sonic

Yes I did read the book. Someone else recommended it earlier. A very vivid description of the events leading up to the battle. It seems to me that the Romans had maintained a delicate balance between immigration, assimilation, and Romanization, which had actually worked very well until then, when they took in more than they could handle, and their system was thrown out of order. I couldn't have put it better!

An excellent link! By the way, concerning your last post, have you found anyone to help you/take over your site one day? I would very much not like to see it go down, I use it more or less daily. It's the same for me. I don't know where I'd be without it! Ian

But part of the strategy would be the removal of all stored foods to defendable sites. Don't forget that the revolt was due to shortage of food and that a victory in battle wouldn't provide that much - especially as the baggage train was left in Adrianople (I think: my memory could be playing up here! ) Many previous authors have made the mistake of seeing the Goths as an army. They weren't. They were largely composed of 'civilians'. As a result, the actual warriors are unable to just wander off anyhwere and do what they want. They are constrained by the need to protect their families from attack. In all fairness, Theodosius did not adopt the usual strategy of 'starving them out' instantly. It was only after he had been defeated personally in battle that he reverted to this tactic.

Theodosius knew that the citizens of the cities in the Balkans would prefer to give food and valuables to the Goths rather than risk a siege. This would enable the Goths to maintain a continuous - if rather poor - level of supply. Theodosius' strategy was to force the Goths into a position where lack of food and other supplies would force them to negotiate or collapse. This worked. The main Gothic force slowly dwindled as 'weaker' elements fell behind and could be dealt with piecemeal, either 'politically' or using the small unit tactics in battle. Interestingly, the Goths who gave in and were transferred across to Asia Minor later rebelled under Tribigild. A 'stronger', rejuvenated army forced them to retire completely from the Empire. But only after they had taken control of the Imperial Court at Constantinople under the leadership of Gildas.

Everyone used such threats against what we would today call 'civilian targets'. Ever since the republic, the Romans had made it clear to settlements that if they didn't surrender and open the gates, they seriously were going to regret it later. In fact, Theodosius could not prevent the goths from threatening siege with garrison troops, although the garrison itself would tend to dissuade confrontations with smaller groups. He couldn't prevent it, but the presence of even a small military force would have reinforced the desire of the inhabitants not to simply give away all of their food and wealth. Yes - especially as they had the majority of the food stores inside the cities. Furthermore, Fritigern (or whoever was leading the Goths at the time) knew that if he laid siege to any city the advantage of the initiative would pass to Theodosius. If that happened, the Goths would be in trouble. But the military treatises and the military reality went against the gathering of troops for a major battle. He had already attempted to give battle and been heavily defeated. Instead, Theodosius relied upon the maintainance of strongholds to store food supplies and weapons, which would then be available to his own troops and not to the Goths. Using these bases as strongpoints, he then manoeuvred the Goths into a weaker position from which they were forced to surrender. Don't forget, although the Goths are always portrayed as one large military force, in reality they were a collection of 'tribes', each with its own leader and each with a large proportion of non-combatants. Theodosius used this to his advantage. He knew that the Goths had neither the equipment, the knowledge or the time to besiege a city. Unless taken quickly, the Gothic families would quickly be placed under extreme duress, since one of the main reasons for the revolt in the first place was lack of food. Although they had won a battle, the Goths do not seem to have captured any city that could supply them with food for a substantial amount of time. As a result, a long siege would probably be more damaging to the Goths than the Romans in the city. Furthermore, any attempt to storm a city was fraught with danger. Even a small garrison could inflict heavy losses on the Goths, which they couldn't afford. And a defeat would have severely weakened Fritigern's political position. Fritigern (or his successor) knew this and so did not attempt to actually lay siege to any city. Theodosius' policy of deploying garrisons was vindicated. Finally, by using these tactics Theodosius managed to weaken the Goths' will to fight to such an extent that some of the smaller 'tribes' chose to make treaties with him and were shipped across the Hellespont to Asia Minor. As the strength of the remaining Goths weakened, they decided that a treaty was the best way out of their predicament.

Actually, the Goths advanced towards cities and towns and threatened to lay them under siege if they didn't provide what the Goths wanted. Part of Theodosius' long-term strategy was to garrison these towns so that the Goths could not use this tactic. I agree This is going back to the point that only the Western periphery of the Eastern Empire was threatened on a regular basis. The first Hun raids were repulsed, which led to a long peace. The frontier with Persia remained reelatively stable, and the desert frontiers were also relatively quiet, so the East recovered after Adrianople. This is possibly more to do with the nature of the politics in the two halves of the Empire. The internal politics in the East was similar to that in the West, but the individuals concerned tended to make decisions based upon the welfare of 'The Empire'. In the West, the scale of individual ambition ceased to be 'The Empire' and tended to focus mainly on Italy and the person of the Emperor. What most people tend to forget is that the civil war of 394 against Eugenius was preceded by the civil war of 388, when Theodosius and the East defeated the West under Magnus Maximus at the Battles of Siscia and Poetovi. All with the help of Gothic foederati enrolled under the agreement of 382. The ramifications of the Battle of Adrianople colour all of the events from the battle itself through to the sack of Rome by the next generation of the Gothic victors in 410, and further to the establishment of the Visigothic Kingdom in Gaul.

