Divus Julius

Such is the glory of internet forums: we have managed to fill some 4 pages with an extensive argument that has established precisely that we... disagree.

Actually, I think that it's not so much me misreading my sources as you misreading half a sentence in a post of mine. My reference is, pure and simple to the fact that the law contained included a prodigal amount of regulations for provincial administration that remained in force for the entirety of the Imperial period. Regulations govern (in theory) how one does something; regulations about how to administer a province govvern how one does... run a province. A law containing extensive regulations for how a province is run could be said to "lay out details for how to run a province", to establish how I came to write my own sentence. Still, I'm glad that our Citizens' Rights debate appears to have finally burnt itself out

Well, I think we've pretty much reached the stage where we agree on the facts, we just disagree on our interpretation of them. Except for just a few points: I'm afraid we're going to keep disagreeing on the issue of the population of the empire being neither more/less miserable during the Civil Wars, before them, or after them. Not so. Before the Civil Wars, the provinces were liable to being bled dry by corrupt governors, and I seriously doubt that they would have no feelings on the subject of Civil Wars that would have a tendency to spread into wherever they might live and seriously churn things up (during the Caesar's war in Africa a major part of his largely successful propaganda campaign to win the local population over onto his side was a call to help him end the war quickly so as to end the massive destruction that was going on). With the establishment of the Empire both problems by and large ended. There was still military chaos once in a while, and corrupt officials is a phenomenon that will likely last as long as there are officials, but for the most part the Empire would have brought a sigh of relief to the provinces, who as we seem to have agreed lost nothing in the way of liberties or rights. "How can Caesar be seen as anything but Republican? Not only was he the product of centuries-long Republican society and family; it was not just that Caesar thrived from the use and abuse of the Republican rules. Each and any one of Caesar

Well, as we continue to establish each time one of us makes a post, we disagree. I don't see how Caesar's rule and political freedoms were necessarily mutually exclusive. Political freedoms, the "rights" of the Roman citizenry, I see as including things like freedom of speech, right for a fair trial, right not to be taxed out of house and home and generally be exploited, and so on, and these things Caesar respected. Citizens if they wanted, could criticize him, or praise his enemies. Cicero and Brutus made full use of this, and both maintained their friendship with Caesar (until Brutus decided to terminate his relationship with the Dictator). One thinks of the incident during Caesar's triumph where a knight; Decimus Laberius, made a number of open insinuations during a play that Caesar was a tyrant. The "tyrant" happily gave a him a massive cash prize for his performance in the play, though he scandalized the nobility by awarding an even greater prize to a freedman. Caesar's rule saw advances in some ways, such as the opening of schools of rhetoric that were for the first time in years open to all classes, thus allowing people who entered said schools to be able to gain prominence through oratory; the standard move of aspiring politicians when still too young to enter the senate, only know open to a slightly wider group. Caesar's rule was by no means a democracy: it was a meritocracy. Anyone with merit, regardless of who they were, could achieve prominence under the new rule, short as it was. Personally, I find this admirable. Caesar's will, of course, was always carried out, but this can, I think, be seen as a good thing as long as Caesar was the one in the big chair. He showed himself well capable of making sensible, impartial decisions. This is of course, a fairl narrow view: we should also examine the point of view of the provincials. Once more we are in huge disagreement on something: from what I have read of the transition of the Republic to the Empire, and the times before and after, the lot of the provincials improved enormously. While under the Republic they might get the occaisonal good governor; a Caesar, a Cicero, even a Cato (for all his faults, I will not deny that Cato was not a parasite like many of his fellow Oligarchs), but by and large a lot of governors were interested in nothing more or less than making up their losses in election spending. This began to tell: economic decline in the provinces was marked. Republian ideals were not much use to the provincials, who could not vote. Thus from this point of view; that of what was certainly the majority of the population in the Empire, the Republic's death brought no loss, and considerable gain. Better administration, relative calm and stability, the process of Romanization really starting to kick in - all these things would make me decidedly pro-Imperial State, were I a provincial, and had never had the luxury of being able to vote in the first place. One could make a case study out of the benfits provincials got out of Julius Caesar alone. Had his career ended after his 1st Consulship, he still could have laid claim to one very great deed: the introduction of his Lex Julia, which effectively laid out all the details about how to govern a province, pand was such a successful document that even Cato could find nothing wrong with it, and it was still being used as the basis of law well into the Byzantine period. However, Caesar's career was even more extensive than this, and one should also note his efforts to crack down on tax-farming, his personal reorganization of many of the provinces, and numerous other helpful measures. No loss of political rights here that had barely existed, much gained. In short, the way I see it, life improved for a great many people. Citizens could no longer choose directly their leaders, but they still posessed the inherent rights of citizenship, and life in general became easier, stabler, and likely as not more prosperous. For the non-citizen, as I have said, nothing was really lost, but signifigant gains were made. And may I bring up again that other critical point: the fact that Caesar's autocracy, whatever its faults, brought the huge benefit of keeping the military under firm control. This, I think should play a much larger role in this argument than it has thus far. To sum it up, I view Caesar as a man not just "great" in the historical sense, but also in many ways admirable, and not just for his many-sided genius. In his statesmanship he saw that it was neccessary that the Republic make the transition to the Imperial State, with a central government that could control the military. What is notable is that he tried to do it without terror, and used the power he gained intelligently for the benefit of the greater majority, and in the process revealed (or so I have become convinced through my reading of events) quite the opposite of what you attribute to him: a great respect for the rights of the citizen and his political freedom. It should thus, I think, be counted as a tragedy that he was murdered, and his banner taken up by Augustus, who was a great administrator, and a master politician, but lacked Caesar's genius, his respect for what I view as political freedoms, and as a result implemented a flawed system. Still, even flawed it was, I think, an improvement on the Republic.

