auxilia

what a great find! thanks for sharing.

Excellent summary by Northern Neil. One thing: where did you learn that Theodosius employed 40'000 barbarians? I know he recruited many of them but I don't know of any such specific number.

It is understood that Roman soldiers didn't wear armor during everyday duties but only during the combat. Also, commanders usually let soldiers wait until enemy comes close before putting their armor vests on. Armor did make troops more tired and lorica segmentata is also known to be very uncomfortable to wear. However, make no mistake! No soldier would have been stupid enough to deliberately discard his armor. You won't care if it's too hot or uncomfortable when your life is at stake. As for Vegetius and his controversial statements you should check: "Late Roman Infantryman 235-565" from Osprey. 1. Vegetius may not have seen any Roman field army at all but only some local garrisons. 2. We don't know when he wrote. Perhaps in the 5th century West, where the regular Roman troops were rapidly being replaced by barbarians and foederates. 3. He may have been over-influenced by an influx of barbarians and foederates who usually fought unarmored, so, he wrongly concluded that regular Roman troops don't use armor neither. 4. He's too negative towards Auxilia Palatine troops. Many AP regiments were recruited from german tribes and some of them continue fighting in their native fashion-lightly armored. Overall, you'll notice that expediti were more a tactical necessity than anything else. Their origin may be traced back to the lanciarii-unarmored fast moving troops who attacked Sassanid heavy cavalry with shower of javelins. In the late empire, every regiment had some portion of unarmored troops that may have been used for rapid action in the battlefield. It makes a lot of sense since Roman adversaries in the West used speed and aggression as their primary tools of the trade. The Romans were often forced to chase them along the border. It was difficult to pin them down in place and soundly destroy. Even if Romans close on them, the all-heavy troops would have never caught the mobile, light enemies. That's why they needed a portion of light troops that could match the enemy in speed and aggressiveness. Expediti were thus used to catch up with the enemies, ambush them and to cut their extraction routes. The auxilia palatine squads were reported to have performed "special operations" on the Rhine frontier-they assaulted barbarian positions via boats during night and cut them to pieces and they do this without any armor. They used element of surprise and rapid brutal attacks. Byzantine army continued the Roman tradition in the east. They used troops called peltasts for such a role. They were light, fast assault troops. If anyone is familiar with Byzantine army he knows that such troops were very useful in combat.

I'm not sure about Julian's "poor leadership". The Romans gained the upper hand at Ctesiphon but they never managed to enter the city. Apparently, someone didn't react on time and seized the opportunity, so the Persians barricaded themselves in the city. Was it Julian or some of his commanders? Unfortunately, there's a major confusion regarding the peace treaty from 382AD. Athanaric did visit Constantinople but I ultimately reject any possibility that it was him who signed the PEACE treaty from 382AD. He probably did sign something....Perhaps, a low level deal concerning his small band of followers. It is suggested he transferred his bodyguards to the Roman military in the return for asylum. But, in no way we may consider Athanaric as a Goth who signed the famous peace treaty from 382AD. Simply, he didn't have any authority over the Goths in question whatsoever. The Tervingii had been fighting for 5 years on the Roman soil under their leaders without any input from Athanaric. He spent those years on the north of Danube with his small band. He lost most of his "kingdom" when the Alans and Huns attacked them, prior to 376AD. The Tervingii couldn't care less for Athanaric. So, the agreement from 382AD was signed with renegade Tervingii leaders, not Athanaric. I strongly suggest you to check this masterful work: Theodosius and the Goths: The limits of Roman power

Yup, I don't think it's the same Sebastianus neither. How capable general he was is best illustrated by his death Just kidding, couldn't resist. As for the post-Adrianople situation? How did the Romans perform then? If there's already another thread about that, please tell me.

Actually it's a very good comparison! I've recently watched an excellent documentary called "La guerra infinita" (infinite war) and the situation seem to be very similar to the late empire frontiers. This is mostly true but don't go too far in elevating Sebastianus. Correct me if I'm wrong but I think there was a skirmish near the city of Dubaltium where Sebastianus lost many men and barely survived himself. Excellent note! This is what struck me the most when reading about 4th c. Roman empire. Not only they lost to the Goths but they also proved unable to defeat them afterward. The Romans had been defeated before but eventually they would have crushed the enemy. In the 3rd c. all borders were penetrated and they suffered many defeats and yet they reasserted full control. Now, however, they failed to do so. Can we hear a bit more about Theodosius' campaign? I think he drew some troops from Africa, they chased the Goths all over the Balkans but on every contact the Goths gained the upper hand. Indeed, did Theodosius ever defeat any Gothic band? Did he win a single victory? His campaign in military terms, although very energetic, seems as a complete failure. Regards