(Sorry for not waiting - limited time!!) I have always found it interesting that when historians talk about the controversy present in the early Christian Church, there is sometimes the proviso that, when seen from these modern 'irreligious' times, the debates about seemingly trivial matters can seem very odd to our modern eyes. And yet, when anyone asks questions about them and sensible people begin answering, I feel that many of the same controversies (for example, reliance on Pagan traditions for the date of Christmas, worship of the Sabbath on Sunday rather than Saturday, the 'Trinity' being 'Polytheistic', etc.) rear their heads and we can get a glimpse into the mindset of the past. When coupled with their strong Christian beliefs, we can also see why the arguments became violent: after all, the souls of 'millions' of people were at stake.

Short answer: all that is undeterminable, as any other anachronic comparison; period. How about this for an anachronistic comparison. If I remember correctly, when the Byzantines recaptured Rome, Belisarius sent out a group of Roman citizens in some sort of phalanx formation that initially drove back the Goths, but they subsquently lost their cohesion and they had to be rescued by the Byzantine troops. Could this group of well motivated though undisciplined citizen troops be similar in effectiveness to those of the early republic? Good enough to defeat an Etruscan army but not good enough to defeat a Romanized Gothic army? Actually, the troops 'deployed' by Belisarius were an untrained citizen volunteer force, which he used to pin those Gothic forces to the West of the Tiber by the classic ruse of having them 'form up' as if regular Byzantine troops. (And please, no comments about the historical accuracy of calling them 'Byzantine' - it's only to differentiate between them and the citizens of the city of Rome!) It was through fear of superior numbers that the Goths withdrew, not 'military effectiveness'. In fact, the Roman forces instantly lost all discipline, sacked the Gothic camp and then were routed when the Goths realised what was happening and counterattacked. (PS they were not rescued: they ran back to the city.) There was a large difference between the 'trained' early armies who fought the Etruscans and the citizens who fought Witigis. Not least was the fact that warfare had changed and this was no longer at a 'city-wide' scale against equivalent 'farmers'. Regarding this particular topic (Adrianople potential impact for the Fall of the Western Empire), that might not be required at all, as your specific argument is actually quite straightforward; i.e. the Roman casualties at Adrianople would have critically reduced the manpower reserve of the West. IMHO, it would be difficult to find hard evidence for that argument; the 15,000 to 20,000 Roman casualties from that battle were in all likelihood absorbed by the 200,000 plus men of the Eastern army and local recruitment. I think that the major factors for the West in the loss of Adrianople wasn't really the number of Roman troops killed. One massive factor was the fact that the Empire had lost an emperor during the course of a major defeat. The morale implications were huge for the East, since they were never really to defeat the Goths in a manner that caused morale to return to normal. The troops in the West likewise feared the enemy that had defeated the Empire. Therefore, the first major factor at Adrianople was morale. Secondly, the loss confirmed to the tribes along the Danube that the Empire was weak. The largest and most devastating attacks on the Empire crossed the Danube and ravaged the Balkans. At this point, they were all forced to the conclusion, as were the Goths, that Constantinople was impregnable and that it was either cross the sea or head West. History notes that there were attempts to cross the sea to Asia Minor, but these failed. Therefore, the 'barbarians' headed West. Thirdly, when the nature of the defeat was recognised by Gratian, he immediately placed the Prefecture of Illyricum in the hands of Theodosius to ensure that tehre would be no division of forces in the area. This resulted in the loss of the area to the West, and, when the East refused to defend it properly, it was to prove a thorn in the side of Stilicho, as not only was there no defence there, but the West received no taxes nor recruits. I hope that explains my personal take - such as it is when I'm exhausted! - on the impact of Adrianople. Sorry if there are masses of spelling mistakes and grammatical errors - it's been a long day!!

Nice one, JP! Lets see more of your wonderful illustrations. Nice Hurricane! Merry Christmas all!! (Don't forget, I'm a LATE Romanist: bah humbug to you naughty pagans!! )

You lucky, lucky ..... person!

How's it going with the second book? When can we expect to find it in the book stores? The script for 'Stilicho' went to the publisher at the end of August. I've been told to expect it out in June/July next year. What's the Scholarship you've gone for?

I hear you. Thank goodness I am not the only one who feels that way. That makes three of us! Thank you. That's one of the greatest compliments I can think of. In January I intend to start the research for book 3 (yet another on Late Rome). That will take up most (if not all) of the year. However, as part of my long-term projects I wouldn't mind delving into Greek history. As you say Pericles, Epaminondas etc. are extremely interesting individuals. Oh dear: I wonder if my editor's reading this? ....

Do you mean Caerwent?