I am by no means saying that the Empire was perfect, merely that it was a system that worked better than the Republic. This is why I think Caesar's rule would have been superior to that of Augustus; contary to what you say, I think that all evidence shows that Caesar did respect the rights of the citizenry, and had a clear agenda for trying to improve their lot in life. There was an a critical benfit of the Empire that I should have included in my previous post, and it is this: it could control the army. The Republic maight have been more democratic than the Empire, but it had no control over the army. The careers of men like Sulla, Pomepy, Caesar, and Augustus make this all too clear. This is a major part of the argument that, I think, comes down on the side of pro-empire. I have lived in a lot of places - Australia, USA, Singapore, Japan, and a few others. I very much appreciate living under a democracy, but just as readily I appreciate living in a prosperous country. Emperors like Caligula and Nero did stir up a lot of angst, to put it lightly, but one notes that as long as the Emperor was not overly insane or tyrannical, the system functioned far better than its Republican predecessor. Having the choice of living in the Roman Republic or the Roman Empire, I would live under the Empire. I appreciate having political rights and freedom as much as anybody (hence my preference of Caesar), but I must admit to the weakness of also liking to live in some prosperity and stability. During the Pax Romana life in the Roman Empire by and large was just that: stable and prosperous - far more so than during the Republic. On the subject of what constitutes political success, we must again disagree. Caesar's work was cut short by his assasination, but in the end, he remained the overall victor. To quote Gelzer again, what happened afterwards happened following the lines that he had laid down. He was the victor in the sense that he had laid the foundations for an imperial system, and that counts for something signifigant. I don't see Caesar's clemency as in anyway corrupt. It was autocratic, but then, he was an autocrat. To associate it with anything "Republican", I think though, is incorrect. Caesar was not pardoning enemies of the Republic - the Republic to him did not exist. He made clear with his comment that "The Republic is nothing - just a name without form or spirirt". If the Republic did not exist, then the Optimates were not fighting for any cause at all, but were enemies of his new Imperial State. He nevertheless set out to try and reconcile them; seeking their help in his task. There is a definite air of tragedy about the whole affair. So we are in agreeance here that he was acting as an autocrat. The difference is that I see this in a positive light, you in a negative. On a final note mostly answering Primus Pilus, I acknowledge whole-heartedly that Caesar was ambitious. But to regard his whole career as merely a pursuit of power, is, to borrow Gelzer's words again, to measure his statesmanship by an inadequate yardstick. His ambition soared so high because he was conscious of his power to become the master of the empire and shape. The tragedy of his career is that out of inner conviction he attempted to do so without terror, and without great enough regard for his own life. One cannot but admire that Caesar clearly determined to use the power he gained to intelligently attempt to improve his world for the better of the majority. Or so goes my opinion.

In answer to Primus Pilus and Sylla: Difference of views again. What we're arguing about (as I see it) is not the benefits of Oligarchic Republic vs Absolutism. That's how the Republic and the Empire respectively were run. I argue that the Imperial State - the Empire itself, was vastly superior to the Republic city-state organization. Thus can Caesar and Augustus both be said to have "begun" the Empire: it was Caesar who effectively established the foundation for the Imperial State; it was Augustus who devised the means by which it would be ruled. My view on Caesar's rule being likely to have been the better of the two stems in a large part from the same reason why I think it ludicrous to say that he was a tyrant: whereas Augustus had no compunctions about reducing the rights of the citizenry drastically, under Caesar they remained in full place. Caesar established the practice of regularly publishing the procceedings of the Senate, Augustus put an end to this. Caesar responded to criticism of his reign with indifference or even encouragement of a form (one thinks of his response to the eulogies of Cato), Augustus did not tolerate disent at all. And so on. I also mark that Caesar's policy of clemency and reconciliation likely reflected (among other things) his recognition of Rome's old elite, for all their corruption, nevertheless continuing to posess the attributes that had made Rome great in the first place. In short, of the two Caesar probably would have been the better of the two to rule the Empire, but as was, the Imperial System was preferable to the Republic, and so I can look favorably on Augustus for upholding it, and devising a method for its continuance. I've been repeating my argument for a while, let's turn things on their head: could you throw up for me some reasons why you think the Republic was superior to the Empire?

