Legionnaire

Furius Venator, Essentially, the Parthians exploited not only their advantage in terms of situation and available resources but also a potential flaw in the cohort system used by the Romans, in that it could be penetrated by continuous bombardment. How could such a strategy of attack be overcome? Is this an innate weakness in the structure of the Roman legion? The capture of Ctesiphon, the Parthian capital, by Septimius Severus seems to indicate otherwise. caldrail, While I agree with your assessment, and Josephus' observation, about fighting "by the book", I'm not sure that this was the absolute nature of the Roman army. I think the flexibility and relative maneuverability of the cohort system, and the innovativeness of the Roman military machine, attest to the importance of creativity in war. Remember: while the Romans may have fought in formation, a formation is only as strong as its soldiers. Rome relied heavily on the legionnaires in many aspects of the empire (construction and maintenance, for example); why not in combat as well? Undoubtedly, discipline and training were fundamental to the success of the Roman army, but the tenacity, skill, morale, and intelligence of the soldiers were, I believe, equally as crucial. This is basically what Caesar says in the passage I quoted.

caldrail, I belive your assessment of cavalry is quite true. For instance, Caesar described in his account of the Gallic Wars how the Nervii (who will appear again later in this post), who did not use any mounted warriors, repelled cavalry: While I agree with many of your comments, I would like to raise one major objection. In his memoirs of his conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar includes an episode against the Nervii, who were particularly fierce and brave warriors: Thus, because of their own creativity and intelligence, the Roman soldiers were able to thwart a sudden and terrifying attack. I do not believe that creativity and discipline are opposite or conflicting: discipline does not suppress creativity. The discipline of the Roman army was undoubtedly essential for the execution of complicated formations such as the testudo during the confusion of combat. However, man is a thinking being, and the instincts and nature of humanity are not eliminated by military training and a life of discipline.

In the Battle Scenarios thread, I asked some of the following questions (others just arose in the process of debate): It is generally accepted that the phalanx, while almost impenetrable in open field combat, is useless in rougher terrain. Are there any faults in the later Roman formations that could be exploited by warriors adapted to mountainous warfare, such as the Samnites? How effective is cavalry in forested areas? Is cavalry support only useful on terrain that is level and that offers a great degree of visibility and room to manoeuvre? As Arminius' success at Teutoburg Forest demonstrated, the Roman legion was quite to ambush. How could such slaughters be avoided? Was the Roman heavy infantry (legionnaires) an effective unit in engaging heavy cavalry units, such as the cataphracts? If not, how could the landscape be exploited to shift the odds in favour of the Romans? Could the strength of a Roman legion be limited by a dependence on discipline and formation? Historians such as Vegetius in his Military Matters discussed numerous examples of formations: Polybius argued for the dominance of the maniple formation over the phalanx in The Histories: But how can we ignore the major defeats suffered by the Romans in discussing the effectiveness of the army's organization and tactics?

Germanicus, I'll try that. One new topic coming up. Thanks.

An important question to consider: is siegecraft integral to laying a successful siege? A siege is as much about isolation as it is about utter destruction; look at Caesar's triumph at Alesia. By simply enclosing Alesia in a wall and by eliminating the ability of Vercingetorix and the 80,000 men in the fortress to resupply their resources, Caesar was able to achieve first a moral victory. Then, because of the discipline and engineering capabilities of his soldiers, a physical victory even against what seemed to be insurmountable odds. If I read his accounts correctly, he did not have any siege artillery or any advanced siegecraft. I think the art of the siege, particularly in relation to the development of more powerful siege weapons, really advanced with the appearance of castles in Europe during the Medieval Era, for instance the trebuchet. Nevertheless, the onager is a specific example of Roman siegecraft. A site about Roman artillery, with seemingly valid credentials, is on the University of North Carolina server. To answer the original question, I think the advantage shifted to the "barbarian" tribes, such as the Visigoths who sacked Rome in 410 AD under Alaric, with the collapse of the army and the subsequent inability of the legions to defend the Roman frontiers. Simply, the Romans became too decadent and were no longer willing to serve in the military. Thus, the Roman army relied on the support of mercenaries. Furthermore, as the Huns pushed into Europe, they created a mass migration of Germanic tribes throughout Europe. How could the deteriorating Roman army cope with the influx of displaced Germans? They could not. Even if the Visigoths did not possess siegecraft, by overcoming the Roman legions, they really already achieved success. A defenseless city will fall to any siege once starvation and disease begins to ravage the population. From: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encycl...anism/sack.html