Hi there, I'd been absent for a while. Yeah, I've heard some stories/theories about triple line being used at Adrianople. Indeed, there's no direct evidence. I don't know how Cowan interprets that triplex but in the book "Rome at War 293-696AD" there's a drawing of such triplex, according to the author-Michael Whitby, that had been used there. It's nothing special actually, he just places the light infantry in front of two heavy-infantry lines. If we assume, however, that such a light infantry line would naturally fell behind as soon as the enemy approached it would also imply Adrianople was fought in the customary late Roman two battle lines. Regardless of Adrianople, I have the impression that late roman infantry formation generally declined (or perhaps just adjusted to the enemies?) in complexity. This may be due to cavalry rising in importance. Perhaps, as early as the 4th century, it was no longer expected from the infantry to win a battle. On the other hand we know that infantry saved the day at Strasbourg. But again, the infantry force at Marcianople was massacred by the Goths. More importantly the army fighting at Ad Salices was a high level force (actually composed of some eastern field legions-probably of the comitatenses level) and they also fought in duplex acies. As we know, they barely survived and ended the battle indecisively (although the Goths strategically won!). Those few battle descriptions we have only suggest that duplex acies was the only way of deploying the infantry. Is it just because the armies of the day were just smaller (and therefore not adequate for triplex or quadruplex of the Caesar's time) or perhaps cause the foot troops were decreasing in importance and/or quality?

Sure. According to all I know it was still the premier fighting force of their day. Not so superior to their enemies like before but still superior. The so-called concept of fighting "at arms length" seems to be very popular. Offensive behavior of the Roman infantry was almost totally gone (though we have reports that the Julian's infantry performed very aggressively against the Persians at Ctesipon, i.e. they charged them). Instead it seems the shield-wall was the preferred method of fighting, i.e. they waited to receive enemy's charge. And missile fighting had undergone serious improvement. Not only plumbatae but also various missiles known as vertuae, lancae, spiculum were invited (though they all appear to be more or less similar) and all could be thrown if needed. Archery became the mainstream feature of any Roman army. But, I'm mostly puzzled about infantry's defensive stance and the shield-wall. We know that many troops had both a spear and a sword. However, reports from the battles of Marcianopolis, Ad Sailces, Adrianople all clearly imply the Roman infantry waited for the enemy to charge. The battle of Strasbourg also. So it might be possible that an entire front line used spears as their primary weapon. Perhaps, an entire army as well. Yet Ammianus gives somewhat confusing report in which he mentions that "tightly packed soldiers couldn't have wielded their swords". Unfortunately, he doesn't specify if those troops were the auxilium palatinum or the legions palatinum. And yet, we know that in those described battles the auxilium palatinum formed the front line while the legions held the rear line. Can we assume then, that the auxilium palatinum (many of whom were of barbarian origin and the barbarians mostly fought with spears) troops fought with spears while the legions perhaps used the swords? Also, as for the tactics it seems the good old triplex acies was phased out and the Romans deployed as an author of an Osprey book stated: "in their customary two lines".

Good summary

You know very well that he did All I wanted to say that largely is the wrong term. Even in the auxilia palatine units there was hardly more than 40% of foreigners. This is a problem. Who says it was necessary? You? "shabby performance of his day"? Read my previous post again, I took some examples of a thoroughly successful campaigns. During the entire 4th century the Roman army was by all means successful against all enemies. No border was lost. No territory was lost. It's as simple as that. Indeed, they suffered against the persians and Adrianople was a bitter defeat. But how we define what is a successful army, that seems to be a problem? I have impression that people sometimes expected the Roman army to do incredible things. Can we say that just because they didn't conquer the whole world it implies automatically they were ineffective????? They preserved the vast territory amid serious pressure on all sides, despite occasional defeats. What more did you expect them to do? To land on the Moon perhaps.... Of course, you're right. It's just that so many variables surround his work that we cannot rely on him completely. Yes, I give you the credit for this. Good point.