It's hard to see how the acquisition of such an Empire can be seen as a sign of administrative incompetence at all. It's evident that from at least two centuries before the Hannibalic War, Rome's territories in Italy were effectively many times larger and more populated than any Classical city-state; countless city-states were actually included within its boundaries (all Magna Grecia poleis, to begin with). If territorial continuity is your criterion for defining city-states, then Russia would just be an overgrown Moscow. Gaining an empire the Republic managed quite well. Ruling it they did not. I really don't see how you can argue that the Republic was managing in a manner that could in any way, shape or form be described as "competent". Quite the opposite really: the system was being torn apart by numerous crisis'; economic, social, and political. Reform was desperatly needed, and reform was precisely what the ruling oligarchy had no intention of ever allowing to happen. While I concede that the Republic was failing in its pre-imperial state, it was not simply because of an incompetent system, but rather the corruption, greed and overzealous ambition of individuals and political groups. If the Republic was incompetent as a system, it would have been incompetent from the start, and it's clear that it worked for some 5 centuries (including healthy civil disturbance that led to systemic improvements). Granted, the dynamic changed as Rome grew from city to regional power to empire and allowed for the afore-mentioned issues to manifest into dangerous problems, but the system itself was set up to work despite requiring individuals of quality in order to thrive efficiently. In any case, give me incompetence over tyranny any day. I'll challenge that. The fact is that the Republic was a system inherently built to manage a small city-state. While Rome was just so, this was fine. As her territories expanded to include much of the Italian Peninsula, and evntually some provinces outside the peninsula, the system started to show signs of strain, but was holding out okay. Having an international empire was simply beyond its capacity. Even those scholars who admire Cicero admit that the Republic was beyond repair - the system needed to change. Proof of this is evident in what happened when a switch to an imperial nation-state occurred: widespread peace and prosperity that derived in a huge part from a switch from the redundant city-state system. It is popular to see the various problems that emerged as having come from external events or individuals to "the system", when in fact they were very much tied to the system itself - said events just brought them sharply into focus. As for the old "incompetence over tyranny" argument - bah! Tyranny, I might ask, for whom? Tyranny for the oligarchs whose hold on power was effectively broken. Under Augustus it could be argued that his rule was a tyranny for the citizens of Rome itself, who lost a number of their old rights (Caesar showed no sign of ever doing such things, and as such I hold that it is ridiculous to call him a tyrant in the modern sense of the word). But Caesar's (and arguably Augustus's) gift was to be able to look a bit further than this, as is the essence of statesmanship. What of the 60 million or so people living in Rome's provinces? What have they to say on the subject? I think that it would seem pretty clear all provincials would have found the Empire a tremendous improvement over a Republic that was quite meaningless to them. The Republic was a system which had brought nothing but misery generally - I have mentioned above that the areas under Republican Roman rule were clearly in economic decline until the prosperity of the Pax Romana came along. So even the flawed system that came out of the Principate, it can be argued successfully I think, was a vast improvement on the Republic. Had Caesar lived to implement his own system, it would have been better yet, I think. So in conclusion, the Republic as a system was grossly unsuited to managing an empire, and it showed. Drastic changes needed to happen, and they did; initiated by Caesar, completed by Augustus. And the only people who would have really mourned the loss of the Republic were the Oligarchs who ran it.

It's hard to see how the acquisition of such an Empire can be seen as a sign of administrative incompetence at all. It's evident that from at least two centuries before the Hannibalic War, Rome's territories in Italy were effectively many times larger and more populated than any Classical city-state; countless city-states were actually included within its boundaries (all Magna Grecia poleis, to begin with). If territorial continuity is your criterion for defining city-states, then Russia would just be an overgrown Moscow. Gaining an empire the Republic managed quite well. Ruling it they did not. I really don't see how you can argue that the Republic was managing in a manner that could in any way, shape or form be described as "competent". Quite the opposite really: the system was being torn apart by numerous crisis'; economic, social, and political. Reform was desperatly needed, and reform was precisely what the ruling oligarchy had no intention of ever allowing to happen.

I'm sorry, but I think we obviously have a complete and utter disagreeance over the events of the lat years of the Republic. Yes, I do think we have a complete 'disagreeance' over the events of the last years of the republic. It would probably be more constructive to exchange our reasons for disagreeing in separate threads than to have a lengthy and wide-ranging back-and-forth on a thread ostensibly about the Ides. Why complicate the matter? I'd say we're having a debate that's going just fine right here. And technically, since most of this resolves around whether Caesar was justified in his actions or not, and so whether assasinating him was a good thing or not, we are on topic.

I'd put it as having mostly started to materialize after the Second Punic War, when Rome truly started out on the path of aquiring an empire. Rome's territories in Italy by the time relevant were effectively a part of the city-state. The military aspect has two possible starting points: Marius's reforms to the army or Sulla's first march on Rome, take your pick. The other problems took more time to acumulate. I'd put the start of these aspects of the Republic's incompetence as having begun and risen with the Latifundia.

