sylla

An specific thread on Classical world mercenaries may be eventually required: No, it isn't. You seem to see the term 'mercenary' in a very particular light. It seems you may really think so for not reading carefully Polybius' Book 6, the lavish panegyric on the Roman constitution; its conclusion is one of the most outstanding examples of bigotry ever written, even after checking on Hitler's and Stalin's speeches::- "But at the time when they entered on the Hannibalic War, the Carthaginian constitution had degenerated"; - "by so much had Carthage already begun to decline"; - "Consequently the multitude at Carthage had already acquired the chief voice in deliberations; while at Rome the senate still retained this; and hence, as in one case the masses deliberated and in the other the most eminent men"; - "the Carthaginians entirely neglect their infantry, though they do pay some slight attention to their cavalry"; - "The reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign and mercenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the soil and citizens" -

"For it would be a strange or rather indeed impossible thing, that after meeting your enemies on equal terms in so many separate skirmishes and in most cases being victorious, now when you confront them by more than two to one you should be beaten". Paullus battle exhortation (Polybius 3.109); Cannae minus two days. (July 31, 216 BC?) Probably the most careful and informed estimation for Cannae's figures (at least that I'm aware of) came from Lazenby (Hannibal's War) Under his assumptions, the Punic army was facing a Roman force that almost doubled its size; however, Paullus in the Roman right was commanding some 2,400 Roman horsemen against one Hasdrubal (neither Barca nor Gisco) in the Punic left with something like 1500 Iberian and 5000 Gaulish cavalry, ie. a transitory but decisive advantage close to 3:1 for the Punic cavalry on the field next to the river; this last fact should have been unexpected for the Roman command, as the opposite was the Carthaginian open flank. The speed of Hannibal's invasion has been frequently exaggerated; however, if any Punic action might be aptly compared with the Blitzkrieg, it was surely the charge of Hasdrubal's cavalry at this battle. Their time was running out because they couldn't be sure how much would the Gaulish-Iberian infantry be able to resist the stress of the Roman center advance without breaking in pieces. Additionally, Paullus was also commanding like one fourth of the Roman infantry. Even so, Paullus' cavalry was obliterated in the field before any other Roman unit could even intervene. Polybius and Livy presented Paullus (a patrician and close relative of the Scipio family) as an able commander handicapped by the incompetence of Varro, the novus homo. In all likelihood, the situation was far more simple: - after the Trebbia and Thrasymene massacres, presumably both his cavalry and his infantry were mostly composed by inexperienced legionaries prematurely recruited; most of the Roman and allied veterans would have been located under their regular (currently proconsular) commanders at the Roman center. - the coordination of too many Roman men under so many commanders must have been inevitably delayed. Our Roman sources vividly transmitted us the futile courage of the defeated party; Paullus may have been wounded by a slinger from the very beginning; unable to properly respond, the Roman cavalry had to fight Hasdrubal's charge as infantry; finally, Paullus' cavalry collapsed so quickly, that when Hasdrubal encircled the Roman rear and attacked the other wing (the allied cavalry under the direct command of Varro) many of them thought it was a treasonous maneuver from the Numidian cavalry they were facing, ie, the Punic right wing (Livy 22.48). Varro eventually fled with just 50 horsemen, leaving his infantry surrounded; it may be reasonably inferred that most of the 200 Punic cavalry casualties reported by Polybius came from the Numidian wing. A MAP OF THE BATTLE AT LIVIUS.ORG

Why the hurry? As there seems to be no immediate economic incentive, it may be better to wait until glory pays for itself.

Suetonius explicitly stated that Augustus was right-handed (cp. 80): " He sometimes found the forefinger of his right hand so weak, when it was numb and shrunken with the cold, that he could hardly use it for writing..."

Alexander III the Great of Macedon is also frequently quoted as left-handed; however, the evidence seems to be rather dubious, as apparently the only source that mentioned it is the medieval "Book of Jossipon" (X century).

Happy Birthday, Sir

As in the above quoted examples, a common interesting trait of many left-handedness related surnames (for example in Spanish) is that their mythic origin is usually related not to any truly left-handed character, but actually to a regular right-handed eponymous hero that in some heroic way lose the use of his right hand; an example of ancestral discrimination?

