion to military invasions planned and executed like Hannibal's. Thus Vegetius' title Epitoma Rei Militaris, in which Hannibal comes up often as an exemplar of advancing military science (logistics, training, etc.). Please forgive me everyone, but...is this a joke in some raw or esoteric manner? I am half-serious! No modern commentator - at least one of any degree of repute - has ever believed the Roman troops were flexible against Hannibal; his audacious invasion was not formed from a notion of baseless optimism. He forged a unique precision instrument, geared to wheel and move in favorable conditions against Roman infantry cohesion centered around weight. This is what Hans Delbr

Great thread! Actually, the thread in mention was begun by...none other! I think the poster, an outstanding history aficionado/moderator on twc.net named Mimirswell, slightly misunderstood - or I wasn't clear enough amid my scattered thoughts being poured out on the keyboard over this fascinating and indeed deep, deep event of enthusiastic perusal: I never meant to argue that Maharbal didn't exist. That Polybius mentions him in a substantial fashion amid the Trasimene campaign should erase any doubts of his existence; there he exercised initiative independent of the main field army. He pounced on and crushed the Roman-led cavalry force sent ahead from the east by the consul of 217 BCE Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, a seemingly capable leader who held up his duties before perishing at Cannae. I think it is very likely, however, that Livy's famed imputation to Maharbal of "Hannibal, you know how to win a victory but not use one" is romantic literary presented ben-trovato at its most affecting. It's a tidy and lifting detail which raises the stakes of the Great Event in Roman History. It arose throughout congregating peoples in day-to-day life, presumably, and from many from many opinions, probably, which permeated the social circles of Roman society - the quintessential boogeyman, Queen Dido's 'avenger', never came when he had us in dire straits! What a wimp! What a coward! Perhaps an influential feature was that Hannibal was a Carthaginian nobleman; the 'attractive Greek Pyrrhus was in a weaker position in 280 BCE as a battle victor to strongly suggest terms, yet at that backdrop (following the Battle of Heraclea) the SEnate considered accepting Cineas assembly, the envoy from the Epirote king. It took the exhorting tenacity of Appius Claudius Caecus the Blind to stamp out the extant misgivings among the body-politic in Rome. With Hannibal's war, we never even remotely get an intimation of a peace party in Rome. Was Hannibal stupid, Paratrooper, for his inaction immediately Cannae?? On the contrary, he was a master of military science, thus became one of the most instructive leaders for posterity. I feel Hannibal was smarter than all his stern critics, and his applications of circumspect moves were based on exigent circumstances. Too cautious, in a broad sense? The leader who undertook the responsibility to direct Carthage;s entire war effort in this clash of unprecedented proportions? The man who crossed over from Spain in the manner he did with his crack soldiers' whole-hearted support under privations they could not have imagined (in all, 1,272 is the total amount, on two occasions in which one was without his presence, of deserters who forsook Hannibal, at least on record: surely, many Iberians must have skipped out at the onset of the expedition when it left NE Spain, as the lines developed which separated the true army-goers under the son of Hamilcar)? I don't think so. What is often 'stupid', forgive me (IMHO), are the somewhat vilifying critics' comments which ring of 'he was a good tactician but terrible strategist.' That can reach levels of utter twaddle when not followed by at least an explanation of why the charge is so full of conviction. One could even desperately reach with a based alternate scenario that had he marched for Rome in August of 216 BCE, the culmination would have been no worse than what actually and ultimately ensued. But the events which have shaped our political and social world were not ever truly inevitable; occurrences are generally just more surprising or even seemingly eminent. But I guess that sounds arbitrary. Because Polybius didn't mention something we read elsewhere in the record does not automatically discard it's plausibility is very tenable (albeit doesn't exactly help it's credibility) - as is the verdict that because a Captain-General ultimately failed does not automatically render him a flawed strategist. Some 'excuses' are actually good ones. As the strategos of Carthage when war broke in 218 BCE, Hannibal shouldered the bearing and responsibility for practically his home government's entire war effort, in effect building a broad alliance system (yes, very loose, but still all having a common ground which was prioritized by all) ringing Italy by 214 BCE. Macedon shared a common enemy in Rome with Carthage, as did Syracuse, where the ongoing civil strife was skillfully exploited by Hannibal's picked agents to gain Carthage's alliance with the great city-state. Rome easily could have (not 'should have', mind you) been compelled to acquiesce hence we could have looked back with a viewpoint of Roman character of 'they were unrealistically obtuse' rather than the ubiquitous 'the Romans were singularly tenacious and brave' judgments. Hannibal became increasingly limited with what he could do as he remained determined in southern Italy, but he also increased the demands of his own innate leadership skills while placing a serious strain on Rome's proximate resource-bases. Twice, probably in 215 and 211 BCE, respectively, she had to ask (supplicating the second time) Egypt for grain. In 215 BCE - three years after the start of the seventeen-year struggle! Rome needing outside aid for her food-supply: however specific, however possibly superficial in the relevant Polybian and Livian works of it relaying it as so severe, this speaks volumes for the effect of a strategy based on attacking an enemy's capacity to fight back. But Hannibal still had to play the hand he was dealt, and amid the historical terrain concerning the events when tensions blew in 219-218 BCE, he was, to reiterate, caught between a rock and a hard place (no pun intended!). The unaccustomed condition of Carthaginian naval inferiority as of the end of the First Punic War, the economic limitations which befell Carthage following the Treaty of Lutatius (241 BCE), and the subsequent and horrific Truceless War (ironically, an event which did enhance the prestige of the Barcids, due to the success of Hamilcar Barca) almost certainly precluded her from building an armada in the immediate years prior to the invasion which would necessitate the transport of Hannibal's invading army onto Italian shores to actualize his aims. Moreover, the island relay points for such operations could be launched were now lost to Roman possession, thus the Romans could, contrarily, use these same invaluable conduits to undertake troop landings onto Carthage's regions of influence; even if the Carthaginians could have substantially built up their navy amid the Iberian enterprise begun by Hamilcar (the economic sinews certainly increased into the 220s BCE), Roman attention would have turned to vigilance (it already was, albeit mildly). Moreover, I feel Hannibal did not have various alternative luxuries seemingly alluded to by some of his critics regarding his elaborate plan: he couldn't arbitrarily 'leave earlier' for Italy or 'wait until next spring', etc. Rome's power needed to be inexorably reduced (at the very least), not merely defeated in a battle or two, a situation which worked in prior conflicts in Greece and the Hellenic East. His grand design could germinate only from the ruggedly landlocked Po Valley. Hannibal saw the enterprising challenge discerningly: Italy had to be attacked when Rome declared war (or compelled it for the Carthaginians to 'accept', if one prefers) - and it had to be carried out while the iron was hot, given the traditional wavering nature of the Gauls, among whom the most powerful tribes who inhabited the lands constituting a vast and fertile region, a requisite for the point of berth of the bold attempt to tear apart the fabric of Rome's military federation in the Italian Peninsula, showed enthusiastic support if he could soon arrive in the Po Valley. For Hannibal's aims, attack was the best defense in a real sense (unlike the 'we're fighting them over there so we don't need to over here' nonsense of recent events); he had to arrive in the Po Valley where enthusiastic allies awaited him, and get there before the weather would close his ability to arrive there over the mountain passes;he arrived in November, probably, near modern Turin, where the Taurini resided. In terms of weather in the alpine regions of southern Gaul and northern Italy, late fall by the calender was early winter by the conditions. However, he couldn't hastily leave too early (he wasn't really in a hurry); the eastern rivers of Iberia were dangerously in spate until the end of spring, and by arriving in northern Italy as late as possible in the late autumn, he would be able to appropriate the full harvests of the regions there. Also, he needed to prevent the Romans from getting wind of his designs too early, for obvious reasons (the element of surprise can quickly become counter-productive). A case in point regarding the harvests - right before the Battle of the Trebbia was fought, one Dasius, a Latin commander (from Brundisium, we are told, which was a Latin colony) handed over the valuable supply-depot of Clastidium to Hannibal, enabling the latter to open his first bouts of propagandized diplomacy against Rome by honoring the commander and his garrison, all presumably Latins as well (Polybius, Book 3.69.4; Livy, Book 21.48.10). Thus the loyalty of the Latin communities, hopefully for Hannibal, was not totally solid to Rome, the aspect Fabius would admonish when a proposal was set forth to allow two Latin dignitaries a place in the Senate, to fill the spots left by those who perished at Cannae. Fabius sternly opposed this, exclaiming that the Latins 'were already hesitating and wavering in their allegiance' (according to Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, Book 23.22.8). In addition, the garrison of Casilinum refused Rome's offer of citizenship following the stronghold's fall to Hannibal in the spring of 215 BCE (the Romans regained it the following campaign season), indicating a likely compromising plausibility to Rome's fabric of power (it may have been more isolated than reflective of a likely course elsewhere with other communities). But no Latin leader or community would henceforth receive Hannibal in a conciliatory manner after Dasius, but as late as 209 BCE the inner ring of the Latin community (twelve of the thirty colonies) - ie, those which Rome drew directly on for the war effort - withdrew from Rome's war effort because they were bled white from Hannibal's grinding and assiduously implemented strategy. Hannibal knew full well the greatest difficulties would be with his commissariat, and he addressed this issue with the calculating care of a diamond cutter: it was indeed the straightforward issue of food which limited Hannibal's capacity to act more freely and widely in Italy. Perhaps the initial paramount aspect of Hannibal's opening gamble, if one need be pinpointed, lay with his sagacious correspondence with the powerful Insubres and Boii of Cisalpine Gaul. Hannibal could not go by sea - not necessarily because the crude nature of shipping at the time would allow for a high rate of success in reaching Italian shores, but because no allies could be guaranteed along any of the littorals of Italy, and, probably most precluding, he had only 37 ships in commission in his Iberian flotilla in 218 BCE. Soon, it appears, Carthaginian ships were being produced, but not in Spain, not now, and there was no time for a 'project' of ship-building at this opening juncture (in terms of inhibiting mobilizations and availed funds, etc., to pay largely mercenary forces which Carthage relied upon). Hannibal probably had spies in Rome; a Carthaginian spy was indeed caught in the Capitol in late 217 BCE (Livy, Book 22.33.1). I doubt this was the only one. The more streamlined coastal route for travel was out of the question: the tough Ligurian bands could not be risked being tested, and a look at the topography reveals a precarious and narrow position along the coast of southern Gaul and northern Italy (see how he would have been trapped in Roman territory, separated from the Po Valley by mountains?). However, the Ligurians are stated as part of Carthage's allies in Hannibal's covenant with Philip V of Macedon (Polybius, The Histories, Book 7.9). But that was four years later, when a possible tipping point seemed to favor Hannibal's cause for a while. In 218 BCE, the fertile Po Valley had to serve as the launch-pad for the grand design, and it had to be effectuated in full swing before the weather blocked any army's arrival into the western regions of the Po Valley. Hannibal certainly weighed his options and chose his course, with an auspicious outlook, following intelligence (modern language, but elucidating nonetheless) procured from his surveyors and diplomatic messengers sent to northern Italy earlier ('the messengers arrived and reported that the Celts consented and awaited him, at the same time saying that the crossing of the Alps was very toilsome and difficult, but by no means impossible', Polybius tells us in Book 3.34.6), outweighing any of the potentially serious liabilities. Assuming the Renaissance MSS didn't construct horrendously inadequate translations of the original wording of The Histories, Polybius does specifically write at a certain point in describing Hannibal's preparations in Spain: in charging his younger brother Hasdrubal with the duties of how to manage the footing in Spain, he also bade him to prepare to resist the Romans if he himself happened to be absent. I do not find these words, although but a few, 'ambiguous'. The invasion of Italy was not plan in the works going back years whatsoever; it certainly was conceived should war with Rome occur as it did, but the 'wrath of the House of Barca' is a Roman tradition placed, among other natural reasons, to obscure the Romans' unjust (legally, even in the ancient context) acts over Sardinia and again in Spain two decades later (I hope nobody seriously thinks that Carthage was planning to utilize a retaken Sardinia in 238/237 BCE to actually strike at Italy, and/or that Saguntum lay north of the Ebro, or that the Iber we read in the ancient literature is really another river which would lend justification to certian Roman claims over war-guilt, such as the Jucar). He came very close... The wisdom of the great Theodor Mommsen explicates for us, R

