Virgil61

Bremer's decision to disband the Iraqi army wasn't so much ideologically driven as much as an example of his ineptness. Time and lack of focus kept me from a play-by-play in identifying what was ideological and what was incompetence--my error. I think the situation in Germany was dramatically different; many of the old guard Nazis were kept in positions of power for years after the occupation--an occurrence which has been subjected to a lot of criticism. Also, in the first year after the war, 45-46, there are many examples of Wehrmacht and US troops conducting traffic stops and patrols together--forgive me for not having the sources readily available but I've read first-person and official accounts of it happening. While not kept at massive troop levels the Wehrmacht for at least a time was used for population control. On the other hand there are dozens of examples of the nitwits at CPA arbitrarily making decisions on purely ideological basis. While the Iraqi Army decision might be discounted, the fact that tens or hundreds of thousands of bread winners were put out of work because cement-heads like Michael Fliescher decided government subsidies were counter to free market reforms. A nice way to create both a dislike of the occupation and a pool of recruits for the insurgency. Clearly Shinseki was right, and Rumsfeld was wrong. But I don't see how this disagreement has a basis in political ideology. As I understood it, Rumsfeld was a champion of the apolitical notion that low numbers of high-tech forces were more effective than high numbers of low-tech forces. This is surely a debatable issue, but isn't this a purely military debate? I don't see why Wilsonian idealists or Kissingerian realists would necessarily have opposing views on this matter. Again you're correct it is a military debate not an ideological one or more precisely as I noted, a civilian insistence on operational norms with little input from the military command. I suppose there's an argument if you cherry-pick commanders who either agree with you or are compliant with your whims there's military input. Again, I don't see the relevance of political ideology here. I completely agree that ignoring regional expertise and dismissing military advice is a recipe for disaster, but given these two ingredients in the recipe for disaster, the political ideology was just for garnishing the dish! I think I gave short-shrift to the counter-arguments and warnings given of post-occupation difficulties that were discounted by Wolfowitz, Cheney and co. The discounting was certainly ideologically driven I believe. It should've been Feith not Pipes (got my Middle East Daniels mixed up). Wolfowitz and Feith were both integral to committing for war on mainly ideological grounds. Both were largely responsible for post-war Iraq planning and discounted much of whatever countered their own view that democracy and free markets would be welcomed with open arms. In the best quote of the book one Army officer calls Wolfowitz dangerously idealistic and 'crack-smoking' stupid when it came to Iraq. This is of course separate to Bremer and Franks on the ground in Iraq. I'm not sure the author really had an axe to grind w/Wolfowitz, he compliments his abilities often. Ricks has been a veteran commentator on the Pentagon and most of Fiasco is sourced from mid to high level military and civilian members of DoD. Perhaps he may have become co-opted by their opinions, but then again much of what he writes I have some knowledge of as being truth. Read it if you get a chance sometime, I'd like to get your take on it.

I'm not sure that's the lesson of Fiasco. I agree the invasion was an idiotic decision in my opinion but having said that the occupation had a healthy shot at some measure of success in the first year ruined by ideological incompetence and the ignoring of Army and Marine advice which was suppressed in favor of political ideology and civilian insistence on operational norms. I saw Baghdad descend into anarchy because we didn't have enough troops to occupy and secure the city contrary to the advice of Gen Shinseki who insisted the force package be three times what was on the ground and paid for it with his career courtesy of Rumsfeld. I saw the window of opportunity being steadily eroded while I was there by Paul Bremer and his incompetent CPA staff who ignored military advice not to disband the army or put thousands out of work. 'Defeat' isn't a healthy option here on several levels and certainly not something I think will be beneficial or have anything to do with our existence as a republic. We leave and the present nascent civil war erupts in a bloodbath of huge proportions. We created this mess and we've an obligation to try and fix it. Perhaps now that ideological idiots like Wolfowitz and arrogant sh*ts like Rummy are gone we may have a small chance to save it although I fear it's to little to late. The point of Fiasco is that political ideology, ignoring regional expertise and the dismissal of military leadership's POV is a recipe for disaster no matter what the justification for the invasion in the first place.

