Pompieus

Isn't it remarkable that several of Caesars legates were involved in his assasination? Why do you suppose this was? They were not members of the old aristocracy, they were equites, and owed everything to Caesar; and Caesar's loyalty to his friends was well known. Were the less prominent men more loyal to the idea of the Republic? or were they pursuing the "main chance"?

That is a very interesting article on Labienus, it reflects the difficulty in interpeting the shifting, impermanent political affiliations of the last generation of the Republic.

It is possible, perhaps even likely that Labienus was originally a client and protege of Pompey, and simply returned to his original patron when forced to decide between his old and new commanders. Those who have the latin (Syme and Munzer for example) say that names ending in "-ienus" often indicate Picentine origin. The family of Pompey was dominant in that region of Italy. So much so that Pompey could raise three legions there on his own authority to support Sulla. A succesful career for any ambitious soldier from Picenum would probably depend on the patronage of Pompey. When Caesar left for Gaul in 59 BC he and Pompey were allies and Pompey might well have lent the services of his client to his political ally.

There was a string on the evaluation of Pompieus under the "Res Publica" heading a while ago, and I would reiterate my defense of my namesakes reputation. Somebody said that amateurs study tactics but professionals study logistics. Pompey was a master of strategy and logistics and faced more able opponents than any Roman general except Scipio the elder.

Ave A, It is true that in actiual fact the destruction of Corinth probably redirected trade to Delos and possibly some Italian ports, enriched Mummius and his troops, and in that sense economics is obviously not anachronistic. But if we're discussing motivations - especially for acts of war and terror - I think economic motivations are usually overstated. I'd argue the destruction of Corinth was intended as a brutal object lesson to the Greeks that the Romans were through fooling with them.

Did "merchants of Rome" have any real influence on foriegn policy? Weren't senators precluded by law from any commercial activity? Did the equites, who were engaged in trade, have enough influence to get the government to destroy a commercial rival by war? I think economic arguments are anachronistic (even from "the master of scholarship (Mommsen)). Wasn't Mummius destruction of Corinth was a calculated act ("terrorism" if you like) to put an end to Greek nonsense. The Romans meant to have peaceful nieghbors and if it required "creating a desert" so be it. He wasn't the first to do it (Alexander re Thebes et al) and he certainly wasn't the last.

There were the soldiers of the "Themes" who held land directly from the imperial government in return for their military service in the Imperial Army. However, there were apparently also independent landed gentry who lived a romantic life of hunting and fighting with similar Muslim types actross the border (sort of like the wild west) as described in the epic poem "Digines Akritas".

That's pretty cool! The whole set should be available like that. Over the eons, by searching the dim, dusty basements of used bookstores in Washington DC and various university towns I managed to collect volumes VII, VIII, IX and XII of the 1951, 1954 and 1971 editions for $45 - $75 each. Today, with the internet etc you can't find bargains like that anymore - even an old edition will cost over $100. And there is a new edition coming out now with a price tag over $200 per volume. The chapters in these old editions are by people like Last, Holleaux, Tenney Frank, Rostovstieff, Adcock, Tarn and other luminaries of the last age and are now somewhat dated. The CAH is still the first place to look though.

The "CAH" is like the encyclopedia...always the best place to start!

As Primus says there is so little evidence on the primitive institutions of the Romans (the first use of the word "consul" evidently dates from 298 BC and it's not even certain that there were originally two chief magistrates!) that anything is arguable. But one need not go as far as Africa - the traditions of the Latins, Oscans and Etruscans all show viable precedents.

In addition to Anna Comnena the primary sources would include: Emperor Maurice's Strategicon Emperor Constantine VII's Administrando Imperio, De Ceremoniis et al. Michael Psellus' biographies of the emperors Ammianus Marcellinus (if you count the 4th century as "Byzantine") and Procopius There is also the epic poem Digines Akrites

Of modern works (well, relatively modern) you should consider: Later Roman Empire (2 vol) - A.H.M. Jones (vital) History of the Byzantine State - G. Ostrogorski (a bit dated but classic) History of the Later Roman Empire & - History of the Eastern Roman Empire - J.B. Bury (ditto) A History of the Byzantine State and Society - W Treadgold (a valuable update to the above with an excellent bibliography) These are fairly massive tomes and fairly turgid in some cases I'm afraid, but they are the basic works. You might also want to try: Constantine Porphyrogenitus - A Toynbee Romanus Lecapenus - S Runciman Byzantium - R Jenkins Byzantium and Its Army - W Treadgold

Clearly nobody can KNOW what happened - there is only Livy xxii.46-49, and Polybius iii.113-117 to guide us. All modern descriptions are derived from those two surviving sources. There were others in ancient times but they were lost in the middle ages. Historians must build large castles on the "Spanish sand" of the primary sources; and battles (even modern ones) are particularly dangerous ground. Didn't the Duke of Wellington say that one may as well try to tell the history of a dance as describe a battle? Personally, I find it difficult to comprehend how even Hannibal could annihilate and army of 87000 with 45000. I agree with Brunt and some of the older historians that it is more likely the alternate tradition mentioned by Livy (xxii.36) is correct in saying that Aemilius and Varro commanded four reinforced legions with allied contingents - say 54000 men, and that Polybius or his source source was confused by the terminology describing a legion and it's associated allied "wing" (stratopedon). On the other hand Polybius is usually more reliable (unless he chose to magnify the disaster "per magnum gloriam Scipionis" - so take your pick.