By any definition, an Empire far beyond any city-state limits has been ruled by the Roman Republic for more than three hundred years, not a bad score as compared with any past or modern state; even under the Civil Wars, the Roman Empire was actually growing. What evidence did Gelzer find on the sudden incompetence of the Republic for ruling such Empire? For the sake of the argument, let us admit autocracy was required (???). Why Caesar? Just because he won the war? The incompetence of the Republic for governing its Empire can very broadly and roughly be divided into two aspects: Firstly; the army. Viewing the events of the last century of the Republic's existence, it is pretty hard to argue with the conclusion that the military's habit of following influential generals into battle against their fellow Romans was a problem that had to be addressed. A military autocracy of one kind or another was inevitable - Caesar recognized this. Secondly, and even more importantly, IMO, than the military issue, to say that the Republic was doing a fine job of ruling itself is a blatent contradiction to the facts. Plundered and Oppressed Provinces, young noblemen with bad habits of running into debt, massive unemployment and the general destabilization of the economy related to the Latifundia and the massive use of slaves, gangs ruling the streets, an oppressive oligarchy that was prepared to fight to the death (literally) against any attempt at what the system needed more than anything else: reform. Gelzer rightly points out that the problems that Caesar faced upon the conclusion of the Civil War (the economy in shambles, widespread devastation and terror, etc) had by no means been caused by the Civil War that had just been fought: they had been brewing for a long time, and all the Civil War had done was bring them over to boil. There is no greater eveidence of Caesar's sheer sanity above all else that having gained power he did his utmost best to use it intelligently to try and improve things, rejecting both populist and optimate interests alike in favor of what was the greatest benefit to everyone in general. That is not to say that the Republic could not have continued to rule its empire feasibly for a few more years, without change. Of course, the problems mentioned above would inevitably have brought the whole system crashing down, and we today would certainly not remember Rome for being the great civilization that it ultimately became. But it was the high mark of Caesar's statesmanship that he recognized that it did not have to be like this; indeed it should not be like this. Why should the empire remain a series of provinces at the mercy of a city-state steadily sucking them dry (this is not an exageration: the marked economic decline of the areas under the rule of the Roman Republic over the years is a fact - it was not until the Empire that they recovered) when instead it could become a universal Romanized Empire with wide-spread benefits for many of its 60 million odd inhabitents rather than just the ones who lived in Italy? There can be no greater proof of the soundness of Caesar's vision than the results of its being implemented. It was the transformation of Rome from a city-state system into a wide Imperial Nation-State that lead to the prosperity of the Pax Romana and the real flowering of Roman Civilization. Of course, to achieve this, the Oligarchic Republic had to go. And in many ways, good riddance. The rule of the Emperors was, many argue, not much better, and this is one of the reasons why I see Caesar's demise as a tragedy. He had succeeded in creating the Empire, but it was left to a still brilliant, but nevertheless lesser man - Augustus - to devise the way it would be ruled. Unlike Augustus, who purged the old nobility and broke it forever, Caesar recognized that while the old nobility might have been corrupt, they nevertheless carried with the the traits that had made Rome great in the first place. This was one of the key stones in his policy of clemeny and reconciliation: he recognized that the new Nation-State coupled with the old strengths that had lead to Rome's rise, freed from their antiquated principles, would be a potent force indeed. And while at it he also intended to try and improve life for the lower classes. As was, Rome had to make do with the Nation State, and the lives of the lower classes were improved. An autocracy was required, and now for your question of: Why Caesar? Pure and simple because there was nobody better suited to the job, and he knew it. His career firmly established him as a believer in meritocracy, and meritocracy in a nutshell is that the best man for the job gets the job. Caesar had many admirable traits, but modesty was not one of them. He knew he was the best, and that was why he won out in the end. Gelzer sums it up nicely: Caesar was conscious of his power to rise to become master of an Empire that he could reshape in his own image. His efforts in Gaul confirmed his rank as the First Man in Rome, the Civil War that followed represents the defence of his Dignitas.

In Answer to Sylla: Caesar did not end the Republic by concentrating all power in the hands of one man (himself). That did not end the Republic any more than did Sulla's reign. Caesar broke the back of the Republic by what he did with his power: laying the foundations for Rome to truly become an empire, as opposed to a city-state that controlled a lot of territory. The essence of the Republic was it being a system designed to run a city-state, and though Rome now controlled vast territories, for all intents and purposes that was what it remained: a city-state. Until Caesar's ground-breaking distribution of citizenship and planting of colonies. That is Gelzer's thesis. I do not conotate intelligence with "slavishness". On the contrary, it is a term I would have applied to the Boni had they worked with Caesar, rather than against him. Caesar did likely aim for an autocracy (such a government being the only real practical one at hand). But it would, I think have been a gentler one than was eventually imposed.

I put little faith myself into those sort of theories about the health of persons of history, ranging from Caesar's epilepsy to the possibility that Henry VIII was brain-damaged. From the descriptions we have from the ancient writers, it comes off quite feasibly that Caesar was simply feeling his years slightly. It really isn't surprising - the man wasn't getting any younger, and had been pushing himself harder than any human really has any right to for the last 16 years, since he began his wars in Gaul. Much as Frederick the Great came back from his wars as "Old Fritz" - aged far beyond his years, and yet he still had it in him to energetically rule for another 20 years or so. There's no real reason to think that Caesar wouldn't have endured for another 15-20 years.

