Julius Caesar

I caught a few minutes of that dog show (Westminster is it?) and in just a few minutes several of the larger breeds were listed as being used by the Roman legions. The only one I remember is the Neopolitan Mastiff.

Maybe we could all agree that a Germanicus principate is one of the great "What-Ifs" of Roman history. It probably would have meant no Sejanus, no reign of Caligula, no reign of Nero, and possibly the continuation of the Julio-Claudian line well beyond the point where Nero destroyed it. Now back to the debate...

Sejanus -- for destroying the eldest sons of Germanicus (Nero and Drusus) and thus inadvertantly paving the way for Caligula.

Livia was rumored to have killed or have killed many Julio-Claudians wasn't she? I wonder if any were true? But anyway, I tend to go with those who say Tiberius was not behind Germanicus' death. Germanicus had already proved his loyalty to Tiberius while in command of the Rhine legions, and even if he planned to have him poisoned, it seems an odd move on Tiberius' part to give Germanicus such broad powers in the East that he himself, as well as Augustus' grandson Gaius, had been given by Augustus. But who knows really. The seeming eagerness with which the Julio-Claudians devoured each other never ceases to amaze me, though I guess it really shouldn't. Germanicus' death (and the inability of his widow Agrippina to keep her mouth shut and hide her anger as Germanicus pleaded with her to do on his deathbed) was probably the worst thing to happen to the Julio-Claudian line though, as it set in motion the chain of events that deprived his two older sons, Nero and Drusus, of their chance at being emperor as both were victims of Sejanus. This in turn left Caligula; surely either of the older sons would have been better. Then came Claudius, and then Nero, who of course destroyed the dynasty forever.

So JC, whats your opinion - Punative or Expansionist ? Well I think its impossible to say with certainty. I think part of this debate is tied to the debate over Germanicus himself -- was he simply a moderately-competent general propped up by Tacitus beyond that which he deserved as a contrast to Tiberius, or was he the brilliant and charismatic general held back by Tiberius, and tragically dead not long past the age of 30? One of the ancient sources say that Germanicus wrote Tiberius a letter saying that he thought he could complete the conquest to the Elbe with one more year of campaigning, so obviously if there is any validity to this then its pretty strong evidence for conquest as the goal. The size of the force Germanicus committed to the campaigns of 15 and 16 could also point to this, but then again one could point to Trajan's massive first war against Dacia where he committed an enormous army to what turned out to be a punitive war. And it could be said that Germanicus was just being careful in making sure that what happened to Varus did not happen to him, and 80,000 Roman troops was a pretty good insurance against that. In the end, I come down on the expansionist side. It is thought that Germanicus was indeed planning on invading Germany again before being recalled in 17, and it just seems like overkill if punishing the Germans was his only goal. He had already beaten Arminius (though was unable to capture him), and 3 yrs of campaigning certainly was enough to put an end to the unrest of the legions that broke out upon Augustus' death. Futhermore, Germanicus knew that a triumph awaited him in Rome, so it seems he had no need to risk his life in further campaigning if he did not have greater aims in mind. Following from all of this, it just seems like too much of a risk to keep going for mere punitive expeditions. Just consider how the campaigns of 15 and 16 ended: In 15, half the army under the capable command of Germanicus' lieutenant, Caecina, fell into a Teutoberg-like ambush while marching for the Rhine, and only the cool and calm resolve of Caecina turned a near disaster into a Roman victory. In 16, Germanicus himself and his fleet was scattered by bad weather while attempting to return to Gaul by sea. It is said that Germanicus was in such despair that he considered taking his own life, but was relieved to learn that his losses weren't as bad as he thought upon finally returning to the Rhine. So taken as a whole, it just seems odd to me that this popular heir to the throne, with his popular wife, and his popular children, and established military reputation would risk his life on yet another dangerous campaign if his goal wasn't to emulate and improve upon his father's conquests in Germany. The only thing that could make me think he would go back yet again for punitive purposes was to do the one thing he hadn't -- capture or kill Arminius. So I tend to favor the expansionist view, though I'm by no means adamant about it. Likewise, I tend to take the pro-Germanicus view of the man. I think he is one of the great What Ifs of Roman history. What if Augustus had made him his heir instead of Tiberius, or what if Germanicus had not died in the East and assumed the purple in due time? Would he have gone back and finished what he started in Germany? Would his status as emperor and many children led to a more stable and longer-lasting Julio-Claudian line?

