sylla

An always interesting issue; however, it's still not clear for me: - From where did Mr. Curry get his gold standard on the average Ephesian diet (to compare it with the Gladiators' nutrition); - Which may his physical evidence on the purported gladiatorial obesity have been. In any case, the physiological basis of this article seems questionable at best, if not plainly absurd. It seems unlikely that obesity might have granted any significant protection from cut wounds or shielded blood vessels, then or now; in fact, as any plastic surgeon knows, human fat tissue is highly vascularized (ie, more blood vessels); adipose tissue bleeds at least as much, or even more, than any other human tissue. I'm not sure if wounded fat tissue may have looked indeed great for the average Roman spectator; but it undoubtedly hurts like hell, then and now; Mr. Curry is clearly not talking from personal experience, as he could have easily tried (even the leanest people have some adipose tissue). Additionally, the relationship between obesity and economic status is not so linear and clear-cut as this article seemingly suggests.

There's no mystery in the formula for popularity among proletarians, from Buddha to Marx; just blame the evil money. Again, embarrassing his contemporaries by their comparison with an idealized vision of their elders was hardly an original idea from Sallust (neither from any biblical author, BTW).

I found the additional references to animal hunts and impact on species in Rupert Matthews' "Age of Gladiators". He claims that by 350 AD, due to Games-related hunting, the North African species of elephant was extinct as well as the Balkan lion and the cheetah of the Middle East. Does anyone have anything to support this? Or perhaps some thoughts on the Ancient Roman attitude towards conservation in general? Themistius seems to be a fascinating author indeed; unfortunately, the retrieval of some of his specific quotations has proven particularly difficult. My impression is that he was an outmost exponent of Julian's doctrine of tolerance; indeed what religious fundamentalists usually call "apostasy". (BTW, it would be otherwise hard to explain why on Earth would IV century Neopagans and Jews cared at all one of the other). The extinction of the North African megafauna seems to have been a long (centuries or even millennia long) process; IMHO, it would be hard to assign even tentative numbers to the relative contribution of different factors. In the case of Loxodonta (africana? cyclotis? pharaonensis?) tusks and ivory trade, recreative hunting, habitat distortion, ecological conflict with agriculture, climate change and even massive taming may all have had a greater impact than the venatio requirements.

Point taken; no one can predict the future. Even the divine word is hardly inerrable. Even on theological grounds, the own author set their odds in a like "one million" figure; but well, miracles happen (even million dollars miracle$!) .