Minor but important quibble, the correct term for an approach towards battle is tactical accomplishment not strategic. Cannae was the perfect embodiment of what is now known as the 'double envelopment'. If you don't think it belongs among the 'great' accomplishments of modern warfare then I advise you to study mechanized warfare on the Eastern Front during WWII and the executed battle plan of Desert Storm.

FYI to the group. This is an excerpt of the Ancient history portion--along with comments--of a suggested reading list for officers at the US Army's Command and General Staff College. An interesting selection. Ancient History Adcock, Frank Ezra, Sir. The Greek and Macedonian Art of War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, c1957. This highly readable short book provides a wealth of knowledge on ancient warfare. Anderson, John Kinloch. Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970. This volume analyzes the functioning of Greek armies of the fourth century B.C. and assesses Xenophon as a pioneer military theorist. Anderson examines all the characteristics of ancient Greek warfare during Xenophon's time. Also included are excellent photographs of vases that show Greek soldiers as they appeared during this period. Caesar, Julius. The Civil War: Together With the Alexandrian War, the African War, and the Spanish War by Other Hands. Translated with an introduction by Jane F. Gardner. New York: Penguin Books, c1967. Both propaganda and a soldier's tale, The Civil War describes Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon, entrance into Rome, installation of Cleopatra on the throne of Egypt, and final battles in Spain in 45 B.C. This work (together with three accounts that were most likely written by Caesar's lieutenants) covers the period of Caesar's final struggle for power and provides considerable tactical detail about his maneuvers. _______.The Conquest of Gaul. Translated by S. A. Handford. New York: Penguin Books, 1982, c1951. Caesar's narrative on the Gallic War, the only account actually written by a great general of antiquity about his own campaigns, provides information on Britain and its early inhabitants and also records Caesar's successful campaigns in Britain and Europe between 58 and 50 B.C. Partly written as personal propaganda, this work has much to say about Roman military history. Engels, Donald W. Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Engels presents an ingenious systematic study of logistics in the ancient world and brilliantly assesses how Alexander combined strategic and logistic objectives. Ferrill, Arther. The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation. New York: Thames and Hudson, 1986. In examining the military reasons for the fall of the Roman Empire, Professor Ferrill shows that generals and their armies were an essential component in the decline and fall. _______.The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great. New York: Thames and Hudson, 1985. Ferrill believes that the developments that led to the tactically integrated army of Alexander the Great laid the foundation of modern warfare to the time of Napoleon. In this work, Ferrill evaluates land and naval warfare in prehistoric times, the Copper-Bronze Age in the Near East, the Iron Age in Assyria and Persia, and classical Greek warfare. Good maps, clear illustrations, and simple prose make this a valuable guide to ancient warfare. Fuller, J. F. C. The Generalship of Alexander the Great. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981, c1960. In this analysis of the military abilities and actions of Alexander the Great, Fuller assesses Alexander's career as a statesman and soldier, and examines his great battles, sieges, and small wars in considerable detail. Fuller believes that, while Alexander was, one of the most audacious generals in history, "the risks he accepted were seldom left to chance; they were carefully weighed and calculated probabilities." Livy. The War With Hannibal: Books XXI-XXX of the History of Rome From Its Foundation. Translated by Aubrey De Selincourt. New York: Penguin Books, 1965. Livy (59 B.C.-17 A.D.) vividly describes the Second Punic War (218-202 B.C.) between Rome and Carthage, and examines the Carthaginians' early success, the famous Battle of Cannae, and Rome's victory over Hannibal at Zama. Reading this book offers a classical perspective on timely military questions. Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. Luttwak, an expert on current strategy and a leading defense reformer and critic, explores Roman strategy, tactics, and military organization in this well-written work. It has been required reading in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College's School of Advanced Military Studies. Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Rev. ed. Translated by Rex Warner. New York: Penguin Books, 1954. Thucydides, the best Greek historian of classical period, analyzes the wars between Athens and Sparta. The work has appeared in numerous editions. This classic is especially prized for showing the relationship between war and society, assessing war aims, and exploring the human factor in war. Xenophon. The March Up Country: A Modern Translation of the Anabasis. Translated by W. H. Rouse. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. If the modern soldier looks to ancient history for knowledge and perspective, Xenophon (431-345 B.C.) is an admirable guide. His immortal story of the march of the Ten Thousand from Babylon through the mountains of Armenia to the Black Sea discloses much about ancient warfare and the timeless nature of military operations and leadership.