I agree with your view on this, especially regarding the centurionate issue. And indeed, those extra-curricular activities are well attested. This is more or less true, however, keep in mind there were periods during the Republic when the military service had been regarded as a dreadful chore as well. After the second punic war in particular, the recruits were also attested as having mutilated themselves in order to avoid the military service. So, this isn't something exclusively bad for the late empire. This is a little bit too harsh, don't you think so. Well, this had always been a problem. Even Caesar had to hold lengthy speeches to encourage his troops to fight Ariovistus, then there were many problems during the invasion of Britain, etc. No! Forget about Vegetius, I've already spoke about him. Yes, I agree that discipline dropped in the course of the 4th century onwards but this man wrote a completely Principate-nostalgic sort of manual . And it isn't manual at all. All we know about him is that he was a writer, an educated man-NOT AN OFFICER OR EVEN A SOLDIER! He perhaps never saw any major field army, perhaps he only wrote considering some totally poor city's garrison troops. Furthermore, he perhaps lived and wrote his work sometime in the 5th century when all hell broke loose. Especially in the west. Do not take Vegetius for granted, that's my advice to you. We shouldn't doubt that the late army was the effective force. If you don't believe me then take a look at this: Constantius the Great-defeated Goths and launched a pre-emptive strike on their territory forcing them to sue for peace. Constantius II-severely defeated the Goths, Quadi and Sarmatians in many campaigns on the Danube. Julian the Apostate- destroyed Alamanni and completely defeated the Franks in many campaigns on the Rhine. Valentinian-also fought successfully on the Rhine. Valens-defeated the Goths and launched a pre-emptive strike on their territory forcing them to sue for peace (from 369-371). Gratian-utterly destroyed the Alammani in some campaigns. There are more examples. Do you base this claim on Gibbon's work, it seems to me you do. His work is totally outdated and his "barbarisation" theory is well rejected by modern scholars. No one seriously thinks anymore that the 4th century army was composed largely of foreigners.

I understand what you mean, but we can certainly agree that those titles, like the palatine, did mean something better than those poor G.I.s who served along the border. Even though they showed the multitude of shortcomings they still represented better part of what was available at the time. Indeed, the term of elite may not be the most accurate one, but regardless, I'm sure you know what I think of. As far as I know every field army had some kind of the scouting cavalry (it would have been very stupid if they didn't). Whether they were a kind of permanently attached formation of an ad hoc unit it's hard to tell. Most likely any conventional cavalry could have been used for this purpose, like equites promotii, equites scutarii, etc.

Interesting. Thanks for sharing it. Do you have any info regarding the battle tactics on the ground?

@ caldrail Seriously, I do tend to agree with you on most of what you said. Still, I hold my view that the Romans at Adrianople did represent some kind of elite troops. I admit it's not that easy to describe precisely what kind of elite they were and it's even harder to comprehend it from the 21st century's point of view. You had said a lot with this-in theory. However, we do know very good it wasn't that way in practice. Even form the Caesar's days the 10th legion was regarded as the Rome's best force. The 2nd Parthica was the favorite legion of the Severans. There were always some legions that were simply better in performance than others. One thing that I consider very important to mention, however, is that you shouldn't rely so much on Vegetius. Honestly, I'm impressed with your knowledge and with that of some other members here, however, even the best scholars should know that not all ancient authors are equally reliable. Vegetius in particular. Why? Because no one knows when he lived and wrote his "manual". Some even believe he never actually saw any major Roman field army . I also believe in this. Additionally, the fact is that he talked so much about the "classical" legions and his entire manual is some kind of nostalgia for the Principate. And he seems to gives all the credit in the world to the legions of the Principate for everything while those of the Late empire are losers, indifferent and ill-motivated motley bunch of peasants and barbarian thugs. Especially his cardinally unbelievable nonsense that "soldiers stopped wearing armour and helmets because they deemed them as too heavy" (I paraphrased) is the absolute peek of stupidity! It is however, strongly rejected by all modern scholars and it is widely understood the soldiers of the late empire (at least for the field armies) were as heavily armoured as those before (cavalry even more!). Another nonsense is their "lack of training". There's a multitude of specialized units listed in the Notitia. Shortly, Vegetius perhaps shouldn't be mentioned at all on this forum. OR, he may have simply lived in the West, let's say, sometime after 410AD when the things started to fall apart-in that case I could understand his disastrous view on the late army. Keep in mind the Valens' army was about 15000 men at max. Out of some 400000-500000 active troops, losing some 10000 isn't really disaster. After all, the East recovered relatively quickly and they kept fighting the Goths in the immediate aftermath of the battle. I'm not sure what you mean....Ammianus clearly describes the infantry fighting correctly, holding their ground and even advancing on the left wing. It is only when the cowardly cavalry left them that their line became disorganized (I quote Ammianus): "This left the infantry unprotected and so closely huddled that a man could hardly wield sword or draw back his arm once he had streched it out" Yeah, that's exactly what I mean as well.

Well, I hope you know the Romans tended to use the term of "phalanx" in rather strange situations. They didn't use it only to describe the old Greek/Macedonian fighting formation but also to ANY FORMATION OF DENSELY PACKED MEN FIGHTING IN ANYTHING THAT REMINDS OF THE SQUARE OR RECTANGLE. They regularly described the barbarians of all sorts as fighting in the "phalanx". Also, the very Roman formation was often called the "phalanx". So, arguing that they reverted back to phalanx doesn't make any serious point. My point is following: we all know they had many weapons, and many troops had both the thrusting spears and the swords. However, which weapon appear to be used as the PRIMARY still remains unknown. Of course, it could have made serious difference if they used spears at the start of a battle and reverted to the spathae only when the spear got broken.