No, that is a faulty conclusion.Nobody knows what Hannibal was thinking just because not a single Punic account has survived, in the same way that we don't know what the hell were Viriathus or Vercingetoryx thinking, even if all of them undoubtedly had "long term objectives". For the same reason, any Roman quote on Maharbal or any other Punic commander, including the "Hannibal didn't know how to win wars" is unreliable; period (Surprisingly, Polybius wrote nothing about such stuff). Strictly speaking, we don't even know which were the long term objectives of Hannibal and the Carthagininan goverment when Punic War II began. Rome was already in an openly agressive policy against Carthage; the stealing of Sardinia, the Ebro treaty, the alliance with Saguntum. In 218 BC, the Roman mobilization was absolutely offensive, necessarily planned far in advance; both consuls had huge armies and fleets already in their way to simultaneously invade Spain and Africa, when the Punic crossing of the Alps suddenly overcame all such projects. We really don't know if the Carthaginians (even less which of the Carthaginians) just wanted Rome to stay out of their business, expected to recover their lost territories, were planning to conquer Italy or plainly tried to destroy Rome; your guess is as good as any other. What we do know is the military situation in Italy before and after Cannae. An obvious goal of Hannibal was to make the Italian cities change sides. If the Punic army was eventually able to survive in Italy at all, it was because he impressed Capua and some other cities; the same as Caldrail and you, they concluded that after so many victories, Hannibal could easily have taken any city. In Polybius' words: "The Carthaginians by this action (CANNAE) became at once masters of almost all the rest of the coast, Tarentum immediately surrendering, while Argyrippa and some Campanian towns invited Hannibal to come to them, and the eyes of all were now turned to the Carthaginians, who had great hopes of even taking Rome itself at the first assault". And in Livy's: "How far that disaster (CANNAE) surpassed previous ones is shown by one simple fact. Up to that day the loyalty of our allies had remained unshaken, now it began to waver, for no other reason, we may be certain, than that they despaired of the maintenance of our empire. The tribes who revolted to the Carthaginians were the Atellani,the Calatini, the Hirpini, a section of the Apulians, all the Samnite cantons with the exception of the Pentri, all the Bruttii and the Lucanians. In addition to these, the Uzentini and almost the whole of the coast of Magna Graecia, the people of Tarentum Crotona and Locri, as well as all Cisalpine Gaul... ... The envoys came to Hannibal and negotiated a peace with him on the following terms: No Carthaginian commander or magistrate was to have any jurisdiction over the citizens of Capua nor was any Campanian citizen to be obliged to serve in any military or other capacity against his will; Capua was to retain its own magistrates and its own laws; and the Carthaginian was to allow them to choose three hundred Romans out of his prisoners of war whom they were to exchange for the Campanian troopers who were serving in Sicily. These were the terms agreed upon, but the Campanians went far beyond the stipulations in their criminal excesses. The populace seized officers in command of our allies and other Roman citizens, some whilst occupied with their military duties, others whilst engaged in their private business, and ordered them to be shut up in the baths on the presence of keeping them in safe custody " That mistake proved fatal for Capua and other defectors. It's hard to blame them; it seems that even nowadays, some historians and UNRV members still make the same mistake. For that goal, Hannibal recurred to all possible trick, even since Trasimene; Livy again: "Hannibal dismissed without ransom those prisoners who belonged to the allies and threw the Romans into chains". Besides, Hannibal and/or the Carthaginian government did their best to recruit any potential extra-Italian ally against Rome: the King of Macedon, the Tyrant of Syracuse, the Achaean league, the Ilergetes and other Roman Celtiberian friends, additional Gaulish tribes and so on. To a large extent, the Italian campaigns after Cannae became a predominantly local war; Rome and his loyal subjects against a coalition of Italian defectors (mostly Campanians at the beginning) plus the invading Gauls and the powerful but minority properly Punic army. However, if that coalition didn't eventually win, that was mainly because the vast majority of the Italian cities remained loyal to Rome. Had more cities defected to the Punic side, Rome may very well have become unable to continue the war in a matter of weeks. Then, what Hannibal tried was a perfectly viable strategy; instead of an useless and risky raid against Rome, he first attacked Campania, the barn of Rome in Italy, where he could terrorize and recruit many more non-Latin Italian cities; more human and material resources on his side, less for the Romans. In fact, if Hannibal actually expected to conquer by force Rome itself or any other large Italian city, he hardly had any other choice. Hannibal was a strategist, not a suicide bomber. In the real world, the cleaver Cunctator proved right from the very first year of the war; without significant local support, the wonderful Punic army was utterly ineffective against fixed positions. In conclusion, from where I am, the immediate military objectives of Hannibal were evident; the recruiting of as many Italian and extra-Italian allies as he could, making then the Roman position untenable. Therefore, the Punic invasion of Campania was in all likelihood the most logical step after Cannae (in Apulia), ie, where the greatest benefits at the expense of the lesser risks were expected. The long term objectives from either Hannibal or the Carthaginian government at any time of Punic War II are simply not extant; period. Far more often than not, Hannibal did select his best available options; his problem was of course that it was just not enough; the Romans were far stronger and, at least at the critical moments, they took the right decisions too.