I'm sorry, but I think we obviously have a complete and utter disagreeance over the events of the lat years of the Republic. To say that Caesar's act served no more purpose than to "monopolize power and make the state dependent on the life of a single man" (which is a false statement by the way) is to make a mockery of the career of one of the most extraordinary, if not the most extraordinary statesmen in history. Caesar's Statesmanship was exemplified in his recognizing that the Republic was an obsolete system that had to be overthrown, and he did so quite handily. Caesar's various acts succeeded in laying the foundations for the universal Empire that was arguably the greatest achievement the Romans ever established. He recognized that it could not happen overnight, but as a good statesman he got the ball rolling, and got it rolling fast enough that it was unable to be stopped. When Roman historians speak of Emperors like Augustus and Claudius giving consideration to trying to restore the Republic but realizing it could not be restored; had to remain an Empire, this was not necessarily just trying to make these Emperors look good - this was touching upon the truth; that Caesar had ensured the days of city-state rule were over with wide-spread citizenship distribution, the planting of colonies, and a Romanization program. The ball Caesar started rolling gathered momentum, and eventually came to the conclusion that Caesar must have known it would: citizenship granted to all free men in the Empire. Caesar's acts also included no end of measures undertaken to stabilize the empire and Rome itself, as well as attempts to improve the lives of the lower classes, and sensible measures like reforming the Calendar. Other things like his publishing of the affairs of the Senate are noteworthy. He did his best to break the back of the Oligarchy that had dominated Rome, and succeeded quite handily. Caesar can be credited with the creation of the Empire and the death of the Republic, but what cannot be credited to him (and ironically, what almost universally is) is that it would be dominated by one-man rule. The fact is we have no idea how he intended his new world to be governed. His career to me suggests that whatever form of governement he decided upon would have been meritocratic in form, and would likely have taken the form of some sort of autocracy, but would likely have been of a very different form to the one implemented by Augustus. Ultimately of course, we have no way of knowing, as he was tragically murdered (as is the whole point of this thread), and his work was left uncomplete. It was left to Augustus to devise a means to govern what Caesar had created, and Augustus, as said, succeeded in doing so, although as said, it was probably not the solution Caesar would have found. Lastly, I must disagree with you wholly and heartily that Caesar was in any way, shape, or form a tyrant. Sulla was a tyrant. Augustus was arguably a tyrant (though a very subtle tyrant). Caesar was certainly not a tyrant, at least not in the modern sense. He was an absolute ruler, but one who attempted to use his power intelligently and wisely to shape his world for the better, and that to me makes him no tyrant (I use the word "hero"). Quite apart from the measures he took to try and improve life for everyone, his far-sighted reforms, his policies of clemency and reconciliation with his foes, his habit of working fully with the People's Assemblies (even after he became Dictator), I look to the fact that under him none of the traditional rights of Roman Citizens were attacked as they were under later rulers. Freedom of Speech remained fully in place, and this remained constant, even when some pushed this to the limit. Personally I think the incident that personisfies the difference between Caesar and others was Cicero and Brutus both publishing eulogies of Cato commending him, and thus by extension criticizing Caesar. Sulla would have proscribed them both immediatly. Augustus would have artfully brought about an excuse to try and execute/exile them, or would have pressured them into suicide. Caesar instead wrote each of them a letter. Not mentioning the content of the books at all, he instead contented himself with warmly praising Caesar's prose style, and kindly informing Brutus that his grammar was atrocious. To counter the book he composed Anti-Cato, and the fact that it was an all-out literary attack on Cato likely motivated by political necessity should in my opinion detract neither from either the fact that much of the abuse was IMO richly deserved (I despise both Cicero and Brutus as historical beings, but above and beyond both of them I think Cato has recieved far, far more praise than was ever his due) or the fact that this was anything but the reaction of the tyrant. You are correct that future rulers from Caesars to Czars to Kaisers would indeed all borrow Caesar's name. Several Popes would take the title "Julius". Great men ranging from Suleiman the Magnificent (who read Caesar's Commentaries every single to day) to Napoleon Bonaparte (who shared a habit with his adversary Wellington of carrying a copy of the Commentaries with him whenever he went out on campaign) modelled themselves on him. This was because his name became synonymous with power and excellence, and many of these men would later try to immitate him. Of them, in my estimation only Napoleon came close to the greatness of Caesar. And yet the thing about Caesar is that there were many sides to him. Almost anyone can find something to admire about him, as is perhaps best evinced by this statement from Napoleon; foremost among the known admirers of Caesar: "I love reading about Caesar's military career, but hate reading about his political career. He cared far too much about the welfare of the people". A telling statement about both Napoleon and Caesar. People like Napoleon and Frederick the Great admired him as they saw him. But it is not just kings and rulers who must admire Caesar. Alexander Hamilton, a republican to the core, declared that Julius Caesar was the greatest man in history. Today we have Michael Parenti, and he is certainly not alone in seeing Caesar as something far, far more as just another tyrant.

It's evident to me that neither Sulla nor Augustus nor any later Emperor (that I

*chuckles at the thought of Barack Obama leading soldiers into battle on horseback* Although from my memory Obama is certainly not the only American President to qualify for this image. As I understand it George Washington, Andrew Jackson, and Teddy Roosevelt all did the "man on horseback" thing, and Ulysses S. Grant was a great general. And I'm not even American :lol But anyway, I see no harm in it. Every Empire since the Roman Empire itself went down the plughole has likened itself to the Romans, from the Holy Roman Empire through to the British Empire. Even the Ottoman Empire got in on the act for a while: Sulieman the Magnificent read through Caesar's Commentaries every single day, referred to his own empire as the "5th Roman Empire", and made it a proclaimed goal to someday "reunite the Empire" by capturing the city of Rome. We like to see the Romans in ourselves, and perhaps we really do see something of ourselves in the Romans. Either way, great way to get some people who would otherwise have been utterly ignorant of it interested in a bit of history. As long as you get you facts right, fire away with the comparisons I say. Only when blatent and utter distortion is obviously afoot do I see cause for complaint.