Sorry GPM, I don't really agree with the statements made above, but am unsure where to start. Hmmm ... I am unconvinced by the common claim that the army became 'barbarized' during the 4th century. The evidence is sketchy and places too much emphasis on unit names, their derivation, and hence the assumed large-scale influx of barbarians into the army. Furthermore, the only evidence usually associated with the Eastern Empire and its 'curbing' of barbarian influence is associated with the revolt of Gainas in 400. This in itself is a one-off and should not be assumed to reflect political policy for the rest f the 5th century. If barbarization did play a role in the fall of the West, it was on a different scale and following different lines to those usually proposed.

E.A. Thompson, Peasant Revolts in Late Roman Gaul and Spain, Past and Present, No.2 (Nov. 1952), 11-23, is a good place to start.

Hey Sonic, I remember a while back before the Belisarius book was released, you asked people on the forum which figure they would most like to read about and I believe that Stilicho was quite a popular choice. Glad to hear you're open to the suggestions of your fellow members. Will we get a mention in the credits for inspiring you to write about Stilicho?????? A good choice anyway mate, I look forward to reading it! Of course I'm open to suggestions! I suppose I should give credit where it's due - especially with regards to information etc. So, yes - the forum will get a mention!! I know which book I'm doing next, although I'm not allowed to say who by the publisher in case somebody nicks the idea - but I'm struggling for the book after that, so maybe I should ask for other ideas ... ? It will be called 'Stilicho: the Vandal who saved Rome'. I hope you find it useful!

Alaric was most likely reluctant to sack Rome. It was only when he came to the city in 410, after two previous 'sieges' (408 and 409), thta the Goths finally plundered the city. Even then, the plundering was almost polite, with many areas not being touched, especially church buildings. The obvious conclusion is that Alaric only sacked Rome in frustration at the incomprehensible policies of Honorius, safe behind the marshes in Ravenna, who did not seem to care what happened even in the rest of Italy, not just the rest of the West.

How desperate are you for information? I've just finished the text of my new book, this one being on Stilicho, and there is a lot of information (and opinion!) on Alaric in it. It's due to the publisher this month and will be out at some time next year. Obviously, I don't want to publish the book in 'serial' form on UNRV as this will annoy the publisher () but, if you can't wait, are there any specific questions?

Well, the Lindum suggestion seems to have impressed some people, including me. Also It would be a more central location for most members, and there are other advantages such as availability of (cheap) hotels and more pubs. I agree. St Albans may be nice, but for us Northerners it's a long way (especially with a travel-sick kid! ). I might be able to get her indoors to agree to Lincoln, but not much further away.

Hi all. Yes, I'm on the scrounge again! Does anybody know of a link etc to a picture of the inscription dedicated to Claudian Claudianus, the late Roman poet and panegyricist to Stilicho? It's currently housed (apparently) in the Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Napoli, but I'm having difficulty getting a response from them. I've found a copy at the website of Bret Mulligan but, as with the museum, he doesn't seem to be responding to my emails. Therefore, any alternative would be gratefully appreciated. Thanks Ian

Hmmmm. Maybe should use Google rather than Yahoo for searching! I only know about it myself from a 'throwaway' line made by Roy Boss, who saw it referenced in a Graham Sumner book. Thanks for the link. At least I now know what it looks like.

Hi all I have recently read in Sumner's 'Roman Military Clothing 2' that there is a 'crudely executed' mosaic in Faenza possibly celebrating Stilicho's victory at Pollentia. Despite long searching, I can't find a picture of this anywhere. Does anyone own a photo of this or know where there are any? Cheers Ian

It's not bad, but I much preferred her book 'Here be Dragons' about Llewelyn Fawr, Prince of Wales during the reign of King John. I think she captures my vision of John, as well as enhancing my love of Welsh history. I've never thought of getting this, Sonic. I enjoy her writing, but do you think I'd enjoy the novel? I should say that I have no interest at all in Welsh history (I don't mean that nastily in any way - it's just not an area that grabs me). Could I be converted? I'll give it a go one of these days and let you know. I've now turned to total trash for the daily bus journeys and am wallowing like a pig in..... in Stephen King's Christine After that I intend to get back to serious research - I think my brain will need to be reminded that it works. Ah well, even old Stevie has his place in the dreary agony that is my daily route to and from work. I think you'd like 'Here Be Dragons'. Although it's about Welsh history, it ties everything together with English history and her portrayal of King John is just about spot on from what I learnt in the past. You can get it cheap on Amazon too! (Sorry about the delay in the reply: Shingles!)

Thanks Ursus. I also would like to express express my thanks to Caldrail for his review, and to GPM for his additions. Any questions, you know where I am.

I agree - to a point. I call him the last of the Roman generals because he is probably the last general that earlier generations, especially in the Principate, would acknowledge as being their descendant, and was probably the last natural Latin speaker that rose to high rank. After him, and especially with Narses, there is a distinct switch to a more Eastern culture, despite the fact that they thought of themselves as 'Romans'. I can't really believe that, for instance, Augustus, Caesar or Trajan would have been impressed with the idea of an eunuch at the head of the Imperial armies.