Yup, our differences were not so fundamental after all, weren't they? I honestly think I have already grasped your points, and I sincerily hope that for some time now it has been evident for you that I can perfectly understand that the most microscopic piece of shit (literally) can give us a treasure of information on let say the social hierarchy and flora of the studied population, period and location. That's not where our disagreements may rest; so let me finish my own points too. First, we can, we should and we ought to grade the relevance of the archaeological findings. Next, it would be extremely naive to pretend to ignore the social (and economic) context where this biblical research is talking place; religion, especifically Christian religion (irrespectively of your personal beliefs) couldn't be any more relevant. In their own words, this article of Jerome Taylor, Religious Affairs Correspondent, explained why, even if there is a one-in-a-million possibility that it could be a Sinaiticus fragment, it would definitely be worth looking, as it raises questions about how close what we read today is to the original words of Christ and his early followers.

Maybe that schatological description fitted the lesser Antonius, as far as we believe in Cicero, which given the political context was indeed a long shot. I suppose the same description could be applied to almost any not-so-famous close relative of any major Roman figure. As far as I can tell, Lucius Antonius political and military performance across the Perugian War and his own consulate was not so bad, during a highly contested period.

During the republic, that simply wasn't true. Individuals freely, openly, and often belligerently opposed magistrates holding imperium. As a result, we have some of the most beautifully anti-authoritarian invective the West has ever heard (Catullus should immediately spring to mind) Yep, I doubt that the Nazis would've let a Catullus live! The fact that he could write what he wrote about who he wrote at the time he wrote it is not indicative of your full on fascist state. If you doubt, read his poetry! Usus autem sum, ne in aliquo fallam carissimam mihi familiaritatem tuam, praecipue libris ex bibliotheca Ulpia, aetate mea thermis Diocletianis, et item ex domo Tiberiana, usus etiam [ex] regestis scribarum porticus porphyreticae, actis etiam senatus ac populi. 2 et quoniam me ad colligenda talis viri gesta ephemeris Turduli Gallicani plurimum invit, viri honestissimi ac sincerissimi, beneficium amici senis tacere non debui. 3 Cn. Pompeium, tribus fulgentem triumphis belli piratici, belli Sertoriani, belli Mithridatici multarumque rerum gestarum maiestate sublimem, quis tandem nosset, nisi eum Marcus Tullius et Titus Livius in litteras rettulissent? 4 Publ<i>um Scipionem Afric<an>um, immo Scipiones omnes, seu Lucios seu Nasicas, nonne tenebrae possiderent ac tegerent, nisi commendatores eorum historici nobiles atque ignobiles extitissent? 5 longum est omnia persequi, quae ad exemplum huiusce modi etiam nobis tacentibus usurpanda sunt. 6 illud tantum contestatum volo me et rem scripsisse, quam, si quis voluerit, honestius eloquio celsiore demonstret, et mihi quidem id animi fuit, 6 <ut> non Sallustios, Livios, Tacito<s>, Trogos atque omnes disertissimos imitarer viros in vita principum et temporibus disserendis, sed Marium Maximum, Suetonium Tranquillum, Fabium Marcellinum, Gargilium Martialem, Iulium Capitolinum, Aelium Lampridium ceterosque, qui haec et talia non tam diserte quam vere memoriae tradiderunt. 8 sum enim unus ex curiosis, quod infi[ni]t<i>as ire non possum, ince<n>dentibus vobis, qui, cum multa sciatis, scire multo plura cupitis. 9 et ne diutius ea, quae ad meum consilium pertinent, loquar, magnum et praeclarum principem et qualem historia nostra non novit, arripiam.

IMHO, it was far more complex issue; after all, under your stated rule, "this" (ie, utter devastation and genocide) should have happened to all the Roman known world, which clearly didn't occur. Because at one time or the other, absolutely all nations "FUCKed" with Rome (no exceptions), in one way or the other; just check on your own sources. Rome was in its way of universal conquest; at the risk of overstating the obvious, you can't make an omelet without breaking the eggs, and no country has ever happily left its sovereignty to any conqueror (contrary to the patently absurd pretensions of some Roman propaganda).

The amusing nature of any work is obviously subjective, but that load of sh*te was indeed great history; Sallust might have been a rascal and a blowhard, but there's a priory no reason why any rascal (and blowhard) couldn't also have been a gifted historian. In fact, we are not short of prominent examples among our regular Classical sources.