I believe that a great deal of the Roman military history of Britain has been the result of epigraphic evidence, that is inscriptions on tombstones and architectual remains that archaeologists have unearthed over the years. Cheeseman, Parker, Webser et al all have innumerable references to C.I.L. and Dessau etc.

The competition for office and honors among the Roman aristocrats was brutal and required MONEY! LOTS of it! And in any government that is not a despotism, people who want something from the government approach people who have power or influence with requests for help, favors or "justice", and are usually willing to do favors in return. "Favors" may be business "opportunities", jobs, "junkets" of various sorts or MONEY! Was there ever a free government in history where this was (is) not the case? The accepting of money or favors from a foriegn prince as opposed to a citizen was not unique in the Republic - see Badian's "Foriegn Clientelae". The problem with "bribery" in the Republic actually indicates that the government was "free" in a primitive sort of way, and was somewhat responsive to "interest groups" outside the governing class. Anybody who protracts (or starts) a war for some personal or political reason is not very bright! Wars, ancient or modern, aquire a momentum of their own that nobody has ever been able to control, and invariably lead to unexpected consequenses. Protracting a war to extend ones command is a standard ancient literary convention and probably not often a real motive for historical figures.

As they left no written records the early history of Parthia is something of a mystery; but the first great Parthian king and the creator of the Parthian Empire was Mithridates I who began his career of conquest sometime around 160 BCE (after the battle of Magnesia and the deaths of Antiochus III and Antiochus Eupator. The Seleucid Empire fragmented and left the field open to the Parthians. Mithridates annexed Media, defeated the Bactrians and conquered Tapuria, Traxiane and Elymais, and took Babylon in 142 or 141. The Seleucid king Demetrius briefly re-took Babylon in 140 but was defeated and captured by Mithridates in 139.

Apparently the Hasmoneans (then in rebellion against the Seleucid kingdom) sent an embassy to Rome in 161BCE during which an agreement was supposedly made such that the senate promised help and friendship in the event of an attack by another power. However, the Romans allowed the Seleucid king Demetrius Soter to drive out the Hasmoneans and to install his own candidate in the High Priesthood at Jerusalem without intervening. In 160 Tiberius Gracchus (senior) met Demetrius' ambassador in Rhodes and recognized him as king. Another Seleucid embassy was received in Rome later in 160 and got formal recognition for Demetrius. Continued dynastic chaos in Syria (instigated by Egypt, Pergamum and Cappodocia, probably with the quiet approval of the senate) allowed the creation of an independent Jewish state around 142BCE. The Jewish kingdom sent another embassy to Rome which supposedly obtained the recognition and support of the Republic. Even so, the Romans showed little interest in the conflicts and wars of the Hasmonean Priest-Kings with Syria, Nabatea and each other until Pompey's lieutenant Scaurus reached Damascus after the defeat of Tigranes of Armenia (65BCE). At the time the Nabatean Arabs were besieging Jerusalem on behalf of one of the two warring brothers vying for the Jewish throne. The Nabateans withdrew at the order of Scaurus and the and two pretenders and representatives of the Jewish people all appealed to Pompey when he arrived at Damascus in 63BCE. Negotiations were still under way when the supporters of one of the pretenders (Aristobulus) refused to allow Roman troops into Jerusalem. When this happened Pompey arrested Aristobulus, siezed the town, and besieged and took the Temple. This was the end of the independent Jewish kingdom and the definite beginning of the Jewish client-state. The other brother (Hyrcanus) was left in charge as ethnarch (vice king) and High-Priest with Antipater (father of Herod) as his minister. The Greek towns and Samaria were separated from the Jewish state and it was placed under the control of the governor of the new province of Syria. Aristobulus was carried off to walk in Pompeys' triumph, but his son and some of his supporters continued to cause trouble for some time. It was left to Antipater, the prime minister, to fight the brigands (or freedom fighters if you prefer) and to steer the Jewish state through the Roman civil wars - giving valuable support to Pompey, Caesar and the assasins in turn.

