Virgil61

If we adjust the question and ask what armies have been successful fighting guerrilla warfare or COIN (counter-insurgency to use the new phrase) the answer shows just how difficult a fight it is. The list of successful COIN operations in modern times is pretty thin. Off the top of my head there's the Brits during the Boer War and Malayan Emergency, the US during the Philippine-American War and nominally in Iraq under "the Surge". I think there's a strong argument that the Roman attempts at COIN were historically more successful than most armies.

I think there's a strong argument that the Roman army under the late-Republic/Principate could hold their own at

Archaeological evidence show that the Romans suffer great loses at the start of the revolt and one legion, the XXII Deiotariana, was completely wiped out and the revels strike coins to celebrate their new found independence. The Romans respond by concentrating their army in Judea in great numbers and they virtually wiped out any places in Judea that could show sympathy to the rebels, in simply terms the Romans were force to enter an attrition war until the overcome their enemy. This Roman method of counter-insurgency here is interesting in that there is something familiar to the approach involved. It's a tried and true strategy of 'draining the swamp' of support for insurgents; supplies and sympathizers (villages) are eliminated decreasing the ability of guerrillas to move freely. During the Boer War the Brits corralled the civilian populace and used a block house strategy to whittle down the Boer area of operations. In Iraq company and platoon sized elements were sent to Sunni areas to live in the smaller towns and villages for 12 month tours lessening the ability of insurgents to move anonymously [we avoided the Roman approach of razing villages]. I'm simplifying of course, the Roman approach was blunt, cruel and harsh (some argue the Brit approach was), but its a sound one. The Romans were engaged in Spain for several years during the 2nd and 1st centuries BC. The terrain and guerrilla operations of some of the indigenous tribes being to blame for the difficulty if I remember correctly. Off the top of my head I recall at one Roman commander in another region adjusting to the local battle by having his cohorts conduct operations in mountainous areas without armor in order to track and engage the enemy. EDIT to add: There's always this Air Force Command and Staff College paper. A lot to quibble with maybe, but still an interesting read; [Opens PDF File] LESSONS FROM ANTIQUITY: WHAT THE ROMANS TEACH US ABOUT INSURGENCIES

Labienus almost annihilated Caesar's whole bloody army. According to Caesar's henchmen, the only reason Caesar was let off the hook was that Labienus wanted to give Metellus Scipio the honors of finishing off the rascal. What is the best source for the Battle of Ruspina? Was it an orderly retreat in the face of overwhelming odds, or was it a major debacle? de Bello Africo is one source: http://www.forumromanum.org/literature/caesar/africoe.html It's a testament to his troops--and probably because of the veterans that he had within the ranks--that they kept their cool in spite of their fears and kept their faith in JC. The formations to counter the encirclement and the extension of his lines to 'break the circle' are quite an insight into the kind of command and control JC had, the response to training of these mostly raw troops and into the junior leadership he had on hand to carry it out. By the way a lot of German historians of the 19th century had differing theories as to what kind of drills and marches may have been used but that's not the point, the point is he responded quickly using the tools available. Ruspina is more military art than military science. [it's possible that this sort of encirclement scenario was predicted and this tactic was thought up as a possible counter to it. Speculation of course but it would make sense if you were 'wargaming' scenarios as a commander.] It wasn't a debacle, but not a win for JC. It was a tactical win by Labienus but the reality was he didn't need a tactical 'win' he needed to annihilate JC. The story goes that later that night deserters from Labienus' camp claimed that he'd hoped for panic and confusion in the ranks. He miscalculated his old commander even in defeat.

Nothing short of Nobel Prize winning genius! I'm not sure if O is a genius but knowing how one gets on law review journals--samples submitted anonymously with a # rather than name and then reviewed by a committee--he's certainly got smarts to have made it as part of one of the two or three most prestigious law journals in the country (Harvard Law Review).

I'm thinking proscriptions had as much to do with the number of New Men then anything else. Sulla (amongst others) did kill him some prominent families and family members.