Nope, please don't fear, I perfectly get the concept.When I used the word "risk" in my last post, that was irony. However, if you check on your statistical methodology source, you wll verify that this is actually an academic valid use for the term "risk"; for example, "good" (HDL) cholesterol is currently considered a negative risk factor for coronary heart disease; See? As Santa Esmeralda used to say, Don't let me be misunderstood.Previously in this same thread, I described myself as a "passive agnostic"; in plain English, that means I can care less if any deity has ever existed or not. As a passive agnostic with reading powers, I must agree with the Jewish view; after all, by definition, the Bible (not "a Bible") was and is their sacred book.As an archaeologist, you must be aware that no copyst from any religion (or non-religious group) has ever been able to perfectly copy any sacred text (at least previous to Xerox); after all, they were not God. All the above basis already said, I'm afraid my original point was just that we can and should differentiate such "theological imperative" that so intensely 'demands' their "continuing attempts" (as it was so eloquently expressed by the Monastery's librarian in the original article from this whole thread) from the simple historical and cultural relevance.

Both authors scored quite high in the arse-licking scale, even by the standards of the Roman historians. Sallust wrote under the II triumvirate high proscriptions period and Velleius at the end of the Sejanus' rule under Tiberius; the both had very good reasons to fear for their necks (and not particularly related with Spartacus for any of them). The spectacular career of Sallus's nephew (and adopted son) under Augustus suggests his uncle actually succeded in pleasing the first Emperor. On the other hand, it's hard not to link Velleius' abrupt dissapearance with the coincident purge of his idol Sejanus and friends. In any case, Sallust was the closer we can get to a primary source for Servile War III. Besides, Sallust is regularly considered one of the main sources used by the sometimes careless Velleius. I see no reason to doubt that regarding the 74 gladiators figure, Velleius simply misquoted Sallust.

Hmm. Journalist colleagues have a mantra, "Never let the facts get in the way of a good story". I think you are saying that if Hirtius and subsequent historians made some of it up, I can be pardoned for the same sins? That's a good point and a wonderful mantra... for journalists and other fiction writers. In any case, why are these facts getting in the way of your good story? As I see it, "facts" here mean the desperate last stand of an heterogeneous group of radical Pompeian/Republicans that were for any reason stubbornly avoiding the Dictator's mercy. Is that really more boring than a routine crush-them-all Caesarian victory?

I only ever had one hangover, at age sixteen; it's still ongoing

The brains of carpenter ants like Dolichoderus scabridus (the victim of this real insect life drama) have around 260,000-300,000 neurons; considering that the average human brain has like 1,000,000,000 neurons and that most if not all the activity of these ants would be considered automatic in comparison with human psychology, the term "Zombie" is probably not an objective description of the effect of this fungus; after all, the severed head of any ant will continue using its mandibles and antennae for hours. When this ant-killer fungus (Ophio)cordyceps unilateralis is ready to spore, its mycelia enter the ant's brain and change how it perceives pheromones, causing the insect to climb to the top of a plant and use its mandibles to secure itself to the stem. The fungus then kills the ant, and the fruiting bodies of O. unilateralis grow from its head and explode, releasing the spores.