Usus autem sum, ne in aliquo fallam carissimam mihi familiaritatem tuam, praecipue libris ex bibliotheca Ulpia, aetate mea thermis Diocletianis, et item ex domo Tiberiana, usus etiam [ex] regestis scribarum porticus porphyreticae, actis etiam senatus ac populi. 2 et quoniam me ad colligenda talis viri gesta ephemeris Turduli Gallicani plurimum invit, viri honestissimi ac sincerissimi, beneficium amici senis tacere non debui. 3 Cn. Pompeium, tribus fulgentem triumphis belli piratici, belli Sertoriani, belli Mithridatici multarumque rerum gestarum maiestate sublimem, quis tandem nosset, nisi eum Marcus Tullius et Titus Livius in litteras rettulissent? 4 Publ<i>um Scipionem Afric<an>um, immo Scipiones omnes, seu Lucios seu Nasicas, nonne tenebrae possiderent ac tegerent, nisi commendatores eorum historici nobiles atque ignobiles extitissent? 5 longum est omnia persequi, quae ad exemplum huiusce modi etiam nobis tacentibus usurpanda sunt. 6 illud tantum contestatum volo me et rem scripsisse, quam, si quis voluerit, honestius eloquio celsiore demonstret, et mihi quidem id animi fuit, 6 <ut> non Sallustios, Livios, Tacito<s>, Trogos atque omnes disertissimos imitarer viros in vita principum et temporibus disserendis, sed Marium Maximum, Suetonium Tranquillum, Fabium Marcellinum, Gargilium Martialem, Iulium Capitolinum, Aelium Lampridium ceterosque, qui haec et talia non tam diserte quam vere memoriae tradiderunt. 8 sum enim unus ex curiosis, quod infi[ni]t<i>as ire non possum, ince<n>dentibus vobis, qui, cum multa sciatis, scire multo plura cupitis. 9 et ne diutius ea, quae ad meum consilium pertinent, loquar, magnum et praeclarum principem et qualem historia nostra non novit, arripiam.

The term 'mercenary' is in this context an explicit propagandistic and derogatory convenience from Polybius and other pro-Roman sources for depicting the Punic army as a whole that can't stand the slightest critical analysis. I just can't imagine which source can be used to infer the feelings of the Punic soldiers for their metropolis. The non-existence of a Carthaginian state army is simply nonsense; the outstanding performance of the Carthaginians at Punic War III speaks for itself. Such army was not raised by cash and certainly had no problem with its 'patriotic' element. It's indeed ironic that the martial qualities of the Punic culture and soldiers are questioned in a thred dealing with Cannae. Then, now and ever, actions speak louder than words: Hired or levied, the contemporary Roman commanders were well aware of the impressive martial qualities shown by many Punic units, and they were only naturally eager to use such units side-by-side with their proud legions, irrespectively of their 'patriotic' element, their symbolic stature or plainly their primary motives; for example, Masinissa (yes, the same one that routed the Scipio brothers), the Numidian cavalry, the Ilergetes, the Balearic slingers and of course the elephant corps that served at Cynoscephalae and latter battles. In fact, some of those units remained as the backbone of the Roman auxilia for centuries; Caesar was still using Numidian horsemen and Balearic slingers.

You really made a thorough search and did get many interesting issues: The soldiers of virtually all ancient armies, citizens' armies included (and naturally Romans too) fought offensive wars for pay and booty; hence, the criteria that define mercenaries must include the voluntary hiring concept, the self auctioning for the highest bid; we have many examples from Greece (eg, Philopoemen of Megalopolis) and other nationalities. "Mercenary" was used as a pejorative term not only (ironically) by Polybius, but also by almost any other pro-Roman source. The "recruiting officers in Greece" (I.32) were mentioned as an extraordinary event for explaining the outcome of the first battle of Bagradas in Punic War I (255), attributing Regulus' defeat not to the "inferior" barbarian Punic army but to the contribution of the hellenic Xanthippus of Sparta, even if he was a "despised" mercenary; Polybius want us to believe that across 23 years of war the Carthaginians had no other significant non-naval victory. We know there were some Greek mercenaries on the Punic side, like Sosylus of Sparta and Silenus of Caleacte; please note, however, that not a single Hellenic mercenary unit is mentioned by our available sources for the Carthaginian Army during the Punic Wars; they were clearly isolated cases, contrary to the extensive use made by the cities of Magna Graecia and Sicily, notoriously Syracuse. Please note too that (unsurprisingly) such cities made essentially no use of Carthaginian subjects as soldiers, as it would have been extected if they were truly mercenaries; eg, the Syracusan used mercenary slingers from Rhodes, not from the closer Balearic Islands. The Gaulish tribes mentioned (Ligurians, Boii, Insubres and so on) were clearly independent nations and occasional allies added exclusively to any of the three Punic armies that crossed their homeland, a hardly surprising fact given that they have been fierce Roman enemies far longer than the Punic themselves; there's no evidence that they were "hired" for serving out of Gaul or Italy. All the other national groups mentioned by Polybius were Punic subjects when they served under Punic command, even the Celtiberians (who seemed to have been occasionally used as mercenaries by the western Greeks). Some of the Iberian tribes had been under Punic rule for centuries. As you pointed out, I compared the so-called Punic "mercenaries" with the Roman auxilia, not with the Italian socii; One is tempted to guess if there was some kind of military service stratification for Punic or "Punicized" subjects from Cathage countryside and colonies, eg. Utica, Lepcis, Hippo, Maho, Cathago Nova, and so on. Again, we simply lack any relevant information for or against this idea and we may well never know; our available sources are evidently ignorant on the main issues about Carthage's politics, society and even military organization.