It was probably their version of our Darwin Awards jokes. During the siege Tiberius looks up the wall inquisitively and exclaims: "Hey Clodius those sure are big rocks!" Clodious (muffled voice from under his shield): "What's that Tiberius?...[big *PLONK* sound]...Tiberius?...Tiberius?..."

All these years of reading on Rome, military history and history in general and I been meaning to but haven't gotten to this one yet. I've read his Strategy and The Rommel Papers a long time ago and remember them to be pretty decent reads.

I highly recommend JFC Fuller's flawed masterpiece; Caesar: Man, Soldier and Tyrant. Fuller is most certainly wrong in his central criticism of what he thinks is Caesar's irresponsibility as a commander [and he's been criticized for it ever since]. He comes across almost like a sports journalist criticizing the New England Patriots for taking too many risks from 2001 through 2005 and downplaying the fact that they won three Superbowls in that time frame. You godless Europeans insert your soccer analogy here (I'm loathed to call that sport football). Fuller, an ex-commander who should have known better, forgot what is the motto of several military units "Qui audet adipiscitur" [Who dares wins]. But Fuller's insight into the mechanics of command, preparation, execution of Caesar's operational and tactical missions and his insight into the psychology of military leadership all through the eye of an ex-commander of troops himself are worth the read.

I love the idea of what they are trying to do--footnotes, translation notes, etc., readily accessible--but the execution (configuring for simple readability) leaves much to be desired. Especially nowadays when so many people are using netbooks, iPads, under 14" screens, etc on the go.

As great a resource as the Perseus web site is I hate using it due to it's layout. For example here I'm looking at an Ammianus Marcelinus page LINK. On the left is a Book/Chapter tree that takes up around 10% of the horizontal screen's space. On the far right are several bars with assorted relevant but not necessary material which--even when the info is collapsed--retains around 40% of the horizontal space and leaving nothing but solid 'white space' below it for the length of the page. The actual writing gets about 50% of the space. Just obnoxious, even worse if you zoom to increase text size.

I think the answer to that is probably. I wasn't clear enough. I meant--with an eye towards events in later 1st Century BC--that accompanying the Marian reform the appointment of position or positions whose task was to "settle" with the veterans, keeping military leaders out of the issue. But of course no one was prescient enough at that time to know what the fallout would be. There are however some good photographic images of possible areas of centuration and discussion on this blog specifically about some North African examples. Brian Campbell's The Writings of the Roman Land Surveyors: Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary (Journal of Roman Studies Monograph) is possibly the definitive work on the subject containing a wealth of detail of how it was carried out and by whom but I haven't got time to go through it at present. This is good stuff. I have a couple of articles in my "Roman Stuff to Read" files by Campbell (I just realized one is on land surveyors) I have never read. They just jumped to the front of the line.

Next you'll be telling us a wolf might not have raised two twins. I just read a few estimates from somewhere in the last few days, educated guesses on the manpower numbers. For the life of me I can't remember where unfortunately. Have you had a look at the essay in Blackwell's 2007 Companion to the Roman Army on the subject of manpower and the 'latest' by Luuk de Ligt? To narrow it down more is the fact that the generals become the 'go too' guys for land when whatever the call-up campaign was for ended. Laying aside the issue of where to get the turf, could the state have had a "land official or officials" offices or positions set up to identify and distribute (even conquered) land to released veterans independent of legion and leader (releasing army commanders of the role of proponent)? I put that out as just a thought. I don't think they were politically consistent enough or perhaps even administratively capable of doing so.

I think the concensus here is that early and late Roman armies were more or less identical in their brutality, Christianity only serving to give justification to the slaughter of non-Christian foes. I wonder, though, wether Alaric's Christianity played a part in moderating his sack of Rome? Most accounts seem to think so. Orosius says something to the effect the Goths (mostly Arians) were very respectful of church property while pillaging and even gives a vivid account of returning pillaged religious valuables to their places. Of course Orosius seems to think anything bad that happens to Rome under pagan leadership is God's punishment and if it happens under Christian (Catholic not Arian) rule then evil must be involved.