To add my two cents on the various items that have come up in this thread: As far as Caesar's age goes, personally I go with the "official" year of 100 BCE. As much as biographers like Suetonius did make some factual errors, mucking up his birth year and making him two years younger seems just a little bit unlikely. Someone previously mentioned him needing tohave been the right age to become the flamen Dialis when appointed to the position by Marius. I was under the impression that it was Caesar's not being the right age (13 - 14) that meant he could not take up the office immediatly? (I rely on Gelzer's Caesar: Politician and Statesman as my most reliable source, but I've also read Freeman, Goldsworthy, and Meier's biographies and they are all in agreeance with the year 100). Overall it really seems a matter of finding an explanation for Caesar's ascending to his various ofices two years earlier than was the norm. Caesar was certainly a political genius which manifested itself early on, a winner of the Corona Civica, and (highly likely) an acquaintance of both Pompey and Crassus before he had yet ascended to the Aedileship. I've also read Parenti's book about Caesar, and overall I think it needs a positive word spoken for it. I don't agree with parts of its thesis (it is highly unlikely that Caesar was aiming towards a democracy of any kind - while he championed the cause of the lower orders and did show a penchant for favoring democracies and governments with elected rulers in Gaul and Greece (as Parenti points out, he restored democracy in Athens) I go with Gelzer's view that his ultimate goal was the establishment of an empire that would have needed a strong central government of some kind), but I liked the book for two reasons. First, because it is nice to see some acknowledgement going to Caesar's genuine attempts to improve life for the people. Ambitious Caesar might have been, but my view is that he did have a genuine sympathy for the lower classes and the provincials, and general intention to use his powers as best he could to try and improve his world. Some ambition (lots, actually) was almost certainly present, but he had, I think, alturistic motives as well. Indeed, a fault I find with Parenti's work is that he focuses in entirely upon the population of the city of Rome itself. He aludes to the suffering of the provincials, but ommited much detail about the measures Caesar passed for their benefit (the Lex Julia that he passed during his consulship alone could have consumed an entire chapter). Secondly, because even more than the first it was a breath of fresh air to read some unreservedly critical remarks made about the likes of Cicero, Cato, and Brutus. To use the words of a reviewer of the book, I long ago independently came to the conclusion that these men really were quite despicable characters, and the unending praise with which they are accorded by many causes for me a mixture of irritation and disgust. Caesar might not have been perfect, but by my estimation he was certainly by far the better man. As for the question "How did Caesar not see this coming?", there are a number of answers. Caesar did "see it coming" insofar as he knew that there were plans for an attempt on his life. As early as 46 BCE he had already made a speech to the Senate alluding to a plot against him, which caused Cicero to rise and propose a motion that henceforth the entire Senate should swear a solemn oath to become Caesar's bodyguards, vowing to "shield his life with their own". Nevertheless he dismissed his bodyguards and generally acted as though he couldn't give a damn about a little thing like his personal safety. There were a number of factors, I think, in this. It seems likely to have been yet another part of his extensive reconciliation program - a sign of trust, or something along the lines. Many refer to it as yet one more act of recklessness in an admittedly very reckless life - this was a man, after all, who was fresh from the experience of having "fought for his very life" on the front lines in Spain. Matthias Gelzer takes another tack - Caesar was relying for protection on the intelligence of his opponents. He understood and remarked upon often that if he were to die violently a Civil War even more devastating than the last one would break out (he should have been a prophet). He trusted that his opponents understood this too. Another view is that Caesar may not have understood their (alleged) motives. He couldn't comprehend that others were too blind to see what he himself comprehended through the insight of genius: the Res Publica was dead - a defunct system that had been dying for a long time through self-inflicted wounds that he had dealt the well-deserved mortal blow to through his effective establishment of the Empire (I go with Gelzer's view that Caesar was the one who created the Empire. Augustus simply figured out how to adminsiter it). Perhaps it was a mix of all four or another reason altogether. Either way he did not think that when he went to Pompey's Theatre on that day he would be so treacherously cut down. Still, for all the tragedy of his demise, Gelzer points out that Caesar, at the end of the day was still the victor. The Assasains had only one chance to achieve their goal, and they lost it when they allowed his laws to be ratified and declared legitimate. The measures he had passed through had guarenteed the destruction of the Republic (more on that later if anyone is confused). That too may have been a reason for Caesar's lack of concern: he comprehended that he had already won.

Another point to make is that Roman accounts of battles cannot all just be lumped into "propaganda" as far as the numbers are concerned. Or at least, they can be sorted into categories of the swallowable and the completely ridiculous. Caesar's accounts fall under the "swallowable" category. By and large his Commentaries have the ring of truth to them. There are inconsistencies here and there, likely some exageration, a couple of rather obvious falsifications, but by and large it checks out. The best summary of this I think comes from Christian Meier, certainly not an admirer of Caesar, who nevertheless concluded that his reports can largely be taken as fairly close to accurate (at least, as close to accurate as records in the Ancient World get). A part of this comes from the fact that when reasoned out, everything (or rather, most of thing the stuff) that Caesar writes makes sense when you think about it - is believable. In the biographies on Caesar by Meier, Goldsworthy, Freeman, and Gelzer that I've read, the historians have come to the same conclusion. On the opposite end of the spectrum I can think of no better example than the reports of the battles fought by Sulla (although Alexander the Great springs to mind). The accounts of his battles against Pontus my contain accurate versions of the events of the battle, but the numbers are completely illogical and clearly made up. The casualty counts of Caesar's battles have the benefit of making sense; as per the broadly summarized post I made above, when reasoned through step by step what we know of the events matches the numbers. As opposed to Sulla's.