A closer reading of Livy reveals that in spite of what Polybius says (i.16, ii.24,vi.19) the Romans did not necessarily raise four legions EVERY year... the senate apparently retained discretion in this area. However, when war was in progress or threatened (after 225BC anyway) , the senate almost invariably authorized the consuls to recruit troops, and in most cases (the Gallic invasion of 225, during the 2nd Punic War, when war threatened with Macedon in 200 and 169, and with Syria in 190) the senate ordered "urban legions" be raised and stationed at Rome as a reserve (Livy xxiii.14, xxxi.9, xxxvi.2 et al). And the veteran Sp Ligustinus served twice in "legions raised for a year" (Livy xlii.34). Commanders in subsequent years could concievably select trained men from these units to bolster the troops they raised. I also concede that troops raised by the consuls often immediately left with the consul for his province, so training would be limited to what could be taught en route to Spain or Gaul. One wonders how the habits of discipline and drill were instilled in the peasant soldiers without any real period of structured training.

The issue of training of Roman troops during the republic is an interesting one. Polybius says in his description of the Roman military system of the third century BCE that four legions of recruits were levied each year called the legiones urbana (Poly vi.19). Is it not likeley that these units were used as what today would be called "training formations" ? So that when the consuls departed for their provinces (probably in the early summer) they could select trained men from the previous year's legiones urbana to take with them as reinforcements (supplementum) to bring the units already in their province up to strength, or they took the previous years legions with them if a new army was required.

Ha! more likely the ancestor of his sheep-keeper! I found an interesting bio of Pollio on (of all places) "Google Books" in the form of a Phd dissertation by Elizabeth Denny Pierce at Columbia back in 1922! I wish I knew how to attach the link!!!! http://books.google.com/books?id=KdX7WR19a...;hl=en#PPA18,M1 (?) It includes his career but is mostly about his literary pursuits. When in Italy some years ago I searched out the tiny towns where my grandfathers were born, and they both have literary associations too. One is very close to Aquino (ancient Aquinum) allegedly the birthplace of Juvenal (and even closer to Roccasicca - birthplace of Thomas Aquinas). And the other is a few kilometers from Venosa (ancient Venusia) birthplace of Horace.

I wish! But I am so "thrifty" that it takes quite a while for me to convince myself to pay $150 for a used book- but I'm thinking about it! I managed to get a look at "Voting Districts" years ago from the library of Congress ("The Great Library of Alexandria" (Va.) is sadly lacking in arcane Roman history books). I have always been interested in Asinius Pollio and the Marrucini because my grandmother was born in Chieti.

Does anyone have a strong opinion about the proposal in Munzer (Roman Aristocratic Families and Parties pg 308-11) that the "Servilius Caepio" who was originally betrothed to Caesars daughter (who ended up married to Pompieus) was none other than Brutus?(!) And that he had gone thru some sort of unofficial-fictitious "adoption" so as to become the head of the house of the Servilii Caepiones under the name Q Caepio Brutus ?

True, true domina Nephele. While perusing Munzer did you notice that he believed that our friend Gaius Servilius Geminus was the tribune who in 212BC was expected to quash the prosecution of the fraudulent army contractor and nefarious tax-farmer M Postumius from Pyrgi but was deterred by the indignation of the people, that he was the only consul who ever served with a colleague of the same "gens" (his patrician relative Gnaius Servilius Caepio), that the two Servilii tried to supercede Scipio in Africa, both left their provinces without permission, and saw that the brother of Gaius was elected consul to succeed them? And that Gaius so abused the office of dictator in 202 that it fell out of use until Sulla? The Livian tradition, Munzer says, has covered up this early attempt at dominatio(?) By the way, since you have "Voting Districts" with its nice maps, can you tell which tribe included the Marrucini of Teate (modern Chieti in the Abruzzi) the home of the historian and consul of 40BC Gaius Asinius Pollio?

The question of the transition to the plebians by the two Servilii brothers Gaius and Marcus (consuls of 203 and 202BC) and the problem that arose when the father turned up alive in the hands of the Gauls is discussed by Munzer in "Roman Aristocratic Families and Parties" and was touched on in a previous post (I forget where). Apparently BOTH brothers were plebians - the evidence for this involves priesthoods they both held early in life that were usually reserved for plebians, as well as the tribunate and plebian aedileship held by Gaius. Munzer thinks it unlikely that BOTH brothers would have independently transferred to the plebs without one of them remaining to continue the patrician line. He therefore proposes that it was the FATHER that made the transfer (he had a brother or cousin who remained patrician - unfortunately he was killed at Cannae). He says that the question that was put to a vote in 203 was not that the father had not approved the transfer of the sons to the plebs, but whether the sons were qualified to hold ANY office due to the previously unknown POW status of the father (which supposedly involved loss of citizenship(?!)) He accuses Livy of deliberate distortion to cover-up the unpleasantness.

Freedmen and new citizens might take the Nomen of a patrician family that had sponsored their citizenship, but they were not members of the family. There were many Gallic aristocrats in the first century AD named Iulius but they were not members of the patrician Iulii. That's probably why there were both patrician and plebian Claudii, Iunii etc.