I just finished Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq by Thomas E. Ricks. Ricks is a veteran correspondent for the Washington Post who covers the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Pentagon. As such he's developed over the years a close relationship with military and civilian personnel in DOD. It's done him well. Rick's book functions to a large extent, as a checklist of how to screw up the occupation of a country. Dispensing with whether the invasion was wise or not he deals directly with how the chief architects of the invasion ignored a large number of mainly Army general's advice. Initial advice briefed by the Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki was brushed aside by an energetic and arrogant Sec of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, whose dislike for the Army generals he found was barely hidden. They were 'Clinton's generals' in his mind, even though the former president generally had little to do with the majority of internal army promotions. This disaffection and lack of engagement with military professionals in favor of picked men and civilian led military planning would lead to laying the groundwork for further disasters down the line. General Tommy Franks, the chief of CENTCOM (in charge of the region containing Afghanistan and Iraq), also comes under fire. Most officers who knew or worked with him considered him energetic but not the strategic thinker needed for the job. His short-sightedness went so far that he considered his role over after the capture of Baghdad and 'disengaged' from day-to-day leadership as he prepared for retirement, even planning on a vacation in the Bahamas two weeks after Baghdad's capture. Frank's eyes off the ball and Rumsfeld's optimism that Iraq would right itself resulted in a series of misplaced personnel appointments. A large number of old-guard generals with years of experience and who'd learned lessons of Vietnam resigned since they'd fallen out of favor with Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Pipes (W and P being protagonists of the invasion and optimists that post-war Iraq could be 'righted' by proper civilian guidance). In a few months the US Army lost a reservoir of talented leaders whose experience would be lost in the upcoming months and years. Rumsfelds lieutenants like Wolfowitz, Pipes and others are addressed mainly through the eyes of senior Marine and army officers who disdained their views and lack of realism. Paul Bremer's appointment as the head of the Civilian Provisional Authority highlighted the lack of planning or approach to the post-war occupation of Iraq. Without a plan and with young inexperience political appointees one of whom described his favorite previous job as 'ice-cream truck driver' he pushed forth several wrong-headed and disasterous orders. The worst being the disbandment of the Iraqi army followed by the discharge of hundreds of thousands of factory employees subsidized by the government as well as the firing of anyone with mid level or higher Baathist party connections. The insurgency's pool of prospects was expanded by countless degrees with these decisions. Even some units of the Army, especially the 4th Infantry Division, misunderstood the nature of the occupation with heavy-handed approaches towards civilians. Worse still, the general appointed to oversee Iraq, Sanchez, was the lowest ranking 3 star in the Army and a logistics expert who clashed with Bremer. It's not happy reading. The civilian leadership, led by the Rumsfelds and Wolfowitzes, guided by ideology refused face the realistic challenges ahead of it and with little guidance from Middle Eastern experts, bypassing Army generals who cautioned them and refusing to see the reality of post-war Iraq laid the groundwork for the current ongoing conflict. It's ugly, but it is riveting. Rick's sources are often named and he names names without hesitation. If I could recommend only one book on the subject and one that espouses my own views and experiences from Iraq and goes beyond them it would be Fiasco. I can't recommend it highly enough.

In North Carolina and Virginia there was a big interest in the Civil War of course, otherwise I think WWII stands pretty tall in most other history buffs who I know. I do think Romanophiles who strictly concentrate on that subject are in a minority, but as far as those with history degrees I think there's still a healthy interest in the field as amateur dabblers. For me Rome isn't my only historical interest. I'm equally at home reading Russian history, early US, economic histories and have been known to go on a bender and sink my teeth into a few Civil War or WWII tomes. Some of the best histories and memoirs I've read come from the Civil War. Grants memoir especially is required reading for any follower of military history. In fact between the two, the CW and WWII, they've generated some of the greatest works of history I've ever read. I believe that the more one reads of history outside of Rome's--including social, economic and military drives and 'great men' from all ages--the better one can analyze Romans and their place within the realm of human history. I'm probably more adept and focused on Rome recently due solely to the existence of UNRV, a debt I owe this forum.