I'm sure next time any of us have a strategy question, we will check on you and not poor old Hannibal.Your last statement is not only absurd, but also a nice oxymoron (sorry, you will have to use your own dictionary). To be fair, the notion that Hannibal was a brilliant tactician and less than brilliant strategist is not new, unusual or at all oxymoronic. To hear the misuse of the term strategy, you only have to watch any episode of "The Apprentice" or listen to any business wanabee! There is no doubt that Hannibal was a brilliant battlefield tactician, but strategy is about ultimate objectives. Warfare is roughly split into three components. The strategic level is that of the objectives set out by the policy underlying the conflict. Following the definition of strategic objectives, the operational level plans the campaigns to reach the strategic objective. Finally, the tactical level concerns the planning and conduct of the actual fighting. For example, in my business, I may set a strategic target of a certain turnover and margin and plan new media to reach certain markets to achieve that objective. On a tactical level, that concerns the way the sales people approach the prospects, how much money is quoted etc. Hannibal absolutely knew how to make the best use of his resources on the battlefield; he was a great tactician. At the strategic level there is more doubt. The consensus is that he did not aim to obliterate Rome, but to reduce her to a regional power. There is further doubt as to whether his supply line could have supported a long seige of the city had his objective been total conquest. This brings us to the widely attested opinion of Marhabal. He clearly believed that the victory at Cannae should have been followed up with a march on Rome, but as we all know, Hannibal hesitated. He may have believed that total victory would have involved a long seige in which case we should understand the hesitation, however the opinion of Marhabal is well known:- "Truly the gods do not give everything to the same man: you know how to win a victory (tactics), Hannibal, but you do not know how to use one (strategy)." There are numerous arguments as to whether Hannibal was being understandably cautious or less than astute strategically. However, even if he decided to not move on Rome at her nadir for very good reasons, his ultimate defeat must call into question his strategic sense. If he was ill prepared for a siege, then his operational abilities should be scrutinized and there is the possibility that at this stage he fully expected Rome to give up any further opposition and reach settlement in line with his expectations. Definitions may vary a little bit, but if we admit that strategy is (SIC) "the science and art of military command exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions" (Merriam-Webster) or anything similar, it's hard for me to imagine how could Hannibal have left any additional evidence of his outmost performance. By definition, "a brillant commander on the battlefield but not so impressive in strategy" is an oxymoron (ie, "a combination of contradictory or incongruous words" [M-W] ). To be fair and as stated like a hundred posts ago, we actually don't know what on Earth was Hannibal thinking, and not because nobody wrote about it (eg, Silenus) but simply because no one of such accounts has survived; anything we discuss on Hannibal's intentions (consensus or not) is speculation. I'm not sure which authors are included by the term "consensus"; in any case, most scholars I'm aware of (eg. Lazenby) considered that the Punic army had no real chance of conquering Rome even after Cannae in 216 BC; Rome was simply too strong and resourceful even after such immense casualties. (That was in fact our main rationale behind the partial analogy with the Soviets and the Operation Barbarossa; do you remember?) Cannae by itself was just not enough. The Romans still had more legions than they had lost, and they were eventually able to raise a minimum of 25 legions (ie, the same as the entire Roman Empire under Tiberius) plus considerable naval forces and allies. Even more, scarcely any Italian city was sieged or taken by the Punic army all along the Hannibalic War; almost all the cities occupied by Hannibal voluntarily sided with him after Trasimene or Cannae. With so many active legions all across Italy, sieges were simply too risky for the victorious but isolated Carthaginian force, both before and after Cannae. Honestly, given the available evidence, I tend to agree; in fact, I may add that the poor performance of the Carthaginians against the sieging army of Ap. Claudius Pulcher in Capua in 212-211 BC is an excellent evidence in total agreement with that argument. Maharbal's statement may indeed have been historical (again, no punic accounts survived), but even if it was so, it was hardly any evidence that the Punic liuetenant may have been any better strategist than his extraordinary commander. Contrary to what some people have stated, Hannibal didn't remain inactive after Cannae; with the help of his Italian allies he tried to conquer the rich Campania (the Italian barn of Rome) and Bruttium; a perfectly viable strategy, and in all likelihood the best possible one, given the circumstances. Some minor towns were actually sieged and plundered, but at a great cost; Livy wrote: "Petelia in Bruttium was taken by Himilco, one of Hannibal's lieutenants, after a siege which lasted several months. That victory cost the Carthaginians heavy losses in both killed and wounded, for the defenders only yielded after they had been starved out. They had consumed all their corn and eaten every kind of animal whether ordinarily used as food or not, and at last kept themselves alive by eating leather and grass and roots and the soft bark of trees and leaves picked from shrubs. It was not until they had no longer strength to stand on the walls or to bear the weight of their armour that they were subdued." The main Campanian and Bruttian cities, like: - Neapolis (under Silanus command), - Nola (under Marcellus), - Beneventum (under Gracchus) and - Rhegium proved consistently immune to years of Punic attacks. What real chance would then Hannibal have had against the Servian Wall, the whole Latium and the remaining active legions, without even any local ally there? Where was the "lost great opportunity"? When after the fall of Capua most of Hannibal's Italian allies returned to the Roman side, there was very little that the Punic army was able do about it. On the other hand, the accounts of Hannibal's battles (especially Cannae) have been used as a significant inspiration by countless military experts for centuries, from his own time to the present day. I simply can't imagine any better evidence of the consensus opinion on anyone's strategic performance.