Isn't that a subject of debate among historians; the question of whether or not Germanicus' campaigns in Germany were strictly punitive or a serious attempt to reestablish the frontier at the Elbe as his father and uncle had done? Germanicus' second and third campaigns across the Rhine in 15 and 16 were massive ones involving 8 legions and their auxillaries. I think the Romans certainly could have completed the conquest of Germany and then pacified it if they had been willing to pay the price. Afterall, Drusus and Tiberius had already established military superiorty once, and Augustus only entrusted the province to Varus because he thought it was ready for romanization. One of the things that made Rome so great was its ability to recover from and eventually avenge most of its worst defeats, as it did with all on this list with the exception of Adrianople. Marius avenged Arausio Scipio avenged Cannae Ventidius Bassus avenged Carrhae, on its very anniversary in 38 BC, and Rome would go on to fight several succesful wars against the Parthians, particularly those of Trajan, Cassius Avidius, and Septimus Severus. Germanicus avenged Teutoberg, and several other Roman armies would later campaign in Germany.

Am I wrong in thinking that the classical Roman legion -- that force of 4000-6000 highly disciplined heavy infantry -- had disappeared by the time of Adrianople? It seems to me that the emergence of cavalry had as much to do with the inability of Rome and successor states to finance, train, and support an effective infantry force as it did with any inherent superiority of cavalry. Certainly the legions had proven that when under the leadership of a good commander, they could handle armies with superior cavalry.

Trying to determine the race/ethnicity of ancient figures of North Africa is a fairly controversial subject in the way the debates often become political or ideological. You have people who insist Cleopatra was black, even though all but one (I think) of her family tree can be traced to the the Macedonian Ptolemic line. Hannibal is also a subject for debate, as is Septimus Severus, though his lesser standing in history means he gets little press. I've read that his mother's family was Italian by ancestry, while his father's descended from Libya. Whether or not that meant they were 'black' is uncertain. Its interesting, but I'd rather have a detailed account of his Parthian Wars than know the answer to this. He is a fascinating emperor, perhaps the last to rule over a Rome of indisputable supremacy over its barbarian and eastern enemies.

Don't many historians today consider Domitian's bad reputation to be overstated, and more a result of the need the writers of the time to tear him down so as to serve as a contrast to Trajan who they were building up?

That the Romans never faced the Macedonian system at its zenith is certainly true, but it doesn't mean that the legion at its height couldn't have beaten Alexander. Its a fascinating 'what if', and I guess the best match-up would be Caesar's army versus Alexander's. Though really the Roman army had several high points. Consider; the legions that won the Second Punic War, those of Caesar, those of the late republic/early principate, those of Trajan, those of Marcus Aurelius, those of Septimius Severus, and those of Aurelian. And this list is certainly not a complete one.

Crassus seemed to make the wrong decision at every turn during his ill-fated invasion of Parthia. He ignored good advice from his officers and the Armenian king, while listening those who turned out to be on the Parthian side. I've read that the Romans used the testudo formation much more effectively against the Parthians during Ventidious Bassus' victories over them in 39 and 38 BC

Scanderberg: I'd agree that the Teutoberg disaster was due more to Varus' command than a deficiency of the legions. I believe that two other Roman armies managed to turn the tables after falling into similar ambushes by Germans and defeat them. The first was during Drusus' campaigns of conquest, and the second during his son Germanicus' second campaign in 15 AD. In the latter, Germanicus' lieutenant Caecina was leading half the army (4 legions + aux troops) back to the Rhine at the end of that campaigning season when they were ambushed by the Germans. I believe Arminius was in charge, and his forces were initially successful but allowed the prospect of loot to cloud their judgement, and then Caecina ordered a counterattack that snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, allowing the weary army to make it back to the Rhine mostly intact (though I think they suffered heavy cavalry losses). Decurio: Do you have any more info on that siege of Volandum, or can you suggest a source that does? Rome vs the East is one of my favorite subjects within the study of the Roman Empire, and I've always found the lack of detail to be frustrating.