Gaius, No apologies necessary. I did not feel attacked; I just felt I had to clarify the purpose of this topic. I had hoped for the scenario to change each time someone responded with their strategy (or at least more often), rather than continuously debating one battle. Otherwise, like Germanicus said, the thread would start to go "round in circles". I thought that this thread would allow for a more lively, creative discussion about the effectiveness of the Roman legions in different settings because often historians like Vegetius neglect to mention the effects of environment on combat. I thought it was an area that was lacking in discussion and analysis. For instance, here are the questions I often found myself asking as I researched the history of Roman warfare: It is generally accepted that the phalanx, while almost impenetrable in open field combat, is useless in rougher terrain. Are there any faults in the later Roman formations that could be exploited by warriors adapted to mountainous warfare, such as the Samnites? How effective is cavalry in forested areas? Is cavalry support only useful on terrain that is level and that offers a great degree of visiblity and room to maneuver? As Arminius' success at Teutoburg Forest demonstrated, the Roman legion was quite to ambush. How could such slaughters be avoided? Was the Roman heavy infantry (legionnaires) an effective unit in engaging heavy cavalry units, such as the cataphracts? If not, how could the landscape be exploited to shift the odds in favour of the Romans?

Germanicus, You are right: much of the discussion on this thread is pure speculation of "armchair generals". However, my purpose in making this thread was not to create another "what if" discussion, but rather to have intelligent debates on the best battlefield strategies and formations as employed by the Romans throughout the history of the Republic and Empire. So, if you want, this could easily become a more academic thread in which specific examples of battles are listed and analyzed and in which we examine the testimony of Roman historians, such as Vegetius in Military Matters: However, an academic discussion loses the human factor and it loses touch with reality, as it tends to ignore the effects of the location and environment of the battle.

Hannibal's centre was destroyed in his victories, such as at Cannae, with the purpose of trapping the Romans. Yes, the legions were able to completely destroy Hannibal's infantry head on, but by doing so, they effectively defeated themsleves by exposing their flanks and rear to attack. If the legions were more flexible - if a commander employed the more flexible maniple system rather than the rigid phalanx formation, the Romans would have experienced greater success on the battlefield at this time in history. The use of a more adaptable formation is exactly what I am proposing for this situation. The phalanx and its powerful frontal assaults are perfectly adapted for open field warfare but are utterly useless in valleys or mountainous regions. In The Histories, Polybius describes the difference between the Roman Maniple and the Macedonian Phalanx, which essentially becomes the difference between a flexible and an inflexible strategy of attack: Thus, if I commanded a Roman legion, I would pursue a more open, "fancy" tactic: remember, the Romans adopted the maniple formation during warfare with other Italic tribes - including the Gauls and the Samnites.

Gaius, I did like your thinking, so I expanded on it. Formations similar to the one used at Marathon have been used successfully so many times throughout history, such as at the Battle of Cannae. Germanicus, If you did attack my divided forces with your entire army, that would be a good strategy. However, you would expose your flank to attack by the other two Roman forces. Another however: these forces would be storming uphill. So your strategy might work, unless I was able to intercept your forces towards the bottom of the hill, striking with all three units - that is what I would try to do. Gaius Octavius' strategy of surrounding the hill could work as an effective counter but the Samnites still have the advantage of height.

Remember, there are cavalry as well. Perhaps the best option would be to use the hills to outflank the Samnites with a combination of cavalry and infantry. Considering the tenacity and ferocity of the Samnites, perhaps a full frontal charge would not be as effective. If I were the commander, I would use the classic tactic used by the Greeks at the Battle of Marathon: by placing the weakest soldiers at the centre of the formation, the Greeks were able to draw the Persians into the midst of their army and attack them from the flanks. In between the hills, a similar strategy could work; by placing soldiers on the hill, the number of soldiers in the field is reduced, and therefore, the centre of the formation is weaker. As the Samnites and Romans clash, the larger Samnite force would gradually drive the Romans backward. This would expose the Samnite flanks to cavalry and infantry attacks from the hill.