You know, when I asked for "textual, epigraphical or archaeological evidence", a wikipedia article is not what I had in mind. What we are looking for is evidence. Naturally, there's nothing wrong with Wikipedia per se; in fact, the thesis that I have exposed is also there: (from the article on Punic Military Forces): "Ancient authors such as Polybius tend to stress the reliance of Carthage on foreign mercenaries. However, the term 'mercenary' is in fact a little misleading and does not fully represent the unique Carthaginian arrangement that equally recruited subjects of Punic-ruled areas and foreigners". It's easy to verify that the vast majority of the so-called Carthaginian "mercenaries" came from Punic-ruled areas; in all likelihood they were levied, not hired. It's also easy to check out armies based on bona fide mercenary units; just turn to their Greek neighbours, especially Syracuse. The poisonous attitude from Polybius was particularly noteworthy because his homeland Megalopolis (and the Achaean League as a whole) were both great exporters and great consumers of mercenary labor; in fact, the famous Philopoemen, the national and personal hero of Polybius, was a notorious mercenary leader.

The question remains: where is the textual, epigraphical or archaeological evidence that those troops were hired soldiers? Certainly not in Polybius.

To be fair that would not be a difference between History and Archaeology, or any other research discipline for that matter. Irrespectively of how we may define "academia" here, all research must be based on empyrical (practical) evidence and elementary logic (the uncommon common sense). Otherwise we would get invalid evaluations even in History, for example the famous mirror weapon of Archimedes.

Why were then Roman granaries buttressed?

That's actually not what Jordanes stated: "Still -- and let me lie not -- I have in times past read the books a second time by his steward's loan for a three days' reading".

The Carthaginian armies from Punic War I & II (but not III) were indeed made up mostly from non-ethnic-Punic / non-citizen Carthaginian subjects; it's their "mercenary" nature what is in dispute here. A mercenary (mistophoroi "men-for-pay" in Greek) is usually defined as a private soldier for hire, auctioning himself for the highest bid, like the Athenian Xenophon and the Greek Ten Thousand in Persia, the Rhodian slingers, the Cretan Archers, or even the Spartan Xanthippus in Carthage itself (Punic War I). There's no evidence that the vast majority of the Lybian, Numidian or Iberian soldiers that fought under Carthaginian command were in such condition; even the famous Balearic slingers seem to have been only attested within Punic units before Zama. Their recruitment and military condition seemed to have been much more like the Roman auxilia. The Insubres, Boii and other Gauls in Trebbia, Thrasymene and Cannae (no less than two thirds of the Carthaginian effectives for the latter battle) were Carthaginian allies fighting under their own commanders (the Insubrian Ducarius was the most famous); they had been fighting against Rome for many years, including the Telamon debacle. They were clearly no mercenaries either.

Mercenaries made-up a large part of the Carthaginian army as well as troops supplied by allies, i.e. Celts, Numidians etc, unless there was a direct threat to the city. Whilst we may not have a clear indication of Carthaginian units we do have an idea of allied and mercenary units and the unit make-up of the various Carthaginian armies in the Punic War which we can use in our discussion. Again, that is the Romans late description, extremely biased and chauvinistic, as they widely used such statements to embarrass Carthage and support their pretended inherent ethnic superiority. Just check out Polybius' Histories, actually written after Carthage disappeared, when nobody could speak for the Punic side. The actual mercenary nature of most of such units (many of them eventually accepted as auxiliary by the Romans almost automatically) is not well attested by any source. In fact, the military nature and status of the Punic "mercenary" and the Roman auxilia were presumably analogous. And of course, we don