You might be thinking of the disaster that befell a Roman army in the winter of 216/215 B.C., Lost Warrior. If Rome was ever going to lose in the Punic Wars, it was in the critical years from Cannae to Hasdrubal's defeat on the Metaurus, more so in the earlier stages. The political situation Hannibal was attemting to molest was working slowly, and Rome even had to lower the wealth-qualification by perhaps 60% for service in the army - an indication that her manpower was indeed being lessened. But even if this is accurate (see Peter Brunt's Italian Manpower 225 B.C. - A.D 14, Pgs 66-75), Rome may not have been as strained as Livy implies, whose genius was literary, not critical. But it could have been. The one event that may have altered the outcome occured in late 216 B.C. When the Roman army of Cannae was assembled, one Lucius Postumius Albinus was sent north with a legion to divert the Gauls away from Hannibal's army. It came to nothing for that purpose, but the size of Postumius' army had reached that of a standard consular army, a paper-strength of 25,000 or so men. Postumius was elected consul for 215 B.C., but sometime in the winter of 216 B.C., perhaps November (a guess), he and his force were thoroughly ambushed and cut down almost to the man by the Boii, in what Livy calls the Litana Forest, probably near modern Modena in northern Italy, just south of the Po. Livy says '10 men' escaped, an illustration of the magnitude of the disaster, despite a certain overstatement (maybe it was 15 who escaped!). It was an impressive military display by these Gauls: they had cut trees to a point so they still stood, but could be toppled upon the road with a little force. When the Romans entered the path through this wooded area, the Gauls indeed pushed the trees upon the marching column, and had surrounded the perimeter, cutting down the Romans who were trying to escape in the limited escape-routes. This disaster, at least as proportionately bad as Trasimene or the Teutoburger Wald, was serious because, at this juncture, Rome had no standing army to immediately replace it. In the Senate, for the only time in the war, they had to acknowledge, following Livy, that a theater had to be shelved; the Gallic war was forced upon them to be left in abeyance - and not because they had options. Hannibal was supreme in the south, though Rome itself could certainly not be taken by assault. Livy tells us of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus' speech, Book 23.25, "..."We," he said, "who were not crushed by the overthrow at Cannae must not lose heart at smaller calamities. If we are successful, as I trust we shall be, in our operations against Hannibal and the Carthaginians, we can safely leave the war with the Gauls out of account for the present; the gods and the Roman people will have it in their power to avenge that act of treachery. It is with regard to the Carthaginians and the armies with which the war is to be carried on that we have now to deliberate and decide..." 'The gods will have it in their power'? If the Gauls, Hannibal's 'looser' allies, had swooped down from their close proximity in the regions around Rome, she would have been in deeper trouble than any time during the actual events of the war. They did it in 390 B.C. - with an open road to Rome, and would revolt again in 200 B.C. This is what makes this so peculiarly fascinating. We cannot blame the Gauls for carrying a grudge with Hannibal; they had beared the brunt of his victories, and were more interested in forage and loot. But the diversionary attempt by the Senate to deplete Hannibal of his Gauls in the south didn't even work slightly. But the Gauls in the north, surely galvanized by their crushing destruction of a Roman army, with no other one coming, did nothing; they didn't even attack the primary colonies of Placentia and Cremona. A Roman army, under one Marcus Pomponius Matho, would not arrive in Gallic territory for more than two years. The inactivity of the Gauls at this point not only enabled the Romans to concentrate fully against Hannibal in the south, where they would slowly and inexorably gain operational superiority, but Etruria and Umbria, showing signs of revolt in the years to come, were given no reason to do so now, as they could conform to Rome's war effort with no interference. People don't realize (not that they should) how close Hannibal came to breaking the federation - with his political strategy. He was a lot smarter than many of his critics, including perhaps even B.H. Liddell Hart and Bernard Montgomery. Comparing Polybius' enumerations for Roman potential manpower reserves and Livy's list of defections after Cannae, we can conclude that Hannibal broke the federation by about 40% (though all the least firmly attached protectorates) by 212 B.C. The majority of Campanians, whom were calssified as citizens, were also unavailable. Again, 40% of the Latin community was bled white, and there were hints of disaffection had been growing in Etruria and Umbria since 212 B.C. Livy even tells us that, after the victory at the Metaurus, enquiries were made as to which cantons in Etruria had intended to desert to Hasdrubal as soon as he appeared, and also which of them had assisted him with supplies, or men, or in any other way (Book 28.10). I realize we must be careful with Livy: his writing is beautiful, but not Thucydidean. But still, he didn't pull his information out of the air, and he wasn't writing fiction. Hannibal, directing the entire Carthaginian war effort almost soley by himself, came darn close! Rome won, for all in all, because of the sound decisions of the Senate, and the utilization of her tremendous manpower reserves - more importantly, where and when to exercise that manpower. But despite the amazing spirit of the Romans and those loyal to her, without the resources she would have perished. Hannibal tapped into this considerably, even if it meant that he didn't make use of those resources for himself. I have mentioned before about the 12 Latin colonies who would no longer, perhaps because they didn't have the capacity to do so, supply Rome with men and money; the Roman disaster at Herdonea (210 B.C.), at the hands of Hannibal's wily genius, probably had an affect on the 12 colonies - the closest of the Latin colonies surrounding Rome. Remember, the Latin colonies were the largest and most important colonies, strategically placed ringing Rome. But that's not all: including the recalcitrant 12 colonies, Livy also tells us of the critical situation, in 209 B.C., for Rome regarding her federation, "The deportation of the soldiers to Sicily, most of whom belonged to the Latin and the allied nationalities, very nearly caused a great rising; so often do small occasions involve serious consequences. Meetings were held amongst the Latins and the allied communities in which they complained loudly that for ten years they had been drained by levies and war-taxes; every year they fought only to sustain a great defeat, those who were not killed in battle were carried off by sickness. A fellow-citizen who was enlisted by the Romans was more lost to them than one who had been made prisoner by the Carthaginians, for the latter was sent back to his home without ransom, the former was sent out of Italy into what was really exile rather than military service. There the men who had fought at Cannae had been for eight years wearing out their lives, and there they would die before the enemy, who had never been stronger than he was today, quitted Italian soil. If the old soldiers were not to return, and fresh ones were always being enlisted, there would soon be nobody left. They would be compelled therefore, before they reached the last stage of depopulation and famine, to refuse to Rome what the necessities of their situation would very soon make it impossible to grant. If the Romans saw that this was the unanimous determination of their allies, they would assuredly begin to think about making peace with Carthage. Otherwise Italy would never be free from war as long as Hannibal was alive. Such was the general tone of the meetings. There were at the time thirty (Latin) colonies belonging to Rome. Twelve of these announced to the consuls through their representatives in Rome that they had no means from which to furnish either men or money. The colonies in question were Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba, Carseoli, Sora, Suessa, Cercei, Setia, Cales, Narnia and Interamna. The consuls, startled by this unprecedented step, wanted to frighten them out of such a detestable course, and thought that they would succeed better by uncompromising sternness than by adopting gentle methods. "You colonists," they said, "have dared to address us, the consuls, in language which we cannot bring ourselves to repeat openly in the senate, for it is not simply a refusal of military obligations, but an open revolt against Rome. You must go back to your respective colonies at once, while your treason is still confined to words, and consult your people. You are not Capuans or Tarentines, but Romans, from Rome you sprang, from Rome you have been planted in colonies on land taken from the enemy, in order that you may augment her dominion. Whatever duties children owe to their parents, you owe to Rome, if indeed you feel a spark of affection for her or cherish any memories of your mother country. So you must begin your deliberations afresh, for what you are now so recklessly contemplating means the betrayal of the sovereignty of Rome and the surrender of victory into the hands of Hannibal." Such were the arguments which each of the consuls advanced at considerable length, but they produced no impression. The envoys said that there was no reply for them to take home, nor was there any other policy for their senate to consider since there was not a man left for conscription nor any money for his pay. As the consuls saw that their determination was unshaken they brought the matter before the Senate. Here such general consternation and alarm were felt that most of the senators declared that the empire was doomed, other colonies would take the same course, as would also the allies; all had agreed together to betray the City of Rome to Hannibal." The fact that some senators thought this was the case reveals how serious the situation had become. But cooler heads prevailed, and the Senate was reassured by the consuls, Fabius and Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, that the other 18 Latin colonies would remain loyal - Signia, Norba, Saticula, Fregellae, Luceria, Venusia, Brundisium, Hadria, Firmum, and Ariminum; the Tyrrhenian ports of Pontia, Paestum, and Cosa; and the inland colonies of Beneventum, Aesernia, Spoletium, Placentia, and Cremona. A simple glance of a map of Roman Italy at the time shows us that the 12 colonies who could no longer furnish Rome were, for the most part, in closer proximity to Rome. Thus they beared the brunt of the strain of the war against Hannibal, and, as Excelsior told us earlier, their soldiers probably were composed of the men who fell at the recent few disasters at Hannibal's battles. If this is true, Hannibal's strategy of destroying Roman armies to detach the allies certainly showed signs of viability. But no major battle in history has been more tactically devastating then Cannae (Subotai's destruction of the Hungarians, at Mohi in 1241. comes to mind), and his great victory cemented, not detached, Rome's core allies. But this all gets even more interesting: in 200 B.C., a major uprising broke out, in which all the tribes, stirred up by the Cenomani, Insubres and the Boii, sacked and burned Placentia, and then proceeded towards Cremona. They were led by a Carthaginian named Hamilcar, who had stayed in northern Italy; he is believed to have been an officer of the army of either Hasdrubal or Mago, the invaders from the previous decade. Anyway, Roman forces, though dealing now with Macedon, where readily available to deal with this threat; Livy tells us some 40,000 Gauls were under Hamilcar. The threat was ultimately dealt with by a praetor - one Lucius Furius, under, of course, decisions made by the Senate. Livy tells this tense event, Book 31.10-11, and 31.48-49. Hannibal, in retirement at this time, must have been very disappointed, assuming he heard of this; why didn't they rise in late 216 B.C. Simultaneous serious threats from north and south might have doomed Rome in this critical time; operations in Spain would be forsaken, and things might have been different. Carthage could not have defeated Rome, but Rome might have been defeated by circumstances at the right ime favoring Hannibal. Much depended on the peoples of Italy, Sicily, and Spain - on whom, between Rome and Carthage, it was in their better interests to join. The Gallic threat following Postumius' destruction might have affected things greatly in Carthage's favor. Maybe he should have assigned an officer to the north to effectuate a resistence against the north, as he did in sending Muttines to Sicily in 212 B.C. Clearly, as events would show 16 years later, the Gauls coud be stirred up under a Carthaginian officer - and even when Rome had forces in the area to resist them; this wasn;t teh case in late 216 B.C. We have to wonder the degree of Hannibal's understanding of the Roman federation. In a letter to the people of Larissa, Thessaly, Philip V explained the nature of Rome's ability to absorb people into her realm. If Philip V understood this, why would Hannibal not have? There was no universal feeling of 'us' and 'them' amongst the peoples under Rome's domain; what had Latins in Spoletium have in common with Greeks in Apulia and Calabria? Even though Rome overcame the Gallic threat of 390 B.C. and Pyrrhus' invasion, they were nothing to what Hannibal threw at them. Unfortunately for him, the allies who did join him proved to be of little help in the field, and his strategy ultimately didn't work. Carthage's continued commercial dominance in the western Mediterranean was not to be; but she still prospered due in large part to Hannibal's later statesmanship. The Roman body-politic was just too strong, but a severe test had to be applied for us to realize this fully. History is full of twists that have shaped our world. Regarding the Battle of the Trebbia, I don't think we can call it an 'ambush'. A small but decisive part of it was. It was a major pitched battle involving more than 80,000 men. Yes, Hannibal effected a trap, as he had concealed with Mago 2,000 men in a water-course he found, one with with steep banks; after the battle began, this unti of infantry and cavalry attacked the Roman rear with precise timing, as Hannibal was destroying their flanks. This was an example of simple-bluff on the part of Hannibal. The Roman might have suspected the ambush from Mago if the terrain was more featured with wooded and hilly terrain, but none of them expected what happened (see Polybius Book 3.71). Remember, hindsight is 20/20. The massive ambush at Trasimene, which nobody has yet mentioned (did I miss it?), was a display of what we may call double-bluff on the part of Hannibal. This area was 'born for an ambush', as Livy remarks (Book 22.4), but Gaius Flaminius, not an inexperienced commander, may have thought this was too obvious, and Hannibal was whetting his appettite to fight with his scorching of the lands nearby. In any case, what commander in charge of some 25,000 men expects to be ambushed? Ambushes etc. hitherto had never occured on such an unprecedented scale; imagine the control Hannibal must have needed to exercise over his motley army, now swelled to perhaps over 40,000 men, to not reveal their position while an entire army marched yards away from them. It's just food for thought, though. I hope I didn't ramble too much off topic. Thanks, Spartan JKM

Hello Gladius. Great observation, and thank you for taking a look. You are absolutely correct: many of the leaders on TIER 3 were even slightly less than mediocre (Archelaus, Crassus etc.). If one had even a slight 'success', I decided, within my knowledge and research, to add them. You may have touched on one that possibly didn't even really qualify as a commander in war. He aided Vespasian with negotiations, but it seems, if we follow his works (yes, his veracity has been often questioned), he was instrumental in joining the Zealots and Sicarians, when they annihilated the Roman garrison at Jerusalem in c. 64 A.D. Militarily, it was perhaps one John of Gischala who was more the commander in Galilee. I just don't know enough to be conclusive. Perhaps someone else does. Indeed, the likes of Heraclius and Khalid ibn Al-Walid would rank at the top, if the list went further in chronology. Thanks, James

Hello everyone. This list is revised from an early one I put together. There really is no such thing as 'the greatest general'; it's like asking who's the best actor or what is the best doughnut. But if following this veritable rule, we couldn't have fun with these 'lists', which are always subjective. I had a lot of fun, my primary aim, in compiling my own 'top military leaders of antiquity' list. I would like to stress that I am merely an amateur, and my knowledge of military history is much more thorough with the West, so I apologize in advance if anyone feels I am too western-centric in my rankings, and/or if certain greats from the East are understated. I have done my best to mention Chinese and other Asiatic commanders, and many should add to the list etc., as well as suggest changes of all sorts to this piece of work. War is not something to be happy about, but it is a powerful reality of history. Thus, my fascination with the subject is indeed a morbid one. Messiahs, diplomats, intellectuals, and philosophers have contributed to the twists and turns of history every bit as much as military leaders, but they have flourished only when protected by those very military leaders who could ensure the survival of their way of life. For the most part, the most significant and affecting leaders in world history have come not from the church, the governments, or the scholastic centers, but from the ranks of soldiers and sailors. Of course, no man knows the extent of his long-term impact upon history until long after his death. Moreover, a vast list could be piecemealed under specifics: strategic, tactical, operational, revolutionary, naval etc. How much credit do monarchs, who weren't actually at the battlefield, and subalterns merit in certain campaigns? Obviously, we have to scrutinize each individual's work. But I think I will bunch it together; the circumstances of war may never be repeated, but the essence of major tactics and strategy have not changed. It is the methods of their applications, primarily due to the changes in technology, that have altered. Thus we can indeed compare the ancient commanders with the modern ones (IMHO), at least from this point of view. It must be understood, however, that modern commanders did not directly lead into action (modern meaning since, let's say, the time of Napoleon, and I mean this very broadly); they directed affairs from far away, and direct leadership was delegated to not just senior officers, but the junior ones. I will add that ones with autocratic power, such as Alexander, answered to no government, which certainly facilitated his situation for conquest, in terms of decision-making. What if the Barcid Clan had been the absolute rulers of Carthage? They would have merely ordered the preponderance of supplies and troops to be sent to Hannibal in southern Italy (rather than Spain), something that proved could be effectuated, if not in huge landings, after his devastating victory at Cannae. The pressure might have been too much for even the indomitable Romans; no general has ever been so brilliant, against an enemy he figured would quail after devastating them so convincingly, as Hannibal - a flawed valuation any good commander could have made. It's hard to choose between him and Alexander. Hannibal simply attacked a state with a stronger political union. So, what makes a great general? Many things, of course, and no man is infallible. Adaptation? Improvisation? Panache? Implementing sound policy (a morale objective) etc.? Magnanimity in winning over allies? Non-hesitation? Flexibility? Decisiveness? Exerting discipline and iron will into his troops? A balance of skillful execution of strategy and tactics? When not to be too rash and hectoring amid policy-making? A political understanding to support one's war? Luck? Advancing one's state's cause for many generations to come? All great ideas are simple (at least to a genius). Perhaps the biggest, if one is most paramount, attribute to a great battlefield commander is his ability to identify a 'simple' solution to victory before his opponent in battle. Logistically, exploiting the terrain and weather is invaluable. The greats had them all. B.H. Liddell Hart, the renowned theorist (among many things he was), says the most important quality is to strike at an opponents' Achilles Heel. But one must find that weak point, and a good commander will conceal his weak point the best he can. For the most part, the great generals possessed the vision to identify the obvious and most viable situation to achieve victory more than his opponent. With all things considered, such as the the tactical brilliance of Epaminondas, Hannibal, and Narses, the acute understanding of building a brilliant instrument of war possessed by Philip II of macedon, the scope and diversity of Julius Caesar's genius, I consider Alexander the Great to be the towering military figure of the ancient world (my cut off point is the year 600 A.D., to include a couple of greats) - from a specific and broad criterion. His ability to successfully adapt strategy and tactics to virtually every branch of warfare sets him apart from every other great commander, perhaps in all of history. He took his army some 20,000 miles in 13 years, not once suffering a major setback, let alone a defeat. His opponent always chose the battlefield and ususally heavily outnumbered him. For what it merits, no other has successfully 'linked' the East and West, thus he was an immense cultural reformer, which is what he wanted to do. He indeed commanded an army much superior than what he faced, but he was outnumbered considerably, and his battle dispositions at his great victory at Gaugamela were perfectly planned to accord with what Napoleon described as 'a well reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive followed by rapid and audacious attack'. Besides, the advantage of a superior force is merely potential. It is the commander that must effectively utilize what he/she has and lead it to victory. In this regard, Alexander shined as well as any other in military history (IMHO, of course). The military machine left to Alexander from his father Philip II was the world's first standing army and raised by the world's first universal military service - a scientifically balanced machine in which the phalanx became the tactical base of cavalry action. But Philip II's son took his machine and succeeded, perhaps, beyond Philip's wildest dreams. A brilliantly constructed army is just potential; it is the commander that must lead it to victory, and advantages in troop quality and technology only produce advantages if used effectively. Alexander innovated the efficacy of combined arms to a much further degree than his great father did, and he introduced the use of reserves on the battlefield that could take advantage of any unforeseen opportunities or reverses against the front lines. He also was the first great commander to use catapults tactically on the battlefield on a substantial level (it may have actually been Onomarchus, the Phocian leader, who first used battlefield catapults against Alexander's father). In the Balkans, Alexander lined the machines hub-to-hub along the bank of the Apsus River to cover the crossing of his withdrawing troops against the attacks upon him by the Illyrian tribes under Cleitus and Glaucius. Contrarily, six years later in 329 B.C. on the other side of the 'world', he effectively used catapults to drive the Scythians from the riverbank of the Jaxartes as he conducted an amphibious assault against them, and then created a sophisticated situation by which their steppe-style tactics were neutralized. Alexander's siege of Tyre was an incredible display of military engineering, including an amphibious assault upon an island-city via a constructed causeway. There has perhaps been no greater practitioner of a great system than Alexander. Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, Chinggis Khan, Subotai, Marlborough, and Napoleon were certainly comparable in thier great works throughout history; Hannibal and Scipio made fine use of offensive reserves in their great victories at Cannae and the Great Plains, and the first 'true' reserve ever deployed may have been Hannibal's retention of his third line at the Battle of Zama. Two great generals squared off that day, with both neutralizing what the other tried to do (Scipio handled the elephant charge but Hannibal thwarted Scipio from using his novel tactics with his infantry; the superior army simply won that day). Though Alexander's empire did not endure as Rome's did, nor was as vast as that of the Mongols, his legacy probably outlasts any other military figure, other than the great Prophet Mohammed, and possibly Constantine I (Augustus can probably not be considered a military commander). Alexander's work was one of near cosmogony. He was a genius. He was a madman. He was a visionary. He was a mass-murderer. He was a liberator. He was intoxicated with power. He was chivalrous when not opposed. Was really he all of these? Was he really any of these? Militarily, he could smash his enemy. Diplomatically, he could win over numerous peoples with his panache. But he was not singular in possessing these attributes; no man is infallible, and his story indeed reveals the darker side of human nature to the fullest; power is a dangerous asset if not handled judiciously. If used as an end rather than a means to accomplish something, it will destroy those who are seeking those ends. But the fact we speak of him today in a manner of attraction and fascination means he got his wish - he will live forever. "If anyone has the right to be judged by the standards of his time, and not by the standards of our time, it is Alexander". -Hermann Bengtson This is the list of whom I think were the ten greatest commanders, from Sargon to Narses. I decided to integrate naval leaders into the third TIER; Themistocles could be raqnked # 1 as the Classical World's greatest leader at sea. I decided to present an assessment of only Alexander, and why I think he would be ranked # 1, if one must be chosen. I will gladly discuss the other greats (and not so greats) amid possible discussions. These I rank in the first TIER; ranking is a sterile pursuit, if trying to be conclusive; there really is not such thing as 'the greatest general of all time'; it's like proclaiming which is the greatest doughnut. But I think it's just fun to present an opinion of who is 'the best', which is conducive to forming a base to trigger entertaining debates. I guess my point is - this all trivial fun. TIER 1 This is my 'top 10' list. Alexander III (Alexandros III Philippou Makedonon) King of Macedon 'the Great' (Gaugamela, 331 B.C.) Hannibal (Hannibal Barca) (Cannae, 216 B.C.) Publius Cornelius Scipio Scipio Africanus Major (Ilipa, 206 B.C.) Gaius Julius Caesar (Pharsalus, 48 B.C.) Belisarius (Flavius Belisarius) (Dara, 530 A.D.) Epaminondas (Leuctra, 371 B.C.) Philip II King of Macedon (Chaeronea, 338 B.C.) Narses (Narseus) (Busta Gallorum, 552 A.D.) Gaius Marius (Aquae Sextiae, 102 B.C.) Han Xin (Jingxing, 205 B.C) TIER 2 These commanders are the next level. I do not rank these; they are listed chronologically by their deaths. If leaders are not specified as being a monarch or 'something significant', then they were generals. I realize this is all very debatable, and many could be replaced by others etc. It's difficult to judge whose accomplishments were more important than those of others, and/or why a leaders can be placed above another. Much has do to do with issues not indicative of an individual's ability. Sargon King of Akkad 'the Great' Tuthmosis (Thutmose) III Pharaoh of Egypt Cyrus Achaemenid King of Persia 'the Great' Iphicrates Seleucus I Diadochi and Seleucid Founder 'Nicator' Pyrrhus King of Epirus Hamilcar Barca Lightning Philopoemen the Last of the Greeks Sulla (Lucius Cornelius Sulla) Felix Quintus Sertorius Lucius Licinius Lucullus Ponticus Pompey (Gnaeus Pompeius) Magnus Surena (Eran Spahbodh Rustaham Suren-Pahlav) Publius Ventidius Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa Nero Claudius Drusus (Decimus Claudius Drusus) Germanicus Julius Caesar Germanicus (Nero Claudius Germanicus) Tiberius (Tiberius Claudius Nero) Roman Emperor Trajan (Marcus Ulpius Trajanus) Roman Emperor 'Optimus Princeps' Cao Cao (Cao Mengde) Emperor of the Later (Eastern) Han Dynasty and King of Wei Zhuge Liang (Chu-ko Liang) Founder of the Shu Kingdom 'the Hidden Dragon' Aurelian (Lucius Domitius Aurelianus) Roman Emperor 'Restitutor Orbis' Shapur I Sassanid King of Persia Constantine I (Flavius Valerius Constantinus) Roman Emperor 'the Great' Julian (Flavius Claudius Julianus) Roman Emperor 'the Apostate' Flavius Stilicho Attila Khan of the Huns 'the Scourge of God' Flavius Aetius the Last of the Romans Clovis I King and Unifier of the Franks Theodoric (Flavius Theodoricus) King of the Ostrogoths 'the Great' These are the rest, listed in chronological order by their deaths. TIER 3 BEFORE CHRIST Lugalzagesi Sumerian King of Umma, Sargon King of Akkad 'the Great', Naram (Haram)-Sin King of Akkad, Hattusili I (Labarna) Hittite Founder, Mursilis I Hittite King, Tuthmosis (Thutmose) I Pharaoh of Egypt, Tuthmosis (Tuthmose) IV Pharaoh of Egypt, Tudhaliya I Hittite King, Suppiluliumas Hittite King, Mursilis II Hittite King, Muwatallis Hittite King, Rameses II Pharaoh of Egypt, Merneptah Pharaoh of Egypt, Gideon (Jerub-baal) Judge of the Israelites, Wu Wang (Chi Fa) Founder of the Chou Dynasty 'the Martial King', Tiglath Pileser I King of Assyria, Chou Kung (Chi Tan) Duke of Chou, David King of the Kingdom of Israel, Ashurnasirpal II King of Assyria, Shalmaneser III King of Assyria, Tiglath-Pileser III King of Assyria, Sargon II King of Assyria, Sennacherib King of Assyria, Esarhaddon King of Assyria, Ashurbanipal King of Assyria, Ji Zhonger Duke Wen of Jin, Nabopolasser King of Babylonia, Cyaxeres King of Media, Nebuchadnezzar II King of Babylonia, Wu Zixu, Sun Tzu (Sun Wu) Honorable Sun, Cleomenes I King of Sparta, Darius I Achaemenid King of Persia 'the Great', Artaphrenes the Elder, Aristodemus, Miltiades, Leonidas I King of Sparta, Gelon Tyrant of Syracuse, Myronides, Pausanius, Leotychides, Xerxes I Achaemenid King of Persia, Themistocles, Cimon, Leosthenes, Cincinnatus Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, Gaius Servilius Ahala, Phormio, Sitalkes Odrysian King 'the Great', Pagondas, Brasidas, Demosthenes Son of Alcisthenes, Hannibal Son of Gisgo, Gylippus, Alcibiades, Agis II King of Sparta, Himilco, Lysander, Agesilaus II King of Sparta, Conon, Dionysius I Tyrant of Syracuse, Marcus Furius Camillus, Pelopidas, Datames, Artaxerxes II King of Persia 'Memnon', Xenophon, Philomelus, Onomarchus, Dionysius II Tyrant of Syracuse, Sun Bin, Marcus Valerius Corvus, Titus Manlius Torquatus Imperiosus, Timoleon, Memnon of Rhodes, Parmenio the Old General, Coenus, Craterus Diadochi of Alexander, Perdiccas, Antipitar Diadochi of Alexander, Antigonus I Diadochi of Alexander 'Monophthalmos', Chandragupta Maurya Mauryan Founder 'Sandracottus', Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus, Agathocles Tyrant of Syracuse, Ptolemy I Diadochi of Alexander 'Soter', Demetrius I (Demetrius Poliorcetes) Diadochi of Alexander, Publius Cornelius Dolabella, Lysimachus Diadochi of Alexander, Olympiodorus, Ptolemy King of Macedon 'Ceraunus', Spurius Carvilius Maximus, Appius Claudius Caudex, Manius Curius Dentatus, Antiochus I King of Syria 'Soter', Bai Qi, Xanthippus, Marcus Atilius Regulus, Asoka Mauryan Emperor, Adherbal, Gaius Lutatius Catalus, Gaius Duilius, Wang Jian, Ming T'ien, Chou T'o, Lucius Aemilius Papus, Gaius Atilius Regulus, Lucius Caecilius Metellus, Cleomenes III King of Sparta, Publius Cornelius Scipio the Elder, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, Gaius Flaminius, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, Titus Otacilius Crassus, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, Hasdrubal Barca, Gaius Claudius Nero, Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator, Mago Barca, Syphax King of the Masaesylii, Titus Manlius Torquatus, Marcus Valerius Laevinus, Marcus Livius Salinator, Attalus I King of Pergamum 'Soter', Hsiang Yu (Xiang Yu), Gaozu (Liu Bang) Han Founder, Manius Acilius Glabrio, Muttines (Mottones), Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes, Manius Acilius Glabrio, Antiochus III King of Syria 'the Great', Prusias I King of Bithynia 'Cholos', Marcus Fulvius Nobilior, Mete Han Shanyu of the Xiongnu 'Maodun', Lucius Valerius Flaccus, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, Philip V King of Macedon, Antiochus IV King of Syria 'Epiphanes', Judas Maccabaeus the Hammer, Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus, Gaius Laelius, Eumenes II King of Pergamon 'Soter', Masinissa King of the Massylii, Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Minor, Viriathus, Aristonicus, Lucius Caecilius Metellus Dalmaticus, Wei Qing, Ho Qu-bing, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Decimus Junius Brutus (Callaicus), Gaius Tuditanus Sempronius, Liu Che (Wu Di) Han Emperor, Jugurtha King of Numidia, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Spartacus, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, Mithridates VI (Eupator Dionysus) King of Pontus 'the Great', Ariovistus Chief of the Suebi, Ambiorix Chief of the Eburones, Tigranes II King of Armenia 'the Great', Cassivellaunus (Cassibelanus) King of the Catuvellauni, Gaius Scribonius Curio, Publius Licinius Crassus, Marcus Licinius Crassus Dives, Vercingetorix King of the Arverni, Pharnaces II King of Pontus, Juba I King of Numidia, Titus Labienus, Orodes II (Hyrodes) King of Parthia, Pacorus I King of Parthia, Mark Antony (Marcus Antonius), Marcus Licinius Crassus, Titus Statilius Taurus, and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. ANNO DOMINI Marcus Silvanus, Publius Sulpicius Quirinius, Arminius (Hermann der Cherusker) Chief of the Cherusci, Gaius Silius, Juba II King of Maueritania, Publius Cornelius Dolabella, Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus, Quintus Junius Blaesus, Cunobelinus King of the Catuvellauni, Caratacus (Caradog) King of the Catuvellauni, Publius Ostorius Scapula, Liu Xiu (Han-Guang Wu Di) Han Emperor, Aulus Plautius, Boudicca (Boadicea) Queen of the Iceni, Gaius Paulinus Suetonius, Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, Vespasian (Titus Flavius Vespasianus) Roman Emperor, Eleazar ben Yair, Cerialis (Quintus Petillius Cerialis Caesius Rufus), Gnaeus Julius Agricola, Flavius Josephus (Joseph ben Matthias), Decebalus Dacian King, Bar Kochba (Simon bar Kochba), Marcus Aurelius, Sun Jian (Wentai) the Tiger of Jiang Dong, Yuan Shao Benchu, Severus (Lucius Septimius Severus) Roman Emperor, Zhang Liao (Wenyuan), Liu Bei Shu Emperor, Maximinus I (Gaius Julius Verus Maximinus) Roman Emperor 'Thrax', Ardashir I Sassanid Founder of Persia, Lu Xun (Boyan), Sun Quan (Zhongmou) Founder of the Wu Kingdom, Gallienus (Publius Licinius Egnatius Gallienus) Roman Emperor, Publius Septimius Odaenathus Prince of the Roman Colony of Palmyra, Postumus (Marcus Cassianius Latinius Postumus) Emperor of Gaul, Iberia, and Britain, Claudius II (Marcus Aurelius Claudius) Roman Emperor 'Gothicus', Zenobia Queen of Palmyra, Shi Le Great Chieftain, Constantius II (Flavius Julius Constantius) Roman Emperor, Ran Min Daowu, Shapur II Sassanid King of Persia, Maximianus (Magnus Maximus), Fritigern (Frithugairns) King of the Visigoths, Theodosius I (Flavius Theodosius) Roman Emperor 'the Great', Alaric I King of the Visigoths, Ataulf King of the Visigoths 'Father Wolf', Wallia King of the Visigoths, Rua (Rugila) the Hun, Bleda the Hun, Majorian (Julius Valerius Maiorianus) Western Roman Emperor, Ricimer, Geiseric (Gaiseric) King of the Vandals and Alans 'the Lame', Childeric I King of the Salian Franks, Odoacar (Odavacer) King of the Heruli and Rex Italiae, Ambrosius Aurelianus (Aurelius Ambrosius), Riothamus (Riotimus) King of the Brittones, Arthur Dux Bellorum or 'King Arthur' (yes, the legendary figure we know so well, and perhaps the same leader known as Owain Ddantgwyn (Owain Danwyn)), Mundus, Priscus General Priscus, Totila (Baduila) King of the Ostrogoths, Ceawlin Saxon Bretwalda of Wessex, Bayan Avar Khagan, and Rhydderch Hael Brythonic hero 'the Generous'. My cut off point is the year 600 A.D. Thanks and enjoy, James