Check out your sources; despite its name, Lucan's Pharsalia tell us nothing about the battle itself. From all your quoted sources, Cassius Dio is the only one that actually described the battle, essentially copying from Caesar's account. As far as I'm aware of, no Pompeian accounts of the battle survived. I'm not talking about acounts of the battle of Pharsalus just saying that not everything we have is anti-Pompey. Indeed, quite a bit is thouroughly anti-Caesar. Plutarch's work is an interesting study in which he seeths with contempt for all of Caesar's early career, is full of boundless admiration for the Gallic War, and is back to anti-Caesar once he crosses the Rubicon. On note of which - Plutarch also talk at length about Pharsalus, statedly utilizing Pollio's work rather than Caesar's, and from him we learn about the additional tactic used by Caesar of ordering his men in how to use their pilla. Suetonius does not talk at length on the battle, although as he also states that he used Pollio as a reference he must have been familiar with it. All these writers and a few others besides, none Caesar proponents, had access to plentiful material on Pharsalus and other battles that we have lost today, and by and large what they had must have matched Caesar's account.

Ave Roma. Happy Birthday.

Oh, and I wouldn't say that "no Pompeian accounts of the battle survived". That's not really true even today when many works of Roman history have been sadly lost. At least one other definitive account of the battle by Asinius Pollio (admittedly a Caesarian, but by all accounts he was unafraid to criticize Caesar, and may well have been one of the many who fell out with him at a later date) was around as a source for a long time. There would almost certainly have been many, many more accounts besides this. Almost all the leading Romans involved would have left their own opinions in their archives, and many other probably wrote of it. These works were all available for those who wished to write on the battle later, and in their broad strokes they apparently matched the account Caesar gave. I'd hardly call Cassius Dio, Plutarch, or even really Suetonius pro-caesarian, quite the opposite really. I don't think I even need to mention Lucan.