Cheers and congratulations to both of you !

Define "facts".My personal impression if that if Caesar had any two neurons actually making synapses (and of course, if he was the military genius I think he was) he must have profited from his overwhelming material and human advantage, facing then his cornered enemies with at least a comfortable superiority. Therefore, without any additional evidece I would consider Hirtius' reported legion figures as absurd and utterly unreliable, to say the least.

Thereby hangs the difference in our viewpoints I see the discovery of any new archaeologically or historically related material as perscriptive for wider research and/ot interest rather than proscrtiptive as only being of interest to a limited interest group whether a religious one or not. [Endit] Yup, we fundamentally disagree; I firmly believe that the historical and cultural relevance of archaeological findings can and should be graded and distinguished from purely theological concerns . I understand that you have been intermitently working in the Marcham/ Frilford Romano-British Temple complex for almost a decade; with all due respect, it's clear that the risk of acquiring relevant historical or cultural information is far greater for the work of your team than for the high-budget biblical paleography that may with some luck eventually determine which of the 500+ ways of reading Joshua 1:10 is closer to the oldest one (ie, the "original") .

My point is simply that the non-religious (in fact, non-Christian) relevance of this finding is questionable at best. Check your sources; we positively know that what is lacking from Codex Sinaiticus New Testament are not entire books, but just passages, lines or even isolated words; as you stated, that's the main reason why CS is so relevant, at least for Christianity. In fact, the list of the missing material is currently reasonably well-known; that's why Jos 1:10 was identified a potential candidate for a CS fragment. Recovering all those fragment will essentially just make this Codex a better Christian relic.