Up to this point, I can't see why it wouldn't be so; I may have actually read something similar (maybe in Asterix). Same as today second language speakers, even excellent Latin learners, would generally retain their local accent (Briton for your youth, isn't it?). Then as today, people adopted "sons" or "daughters", not things or slaves; they were property. Courts dealt with slaves as property, except if they contended their servile condition, eg if they pretended to be quirites or recognized peregrini that had been illegally enslaved; being that the case, your hypothetical merchant might have been in big troubles. In principle, any property could be sold as long as it could be proved it has been legally acquired (or of course, if nobody cared). Had your merchant sold any slave, he would have been a slave trader himself; however, my guess is that this kind of trade was a quite specialized market activity in the imperial Rome. It was forbidden for quirites to sell themselves; I'm not aware of any express legal consideration on peregrini self-enslavement. Roman slave auctions were very real.

" Nihil "; that was exactly Titus' answer and Vespasians's point.

Translations will vary from text to text, but it's a "quote" by Agrippa to Augustus (pre final settlement) in 29 BC I put quote in parentheses because Dio, my personal favorite ancient historian, is well known for quoting important figures in rather long speeches with a certain dramatic flair. From Cassius Dio Book 52.30 Nice spotting. However, it's actually "Maecenas" who is declaring what was quoted above (Dio 52,30), answering "Agrippa"

I don't think C "missed" this one. May I ask you for your source on this statement? What I understand is that the left-handed Roman soldiers were simply forced to use their right hand.

A myth, caused by the introduction of superior and more consistent training from the Marian Reforms onward. The Roman legions of the time weren't as well trained as their image depicts. Furthermore, the work of Vegetius tends to reinforce this image but incorrectly, since he collated all the various training methods used over the centuries and implied this was standard since the beginning. Not so. The Roman legion at the time of Cannae still used the 'consular' style formation of hastatii, principes, and triarii, each composed of increasing age and experience. Nor was the Roman legion at this time a permanent institution. Legions were formed for the annual season or a particular campaign. They were, to all intents and purposes, a militia until 107 BC. PS - Before I forget, I should point out that some of the Carthaginian mercenaries were very good troops, the gauls in particular were well regarded. The Gauls in Hannibal's and other Barcid armies were allies, not mercenaries. The actual mercenary nature of most ethnic non-Punic soldiers on the Carthaginian armies of Punic War II is not adequately attested by any source and in all likelihood it was a derogatory chauvinistic denotation from their enemies. In fact, many of such "mercenary" units changed sides virtually overnight as Roman "auxiliary" units, sometimes more than once, eg, the Ilergetes and the western Numidians. Please note that as essentially nothing is known about the training of any unit from the Carthaginian army, they can hardly be compared with the Romans.

Actually we simply don

The chance of finishing Rome was the entire point of the campaign. As to whether it was a 'real' chance, Hannibal was gifted leader willing to lead his mercenaries on a harsh journey across alpine Europe and tackle the Romans on home ground. Obviously, he considered the possibility real. Even considering his hatred of the Romans, he wasn't stupid. For that matter, he came a lot closer to victory than is generally realised. Rome was in a state of panic. Don't be drawn into thinking Hannibals campaign was aimed at mere military conquest. That wasn't the point. The real point, the 'real' chance of victory against Rome, was to make Rome feel helpless, to bring it to it's knees, to force it to seek terms. Close, but no cigar. As no account from Hannibal or his proxies has survived (and we know there were at least a couple of them), we really don't know which was the exact point of his campaign. In any case, our sources didn't hide Rome also tried to attack first; in 218 BC Scipio was going to invade Spain and Sempronius, Africa itself. We really don't know if Hannibal hated Rome previous to Punic War II. That nice story on baby Hannibal's anti-Roman prayer before diner has a trademark problem; it is (un)surprisingly similar to the baby Xerxes account from Herodotus; in any case, both were almost surely apocryphal. I think no one would consider Hannibal stupid; that he also mastered the siege techniques he had proved at Saguntum. However, for his own isolation he was unable to sustain position warfare for any significant period; Fabius Maximus

Thanks, now I get it. And I have a question: If by studying History any one of us is always (or almost always) rationalizing the present, it may look like a quite futile exercise, as it seems we would be mostly reaching our own preconceived conclusions. Then, should we study History at all? Why?