I present to you the findings of the next Nobel Prize winner in the field of science : Beer goggles' effect explained Scientists believe they have worked out a formula to calculate how "beer goggles" affect a drinker's vision. The drink-fuelled phenomenon is said to transform supposedly "ugly" people into beauties - until the morning after. Researchers at Manchester University say while beauty is in the eye of the beer-holder, the amount of alcohol consumed is not the only factor. Additional factors include the level of light in the pub or club, the drinker's own eyesight and the room's smokiness. The distance between two people is also a factor. They all add up to make the aesthetically-challenged more attractive, according to the formula. The formula can work out a final score, ranging from less than one - where there is no beer goggle effect - to more than 100. (Full article) KEY TO FORMULA Beer goggles equation An = number of units of alcohol consumed S = smokiness of the room (graded from 0-10, where 0 clear air; 10 extremely smoky) L = luminance of 'person of interest' (candelas per square metre; typically 1 pitch black; 150 as seen in normal room lighting) Vo = Snellen visual acuity (6/6 normal; 6/12 just meets driving standard) d = distance from 'person of interest' (metres; 0.5 to 3 metres)

Imperialism in general is simply an effective means to insure the survival, growth and/or maintenance of one's own empire by controlling those around you. In that sense there's probably nothing unique about the Roman version. The closest answer to your question I can think of is the belligerent atmosphere of the early Roman entity. Surrounded by constant warfare which eventually resulted in their acquisition of neighbors territory (Latins, Etruscan, Sabine, etc.) either through direct conquest, allied treaties or other controls one could argue that the mindset may have become the predominate approach by Romans to the external world. That's one possible argument that comes to mind.

Completely untrue vis a vis the Parthians. This has persisted as a silly myth for ages. The Romans especially from the 1st century AD, on handled the Parthian tactics rather well, even adopting some things like heavy cavalry themselves. Except for Antony and Crassus' bitter forays the Romans gave to the Parthians much better than they got. The rise of the Persians can partially be attributed to Parthian weakness caused by Septimius Severus' sacking of their capital and the massive amount of capital depleted from their treasuries. EDIT: I'd posit that the struggle with Persia became difficult as much because of the internal civil wars of the 3d century within Rome and what I'd say is the qualitative decline of the Roman Army because of them than anything else.

Thanks for that Ursus, and I offer my thanks to all as well. Can't think of a better place on the 'net, some wonderful minds here.

I sometimes think the NFL equals the death of fun regarding football. I'll watch and sometimes enjoy it but nothing gets me going like college ball. I'm not tied to any Pro team anymore--I was a rabid LA Rams fan years ago and follow both the Redskins and Seahawks. But college ball that I really enjoy. North Carolina is my team (bad year for that but we get Butch Davis as coach next year) and for any team playing Duke or NC State. I'm lifelong Notre Dame fan as well, with Boston College and the Washington Huskies perennial favorites. Give me a few decent college games and I'll sit on the couch all Saturday.

Arrived in one piece and it wasn't all that bad. No snow on the road and only about ten or so miles of it was really all that snowy. Beat the traffic, which was the most important thing. Never tried Steven's before but it's got a bad rep, I'll pass.

The Pass Of course the camera shots are only impressive in the daylight! See you in a few...

I am opposed to Rammstein unless (edit) these fellow Germans are allowed on the list as well:

Let's not forget the recent intel errors in Iraq which had me, for at least a week's time, helping search for non-existent large numbers of WMD. Interesting exercise nontheless which led my unit to this location. The artificial 'hill' (a 'swirl' allowing a road in the gap) was complete when we found it. Very eerie, like a late 60s/early 70s community college campus.

There are so many holes in the list I'm wondering if it's just a bit of a send-up to rile people up.

I'm not to fond of the 2000s listings. No Pink Floyd, no Allman Brothers, no Cap'n Beefheart and a dozen others. The List.