Yeah, after he paraded her through Rome as part of his triumph.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Germanicus was actually named after his father Drusus' successful campaigns in Germany. That Germanicus himself later led his own successful campaigns into Germany and against Arminius was coincidence as far as his name was concerned. Though that's not really germane to the point of this topic I guess.

Sebastianus: Aurelian's achievements in his 5 yr reign were quite staggering, and it is tempting to think what he could have done at Rome's zenith, or even if he had lived longer in his time. He was in the midst of preparing for a campaign against the Persians when he died, though I don't know if it was envisioned as more of a punitive campaign for loot, or one of conquest. Clearly he was an excellent general. In his campaign against Zenobia he twice managed, at the battles of Immae and Emesa, to win the day with his infantry after the Palmyrene cavalry had routed their Roman counterparts. And of course he won one victory after another against the barbarians.

JetJon: Not to get too far off topic, but Napoleon's invasion of Russia began in the summer, and he reached Moscow before winter arrived. That's not to say he didn't make a serious error in following the Russians to Moscow, or not leaving Moscow earlier, but he at least began the campaign at the right time. And it could be argued that his decision to occupy Spain was an even bigger blunder, as it bled and deprived him of thousands of soldiers who may have saved him after the Russian disaster. But he was a great battlefield general. He rose from obscurity to create the most powerful empire on mainland Europe since Charlamagne, or even Rome. He routinely defeated armies that outnumbered his own, and infact, his campaigns after the Russian disaster are considered to be some of his most brilliant. But by that time, though, he simply could not match the numerical superiority of the allies. Napoleon clearly showed some bad judgment, but really very few generals have gone an entire career w/o losing at some point. Napoleon's problem was that his political mistakes compounded his military ones.

You may be right about Germanicus' campaigns being nothing more than punitive campaigns. I know that some historians take that view, but then again some take the view that it was an attempt at reconquest. I wonder if it could be both. Perhaps the limited excursion in 14 AD was just that, but its success convinced Germanicus to continue next year with the entire Rhine army of 8 legions instead of just the four he had taken the first year, with the goal of reconquest. It is said that he wrote to Tiberius expressing the belief, or hope, that he could complete the reconquest with another season of campaigning. His victory, or victories, over Arminius must have bolstered such a belief. Or maybe the limited expedition in 14 was just a preparatory mission in advance of what a planned reconqest all along, one that had the blessing of Tiberius and that was only canceled by the emperor after the natural disasters which inflicted as much or more damage on the army as the Germans managed to do in losing battles. Or maybe they were all punitive expeditions, with those of 15 and 16 being massive ones. Its an interesting question. I wonder if Germanicus had lived and assumed the purple, if he would have resumed the campaign.

The Julio-Claudian era is probably the most fascinating with historical giants like Caesar, Augustus, Antony,Cleopatra, Caligula, and Nero. Its also interesting too see how so many of Augustus' preferred heirs died young, and how as a result the chain of events that led to the end of the dynasty with Nero occured. Its ghastly the way in which the imperial family devoured each other after Augustus' death (or before according to some). And of course this era includes the life and times of Jesus Christ.

JetJon: Scipio defeated Hannibal in Northern Africa at Zama, not Spain, and Carthage wasn't sacked until the end of the 3rd Punic War, I think. If one were making an elite list, you may be right that only Caesar definitely rates as great, while Scipio might, but in no way does the remainder of Rome's generals rate as 'pathetic.' Cases can be made for all of the following that they were good-great commanders: Fluvius Camillus, Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Ventidius Bassus, Marc Antony, Marcus Agrippa, Drusus, Tiberius, Germanicus, Caecina, Corbulo, Aulus Plautius, Seutonius Paulinus, Vespasian, Titus, Agricola, Trajan, Lucius Quietus, Cassius Avidius, Septimius Severus, Maximinus, Gallienus, Timesitheus, Aurelian, Carus, Galerius, Constantine, Stilicho, and Aetius. And there were definitely great generals between the fall of Rome and WWII. You have Belisarius and Narses (if you count Byzantine as separate from Rome), Gustavus Adolphus, Wellington, Robert E Lee, Stonewall Jackson, Nathan Bedford Forrest, and Ulysses S Grant were all fine generals, and that is a short list. And Napoleon definitely rates among the greats. So I'd have to strongly disagree unless you are defining 'great' in the most strict of terms, but even then many others would merit inclusion, like Napoleon.