I think that's a very good point, sonic. Obviously, people could ride and fight on horses just fine before the stirrup. I think it enabled people to learn to maneuver on horses quicker than before. The Romans did develop good horned saddles by the 4th century, and they apparently used spurs. One book titled The Roman Cavalry, by one Karen Dixon, states on Pg.110, "...Throughout the whole of the Imperial period the Roman cavalryman, be he on horse or camel, was provided with a secure seat from which to fight. The lack of stirrups for most of the period under study is neither there nor there. The importance of the stirrup has been over-emphazised, as the Roman cavalryman was perfectly able to engage in shock combat with spear and sword without them. Indeed it has been asserted that the main initial impact of the stirrup was to reduce fatigue on long distance rides..." However, it is quite a debate that the stirrup is 'overrated', depending on the degree of the importance of it being claimed. It definitely gave the horsmen greater stability, regardless how 'natural' one was growing up on a horse. The basic tactics of mounted warfare were certainly affected, as mounted warrior supported by stirrups was less likely to fall off while fighting, and they could satnd while mounted. They could deliver blows with his weapon that more fully employed the weight and momentum of himself and the horse. If the saddle solely allowed for that, Persians, Macedonians, and every other bridled cavalrymen, I would think, would have used their thrusting weapon under-handed. Peculiarly, the invention of the stirrup occurred relatively late in history, considering the fact that horses were domesticated around, what, 4,000 B.C.? Great stuff, Spartan JKM

Very elucidating caldrail. Thank you. Indeed; forgive my brevity, but I was thinking of the tactical concept of stirrups allowing for the full momentum of a horse behind a lance. 'Heavy cavalry', before the 7th century or so in Europe or Asia (Near and Middle East) couldn't deliver the shock the likes of the Carolingians could; the energy transfer from the horse to knight to lance was enabled primarily by the coupling of the stirrup. It connected the horse's 1,000 pounds and 40-mile-per-hour speed to the end of the couched lance, held under-arm, by way of the knight. This massive momentum was used much like a tank to take down massed foot troops or mounted warriors. The entire major social system, it seems - the feudal system - evolved around this simple mechanical device. This triggered debates, however, as scholars argued that it couldn't be that simple. The Parthian and Sassanid (and Byzantine?) 'heavy cavalry' were noted as such due to their armor, both on horse and man; basically, to deliver 'hammer blows', they needed to be supported by horse-archers, akin to what you were describing about the missile weaponry of the Goths at Adrianople. Egyptian Mamelukes defeated the Mongols in part because of superior heavy cavalry. Of course, this subject is very debatable and potentially comprehensive. Thanks, Spartan JKM

Great thread. I think this connection with Adrianople to Medieval feudalism/chivalry seems, indeed, to be a myth. It seems, quite possibly, that Charles Oman and cavalry officers etc. of the 19th century were seduced by a tidy idea that a superiror style of horseman brought the Roman Empire down. It may have been primarily with Charles Martel and his Franks who began encouraging cavalry to the degree that created and influenced European chivalry. Threats came from all directions upon their kingdom, and infantry, though effective in a set-piece battle if properly utilized, was too slow to deal with potential enemies from different directions. Cavalry is simply far more mobile, whether for raiding and/or repulsing raids. This doctrine, not a swift process, probably did not start with Adrianople. It came much later. The cavalry-cycle, heavy cavalry that could ride down infantry, can be claimed to have begun with the Carolingians some 500 years later; they were the first Europenas to substantially utilize the metal stirrup. I have Stephen William's and Gerard Friell's (Friell is the archaelogical expert of the duo) Theodosius: The Empire at Bay; they state on Pg. 19, "In terms of military history, it has been commonly assumed that the outcome of the battle demonstrated the superiority of cavalry over infantry; which lasted until the late middle ages and the development of more effective projectile weapons. In our view this is a flawed approach, arising from a misunderstanding of the battle itself and the nature of the opposing forces, which ignores the vast bulk of evidence to the contrary, both in the later fourth century and in other periods. Adrianople was an infantry battle, decided by a series of tactical moves and accidents, and was no different in its troop composition and maneuvering from most of the set-piece warfare of the day..." As I see it, one primary reason the Battle of Adrianople was significant was because it irrevocably changed the conditions on which barbarians and Romans would deal with each other in the future, and Rome might have been sacked sooner if not for the diplomatic astuteness of Theodosius I; his offer to the vagabonding Goths in the Balkan regions of allied status (foederati) with Rome, while retaining their own sovereignty, proved very efficacious until his death in 395 A.D. There was something more appealing for many barbarian chieftains about leading their warriors to fight along the ranks of the Roman military system than merely leading their own federated mobs (somewhat) into battle against Romans. They were probably thinking along the lines of stature, such as gaining war ministries in the empire. Moreover, Theodosius paid them higher than the Roman troops (reputedly), and showed them greater consideration. Trained units were also transferred from Egypt to replenish Thedosius' ranks. The result of the battle also seemed to signify the reality to the Eastern Empire's military that efficient cavalry must be adopted more fully. Part of Theodosius' foederati was perhaps 40,000 conscripted Gothic warriors, many being cavalry. This must have been instrumental in the vanquishing of Theodosius' rivals, Magnus Maximus and Eugenius by 394 A.D. Actually, Alaric was part of the campaign that crushed Eugenius. Was the battle of Adrianople the advent of the cavalry cycle - the so-called tactical revolution in the relation between cavalry and infantry which would influence the period when heavy cavalry, typified by the Medieval knight, dominated the battlefields of Europe for another 1,000+ years? Contrarily, was the battle simply a battle lost catastrophically by the emperor Valens because of his tactical and intelligence failures, combined with a swift tactical surprise from the Gothic horsemen? But remember, it wasn't an ambush akin to what Hannibal achieved at Trasimene, Scipio's 'Burning of the Camps' (night ambush), or the Teutoburger Wald. The clash at Adrianople was fought on an open plain. Did the Gothic cavalry contemporaneously send the Roman horsemen into flight and aid their infantry in the destruction of their enemy? Or was it really a battle won by Gothic infantry over Roman infantry, who were already thrown into disorder (terribly tight-packing of their ranks) by the initial salvo of Gothic cavalry, who all left the field chasing Roman cavalry, thus being merely a preliminary supplement? Some reputable modern sources state unequivically 'no' to the cavalry-cycle issue. I agree; this battle led to a Roman catastrophe due to faulty intelligence and tactical surprise from the Gothic cavalry. The arms and tactics employed were nothing new from both sides. This wasn't like Crecy of 1346. I think, basically, both armies at Adrianople numbered between 15-20,000 men at most, with Valens having an edge in quality and quantity (slight edge in numbers). But Valens thought he was approaching an enemy force, primarily Fritigern's footmen housed in their wagonlaager (wagon-fort), composed of slightly more than 1/2 of what it actually was. Fritigern had sent for his allied horsemen, out foraging 'far away', and was 'begging' a truce with Valens, sending out envoys of 'low origin' initially, whom Valens refused to see. Valens wanted to be sent a suitable chieftain to execute a lasting treaty. Fritigern then sent a 'common' soldier as a herald, requesting that picked men of noble rank among the Romans be sent to him as hostages, and he would tolerate the anger felt by his warriors because of his virtual overture of peace. But, in actuality, he was purposely delaying, hoping that amid the pretended truce his cavalry might return. Valens approved, but may have been also buying time to deploy efficiently (Ammianus Marcellinus, our original main source, doesn't say this on the part of Valens). This makes sense, as the wagonlaager was, presumably, well situated and difficult to assault, and Valen's men were weary and the day was extremely hot. Perhaps the Romans could hav eset the wagonlaager ablaze. But they didn't. As already mentioned, Fritigern also set the surrounding land afire, thus exposing further with time the Romans to such horrid conditions in the 'fiery summer', exhausting them by heat and thirst. Valens had already imposed a forced march on his men to get here. Hunger began to set in for the Romans, too. Marcellinus tell us of Valens' emissary, one Richomeres, "...As he was on his way to the enemy's rampart, the archers and targeteers, then under the command of one Bacurius of Hiberia and Cassio, had rushed forward too eagerly in hot attack, and were already engaged with their adversaries; and as their charge had been untimely, so their retreat was cowardly; and thus they gave an unfavorable omen to the beginning of the battle..." This untimely action, perhaps one of insubordination, is believed to have been instigated by the right (we don't know for sure) Roman cavalry. Then, like a 'thunderbolt does near high mountains', the cavalry under Alatheus and Saphrax arrived, and threw themselves into the 'confusion'. This is the Marcellinus' overview of the entire battle, Book 31.13 (Loeb Classic Library), "All the Goths united, namely, the Theruingi under the command of King Fritigern, and the Greuthungi led by Alatheus and Saphrax, and engaged with the Romans in the open, routed their cavalry, and put to flight the infantry, thus left unprotected and crowded together, with enormous losses; Valens was killed, but his body could not be found." 'All the Goths united', with no specific mention of all of the Gothic cavalry leaving the field. Thus, in my opinion, the revised theory that this was a battle of mainly infantry over infantry is not incontrovertible. But Marcellinus' account does carry some gaps. Right from the beginning, Marcellinus states, "On every side armor and weapons clashed..." A few sentences later, "...the lines dashed together like beaked ships, pushing each other back and forth in turn..." (could infantry alone, of no more quantity, cause this?) He then tells us that the left cavalry wing of the Romans, deserted by some of their comrades, was hard pressed by the enemy's numbers, crushed, and overwhelmed, the infantry now unsupported. Again, he does not say the Gothic cavalry left the field. But he doesn't say the stayed either. Gosh, I wish he had specified! He continues, "...Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen, and echoed with frightful cries. Hence the arrows whirling death from every side always found their mark with fatal effect...But when the barbarians, pouring forth in huge hordes, trampled down horse and man...no room for retreat..." Now, I hope the 'picking and choosing' doesn't signify a taking out of context, but think it is plausible, though the word 'cavalry' doesn't come up from Marcellinus after the initial charge of the Gothic horsemen, that phrases such as, "On every side", and, "Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen", and, "arrows whirling death from every side", and, "barbarians, pouring forth (not 'out', as out of their wagon-fort), in huge hordes, trampling down horse and man", and, finally, "no room for retreat", can not mean only the Gothic infantry itself surrounded the Romans, which has been a major belief of the current appraisals of the battle (Thomas Burns and Stephen Williams, to name a couple). These beliefs have been accepted, and are very credible (I have skimed Williams' excellent Theodosius: The Empire at Bay) on many issues (IMHO). This is definitley not a black & white issue. Much of the Gothic cavalry vanquished the Roman horsemen with great celerity, mainly because of the element of surprise, but some seemingly swung inwards to aid in the envelopment of the body of infantry, already thrown into disarray. Men alone do not "trample down horse and man" (do they?). Perhaps I am being too academic, and ancient accounts can suffer from 'static' with the translations down the timelines. One of the eminent and panoramic works of Roman history, especially of this period, says this of the battle of Adrianople, "On the 9th of August 378 A.D., a day which has deserved to be marked among the most inauspicious of the Roman Calender, the emperor Valens, leaving under a strong guard his baggage and military treasure, marched from Hadrianople to attack the Goths, who were encamped about 12 miles from the city....The event of the battle of Hadrianople, so fatal to Valens and to the empire, may be described in a few words: the Roman cavalry fled; the infantry was abandoned, surrounded, and cut to pieces. The most skillful evolutions, the finest courage, are scarcely sufficient to extricate a body of foot encompassed on an open plain by superior numbers of horse..." -Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. III, Ch. XXVI. Gibbon did could not make scientific extrapolations from examining the field etc., and certain sources he used have been declared advanced since his time (he wrote his masterpiece throughout the 1770s-1780s ), but he drew from the same sources our contemporaries do. Actually, he is constantly used for a source. Another is Theodor Mommsen, whose famed work I don't have with me. Thanks, Spartan JKM

Actually, I find Dodge and Hart an excellent 1-2 punch for studying Scipio and Hannibal. It is in the biography section, 5th floor under the S section. It is not in the famous library (you know, the statues of the two lions), now one for purely research, but located in the branch across 5th Avenue (entrance on the SE corner of 40th st and 5 Avenue). It is one of the best biographies I have ever read! His analysis of Zama is an outstanding postulation, in my opinion. I keep my photocopied copy 'safe' and binded. If anyone has questions with anything specific about Scipio from professor Scullard's work, I'll be happy tp provide quotes etc. Thanks, Spartan JKM

The Augusta, the strategic narrative of B.H. Liddel Hart's work is outstanding, as it sheds valuable light as to why Scipio was a remarkably balanced commander. However, when it comes to comparisons with Hannibal, the opinions of Hart seem quite tendentious. In my opinion, all his downplaying of Hannibal can be countered, such as the supposed 'inability' to siege cities and undertake pursuits. We can talk about this if you would like. I must stress the value of professor Howard H. Scullard's Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician. The study is longer, more balanced, and overall more objective than Hart's work, which is certainly terrific to counter the Hannibal biographers. We need a level of balance and opposing views to form deep conclusions of our own. History has simply found Hannibal more romantic than Scipio, though the two were very much alike as generals and men who understood that policy is what wins wars. The book is out of print though. You'll have to go to a major library. I spent hours photocopying it at the NYC Public Library, being that I wanted it so badly. I had to put it on reserve, too. If you can't find it let me know; maybe we could work soemthing out. You must study Scullard's work, judging by your inspiration regarding Scipio. It is a must!! Let me know how your search goes. Thanks Spartan JKM