That's an observation--the ebb and flow of the ancient battle--quite few have made that passes the 'smell test' as we say. The line-relief at the small unit level issue aside, the bottom line--we agree on--is that there is a distinct advantage to getting fresh soldiers into the battle. I think the issue was the writer's attributed fondness for excessive formality or reliance on strict dress-right-dress formations on the battle line. But you're right, there is a wide range of options between a toy-soldier like disposition and that of an unruly armed group of Germans heading in your direction like a mob of fat wives making a bee-line through Macy's doors for the Christmas sales. Off topic but interestingly here are 'drills' which have replaced marching drills in the sense of marching drill's usefulness on the front line [in the Napoleonic manner] - LINK. A much different animal.

It's also a first example of invention. Nowehere, as far as 'm aware, do the Romans dicuss a formal manoever to replace the front rank in combat. The Romans were far more down to to earth than that. A massed sword fight is not going to be conducted with their centuries and cohorts in precise order. Although they were trained to present a persistent front (Always moving into a gap ahead of them caused by casualties, thus a 'relieved line', if somewhat less than the parade ground manoever often quoted or in this case filmed for the express rwason of impressing us with Roman organisation as opposed to representing real life behaviour), the realities of a pitched battle mitigate against such line manoevers. In conducting the 'Line Relief', there is a grave danger that an alert enemy could exploit the situation and cause chaos. I'm at a loss to know who you are arguing with. I'm wasn't arguing for the line-relief method used on HBO [or any specific method for that matter]. The question asked was a

A shame. I remember reading a couple of articles quoting some American and British archeologists complaining about the way things at Pompeii and Herculaneum are being run. Really very sad.

I seriously don't think a rehearsed chorus line of actors represents adequate proof of something that isn't documented in Roman sources. This is not a proof I'm talking about here, but a mere indicator of "Could it be possible to train average people to do that kind of system. Is it possible? Yes. Anyone who's both been trained and trained soldiers, been in combat and--less often--marched or been marched could point out that the scenario is possible. Certainly the fighting must have been exhausting--no matter what the physical stamina of the soldiers--so some relief in the first line system must have been in place as it was at the larger organizational level. As a practical matter marching over rough ground is more difficult but, with a proper guide system, possible. A more "loose" Roman formation was certainly more capable in rough terrain than the Greek phalanx which by necessity needed to be tighter to be effective [as Pydna showed]. It's doubtful an artillery battalion commander [like LTC SG Brady] in the post-War American army [circa 1947] would hold marching in much esteem. Parade marching tends to have been (and still) held in fairly low regard by combat arms units like artillery or infantry.

Kindle for PC seems to have limited functionality. I used it then found mobipocket ebook reader which reads the same ebook files Kindle does (mobi and prc). It's far superior in functionality than what Amazon gives you on Kindle for PC. LINK I also use Caliberwhich is pretty funky as well. It reads both Kindle and Nook type files.

I have two recent translations of the Annals. One is by AJ Woodman and one by JC Yardley. I've already read Michael Grant's Penguin translation and a couple of forgotten old versions. Anyone read either of these new translations?

That's exactly the point. There is no skill in drawing comparisons between ancient and modern because inevitably it distorts the ancient world in modern colours. You believe there is no skill in drawing comparisons between the ancients and modern (or any) society? Hundreds of PhDs in the classics and history have been awarded on the basis of 'skill' in comparative analysis of historical eras. Avoiding historical distortions are partially why history departments teach historiography and there is a discipline called history in universities. Chapter 4 of Victor Hanson's

To go slightly off post topic, Cato's (not yours the other one) intentions aside (as you probably guess-remember I'm suspicious, but that's another thread) I think one issue here is not so much giving veterans land as where the veterans wanted to be settled. Giving them land in some newly expanded area of the Republic might not have been a great problem but, if I what I've read so far is correct, most of these veterans of the late Republic wanted their land in central Italy and as the old adage goes you can't fit 10 lbs of sand in a 1 lb bag. Armies of the Principate don't seem to have this as dramatic an issue as the late Republic (though there was sometimes grumbling over the kind of land). To make matters worse I've just been reading that Sulla used a technicality to appropriate land for his veterans. I've been skimming Public Land and the Roman Republic and many of the Italian tribes had signed treaties that made much of their agricultural land legally the property of Rome though in practice it was left to be tilled by the locals for decades. Apparently he took the land regardless of whether the tribe had been loyal to Rome or forced to sign treaties. You can imagine the happy campers they must have been when told.