Why "sorry"? You have been repeating the same bare assertions all across this thread, without any single explicit quotation of any classical source.If by "clicking the fingers" you do mean asking me to share our sources... be my guest!!! Goldsworthy, Connolly and Mr. "Osprey series" know perfectly well that any statement is as good as its source; if you might post the specific passage that you require from those tertiary authors, and if you might also point the primary classical sources for such quotations, your previous comments may eventually make any sense (I mean, if that is not too much "clicking the fingers" for you!) BTW, please repeat all those years when the Roman Republic lacked this not permanent institutions (if your sources are not too hidden, of course) The answer is no mistery; the citizen army was permanent, even if each individual legion lasted only one year. A nice Red Herring, if I have ever read one.And also a fancy explanation on why you don't like (or are able to) use the blessings of our classical sources after just 2456 posts at UNRV. I'm sure you trust your hidden sources knew better than Livy and Polybius; that may help explain your last bare assertions. This was after all written by the man you described as a supremacist. But isn't this pretty much what I said? The Romans had no answer to Hannibals War. They had lost four battles severely and weren't willing to confront him in that manner again. Fabius was playing for time, not annihilating the enemy. Polybius has merely rationalised what was an unadventurous policy designed to minimise the damage rather than sweep it away. If Fabius was such a success, why was it necessary for Scipio to force the issue? Hannibal wasn't going away, part of the senate at least were considering surrender, a portion of Roman territory had sided with the invader, and the war was lingering on at no benefit to the Romans. Of course the Senate slapped themselves on the back and said the Fabian Strategy was the key to success - politicians always back the winning side after the event. Praise for Fabius was an indication of his political acceptance rather than any real military ability. The fact remains that Fabius didn't win the war. Hannibal lost it. Yes, we all would prefer your bare assertions over our primary sources any day...It's a little depressing to corroborate that just posting some thousands times doesn't teach any critical analysis by itself; sadly, for that you have to actually read the text with care. And just for the record; what part of his obvious supremacist agenda prevented Polybius from being the best Historian of his Era? You won't believe it, but all those reports on the extraordinary success of the Fabian Strategy (and not necessarily Cunctator per se) came not from Fabius but from absolutely all available sources (maybe even from your hidden ones!); to verify this, all you have to do is to read again my last post, this time carefully.As anyone can see (maybe even you) after all this time you still have not the slightest idea of what on Earth the Fabian Strategy may have been (You haven't asked Mr. Washington, have you?). For that, all you need (yes, you knew it!) is to read again my last post, this time carefully. I'm sure next time any of us have a strategy question, we will check on you and not poor old Hannibal.Your last statement is not only absurd, but also a nice oxymoron (sorry, you will have to use your own dictionary). Now, let us get a little more serious, shall we? The advance of their own personal agenda instead or even at the expense of the Republican better health was indeed noteworthy, but it was the norm, not the exception, even at the Roman worst hour across Punic War II; the really amazing facts were that:- it didn't seem to have interfered too much with the Roman World conquest; - our sources didn't seem to care too much about it. Regulus' story is evidently extremely morally edited (and therefore, unreliable), even to the level of modern Christian hagiography. Flamininus' early age is a good evidence of the extreme attrition of the Roman nobility after Punic War II that you were talking about. As previously stated, we have pretty nice examples from the very Hannibalic War; the most aristocratic families, like the Scipio and the Fabii, were still unshamefully advancing their own offspring. If we should trust Livy, the struggle of the orders was still surprisingly active; just check on the experience of Flaminius and Varro. MC Marcellus, the Sword of Rome himself, was once prevented from becoming consul just for being a plebeian! Fabius Cunctator repeatedly tried to obstruct Africanus' advance; conversely, Scipio Africanus Major himself openly admitted that he was delaying his final battle against Hannibal just for his own chance of conquering Africa! Finally, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, then the elected patrician consul, reportedly tried to delay the peace negotiations with Carthage, just for stealing the imminent triumph celebration from Scipio! The main lesson for us is that, in spite of the unavoidable interference of such petty personal political considerations, the pre-Marian citizen army was still a military machine perfect enough for conquering the World without any single lost war across so many centuries. From more than a hundred posts ago: The only problem for this statement was just with the "mercenaries" depiction, which under any strict definition the vast majority of the Punic soldiers clearly were not; the training comparison of Anakin was entirely precise,and it would have been so too against absolutely any other contemporary army, either citizen (eg, the Achaean and Aetolian leagues), "militia" (eg, Boii and Insubrian troops), "professional" (eg. the Hellenistic kingdoms) or even truly mercenary (eg, the Cretan archers and the Rhodian slingers).