Try this: one poster posts a fictional battle scenario, including details about troops, landscape, time of day, location, enemy, and era. The next poster describes how he/she would command the Roman soldiers in battle, and, after responding, creates a new confrontation. I thought this would be a great idea to test and gain knowledge about battle tactics and the Roman army throughout Roman history. Let's begin with a fairly easy one. It is the fourth century BC, and a Roman legion, with a cavalry force of 300 men, has encountered an equally sized Samnite contingent on a flat field flanked by hills covered with a light forest. It is early morning, the field is still damp with dew, and the sun is rising. The Samnites are approaching from the east, with the sun at the backs; you and your legion are facing the sun. The location is in territory between the two nations, therefore giving no one combatant any advantage in terms of support. What would you do? Enjoy, Legionnaire

Hi, I think the idea of a "fat" or "thick" gladiator is mostly the product of stereotypical views of Europeans. People of the modern age generally associate martial arts with the Asian world, believing, astoundingly, that Europeans created no indigenous martial arts. Finesse, skill, technique, and mastery are associated with the Orient; brute strength and even incompetence or ignorace are associated with the West. This statement comes from experience: people are just completely unaware of European martial arts and the skill of knights, legionnaires, or gladiators. The pinnacle of the warriors is seen as the samurai, the ninja (which, in fact, is a creation of ancient Japanese theatre), or the shaolin monk. Thus, in order for Europeans to have been successful in combat, people believe, they must have been strong and fat, able to deliver powerful blows with dull, heavy swords and other weapons and able to receive harmful strikes without suffering much damage. This is absolutely ridiculous. The idea that gladiators had high fat percentages strikes me, again, as preposterous. Barley is quite low in fat, relatively high in proteins, and, as a wheat product, high in carbohydrates. Therefore, barley is an excellent component of an athlete's diet. Furthermore, gladiators trained, exercised, and performed continuously: the strains of fighting would undoubtedly contribute to incredible fitness among the athletes. In summary, the notion of a fat gladiator is myth. Thanks, Steve Additional Information Nutritional Analysis of Barley Serving Size: 1 cup cooked pearly barley Calories - 193 Protein - 3.5 grams Fat - 0.7 gram Cholesterol - 0 Carbohydrate - 44.3 grams Dietary Fiber - 9 grams Calcium - 17 mg Iron - 2 mg Magnesium - 35 mg Phosphorus - 85 mg Potassium - 145 mg Sodium - 5 mg Zinc - 1.2 mg Niacin - 3.2 mg Folic Acid - 26mcg Images of Gladiators: Note the muscle tone

Hi. I've finally returned after a year's absense. Thanks for all the replies. I have continued to research this topic - unarmed combat training and techniques in Ancient Rome - and I found interesting information and websites. In Italy, there is organization called Ars Dimicandi (www.arsdimicandi.net), which specializes in experimental archaeology for the purpose of recreating the combat arts, training, and ideas of Ancient Rome (unarmed, gladiators, and legions). The unarmed arts practised at the institue are Pugilatus (boxing), Luctatio (wrestling), and Pancratium (essentially the same as modern mixed martial arts). Undoubtedly, like in Ancient Greece, these arts were taught and practised not only for their obvious martial benefits but also their physical and fitness benefits. Thank you for your interest, Legionnaire

Hello, I am a new "recruit" to this website, having recently joined because of my great interest in Roman history, particularly in relation to the military. My concise personal biography aside, I have always wondered: did the legionnaires of the Roman military receive any distinct unarmed combat training, or was practise in such fighting techniques limited to combative sports, similar to those at the gymnasiums or public bath houses? Personally, I believe that, as they were highly trained soldiers in a professional army that was needed by the Roman government to conquer and occupy the known Western world, the Roman legionnaires were undoubtedly highly capable in unarmed combat skills. In order for you to fully understand the question, I think some things need to be clarified or defined, particularly the phrase "unarmed combat skills" - by this, I am not referring only to wrestling or boxing, but also disarm techniques or principles that could be used to effectively neutralize an armed enemy. Before, however, you assume perhaps that this applies only to the battlefield (on which an unarmed, isolated Roman soldier would be quickly slaughtered), consider the known historical fact that Rome had well-established secret service organizations (the Frumentarii, founded by Emperor Hadrian, for instance). Additionally, it is highly possible that the Roman military included units that specialized in guerilla warfare, as a means of disabling the enemy before engaging them with the legions. Overall, I think it would be interesting to read both historical evidence of Roman "special forces" units and the unarmed combats training they received as well as some of your opinions about whether or not these contingents and these martial arts existed. Sincerely, Legionnaire