We can't because the forum rules say so As it happens, people do that routinely. In fact, by making direct comparisons, the temptation to paint the Romans in modern colours is distorting the picture. It is true there are parallels, for no other reason that the Romans were human beings too, and despite differences in culture some elements of behaviour are bound to be similar. The skill is to draw the correct comparisons and not to take it to far. The Romans weren't aliens but nor were they 21st century Royal Marines. However, there is an assumption about the Roman legions that isn't supported by archaeological or anecdotal evidence. In Life In Roman Britain, Joan Alcock describes the legion as "An efficient fighting machine". That's a common statement and one based on reputation and the idea that a persistent and detailed organisation implies certain kinds of behaviour. I won't contest the Romans were organised. They obviously were, at least in terms of organisation, but apart from unit affiliation and provision of duty, how organised were they? Note this extract... Certain soldiers are gramted by their conditions of service some exemption from the heavier fatigues. These are men such as surveyors, the medical officer, medical orderlies and dressers, ditchers, farriers, the architects, pilots, shipwrights, artillerymen, glassfitters, smiths, arrowsmiths, coppersmiths, helmet-makers, wagon-makers, roof-tile-makers, swordcutlers, water engineers, trumpet-makers, horn-makers, bow-makers, plumbers, blacksmiths, stone-cutters, lime-burners, woodcutters, and charcoal-burners. In the same category are usually included butchers, huntsmen, keepers of sacrificial animals, workshop officers, attendants, clerks who give instruction, clerks responsible for monies left on deposit, clerks responsible for monies left with no heis, orderly room staffs, grooms, horse trainers, armoury officers, the herald and the trumpeter. Digest (Tarentus Pateernus) At first glance this seems like an astonishing depth and breadth to legiomnary life. However, notice that in most cases, these are civilian trades already known to the individual. The legions did not train people in all of these tasks, and for many, the jobs listed are little more than specific but menial duties that aren't actually required on a day to day basis. Instead, they are listed as Immunes, trades or posts for which the lucky holder can avoid onerous labour. The point is that many of these are of exaggerated importance. Excuses to sit on their backsides in some cases. Also notice that the treatment of these individuals mirrors that of the villa system. Skilled slaves are given specific duties and kept from hard labour. The positions are excuses to sit on their backside, but that is one of the benefits that no doubt the individual was happy about. The system somewhat mirrors practice common in most organized armies. For example, currently trained doctors, nurses and other skilled medical personnel are given accelerated rank and additional pay in the U.S. Army. The system looks like an incentive to keep skilled labor. It also recognizes the fact that for an army to operate efficiently it does not put skilled positions into the front-line ranks. Did this attitude of skiving and bribing really produce an efficient military machine? I don't know, most armies as you say "bribe" skilled positions though I'd use the word incentive. And yes, I'd say it does contribute to efficiency to some degree. Soon no skilled personnel would want to join the legions to make bows, helmets, shields, give medical treatment to the wounded and sick and so on. A small inefficiency contributes to a larger efficiency I think. We have letters like one recovered from Vindolanda, asking for underpants and demanding to know why their beer ration hasn't arrived. We have accounts, like those of Tacitus recounted earlier, or the insights provided by Josephus. Indeed, the letter is striking in how it looks so much like letters home from a soldier in any era asking mom for socks or complaining that the rations are short of edible items. Josephus is mostly quoted for the famous line that "Their drills were bloody battles, and their battle were bloody drills". Yes, remember I quoted that to you once to emphasize training on another thread (that got pulled). It does suggest an aggressive and grim determination in conflict, which was exactly what the Romans wanted from their legions. However, Josephus also tells us how dull witted and clumsy Roman soldiers could be in their business. Whilst engaged on siegeworks, Roman soldiers leave their weapons too far away, and an ambush by zealots results in chaos, one instance nearly causing the death of Titus himself. For all their 'traditional military discipline' as Drusus described it, it was quickly thrown off. Note also how Josephus gives an account of Roman looting, when legionaries are let off the leash deliberately by their commanders, effectively out of control for three days. Notice how quickly discipline evaporates in Pannonia and Germania. It's all very true. Yet none of it means the Romans weren't disciplined or professional, it means they were an army composed of--generally--younger men and of leaders who sometimes make mistakes. Discipline, as I wrote previously, is often notoriously absent from the most elite units be they a Roman Legion, the Army of Flanders looting Antwerp or US Army Rangers returned from Afghanistan robbing a bank in Tacoma, Washington (!). We cannot discount the endemic corruption, the fleeting nature of their uncompromising discipline in both peace and war, nor that evidence the Romans have left us that condradicts the image of an efficient Roman military. Of course there was corruption but there's no evidence it was endemic to the army as a whole at all times. Good Roman leaders understood leadership principles (pay your troops, firm but fair discipline, listen to them, have good junior leaders, etc). Bad ones--sometimes--paid for it. The trick is, I think, to walk the line between thinking the Roman legions can't be understood in any modern context and thinking they are some sort of example of uber-efficiency. The Roman Army--in any era--was neither completely exclusive in its experiences and organization or an uber-efficient machine. What they did have was a superior system and culture of producing soldiers and army organization, warts and all.