Not at all, I am glad that you now realise that your original interpretation of what was being said was incorrect. While I understand that you may have theological views on what or what is not a constituent part of the New Testament historically several different books have been included or excluded from different Chrisitian sects versions of the Bible - sometimes even splitting the earlier Old Testament books into more than one book or at other times merging books together. In fact even today there is a degree of disagreement in the order in which the books should be read and a few additional books included by at least one 'Christian' sect in their version of the bible - and I don't mean the 'M' group On that basis there is little point in spirallling off into what is or isn't canonical because as you have now agreed the 'Codex Sinatiacus' is currently the oldest and most complete version of what historically has been included in the Christian Bible - not just the New Testament. The papyri versions you mentioned tend to be even more incomplete. For historians, if not theologians, the latest discovery of additional leaves from the codex bound into the spines of other library books potentially will make the Codex's 'virtual' recreation even more 'complete'. I am sure that you will agree that from a historical standpoint that can only be a good thing. Indeed, but you will also agree that its relevance is far more theological than historical . (That may be the reason why this article was written by J Taylor, the "Religious Affairs Correspondent" of The Independent). Just for the record: - the theological views depicted here are not "mine"; when I am here and for all purposes, I'm an absolute passive agnostic. - the definition of what the Bible and the New Testament are is entirely theological. - My "interpretations", as far as I can say, are still the same. - As far as I'm aware of, my only mistake so far was not checking carefully on the explanation of FV in the first post of this thread (ie, the "Christian bible" line) . Now, let see if we may agree on why and for whom is this finding such a big thing: In Mr. Taylor own words: "it often raises questions about the evolution of the Bible and how close what we read today is to the original words of Christ and his early followers". Estimations on the number of versions of the Bible vary; for the English language alone, they are regularly in the order of 450-500 or more. Obviously, each and any of such versions is the only and whole truth for at least some group(s) of Christians; so imagine the potential religious and economic value of the "scientifically" validated original version of the Bible. Mr. Taylor reported here the study of a parchment fragment that may (or may not) be a tiny fraction of the Codex; however, in the monastery's librarian opinion, "even if there is a one-in-a-million possibility that it could be a Sinaiticus fragment", it's worth the research (and this article, BTW). IF the fragment is indeed from the Codex, reportedly it may contain "the beginning of Joshua, Chapter 1, Verse 10". Now, the Codex Sinaiticus is already essentially complete; in fact, that's the main reason why it is so valuable for Christianity, as you rightly pointed. We already know the Codex OT section is based on the Septuagint, and the Septuagint version of Joshua has been well known for a long time; obviously, translations vary, but a reasonable transcription of Jos 1:10 would be something like: "So Joshua ordered the officers of the people:". Of course, religious wars have begun for disagreements in just a couple of characters; but as you can see, its unlikely that this fragment would eventually have too much extra-religious impact.

In Florus' words: "The first hope of the Empire, as it began to recover and, so to speak, return to life, was Fabius, who devised a new method of defeating Hannibal

I suppose you're going to hate me for decomposing your question . Naturally, your original statement was entirely right and I haven't checked the first post of FV then; I have only read the name of the thread. By definition, we cannot talk about the New Testament without some care for their canonicity (ie, their acceptance status) because it's exactly such canonicity which determines which book is and which book isn't New Testament; non-canonical books are by definition apocryphal and therefore, not NT. The Codex Sinaiticus is the oldest example of an almost complete Christian Bible (NT + OT), acknowledging its "canon-plus" status; otherwise, priority would go to the Codex Vaticanus (strictly canonical). Regarding exclusively the NT text (ie, canonical or proto-canonical Christian books) there are several older manuscripts (essentially papyri) which predate the Codex Sinaiticus by many years; some of them may have come from as early as the late II century.

Given that the first posting on this thread includes a definition of 'Codex Sinaiticus' as the 'oldest Christian' bible and I specified the link as 'of related interest' then yes By "the 'oldest Christian' bible", the source quoted by FV rightly implies that the Codex is the oldest extant copy (early IV century) that in his New Testament section includes all the 27 Books Canon currently comsidered as canonical by most Christian Churches (a theological, not a scientific definition), including some disputed Catholic Epistles (II Peter, II & III John and Jude), questioned even by Eusebius; the latter Epistle is especially problematic because it explicitly quotes some apocryphal Books (especially Enoch). Now, the Codex is not exempt of problems for the current Canon, because aside from some editing, it includes two additional books almost universally considered today as Apocryphal; the Epistle of Barnabbas and the Shepherd of Hermas; it seems both were best-sellers at the IV century. Therefore, the Codex Sinaiticus NT would actually be a "Canon-plus" version, and the Codex Vaticanus would then be the oldest extant strictly canonical version by current standards. The Old Testament version of the Codex Sinaiticus is an almost complete copy of the Septuagint, including then also some non-canonical books ( Tobit, Judith, 2 Esdras, 1 and 4 Maccabees, Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus). Not included in the Tanakh (the original [Jewish] bible) such books are considered "Deuterocanonical" and their level of canonicity depends mainly on who you ask; for example, the Roman Catholic Church accepts all of them, except 4 Maccabees.