All sources were Caesarian; no Pompeian account survived, and there's a reason for that. There were new recruits, auxiliaries and Gallic veterans in both sides (Labienus was the obvious example). In fact, Caesar frequently stressed his relative lack of veterans as an additional handicap; Thapsus was an excellent example, which BTW didn't prevent Caesar from the regular favorably unbalanced casualty report. However, my favorite would be Munda (presumably Hirtius' narrative); we're supossed to believe that: - After ruling for years 90% or more of the Roman world, the Dictator Caesar was unable to match the legionaires from the single rebel province of Hispania Ulterior (13 Pompeian legions versus 8 Caesarian). - Even so, the casualties balance was like 30:1 (please don't ask me which side was favored). Naturally, Caesar was not particularly original; the same applies to Scipio, Constantine and most Roman generals. There was a reason behind publicizing (and bumping up & down) battle reports: basic propaganda. We're dealing here with a literary heroic archetype older than History, analogous to the biblical Samson against the Philistines. *shrug* You're entitled to your own opinion, but I'm going with what most historians say about battles of the ancient world: contrary to the movie depiction where the two forces slam together and remain locked in combat for the entirety of the battle (usually a few minutes) until everyone on one side is slaughtered, the battle was far more likely to consist of small groups of men who would clash, fight furiously for a few inutes, break apart and withdraw slightly to catch their breath, and then repeat. Eventually (in theory) one side vreaks and runs, and the winner can hunt them down. This is where the vast majority of the casualties occur. Let's take the battle of Munda. It's quite natural that Caesar should have had a signifigantly smalller amount of soldiers. Many of the soldiers had been retired, a lot of others were dead or tied up in garrison duty (Africa, recently reconquered needed to be watched closely, and there was still a rather nasty situation in the East that tied up many legions). The 6 legions that Caesar gathered then had to march some 1500 miles at a cracking pace of around 60 miles a day, to arrive in Hispania in 24 - 27 days (the sources disagree), long before the Pompeians were ready (considering the incredible logistics that must have been involved to move a force of some 30,000 men that far, that fast, it really isn't surprising the force may even have been kept down). In any case, going to engage the enemy with only small bodies of men is quite consistent with Caesar. He crossed into Greece to face Pompey with only half his army rather than wait for more ships to be built. He launched a lightning campaign against Pharnaces with only 1000 odd veterans and three legions of recently defeated new recruits. He sailed to Africa with only a tiny portion of his army. Caesar consistently showed a preference for taking what was at hand to confront the enemy immediatly rather than giving them time to continue prepartaions while he gathered a stronger force. Some have criticzed him for it, others have praised him for it. Either way he still won. Getting back to the topic at hand, Munda follows the general pattern of ancient battles. Initially thanks to the disadvanatage of the ground the Caesarians lose slightly more men, but make up for it by Caesar's action on the right wing and the Cavalry Envelopement of the enemy right wing that this allows. The result is that when the enemy break and run, it is thought by most that their casualties were more or less equal - both sides losing about a thousand or so men. The Caesarians then inflict a further 29,000 casualties in the pursuit (it is also in the pursuit that all 13 of the enemy eagles are captured). Pharsalus also fits the pattern, Thapsus slightly different. At Thapsus by all accounts Scipio's men broke and ran extremely soon after engaging with Caesar's men (understandable with their own elephants stampeding through their flanks, their cavalry deserted and Caesar's also flanking them, Caesar's 4th lines having captured the fortified positions behind them, troops from ships he had sent around to demonstrate against them from behind making a show, and Caesar himself leading an attack on the front) only to retreat around the lake to what they thought was their own camps, only to find these too in Caesar's hands and surrender. Most of the casualties seem to have come upon a slaughter carried out by the Caesarian soldiers after the surrender, and there seems to have been very little actual fighting ergo very low casualties for Caesar. At Pharsalus too all the facts point to the general pattern being followed, but even more so than usual. When the line was halted halfway through the charge Pompey's plan to tire his opponents out was ruined. As per Caesar's oders the first two lines rushed in to throw their pilla at close range before charging in immediatly afterwards, throwing the enemy back a bit, and giving the Caesarians the momentum in the scuffle that followed. Many of Caesar's veterans were gone, but he makes it clear in his own acount that there were enough of them left to form a a deadly nucleus of that likely played a part in the combat favoring the Caesarians thus far. Meanwhile Caesar's brilliant creation of a 4th line on the right wing, and the special orders he had given them (to weild their pilla like bayonets and aim for the faces of the Pompeian cavalry) had seen said cavalry routed and the the archers and light troops screening the Pompeian left slaughtered. Then at the same time as the Pompeians left is enveloped, Caesar orders in the 3rd line that he left in reserve. The above discussed nature of ancient battles is critical in understanding that this, just as much as the envelopement by the 4th line, was critical in causing the enemy to break up: with both sides having just broken apart from their struggling to catch their breath and regather their will to throw themselves back into the struggle the Caesarian lines part and the Pompeians, expecting to be able to rest for a bit standing and glaring at their opponents, instead find themselves attacked by a wave of fresh troops. Once the first few lines of Pompeians break and run, it soon turns into a complete rout, and this is where the vast majority of the casualties happen. Although a description of the battle of Pharsalus and the key parts of it is relatively long (in comparison to anumber of other ancient battles), the battle itself was over extremely quickly, and this helped the tactics Caesar used: to overwhelm the enemy quickly. In the pursuit that follows the majority of the casualties occur. All in all everything we know fits what is put down: the Caesarians suffer very light casualties, the Pompeians heavy. Great reason to fight for Caesar

On the continuing subject of Caesar's Commentaries, I've always wondered why the fact that he wrote them himself makes them so much more untrustworthy than other sources of Ancient History. Granted, they might be slightly more difficult to gauge, but from the opinion some people express about them, you'd think that Caesar's reports made other accounts look like gospel truth by comparison. The fact is that while most other commanders did not right up their reports themselves, their creatures did, and it is from these that we get our numbers. Pompey the Great's lackeys composed the accounts of his campaigns under his supervision. Our most reliable accounts of Scipio Africanus's numbers come from information from his own archives. For most of the ancient writers writing about Alexander the Great, his own journals, surviving in the Library of Alexandria, were a primary source. And so it goes. Caesar's numbers are no less trustworthy than those of any other battle we have records of, and possibly slightly more. He based his Commentaries off reports that he had already sent back to Rome, at a time when he could not afford to overly falsify events owing to the fact that reports of anything he ommited would almost certainly find their way back to his enemies, ever keen to discredit him. His account of the events can thus be mostly trusted, and his casualty numbers too to an extent, with a few exceptions (notably his numbers for his battles in Gaul match calculations of the population at the time, and the capabilities of the Gauls). When he says he was outnumbered, it is reasonable to go with him on being outnumbered, and when he says he suffered light casualties to heavy enemy losses, that too is acceptable.

Analogous to the Soviets in WWII, Roman casualties reports were essentially propaganda and almost always totally unrealistic . Granted, the numbers are probably bumped down and up respectively (another estimate is 6000 pompeian dead and 1200 Caesarians, another still is that there is confusion betweenb the two sources - 6000 pompeian legionaires died and 9000 auxillaries while 200 caesarians died and 1000 were badly wound, all sources agreeing that 24,000 pompeians were captured alive), but it still gives an indication of the massive imbalance of the casualties, which is very consistent with the way ancient battles were fought - the vast, vast majority of the casualties occured in defeat ie when one force broke and ran, to be hunted down; Caesar's Gallic veterans would have given him an advantage in what fighting actually took place, and by all accounts the battle was over very quickly, all of these lending credence to the numbers we have, which as they are the only ones we have we really have no choice but to accept, especially as they do make sense considering what we know of the battle. There's also the argument that Caesar really could not afford to make great falsifications in his accounts, but suffice to say that we can be confident that Caesar suffered relatively light casualties at the battle of Pharsalus, while those of Pompey were heavy indeed.