Great thread! May I add some stuff? There is no question Cannae was an abject failure for Rome that day, and the legionnaires who fell suffered horribly because of the reversion to the stiffness of the phalanx. Final victory over Hannibal would become a powerful source of pride for the subsequent generations of Rome, and it was sweet justice for Rome that many of the Cannae survivors formed the core of Scipio's victorious army in Africa. I do not believe the Second Punic War was a personal war for Hannibal. He was simply ready for war when it broke. He was a general in the service of Carthage. Hannibal recieves much praise and criticism, and a remark from the great Helmuth von Moltke ('the Elder') carries much weight, "No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy. The commander is compelled...to reach decisions on the basis of situations which cannot be predicted." Hannibal's grand strategy to defeat Rome was as brilliant as it was audacious. His strike into Cisalpine Gaul, which the Romans deemed an impossible task, was a classic display of attack is the best defence. I am certain he knew the risks, and he never wavered from the only strategy that would have worked - that of detaching Rome's allies from her, thus reducing by as much as half her material and military strength, including the maritime units. No foreigner could have known, with in-deep thoroughness, the intricate nature of the Roman federation, which was a complex amalgam of peoples throughout Italy who didn't necessarily carry a universal feeling of 'us' and 'them' with regards to their Romans masters; what had a Latin from Clastidium have in common with a Samnite, or a Greek from Tarentum or Locri? Remember, as Livy tells us (Book 23.5 and 24.47), the Romans were perplexed that disaffected allies would choose to side with 'foreigners' and 'barbarians' against a people of Italy like themselves. Hannibal's diplomatic work must have had some validity. We can never be completely sure his war was a fanatical 'war of revenge'. That he was ready when war broke out is what we are sure of. The wrath of his father did not completely absorb him; Hannibal was also rubbed upon by the sensible sense of diplomacv of his older brother-in-law Hasdrubal, whom he immediately succeeded. Hannibal's actions throughout his career do not witness any acts of gratuitous cruelty, and none of his decisions were reached by any tempestuous behavior on his part. Interestingly, the one man of action in antiquity who perhaps matches him in possessing such a determined yet composed temperament was his eventual conqueror, Publius Cornelius Scipio, later Africanus. Anyway, his insistence that Carthage make peace after Zama (Polybius 15.19) does not suggest a fanatic. He could have skillfully organized a stiff resistence within Carthage itself, in which the Romans would have been forced into a long, grueling siege, which would have taken years. Moreover, before the upheaval at Saguntum in 219 B.C., his campaigning in northwest of Iberia, in which he achieved a smashing Alexandrian-style victory over a tribal army numbering about 100,000 men (according to Livy) on the banks of the Tagus, could have been nothing more than the continuation of the prosperous empire-building begun by his father and brother-in-law. No doubt he hated Rome, and if they began jostling against Carthaginian interests here in Spain, which had they did begin to do, he wouldn't back down to their admonishments. Not because of any wrath or megalomania on his part, but because backing down over Saguntum, whom Rome never came to help once he besieged them (perhaps indicating they were bluffing all along), but because he had an acute understanding of Rome's imperialistic nature, which involved the fact they wouldn't have ceased with Saguntum. It would have been merely the thin edge of the wedge. If the Roman challenge over Saguntum was not taken up it would not only cause irreparable damage to Punic prestige amongst the Iberian peoples, but would also ruin all the work of the past two decades which renewed Carthage's prosperity. When should he have fought? What if New Carthage followed, or Gades, or Utica? Polybius tells us in Book 3.33, "...next he instructed his brother Hasdrubal how to manage the government of Spain and prepare to resisit the Romans if he himself happened to be be absent..., which possibly suggests he was not yet totally decisive about invading Italy. Thus, we cannot be absolutely certain he would have invaded Italy if the Romans had chosen to turn a blind eye regarding Saguntum. Hannibal had informed himself that he could count on allies in the regions which Rome had fought a desperate war against the Celts as recently as 222 B.C. The area of northern Italy could serve as a viable starting point of operations, with an excellent source of abundant recruiting material, upon Rome's lands to the south, once he quickly established himself there. The founding of two new Latin colonies in the Po Valley in around 220 B.C. (Placentia and Cremona) certainly influenced Hannibal's thinking that trouble could be stirred up, as indeed turned out to be the case. His preparations which preceded his departure from New Carthage included sending envoys to the Alpine regions through which he intended to pass. As Polybius tells us in Book 3.34, "...He had informed himself accurately about the fertility of the land at the foot of the Alps and near the river Po, the denseness of its population, the bravery of the men in war, and above all their hatred of Rome ever since that former war with the Romans...". Though it was dearly bought in losses, the crossing of the Alps was a tremendous strategic success, as it could not have been chosen at a better time; Hannibal knew he had to move quickly, as a victorious war in Italy would have been improbable later on. The Romans had indeed recently aflamed the Cisalpine Celts, mostly the Boii. But the power of the Gauls was not yet broken (the Insubres were subjugated). Hatred of the Romans was extreme, and Rome had scarcely begun to establish themselves in these 'conquered lands' centered around the Po. Hannibal's initial success on the Ticinus, and more so at the Trebbia galvanized the Gauls to a common cause. But the Gauls had a legitimate beef with Hannibal, as they noticed he was more concerned for the lives of his African and Iberians, using them as pawns to be sacrificed to his tactical choices. They certainly paid the heaviest price for victory against the Romans. But their expecations lay in trampling the ager Romanus itself, and under him they probably saw their best chance, especially in the prospect of booty. Hannibal knew he had to get moving soon to keep them under his leadership, but he also had to get a message across to Rome's allies that would be very clear from afar - that he wasn't in Italy to directly attack them. It's too bad for Hannibal's cause the Celts of northern Italy didn't come charging down upon Roman territory after Cannae. The force sent north under one Lucius Postumius didn't seem to work in creating a diversion, as they destroyed his force in the late winter/early spring of 215 B.C. To what point can we sustain Classical historians' suggestions that the Gauls were a fickle, wiseless people? Hannibal wisely concluded that the only way Rome could be checked (at the least), and for Carthage's hegemony to be ensured, was to break the Roman confederation up and Rome to be isolated from a significant portion of her alliance with the peoples of Italy, even if they didn't actively join Hannibal in arms. A defensive war fought in Spain, or taking personal command in Sicily when the island became an important theater of the war, however long drawn out, would do nothing more than make Rome's allies feel weary. They would never turn against Rome until they could be assured that a rebellion was plausible, and this only applied to the ones whose loyalty was less-reconciled, most notably in the south, where Hannibal spent the rest of his time after Cannae. This is why he disposed his battle-lines at Cannae the way he did - to achieve a battle of annihilation, not just a subtle victory. This is what would induce the allies to listen, if Rome was shown to be threatened significantly. That he failed in the end, even after achieving a dissolution of the confederacy by 40%, illustrates why the dour Romans became, well, whom they were - a people that would dominate the western world for the next 7 centuries. His entire strategy to bring Rome down was based on flawed valuation, but it was inevitable, as he couldn't have known the granite solidarity of the core of Rome's confederation, the Latin colonies, which had never been tested, except sporadically and not as thoroughly against Pyrrhus 6 decades earlier. But Hannibal certainly believed he could do it, and he came very close. There is no reason to think added pressure on Rome after Cannae with more forces at his disposal would have compelled the Romans to come to the table. The solidarity of the confederation had nothing to do with the folly of Carthage's generals in Spain and Sicily, where the Romans flat out beat them, despite being vastly outnumbered, and in Sicily, where nepotism ruined a resurging Carthaginian effort under a brilliant cavalry leader named Muttines, who was personally sent to Sicily by Hannibal in 208 B.C. Regarding the important factor of seapower, well, the easiest way for Hannibal to reach Italy would indeed have been by the sea, which would have avoided the losses he surely expected to incur on the overland march. It would have been much quicker, too. He couldn't known exactly the strength of Roman seapower, but he must have known it was superior now to Carthage's. Rome had 220 quinqueremes in commission in 218 B.C., 60 under Publius Cornelius Scipio (the Elder) in the north, ready to strike at Spain via Massilia, and 160 under Tiberius Sempronius Longus, in the south, ready to strike Africa from Sicily. The figures we have from Polybius and Livy for the Carthaginian naval strength illustrate how inferior they were to the Romans, in terms of quantity: Hannibal had 50 quinqueremes in Spain, but only 32 were fit to put to sea (Livy 21.22), along with 5 triremes. Livy tells us (21.49) that 20 vessels were sent to raid Italy, 35 were sent to western Sicily, and Polybius tells us (Book 3.96) 70 were sent to Sardinia in 217 B.C., but part of these were probably from the squadrons sent to Sicily mentioned by Livy. Basically, it looks like Carthage had 100 or so fewer ready warships at the beginning of the war. According to Livy (Book 21.17 and 21.22), the Romans knew this, and Hannibal's dispositions to safe guard Africa and Spain with the prudent cross-posting of roughly 35,000 troops, which would weave solidarity between disparate troops from Spain and Africa in the testing times ahead, indicates he knew it too. Sure, it's possible he could have slipped through, as 'control of the sea' hardly carried the same definition as in modern times. A Carthaginian fleet did reach Sardinian and Pisa in 217 B.C., as Bomilcar did to Locri in 215 B.C., and as Mago did to Liguria in 206 B.C. But these were smaller detachments than his army of Italy, and being caught at sea by a superior Roman fleet would have meant the end of his campaign - actually, this would have meant it never really began! Such an attempt would not have been a calculated risk, but a foolish one. It was not that Hannibal was some landlubber who didn't understand seapower; he understood it all too well, as his undertaking to procure Naples, the closest major port pointing directly southwest to Carthage in a straight line just west of Sicily, as his first priority after Cannae, indicates. He knew the Carthaginian navy was a broken reed by 218 B.C., a fact vividly realized when Bomilcar failed to even fight a numerically inferior Roman fleet (for the only time in the war) off the southeast tip of Sicily. If Bomilcar had fought and won, which was a distinct possibility (the Carthaginians were still probably better seamen and, as we have stated, the corvus was no longer in use), Syracuse would have been at least received ample supplies, as the Roman naval forces would have been scarce in the harbor, and he had 700 merchant ships with him, thus raising the siege would have been practicable. Sicily could have been recovered as a whole for Carthage. Roman apologists, understandably, scoff at all these 'what-ifs' of the 2nd Punic War that could have gone Hannibal's way, but they seem plausible to me. However, Rome was indeed always going to win in the very long run. Events such as what happened off cape Pachynon in 212 B.C., along with Hasdrubal Barca's victory in Catalonia against Ganeus Scipio in 215 B.C., or his victory over Gaius Claudius Nero at the Metaurus in 207 B.C., would merely have delayed Rome's dominance of the Mediterranean. As we look back, they were unrelenting in colonizing and expanding, and were never accustomed to involuntarily drawing away due to fear. Hannibal's subtleties were simply watsed on such a resilient state, whose bonds with her subjects made up a form of nationhood far superior than where Hannibal came from. But he realized this fully only after he applied such a stern test. Perhaps only the Soviets of WWII have been so pummelled initially yet able to hang on for final victory. Many critics of Hannibal seem to allude that he could control the whole Carthaginian war effort; he must be held responsible for engineering this war, though he didn't technically break any treaties and the Romans actually declared war, but his ultimate failure was a result of the force of circumstances. I think he made all the best decisions in the exigencies of the moments. His failure to take towns meant he couldn't win them over, or detach from Roman suzerainty, not that he couldn't siege strongholds. What good would assaulting towns, except for a means of punishment etc., achieve? Certainly not the appeasement he hoped for. In all the towns of Italy there existed a conflict between the ruling nobility (loyal to Rome) and the commons. Hannibal's attempt to foster a democratic cause, thus detaching these towns, particulalry in Campania, was the astute thing to strive for. If not for the stout intervention of Marcus Marcellus at Nola, Hannibal might have won over the town, as there were indications of the popular party wanting detachment from Roman rule, in this very important city, which commanded a main route near Capua. Now, for the issue about the Barcid 'palapinate', if we can call their faction as such, it is incorrect to think of them as viceroys in Spain independent of the Carthaginian government. Yes, they opposed the policy of appeasement favored by the home government, but Hannibal, as well as his father and brother-in-law, were not military entrepreneurs/adventurers akin to the likes of Memnon of Rhodes or Quintus Sertorius, or later ones such as Albrecht von Wallenstein or Raimondo Montecuccoli. They were generals of a Republic, and their policy had to take account of the views they completely didn't share with the Carthaginian sphere of aristocrats who held the power and final decision-making. Hannibal did indeed send to Carthage for instructions at the onset of the Saguntum problem, and they indeed refused to give him up to the Romans, thus certainly authorizing him to take steps he saw fit. Actually, Appian tells us that Hannibal demanded the Saguntines and local tribes whom they were at odds settle their dispute. But it didn't materialize, and Carthage became commited to war, one they were willing to risk for the sake of their interersts in Spain. This could only be saved by Hannibal's grand plan to defeat Rome in her own yard. Again, there was definitley much enmity on the part of Hannibal concerning Rome, but the 'wrath of the house of Barca' and 'the revenge of Hannibal' perhaps belongs to Roman historiography which attemts to obscure the extent to which the Roman seizure of Sardinia and her interference in Spain drove Carthage to war. Please don't misunderstand me; the Romans were certainly not unilaterally the 'bad guys' in this great conflict. Their interests and security were threatened, so they felt, by Carthage's new found prosperity. The Massiliotes and Saguntines clearly preferred a Roman to a Carthaginian friend, and the Romans, an expanding state, couldn't ignore such valuable 'friends' located in strategically important locations. In the broad scope, however, and though Hannibal's attack on Saguntum precipitated the war, which was carried out with his full knowledge of the consequences, we must conclude (or decide) that, being that attack and defence have a meaning in such a tussle between two powerful states relativley close to each other, the balance of aggression, in my opinion, must be ascribed to Rome. Polybius makes it clear the allies were wavering just before Cannae, and makes it clear in Book 3.106 that the Senate ordered Gnaeus Servilius to avoid battle with Hannibal, and to train and condition the new recruits, as they were convinced their recent losses to Hannibal were the result of raw levies. They were ready for this upcoming great battle at Cannae. The Roman strategy after Cannae entailed a huge sacrifice in men and money on her core allies, not to mention a level of indomitability few peoples could sustain, and the strain it caused took quite a toll by 209 B.C., when much of Etruria was on the verge of revolt, and 12 of the 30 Latin colonies were bled white, unable to meet their quota to the Republic in arms and men. These unsettling situations among the allies were exactly the primary elements Hannibal hoped to achieve to break the federation. He simply couldn't quite achieve it enough. Who knows what added pressure with Hasdrubal's arrival could fostered in 207 B.C. It still may not have been enough. We must rely mainly on Livy for the war beyond Cannae until Polybius' works re-appear in the African campaign, and even if he exaggertaes the scale of some of these smaller battles, Hannibal clearly destroyed Roman forces twice around Herdonea (212 and 210 B.C.). Livy credits Marcellus with a victory over Hannibal at Numistro in 210 B.C., but Julius Frontinus credits Hannibal with the victory here. The clashes around Canusium were doubtless tactically won by Hannibal: a victorious army does not 'billet' for months after a battle, and with Hannibal subsequently holding the field and successfully raising the siege of Caulon a far off distance in Bruttium, in a relatively short time; nor does one's government scourn a commander for 'twice having his army cut to pieces' if he had won even a stalemate (Livy Book 27.21). Regardless of the absurdity that Livy would intimate a defeat of Hannibal, then construe more light to the contrary with his subsequent narrative, the words are there. Hannibal fought a battle with Nero near Grumentum, which seemingly ended with Hannibal maneuvering to give Nero the slip while positioning himself awaiting news of Hasdrubal's situation. It's certainly all debatable, and depends on what one wants to believe. We'll never know for sure. Actually, a bit of trivia: Tiberius Sempronius Longus and Gaius Flaminius, the losers at the Trebbia and Trasimene, are deemed by some to have been horrible generals. But they had some success during their tenures. If we can sustain Livy, Longus defeated a Carthaginian force under one Hanno near Grumentum in 215 B.C. (Book 23.37), and Flaminius achieved success before the Second Punic War, leading his army across the Po in 223 B.C., defeating the Insubrian Gauls. How horrible could they have been? As for