And much like Alexander, it probably would've collapsed after his death. Fortunately for Rome, they still had another 50 years of positive imperial rule ahead of them after Trajan died. Despite his failure at Hatra, Trajan and his generals had done much to restore Roman control over northern Mesopotamia by the time of his death. I think that Hadrian could have held the area if he had wanted to, but it would most certainly have required the raising of new legions. Afterall, Severus established a permanent province in the area by the end of the 2nd century, and it would remain in Roman hands, off and on, for the next 160 years until the Jovian peace. Trajan himself planned to march back into Mesopotamia in 117, but was dissauded from doing so by his failing health. So it is tempting to contemplate what he might have done had he lived, or better yet had he been younger when he started the war.

Ventidius Bassus deserves mention for his success in avenging Carrhae. Marc Antony had put him in charge of countering the Parthian (aided by Roman renegades) invasion of Syria. Bassus won several battles, most notably at Mt Amanus in 39 B.C. then the next year at the Battle of Gindarus on the anniversary of Carrhae, where he destroyed the Parthian army, killing the Parthian prince Pacorus in the process. His victory was decisive, as the Parthians did not invade Syria again until the reign of Marcus Aurelius

But back to the topic of the thread; The beleaguered Gallenius showed great promise. Carus also showed his potential in his brief reign, as he defeated a Quadi and Sarmatian incursion into the empire, then led a successful invasion of Persian territory, capturing their capital Ctesiphon. I've read the invasion was either completely unopposed, or initially unopposed and that Carus defeated a Persian army before taking their capital. Whatever the case, he planned to campaign futher against the Persians when he died.

Germanicus: I have only read parts of the book you speak of, so I can't really comment on it as a whole, but I do find his skepticism of the accepted history that Germanicus defeated Arminius to be a bit puzzling. To use as evidence against it the fact that the province of Germany was not reestablished seems weak to me seeing as how the Romans were seldom able to subdue a people with one or two battles. It took Caesar yrs to subdue Gaul, and it took Germanicus' father and uncle yrs to subdue Germany the first time. That Germanicus defeated the Germans, but that it didn't result in the subjugation of Germania makes perfect sense to me. Total victory would have required several more campaigns.

Why do you say Tiberius was a bad field commander? Didn't he complete his brother Drusus' conquest of Germany to the Elbe, then successfully suppress the massive Pannonian revolt? Of course this was before he became emperor, but as emperor he never commanded again, so I don't see why he'd be considered a bad military emperor. He did recall Germanicus from his attemps to reestablish the lost province of Germany, but even with that there seems to be no consensus from historians as to why. Some say it was out of jealousy of the popular Germanicus and fear that he'd pull a Caesar and march on Rome. Others say it was a wise and prudent decision because, although Germanicus had commanded well in defeating Arminius and reasserting Roman military dominance over the Germans, the successful completion of the campaign would have required several more years of campaigning and incurred a cost in men and material that far outweighed the gain from attaining the Elbe as the new frontier.

In terms of emperors who successfully campaigned while emperor, and who actually took a leading role in the command decisions; Trajan -- easy choice for his successful conquest of Dacia, and transient conquest of Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Assyria. Had he lived, he most likely would have made northern Mesopotamia a permanent province, at a minimum. Severus -- won a bloody civil war, then defeated the Parthians, thus carving out a permanent province of Mesopotamia and in some respects finishing the work left undone by Trajan. Then he campaigned in Scotland. Aurelian -- defeated multiple barbarian tribes, brought back the break away Gallic empire, crushed Zenobia and her Palmyrene empire in the East, and was planning a great campaign against Persia when he was assassinated. Constantine -- defeated several other Roman armies, plus multiple barbarian tribes, and was planning a great campaign against Persia when he died.