Speaking of discipline I have a copy of "Roman Military Service; Ideologies of Discipline in the Late Republic and Early Principate". LINK Interesting Bry Mawr Classical Review excerpt: S. E. Phang's Roman Military Service is a wide-ranging look at military discipline and a host of related issues from the point of view of social and cultural history. As Phang usefully points out in her introductory chapter, there are commonly held views of the Roman army that exaggerate certain aspects of discipline--decimation and the view of Roman soldiers as tactical automatons are among the apt examples--and thus severely distort a more complex reality. Rather than mere repression or organization in service of a tactical goal, Phang argues, "discipline" embraces a wide array of cultural practices that inculcated obedience, enabled the social control of the army by the elites who commanded it, and were shaped by a complex of ideologies. There is a wealth of useful information in this book, and it provides several new ways of looking at important aspects of the social and cultural history of the Roman army.

It's a fascinating subject. I don't agree that we can't compare the Roman army to later armies, in fact through experience and my own knowledge of military history the Roman experience in mutiny, discipline, etc., is often comparable to other armies (Army of Flanders, French Army in 1917, etc.). As a side note, in terms of discipline (not mutiny) the absolute worst tend to be the elites; paratroopers and Marines. The home of the 82nd Airborne Division, Fayetteville North Carolina, has been famous for full jail cells of paratroopers on Friday and Saturday nights. The British Royal Marines I saw (and partied with) in Injurlick Turkey were among the rowdiest people I've ever seen. Of course Roman methods were more brutal [as were many things in those times]. Again, the irony is that the most disciplined troops are often the worst in terms of behavior. One can speculate on the reasons and where they are similar or dissimilar to each other and the Roman experience. I partially agree that we can't take everything about the Romans too far in comparing military experiences but I believe the Roman military experience can a teach some basics rules of leadership to a perceptive military reader and the issue of mutinies does a fine job of highlighting it [issues of pay, excessive discipline, continued enforced enlistment, keep troops busy, etc.] In 1920 Wm Messer wrote an article in Classical Philology (Mutiny in the Roman Army. The Republic; William Stuart Messer; Classical Philology, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Apr., 1920), pp. 158-175) that covers similar ground on the issue of mutiny in the Roman army. He essentially accuses Polybius of being the first to exaggerate the Roman military. JSTOR charges $19 for it but Google Books has it for free: http://tinyurl.com/2wm9odf. [see the download button on the upper right.] Worth a read.