Varro at Cannae, the People did not elect him and Aemilius Paullus as consuls, and didn't provide them with a huge force, to wait it out amongst the hills watching and hampering the dreaded invader Hannibal, if the opportunity arose. Attempting to seek a decisive battle was hardly a foolish move, and any waiting around would result in a loss of morale. The attritional strategy of Fabius, though quite astute, had failed in whole; Hannibal marched where he wanted and when he wanted, and moved faster than Fabius' army. If the Romans would not face him, he would plunder and destroy what he didn't need or couldn't carry, and appropriate everyhting else. Hannibal's breakout at the Ager Falernus against Fabius was a mastepiece of stratagem. Unlike Alexander, Hannibal did not come to Italy to conquer, but to ensure the prosperity of his own people; his strike into Italy was a classic example of, again, attack is the best form of defence. The Romans headed to Hannibal's position carefully, heading along the coastal plain, eliminating any chance of a terrible ambush. Livy describes an elaborate plan of Hannibal's to ambush them, and when Roman intelligence knew of this, he was compelled to make a dash for Gaul with his cavalry, abandoning his infantry. In view of Polybius' silence, this is unlikely. Hannibal needed a great victory to forward his political goal here in Italy, and judging by his tactical conduct displayed at Cannae, he was confident of victory. A few days before the Battle of Cannae, Varro took command and marched eastwards towards Hannibal's position. He bested an attacking party of Hannibal's upon his van, in which he disposed some cavalry in support of his foot. Varro had showed discretion in his leadership, but many feel Hannibal was doing what he had done to Sempronius Longus at the Trebbia: attacking his forces and withdrawing, ostensibly being beaten, thus whetting an inexperienced commander's appetite for increased action. Anyway, Paullus has been credited by Roman historiography for refusing the challenge of Hannibal's for battle due to unfavorable ground on August 1, but Varro, in command the day before, was obvioulsy just as willing to wait. On August 2, Varro was ready to fight, as the morale of the men wouldn't increase with more harrassing from the swift-moving Numidians, and Hannibal's superior cavalry would make foraging easier for the Carthaginian side. Many constantly stress the suitability of the flat terrian for Hannibal's cavalry on the banks of the Aufidus River, but we shouldn't discard the fact that the Roman infantry required level ground to take advantage of their sheer weight of numbers. After both he and Paullus decided not to fight on the left bank, Varro chose to engage Hannibal in full on the right bank of the Aufidus. Hannibal remarked to his men that the left bank was perfect cavalry country (Polybius Book 3.111), but Varro clearly saw that on the right bank the ground rose steadily from the sea, and with a raised area along the river bank. It still provided good terrain for cavalry, but provided more hope for infantry. Varro deserves credit for spotting this, and there is no reason to believe Livy that Varro ordered the army to deploy for battle without consulting Paullus, who clearly was more or less in agreement, if we can judge by the movement. We are a little more sure of Hannibal's enemy's size than that of Alexander's at Gaugamela, but not without uncertainty. Basically, the Romans had 80,000 infnatry and more than 6,000 cavalry to face Hannibal's 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. As with Darius III against Alexander at Gaugamela, Varro's plan was simple and based on prior experience; in defeat, the 10,000 Roman infantry in the center at the Trebbia smashed throught Hannibal's center, and the vanguard broke through amid the disaster at Trasimene. Varro was not unjust in his confidence that the Roman legions could repeat this, but this time via a huge offensive battering ram. Varro and Paullus knew full well they were not going to outfight or maneuver Hannibal's cavalry, but by placing themselves personally at the helm of the two cavalry units, they clearly hoped to uphold enough spirit to hold their ground as long as possible while the infantry crushed Hannibal in the center. Regardless of what happened on the wings, crushing Hannibal in the center would decide the outcome; much of his cavalry would certainly get away, but would soon be in trouble wandering around hostile land after Hannibal's defeat, and Rome resurgent. Varro chose the field, hoping to nullify Hannibal's superiority in cavalry on ground impracticable for enemy horses to ride around them, and with the sea at their backs, no ambush could be implemented upon them from behind. Hannibal no longer had any elephants, which he used efficaciously at the Trebbia, the river was on his left and uneven ground on his right. Varro's plan was not subtle, but anything more sophisticated would have been counter-productive with such a huge force. He has been severely criticized for substituting flexibility for power, but a shorter front with more depth allows for a smoother marching order with so many men; a deeper, narrower deployment allows for the army in whole to move quicker and maintain order more easily than a wider formation. Varro needed his superior numbers of foot to come into play, and the battlefield was limited. For what he was attempting, the narrower front with deeper ranks was the best formation. Please don't misunderstand me, fellow posters; Gaius Terentius Varro was a moderate commander at the very, very best. I just don't think he was completely incompetent. It was simply his misfortune he went up against one of the greatest battlefield commanders of all time that terrible day on August 2, 216 B.C.. Regarding Cannae, it can be concluded that every tactical masterpiece was probably the result of supreme generalship on the part of the winner and some form of crude management by the loser, but I do not agree that with Cannae it was more the latter. It is incredible what Hannibal achieved here. The amazing 'reverse-refusal' he administered with his infantry maneuver constituted a giant trap. His center was deployed in a convex manner, so as to entice the advancing Romans (aggressive by nature) to attack them, and the placing of 2 strong blocks of African infantry on either wing and further back meant not only would the enemy tend to suck into the center, but if things went amiss fugitives from his Celtic and Iberian units would also be funnelled into the center where they could bunch and slow the Roman advance - even if they didn't want to. Hannibal personally commanded the center, as he intended his troops at this point to stage one of the most difficult maneuvers a unit could be asked of by their commander to pull off in battle - they were to fall back under the pressure of the Romans' advance, but not break. In these battles of antiquity, most of the casualties were suffered as the defeated fled in rout. Of course, those who fled first had the best chance of getting away. For an army to fight effectively, particularly under these circumstances, each soldier had to trust that his comrades would not leave him in the lurch. This paramount level of trust was tested to its fullest when their battle line started to bend backwards. This was an amazing display of leadership at the helm of polyglot contingents. Hannibal's unusual placing of the more numerous shock cavalry on the confined flank near the Aufidus River, with the Numidians on the other side, actually slightly outnumbered by the Roman allied cavalry, meant that the Roman contingent would most likely be checkmated by the maneuverable Numidians, while the heavy cavalry would dispose of the Romans easily on their side, and be available for other tasks. Varro, the Roman consul, should be at least credited for realizing the right bank of the river was less suitable for cavalry, but Hannibal came up with an answer. The only way to significantly seduce Rome's allies was to destroy Roman armies, not just best them. No victory could have been greater for this purpose. But in the long run, Cannae simply cemented the loyalty of Rome's core allies - something nobody could predict without applying such a test. Part of Hannibal's genius lay in his ability to transcend the traditional ability of many soldiers of Iberian and Gallic heritage etc. With the great struggle with Hannibal, Rome produced a corporate heroism of contributors - Fabius, Nero, Marcellus, and Scipio were the main commanders that achieved the greatest Roman successes. But the likes of Publius Cornelius Scipio (the Elder), Gnaeus Scipio, Marcus Silanus, Gaius Laelius, Tiberius Fonteius, Titus Manlius Torquatus, Marcus Valerius Laevinus, Titus Otacilius Crassus, Quintus Naevius Crista, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (d. 213 B.C.), and Appius Claudius Pulcher, all contributed greatly for Rome to finally win in the end. In all, Rome had better commanders, and outnumbered Carthage by about 6 to 1 in total manpower reserves. She also had command of the sea, which Hannibal was initially able to circumvent. The Romans successfully played the Greeks of each other, thanks mainly to the Aetolians, were triumphant in Sicily, and thwarted the Carthaginians on the Iberian Peninsula from getting to Italy, despite the efforts of Hasdrubal Barca, and no thanks to the lack of co-opertaion of the other commanders, who failed dismally to vanquish the Romans at the Ebro in 211 B.C. when they had just 9,000 beleaguered soldiers hangin on. The Carthaginian navy failed to take advantages off Cape Pachynon, the south-east tip of Sicily, when Bomilcar actually had a superior fleet than the Romans (no mention of the corvus at this time). Hannibal has to be held accountable for something, as he engineered this great conflict, but these significant Carthaginian reverses were simply not his fault. Lastly, I do not agree with the story of Hannibal's 'oath' - to the point it clouded his judgment. That story, if not altogether apocryphal, came from Hannibal himself, told to Antiochus III of Syria to convince the Seleucid king of his hatred of Rome, and within the context of trying to convince the king that Rome could only be defeated by fighting them within Italy; part of Hannibal's grand strategy against Rome, which many critics seem to miss, was that he planned to fight the war not in which Carthage relied on her resources and the Romans on theirs, but increasingly he would fight Rome with her resources, while depleting her reserves in manpower by detaching her allies, even if they didn't join his cause for Carthage directly. It's a mistake to assume he was banking on Italian peoples joining him in arms. As Livy tells us, Book 34.60, "...Hannibal, a fugitive from his native country, had reached the court of Antiochus, where he was treated with great distinction, the only motive for this being that the king had long been meditating a war with Rome, and no one could be more qualified to discuss the subject with him than the Carthaginian commander. He had never wavered in his opinion that the war should be conducted on Italian soil; Italy would furnish both supplies and men to a foreign foe. But, he argued, if that country remained undisturbed and Rome were free to employ the strength and resources of Italy beyond its frontiers, no monarch, no nation could meet her on equal terms..." Just a point of view, and I hope I didn't ramble too much. I find this historical chapter fascinating. Thanks Spartan JKM

I am inclined to agree with you, Pantagathus, but only in the sense of Maharbal's vilifying of Hannibal for not marching on the Capitol. Polybius mentions Maharbal in his accounts of the Trasimene campaign (Book 3.84-86). In all probability, Maharbal did exist. Thanks, Spartan JKM

I've noticed many discussed issues about Hannibal's great campaign - yes, that very ill-fated enterprise of 219 - 202 B.C. This post is, as usual, merely a point of view of a subject I find fascinating. I hope we can all agree on that point I hope this isn't too long winded and choppy. My quotes of Polybius and Livy are from this valuable online service: http://www.uvm.edu/~bwalsh/RomanHistory/RomanHistory.html Titus Livius, The History of Rome Book 22.51, "...Hannibal's officers all surrounded him and congratulated him on his victory, and urged that after such a magnificent success he should allow himself and his exhausted men to rest for the remainder of the day and the following night. Maharbal, however, the commandant of the cavalry, thought that they ought not to lose a moment. "That you may know," he said to Hannibal, "what has been gained by this battle I prophesy that in five days you will be feasting as victor in the Capitol. Follow me; I will go in advance with the cavalry; they will know that you are come before they know that you are coming." To Hannibal the victory seemed too great and too joyous for him to realise all at once. He told Maharbal that he commended his zeal, but he needed time to think out his plans. Maharbal replied: "The gods have not given all their gifts to one man. You know how to win victory, Hannibal, you do not how to use it." That day's delay is believed to have saved the City and the empire..." So, was Maharbal right? The story, even if partly or wholly fanciful, is certainly well-expressed in dramatic fashion. However, Polybius, our more reliable source, makes no mention of Maharbal in his account of Cannae; he has one Hasdrubal and one Hanno as the primary cavalry commanders. I guess that trivia really doesn't matter, and no less an authority than Bernard Montgomery has claimed that Maharbal was indeed correct. This comes from another man of high repute, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, from Pg 12 of his Scipio Africanus: greater Than Napoleon, with regards to the Roman fugitives after Cannae, "...made their way to Canusium. Their situation was still perilous, for this place lay only some 4 miles distant, and why Hannibal did not follow up his success by the destruction of this remnant, isolated from succor, remains one of the enigmas of history, to all appearance a blemish on his generalship..." True, if the 10,000 Romans who made it to Canusium (another, 4,550 made it to Venusia) had been rounded up, they wouldn't have been available for Marcus Marcellus to incorporate with his own legions later on. They would prove very valuable in some slogfesting with Hannibal around Nola and Canusium. But despite the magnitude of Hannibal's astonishing tactical masterpiece at Cannae, his entire army, including a garrison for his firm base and wounded, was now around 40,000-45,000 men. But his effective fighting strength would have been no more than about 35,000. He had rounded up very swiftly 19,300 prisoners (this is where Livy is more reliable than Polybius), and from different directions. Any further military action, unless soundly based, would reduce these modest (given the numbers still available to his enemy) totals even more so, unless he could find the means to increase his numbers. Moreover, immediately following the Battle of Cannae, Hannibal learned he had lost many of his most senior and experienced officers. A period of consolidation was now required, and, of no minor importance, the battlefield was was covered with vast amounts of booty and military equipment - the very essentials behind the financing of his war. This bore very real implications; his soldiery were mainly mercenaries, and they had served him with the utmost vigor and loyalty, and it was primarily the prospect of booty that drove them to serve with him. They now deserved their moment of reward. He couldn't refuse them. In one respect, Maharbal was correct: Hannibal knew how to win a battle. Even Montgomery says in his History of Warfare, Pg. 96, "...indeed Hannibal's tactical genius at Cannae can compare with the conduct of any battle in the history of warfare...", and the great historian Will Durant states in his The Story of Civilization, Vol. 3, Book 1, Ch 3, Pg. 51, "...It was a supreme example of generalship, never bettered in history. It ended the days of Roman reliance solely on infantry, and set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years.... The Prussian General Staff of the late 19th century seemingly became obsessed with Cannae, and the 1914 Schlieffen Plan was inspired by the battle, though the scale was much different. Lack of manpower for a 'colossal Cannae' forced the substitution of a 'right hook' for Hannibal's 'double-envelopment'. Alfred von Schlieffen's scheme brought Germany close to victory early in WW1, but turned out not to be feasible with the arrival in France, among other issues, such as Schlieffen and von Moltke (the Younger) being at loggerheads with each other, of the British Expeditionary Force. Sorry, this isn't the place for this, but basically, Cannae would become an ideal of many future commanders, and the Wehrmacht's vast envelopments of the Soviet forces at the start of 'Barbarossa' were called 'super-Cannaes'. Gregori Shtern, the Far East Army commander under Georgi Zhukov, said of the great Soviet envelopment of the Japanese in 1939 at the Battle of Khalkin-Gol (Nomonhan), "...I think we have won the second perfect battle of encirclement in all history...". Norman Schwarzkopf, among many others, including Napoleon and Wellington, was an avid admirer of Hannibal's generalship. Hannibal's qualities as a general have been studied and admired since Polybius' time: Polybius, The Histories, Book 11.19, "...No one can