There's certainly something to that although I'd posit that even without any 'leeching' the Soviet state with it's internal cohersion, economic inefficiences and later Brezhnevian bureaucratic schlorosis--complete with an almost semi-instituted system of false reporting--would've done itself in. Western intel agencies, especially the CIA as a whole, were duped, possibly by their own mindset, into putting forth the Soviet 'menace'. I remember a CIA or DoD fact book released just before the fall in '88, which predicted Soviet parity with the US on the naval front in a decade. Whoops.

I'd reword it to say early losses were a testament to Soviet incompetence and Nazi advatanges in combined arms at tactical through operational levels, better battle staffs, and so on. Poor strategic decisions (or incompetence) at the strategic level changed those variables considerably. Comparing the incompetently led Soviet army in '39 to later in the war is about as fair as comparing the American army which was humiliated in the Kasserine pass with the same army two years later (not for nothing did the Brits originally call the US Army 'our Italians'). Both had improved vastly. I'm not sure that the '44 war w/Finland is indicative of anything considering the massive numbers in the struggle engaged by the Germans and Soviets further south. By that time both Kursk and Stalingrad as well as dozens of lesser engagements were won by Soviet forces. The Finns in '39 were a damn good army, well led and equipped to a large extent by '41 by Germany. In '44 German units were interlaced with Finnish ones and 'aid' included anti-tank weapons including the deadly panzerfaust useful in anti-armor warfare. No one should deny Western aid and no one says the Soviets were an unstoppable superpower. But it was their backbone, their tanks, their artillery and their soldiers that tackled the majority of the German army--never less than 75%. Re the winter, as an infantry instructer told us once; "If you're cold, hungry and tired, so is the enemy". The Red Army absorbed losses that the West never faced. It's tactics, it's successful tank models, development of mech warfare, development of an officer corps, artillery, tank destroyers, et al were--with exceptions--indigenous events. Neither does lend-lease or NKVD punishment battalions explain the patriotic fervor, cynically promoted by Stalin, which led to the defense of Leningrad or the victories at Stalingrad, Kursk, Berlin, et al. The allies never faced the cream of the German army in quality or quantity close to the Soviets.

You underestimate the quality of the Soviet Army, especially circa '43 and after. By that time the 'not one step back' policy was replaced by a general staff overseen by Stalin but whose operational decisions were generally left to the generals unlike the German high command. Most of the horror stories of Soviet armed forces being poorly equipped were limited to the first year and a half of the war. By '43 the Soviets production lines were pushing out more quantity and a decent amount of quality such as numerous T-34 varients. A West Point study showed that 75-80% of the German army (and a majority of their best units) were devoted to the Eastern front at all times. You can quibble about lend-lease and a second front but the fact is the Soviets took on the bulk of the German army and beat them.

Why not? If the institutions of the Republic had been strengthened and the Army's organization had been adjusted to bypass loyalty to individuals then sure.

Having all of Livy and Polybius works instead of the few books we have would be fantastic. Hannibal's bio from the point of view of a Greek that accompanied him (can't recall the name offhand), now that'd be a keeper. Claudius' writings--already mentioned, Hadrian's autobiography, Q. Fabius Pictor's early history of Rome to name a few. J.Caesar's 'Anti-Cato' would be a great find if only to stir up UNRV!

I'm an army brat as well Spurius. Frankly I think we've dropped the ball (in the United States) big-time when it comes to teaching civics at school. In a country whose constitutional basis was founded on Locke and other enlightment writers one must teach those writers to its constituents. Civics ought to be taught from 1st to 12th grade (is it anymore?). Not flag-waving patriotism, but the nuts and bolts of the US system and the responsibilities of every citizen. The Federalist Papers (who's read that here I wonder) should be required reading for high schoolers. My .02.

Remember the Constitution isn't the only body of law ruling this in the US, there are hundreds of congressional federal statutes, state laws etc, that supplement Constitutional requirements. As long as they don't conflict or supercede the constitution they generally are OK--affirmations or oaths being included. As for oaths including a deity I'm in agreement ith you.