withhold admiration for Hannibal's generalship, courage, and power in the field, who considers the length of this period, and carefully reflects on the major and minor battles, on the sieges he undertook, on his movements from city to city, on the difficulties that at times faced him, and in a word on the whole scope of his design and its execution, a design in the pursuit of which, having constantly fought the Romans for sixteen years, he never broke up his forces and dismissed them from the field, but holding them together under his personal command, like a good ship's captain, kept such a large army free from sedition towards him or among themselves, and this although his regiments were not only of different nationalities but of different races..." and, Book 15.15, "...But nevertheless to meet each of these advantages Hannibal had shown incomparable skill in adopting at the critical moment all such measures as were in his power and could reasonably be expected to succeed..." The 'advantages' Polybius means are those Scipio had over him at Zama, yet the battle was touch-and-go until the cavalry returned 'providentially' for Rome. If there was a single (double, actually) astounding key to Hannibal's military genius, it was perhaps those 'variations of a trap' - subtle uses of bluff and even 'double' bluff. Examples of simple bluff was his brushing aside the Volcae, at the Rhone, and the Allobroges at the Gorge de la Bourne (?). But his classic breakout at the Ager Falernus, where Fabius Maximus thought he had Hannibal trapped, was a paradigm of superb stratagem; Hannibal sent 2,000 oxen, their heads ignited by fire at night, up the pass near the 4,000 Romans guarding the exiting defile. The Romans rushed up the hills ready to engage what they thought were enemy soldiers trying to escape. Instead they found writhing cattle! I sure hope the movie includes that scene. Double-bluff was exemplified by the Battle of Lake Trasimene. Roman historiography has labeled Gaius Flaminius as a fool for marching into a trap in an area which Livy described as, "...a position eminently adapted for surprise tactics, where the lake comes up close under the hills...", but Flaminius, in reality a seasoned commander who had recently defeated the Cisalpine Celts (ie, he wasn't a stranger to ambushes), could very well thought this was too obvious - in any case, how could anyone in command of an army of 25,000 men or so expect to be ambushed? Hannibal's approach march to Tarentum in 212 B.C. was masterful - and another display of superb 'double' bluff. Instead of completely trying to conceal his movements, which would have been practically impossible, he dispatched 2 parties of Numidian horsemen, one on either side of his approach to scour the countryside. Thus anyone who spotted them would either be taken prisoner or simply report a Numidian plundering raid. The Battle of the Trebbia was an example of simple bluff. As Polybius tells us, Book 3.70-71, "...Such, then, was the purpose of Hannibal, who knew that Tiberius was sure to be aggressively inclined. He had long ago noticed a place between the two camps, flat indeed and treeless, but well adapted for an ambuscade, as it was traversed by a water-course with steep banks densely overgrown with brambles and other thorny plants, and here he proposed to lay a stratagem to surprise the enemy. It was probable that he would easily elude their vigilance; for the Romans, while very suspicious of thickly-wooded ground, which the Celts usually chose for their ambuscades, were not at all afraid of flat and treeless places, not being aware that they are better adapted than woods for the concealment and security of an ambush, because the men can see all round them for a long distance and have at the same time sufficient cover in most cases. Any water-course with a slight bank and reeds or bracken or some kind of thorny plants can be made use of to conceal not only infantry, but even the dismounted horsemen at times, if a little care be taken to lay shields with conspicuous devices inside uppermost on the ground and hide the helmets under them..." The consuls who were beaten badly by Hannibal have all been labeled fools, in some form or another, by Roman historiography. They certainly were not innovative thinkers, but these men were simply attempting to bring about decisive engagements, and waiting would not improve the situation. Much can be said for Tiberius Sempronius Longus' attempt to crush Hannibal before the Carthaginian's strength grew with Gallic aquisition, which was manifesting rapidly at the time. I feel it is also a mistake to think the 'professionals' under Hannibal were superior soldiers per se to the 'amateurs' of the Roman Republic's citizen militia. Despite the inexperience of the soldiers and stodgy concept of conventional warfare on the part of the Romans, we should not underestimate their fighting qualities. Once they found the measure of Hannibal's more mobile and flexible methods, they would prove themselves capable of supreme celerity and complicated maneuvers, evidenced under Gaius Claudius Nero and Publius Cornelius Scipio )(later Africanus). Remember that Rome was a nation-at-arms, and these 'amateurs' were trained for war from youth The amazing 'reverse-refusal' of Hannibal's infantry maneuver at Cannae even constituted a giant trap. His center was deployed in a convex manner, so as to entice the advancing Romans to attack them, and the placing of 2 strong blocks of African infantry on either wing and further back meant not only would the enemy tend to suck into the center, but if things went amiss fugitives from his Celtic and Iberian units would also be funnelled into the center where they could bunch and slow the Roman advance - even if they didn't want to. His unusual placing of the more numerous shock cavalry on the confined flank near the Aufidus River, with the Numidians on the other side, actually slightly outnumbered by the Roman allied cavalry, meant that the Roman contingent would most likely be checkmated by the maneuverable Numidians, while the heavy cavalry would dispose of the Romans easily on their side, and be available for other tasks. Varro should be at least credited for realizing the right bank of the river was less suitable for cavalry, but Hannibal came up with an answer. In final defeat at Zama, Hannibal showed he had lost none of his touch. He knew he was finally outclassed in cavalry, and up against a great general in Scipio. Though our sources don't imply this, he probably deliberately sacrificed his horsemen to lure the Romans and Massinissa off the battlefield, where he had greater chance with his infantry. By using his cavalry units as decoys, however, he was taking a risk by doing so, because it still involved their defeat, exposed his flanks, and the Roman/Numidian cavalry could return before he had finished off Scipio's smaller but better body of infantry. But he had to do something, and I don't think if they had held their ground they would have lasted long. The fact it was pretty close later shows Hannibal made a viable decision. Furthermore, Scipio had superior cavalry and proved his adeptness with 'boomerang' style tactics before. Hannibal was a student of war, and, as I said earlier, a master of simple and double bluff. He also knew his history, particularly that of the Hellenistic kingdoms (he had Greek tutors). He knew what happened to Antigonus when his son, Demetrius Poliorcetes, went off in pursuit of Seleucus' cavalry at the great battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C. It has been suggested that Seleucus did indeed have his horses feign retreat. But, unlike Hannibal, he had 400 elephants that day, so he could deploy some in reserve in case Demetrius returned. He never did. Did Scipio order his cavalry to merely ride out and ride back in the manner they did? Why didn't Scipio try a flank maneuver with his cavalry, as Hannibal had done at Cannae? He was certainly capable, and with superior material at his disposal. Scipio doubtless did not wish for the complete departure of his own cavalry. Having driven the enemy away, he no doubt counted on them to attack the flanks of the main Carthaginian body, instead of pursuing a fleeing foe. He has been justly praised how well he handled the elephants at Zama, but it shouldn't be forgotten that Hannibal certainly knew all about the tendencies and contingencies of elephants in battle. He surely hoped they would do their stuff, but he easily could have known they would do exactly what they did do - swerve out to the flanks and disrupt things, which would aid his cavalry deception. It is impossible that Hannibal thought things would go smoothly with recently levied war elephants, and it is possible they didn't do as much harm to his cavalry squadrons as the ancients imply (I stress 'possible', OK?) We have a scholarly point of view from H.H. Scullard, from his terrific Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician pg. 150, "...Since it would take longer to convert a nominal into an actual flight than to drive a defeated enemy off the field, and since in fact the Roman cavalry only returned in the nick of time, it seems more probable that the Carthaginians deliberatley drew them away. After getting rid of the Roman cavalry, though with little hope that his own could rally against them, Hannibal would throw all his weight against Scipio's numerically inferior infantry. The elephant charge, with which he had hoped to confuse his foe, miscarried somewhat, partly through Scipio's foresight in leaving gaps in his line for the animals to run through, partly because they were always of rather doubtful quality, and here fell afoul of the Carthaginian cavalry. However, they cannot have done great harm to their own side, since their drivers had the means of killing them if they got out of hand...". Scullard, more than any scholar of this period we're discussing, wrote a book about elephants in ancient warfare. I would like to believe he wasn't far-fetched with his research. Moreover, Polybius only mentions it was Hannibal's left flank that was disrupted by elephants sent out of control. On the right flank he tells us that the scattered elephants, "...while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight...". What confusion, Polybius, if the elephants escaped out of the field? How did Gaius Laelius so easily send the Carthaginian cavalry, though green but not outnumbered (assuming Masinissa's 4,000-strong was not interdispersed with the Romans), into flight? The flight seemed immediate. The answer is they quite possibly were ordered to give ground. His infantry dispositions at Zama were also unusual, probably becuase he knew he was at a disadvantage here too. He surely wasn't going to try to repeat his tactics at Cannae against a brillaint general who had been there as a 17 or 18 year old, thus wouldn't be taken in. Moreover, Scipio favored flank attacks with his best troops. Hannibal adopted a Roman triple-line, but with his best unit, his veterans, the one unit who could match Scipio's troops, at a further distance than the one between the 1st and 2nd line - a 'true reserve'. Scipio could not do to him what he had so easily done to the other Carthaginian generals the past 7 years. Hannibal absorbed Scipio's legions, tiring them in the process, hoping to beat him head-on. It wasn't to be, as Scipio was too good not to lose his advantage, as Polybius said, and his army was too well-organized and well-drilled. But who knows what might have been if the 1st 2 lines hadn't turned on each other and Massinissa and Gaius Laelius hadn't returned 'providentially', as Polybius also said. An attack on Rome never was part of his plans. Assaulting Rome could only be practical with the total dissolution of the confederacy. For Hannibal, the swiftest and most economical method of taking a city was by treachery, something inconceivable in the case of Rome, as the Senatorial class was far too patriotic. Despite Roman scaremongering, there were plenty of troops for the immediate defence of the Capitol. 2 city legions had been raised at the beginning of the year, and Marcellus had a legion of marines at Teanum, as well as 1,500 men at Ostia. A considerable force was raised from the slave and criminal population, and 2 legions were to the north under one Postumius (who would shortly be ambushed and destroyed by the Boii in Cisalpine Gaul). The Romans were still dominant at sea, thus they would easily have returned many, many troops from Sardinia and Sicily to hemm in a besieging army - one which had no immediate siege machinery. Furthermore, his lively and imaginative strategy entailed mobility, and a static war, which a siege or besiegement of Rome would require (not to mention manpower he didn't possess), would hand the advantage back to them, in which their superior numbers would come into play. Rome's superiority in manpower would still come into play, but not for many years to come. Rome was protected by the Servian Wall, which had been enlarged and strengthened after the great Gallic threat in 390 B.C. In the 370s B.C., the walls were further solidified by bonded blocks of tufa from Etruria. At the time of Hannibal, the walls of Rome followed a line about 7 miles long, interrupted by flanking towers and enclosing about 1,000 acres (400 hectares ?). At its weaker points, between the Colline and Caelimontana Gates, the wall was matched evenly on both sides by a powerful fortification: on the city side, a broad landfill, the agger (?), sloped gradually up towards the top of the wall and formed a platform on which defenders could circulate and maneuver. On the countryside, a trench was dug that reached a depth of more than 30 ft. (10 meters). Now, it is quite possible he didn't know the information I just provided to the degree we now know, but he clearly wasn't coming for Rome, and probably enetertained all ideas, being the composed, sober calculator he was. Also, it would have taken Hannibal, with his exhausted army after Cannae, upwards of 2 weeks to get there - ample time for them to prepare. There was a strong risk that the fermentation of rebellion which began to seethe throughout southern Italy (and even beyond) might subside with his departure. I think Hannibal pursued the only strategy that would break Rome, that of severing her ties with her allies, who furnished her with the arms, troops, and resources that made her fomidable, even in the face of a crises like Cannae. By marching on Rome after Cannae, it would have involved a compete reversal to that very strategy. How could he gain the appeasement of the peoples of southern Italy, whose ports could provide a great rendezvous for his allies from Macedon, Sicily, and Africa, and the colonies whose loyalty to Rome was more in question, and amongst whom much defection from Rome would occur, if he suddenly marched away into the heartland of the Roman federation, largely populated by peoples who had already closed their doors to him on his march down from a year earlier? They would certainly have followed a policy of 'wait-and-see', as had happened with Roman allies after Trebbia and Trasimene. Perhaps it was Maharbal who didn't know how to use a victory. Furthermore, he didn't seem to be aiming for the destruction of Rome, as his treaty with Philip V of Macedon suggests (Polybius, Book 7.9). Many critical comments of Hannibal's strategy have included allusions that he was bound to lose in a protracted war. As Polybius tolds us, Book 3.89, "...those means in which the Romans had the advantage, confined himself to these, and regulated his conduct of the war thereby. These advantages of the Romans lay in inexhaustible supplies of provisions and men...". But part of Hannibal's visionary strategy, which many critics seem to miss, was that he planned to fight the war not in which Carthage relied on her resources and the Romans on theirs, but increasingly he would fight Rome with her resources, while depleting her reserves in manpower by detaching her allies, even if they didn't join his cause for Carthage directly. It's a mistake to assume he was banking on Italian peoples joining him in arms. After all, it was this very concept that Hannibal allegedly advised Antiochus III of Syria to undertake, as Livy tells us, Book 34.60, "...Hannibal, a fugitive from his native country, had reached the court of Antiochus, where he was treated with great distinction, the only motive for this being that the king had long been meditating a war with Rome, and no one could be more qualified to discuss the subject with him than the Carthaginian commander. He had never wavered in his opinion that the war should be conducted on Italian soil; Italy would furnish both supplies and men to a foreign foe. But, he argued, if that country remained undisturbed and Rome were free to employ the strength and resources of Italy beyond its frontiers, no monarch, no nation could meet her on equal terms..." Hannibal may have been somewhat naive as to the nature of Rome's relations with her allies, a misconception anyone could have made, but he certainly understood what gave Rome her strength, and it was that very strength he attacked. Maybe he understood all too well the nature of Rome's relations with her allies. Time perhaps was on Hannibal's side, and we shouldn't assume he was out for a 'blitzkreig-style' victory. Perhaps it was opportunism, not a need for 'blitzkreig', that resulted in such quick victories from 218 - 216 B.C. for Hannibal. Remember, the Romans came after him from Ticinus to Cannae (after Fabius'/b] policy fell out of favor). If Hannibal had learned anything from his father, he knew Rome was immensely resilient, not to mention stubbornly proud. The 1st Punic War lasted 23 years, with plenty of serious Roman setbacks. But Rome won and Carthage was drained. Maybe he was hoping his own war of attrition, with the appropriation of Rome's own resources, in which the allies Rome depended on would finally succumb from a constant devastation of fields and farms, mingled with with humbling battle losses inflicted upon their masters. Moreover, the loyalty of the Latins was not unquestionable. After all, it was a Latin, one Dasius from southern Italy who handed Clastidium (modern day Casteggio), a Latin colony, to Hannibal upon his arrival in the Po Valley in 218 B.C., and this certainly gave Hannibal's justified confidence he could drive a wedge between Rome and her alliance. Nobody could have guessed that it was likely no more Latins would join him. As Polybius says, Book 3.69, "...the town of Clastidium was betrayed to Hannibal by a native of Brundisium, to whom the Romans had entrusted it, the garrison and all the stores of grain falling into his hands. The latter he used for his present needs, but he took the men he had captured with them without doing them any hurt, wishing to make a display of leniency, so that those who were overtaken by adversity would not be terrified and give up hope of their lives being spared by him. He conferred high honors on the traitor, as he was anxious to win over those in positions of authority to the Carthaginian cause..." And Livy, Book 21.48, "...Hannibal had encamped not far from there, and in spite of his elation at his successful cavalry action he felt considerable anxiety at the shortness of supplies which, owing to his marching through hostile territory where no stores were provided, became more serious day by day. He sent a detachment to the town of Clastidium where the Romans had accumulated large quantities of corn. Whilst they were preparing to attack the place they were led to hope that it would be betrayed to them. Dasius, a Brundisian, was commandant of the garrison, and he was induced by a moderate bribe of 400 gold pieces to betray Clastidium to Hannibal. The place was the granary of the Carthaginians while they were at the Trebia. No cruelty was practiced on the garrison, as Hannibal was anxious to win a reputation for clemency at the outset..." Livy says, after Cannae, Book 22.61, "...How far that disaster surpassed previous ones is shown by one simple fact. Up to that day the loyalty of our allies had remained unshaken, now it began to waver, for no other reason, we may be certain, than that they despaired of the maintenance of our empire..." Clearly, the solidarity of the Roman federation cracked after the smashing victory at Cannae. Now, Hannibal's strategy, after they wouldn't discuss peace, was to be primarily intensely diplomatic. But more than Cannae, it was 7 years later in which Hannibal's grand strategy may have been succeeding: Livy, Book 27.9, "...There were at the time thirty colonies belonging to Rome. Twelve of these announced to the consuls through their representatives in Rome that they had no means from which to furnish either men or money. The colonies in question were Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba, Carseoli, Sora, Suessa, Cercei, Setia, Cales, Narnia and Interamna. The consuls, startled by this unprecedented step, wanted to frighten them out of such a detestable course, and thought that they would succeed better by uncompromising sternness than by adopting gentle methods. 'You colonists,' they said, 'have dared to address us, the consuls, in language which we cannot bring ourselves to repeat openly in the senate, for it is not simply a refusal of military obligations, but an open revolt against Rome'..." Not only did Hannibal render Campania unavailable to Rome, but there were hints of disaffection spreading elsewhere. Livy tells us, Book 27.21, "...In the middle of the elections considerable anxiety was created by the intelligence that Etruria had revolted. C. Calpurnius, who was acting in that province as propraetor, had written to say that the movement was started at Arretium. Marcellus, the consul elect, was hastily despatched thither to ascertain the position of affairs, and if he thought it sufficiently serious to require the presence of his army he was to transfer his operations from Apulia to Etruria...' and, regarding Etrutia, Book 27.24, "...Day by day the reports from Arretium became more serious and caused increasing anxiety to the senate. Written instructions were sent to C. Hostilius, bidding him lose no time in taking hostages from the townspeople, and C. Terentius Varro was sent with powers to receive them from him and conduct them to Rome. As soon as he arrived, Hostilius ordered one of his legions which was encamped before the city to enter it in military order, and he then disposed the men in suitable positions. This done, he summoned the senators into the forum and ordered them to give hostages for their good behaviour. They asked for forty-eight hours for consideration, but he insisted upon their producing the hostages at once, and threatened in case of refusal to seize all their children the next day. He then issued orders to the military tribunes and prefects of allies and centurions to keep a strict watch on the gates, and to allow no one to leave the city during the night. There was too much slackness and delay in carrying out these instructions; before the guards were posted at the gates seven of the principal senators with their children slipped out before it was dark. Early on the morrow, when the senators began to assemble in the forum, the absence of these men was discovered, and their property was sold. The rest of the senators offered their own children to the number of one hundred and twenty; the offer was accepted, and they were entrusted to C. Terentius to be conveyed to Rome. The report he gave to the senate made matters look still more serious. It seemed as though a rising throughout Etruria was imminent. C. Terentius was accordingly ordered to proceed to Arretium with one of the two City legions and occupy the place in force, C. Hostilius with the rest of the army was to traverse the entire province and see that no opening was afforded for revolutionary disturbances. When C. Terentius and his legion reached Arretium, he demanded the keys of the gates. The magistrates replied that they could not find them, but he was convinced that they had been deliberately carried off and not lost through carelessness, so he had fresh locks fitted on all the gates, and took especial precautions to have everything under his own control. He earnestly impressed upon Hostilius the need of vigilance, and warned him that all hope of Etruria remaining quiet depended upon his taking such precautions as to make any movement of disaffection impossible... Yes, Hannibal did ultimatley fail. But can we really think of him as a complete failure? I guess it comes down to one's impressionable nature, but in my opinion, Hannibal wasn't a complete failure at all. It took nearly 2 decades for Rome to overcome him, and although he had, at least in the first few years, an excellent war staff, he never had allies that succeeded. Alexander the Great had Antipitar, who successfully, unlike the Carthaginians in Iberia, secured the home base against the Spartans and sent the great one reinforcements when he needed them (after Gaugamela). In all, Alexander received about 47,000 reinforcements for his campaigns after Gaugamela. Hannibal received just 4,000 of the many that Carthage dispatched throughtout the war. Scipio had a secure base and indeginous allies to begin with in Iberia, never had to venture far into the Iberian and African lands, and certainly never faced the enormous reserves of manpower that opposed Hannibal. Julius Caesar, though brillaint, faced unorganized tribal levies in Gaul, and his veterans were more than a match for the bulwark of Pompey's raw recruits. Genghis Khan had Chepe and Subotai to conquer elsewhere, and Napoleon had his brilliant marshals, particularly the great Davout. How can we call him a complete failure if, after 7 years, his strategy resulted in the defection of the 2 largest cities in Italy after Rome itself, along with 40% of the Rome's allies rendered unavailable for her, and when he beat them many times in the field (don't be fooled by Livy's patriotic rhetoric when it comes to some of these clashes in 209 -208 B.C.), including smaller battles after Cannae? Please don't misunderstand me; Hannibal had plenty of trouble too, as the war dragged on. His allies became a liability the more he needed to protect them from Roman reprisals in his absence. He could never establish a 'no-go' area south of Capua, thus Rome could continually wage war amid the interior lines, and when he did attempt an assault on a city for strategic purposes, he failed. The strongholds of Nola and Neopolis (Naples) would have been paramount for his cause, and the Romans adopted a successful policy of an indirect approach against him. But it took time, and as late as 207 B.C. things could have gone against them with Hasdrubal's merging with Hannibal. Another issue which is important is the seemingly common criticism of his inability to 'siege cities'. I find this criticism, forgive me, misplaced. His siege of Saguntum, in which he had about 150,000 troops and no hostile standing armies in the lands near him, was resolute and skilled in siege tactics, not to mention replete with a variety of siege machinery. Taking Saguntum was no child's play; it lay a mile or so from the Mediterranean and commanded the entire country within its visual, and lay on a long and naked rock, some 300 ft. above the plain. It was well placed and equipped to resisit a siege and very difficult to approach. Only so many men could be put to work on the walls. The operation was not as ingenious as Tyre or Alesia, but it is simply not credible for people to allude that Hannibal could not siege a city. In my opinion, of course. It should be noted that Hannibal took the Iberian towns of Carteia, Arbocala and Salamantica, as well as Saguntum, and did capture Italian strongholds at Turin and Casilinum by storm, though without a lumbering 'siege-train'. Sieging strongholds in Italy would greatly impede his freedom of maneuver, and if he captured towns completely against their will, they would certainly not be reliable allies. Gaining allies, even loosely, could not be attained by assaulting their cities. He always attempted to appeal to the people first, as at Nola, in which the Popular Party favored his alliance with him. Marcus Marcellus' stout intervention at Nola was a supreme factor in the war for Rome's cause. Hannibal would also have had to garrison strongholds he captured by force, which he could ill afford to do, as Livy tells us, Book 26.38, "...Hannibal's principal cause of anxiety was the effect produced by the fall of Capua. It was generally felt that the Romans had shown greater determination in attacking than he had in defending the place, and this alienated many of the Italian communities from him. He could not occupy them all with garrisons unless he was prepared to weaken his army by detaching numerous small units from it; a course at that time highly inexpedient. On the other hand he did not dare to withdraw any of his garrisons and so leave the loyalty of his allies to depend upon their hopes and fears..." The last quote from Livy clearly illustrates Hannibal's need for reinforcements by a certain period, probably around 213 B.C. or so. Of the 77,000+ troops dispatched by Carthage throughout the war (not including his initial invasion), only 4,000 reached him, at Locri in 215 B.C. His defensive war became increasingly difficult without help from outside Italy. He had accomplished enough on his own for southern Italy to be a great rendezvous for the forces and fleets of Macedon, from the East, and the Carthaginian contingents throughout Sicily, Africa, and Iberia to be put forth and land here. That it could have been possible for substantial forces to reach him was demonstrated not only by the disembarkation of those 4,000 and Hannibal's successfull landing in Africa in 203 B.C., but also by Mago's arrival at and seizure of Genoa with some 14,000 troops as late as 206 B.C., coupled with the fact that supplies and troops numbering an additional 6,800 (and 7 elephants) reached him from Africa. I know - 'would have, could have, should have'. Polybius even records of a Carthaginian landing at Pisa in 217 B.C. before Trasimene: Book 3.96, "...Owing to this success the prospects of the Romans in Spain began thenceforth to look brighter. But the Carthaginians, on the news of their defeat, at once manned and dispatched seventy ships, regarding the command of the sea as necessary for all their projects. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisa in Italy, the commander believing they would meet Hannibal there, but on learning that the Romans had at once put to sea from Rome itself with a hundred and twenty quinqueremes to attack them, they sailed back again to Sardinia and thence to Carthage..." What else could Hannibal have done? Standing on the defensive in Iberia, where he certainly could have handled invading Roman forces? No, though he certainly could ahve handled Roman forces sent to Iberia initially, fighting Rome outside Italy would not have worked in the long run; Rome suffereed many disasters, on sea and land, in the 1st War, yet still won, and if Hannibal destroyed Roman expeditionary forces, more would have come. Besides, they would have simply struck at Africa. This is exactly what happened in the 2nd War, when, despite Hannibal's continued presence in southern Italy, the Romans decided not to cut their losses after the defeat of the elder Scipios in 211 B.C., but to send more forces, about 25,000 men, to Iberia between Nero and Scipio. Indeed, Hannibal did envisage attacking Roman forces upon Africa and Iberia, as he cross-posted some 30,000 Africans to Iberia and vice-versa. This was strategically prudent, as he menat to weave solidarity between Iberia and Africa in the testing times ahead. This action also lessened the chance of desertion, with soldiers not stationed in their native lands. Should he have not gone too war at all? Absolutely not; it may have taken a little while, but war was coming. The whole history of Roman diplomacy before and after Hannibal suggests that her demands would not have ceased with Hannibal laying off Saguntum. His great strike into Italy was a classic example of attack is the best defense. I think the arguments concerning Hannibal as a 'failure', despite credible points of view, amounts to saying that he shouldn't have gone to war in the first place. What if he had backed down with Saguntum? What next? Appeals to Rome from New Carthage? Gades? Utica? The outcome of acquiescing to Roman demands could have led to the abandonment of Carthage itself. In 150 B.C., Rome demanded that Carthage resettle not less than 10 miles from the sea. With the great struggle with Hannibal, Rome produced a corporate heroism of contributors - Fabius, Nero, Marcellus, and Scipio were the main commanders that achieved the greatest Roman successes. But the likes of Publius Cornelius Scipio (the Elder), Gnaeus Scipio, Marcus Silanus, Gaius Laelius, Tiberius Fonteius, Titus Manlius Torquatus, Marcus Valerius Laevinus, Quintus Naevius Crista, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (d. 213 B.C.), and Appius Claudius Pulcher, all contributed greatly for Rome to finally win in the end. In all, Rome had better commanders, and outnumbered Carthage by about 8 to 1 in total manpower reserves. She also had command of the sea. The Romans successfully played the Greeks of each other, thanks mainly to the Aetolians, were triumphant in Sicily, and thwarted the Carthaginians on the Iberian Peninsula from getting to Italy, despite the efforts of Hasdrubal Barca, and no thanks to the lack of co-opertaion of the other commanders, who failed dismally to vanquish the Romans at the Ebro in 211 B.C. when they had just 9,000 beleaguered soldiers hangin on. The Carthaginian navy failed to take advantages off Cape Pachynon, the south-east tip of Sicily, when Bomilcar actually had a superior fleet than the Romans (no mention of the corvus at this time). Hannibal has to be held accountable for something, as he engineered this great conflict, but these significant Carthaginian reverses were simply not his fault. In this titanic struggle of antiquity - a world war for its time - Carthage had but one man on her side who achieved anything significant (with the possible exception of his brother's defeat of the elder Scipios). He was one of the greatest field commanders in military history, one who indeed possessed strategic vision and fully understood that policy, not merely battle victories, will win a war. I think if we could have sat down and had a chat with Hannibal (he reputedly had a peculiar sense of humor) in 219 B.C. in Iberia, he would have agreed that his upcoming enterprise was quite a gamble. But I think he would have told us he would rather fail trying than to never gamble at all. So, I think no, Maharbal was not right. I think Hannibal was just as intelligent as his critics, and made the most viable decisions to bring Rome down. It just never was going to work. But his genius nearly pulled it off, and so stern a test was never applied again to a rising power by a weaker one (militarily speaking). Thanks, Spartan JKM