Pompieus

Economics - there's a topic that will arouse everyones interest(!) I have seen several papers that explain the collapse of ancient civilization by the restrictions on the free market imposed by guilds and the government - especially on agricultural goods (the main product of the ancient economy). Obviously the government was trying to make sure that the cities always had food available at reasonable prices to avoid civil disorder. The argument apparently is that these restrictions on prices made grain farming unremunerative and destroyed the exchange of manufactured goods from the town for foodstffs from the country; resulting in abandonment of the cities and self-sufficient manorialism in the country. This seems suspiciously "Objectivist" to me. Isn't the low buying power of the working classes, due to low wages, caused in part at least by widespread slavery, way more important than any government or guild action? After all, the economy of the Middle ages had the same "moralistic" restrictions on pricing and usury as the Romans did - didn't it? Besides Rostovstiev (very hard to find) does anyone know the important works on this? Any strong opinions?

The "Notitia Dignitatum" shows no less than 12 cavalry units designated catafractii or clibanarii in the Eastern field armies while there are only two (equites sagitarii clibanarii in Africa & equites cataphractarii iuniores in Britain) listed in the Western armies.

"Specialist" troops (other than cavalry and light infantry recruited temporarily from allies and provincials) came with the empire. There were units of auxilia called sagittariorum (archers), dromedariorum (camelry), contariorum & clibanarii (armored cavalry), as well as units with national names that may have also indicated a special "national" way of fighting. In the later empire there were legions and auxilia regiments called sagitarii, lanciarii, propugnatores and balistarii which may also have indicated special ways of fighting.

There was a long tradition in the republic of conferring the power of an office on an individual without the actual office. Imperium was the usual power conferred. This was how Scipio Africanus, who was too young to be consul, was given the command in Spain. The innovation was the use by Augustus of the powers of a tribune. The idea was, probably, to abandon the coercive powers of imperium and free up the consulship for other nobles while retaining the less threatening legislative power of a tribune -as well as the relatively benign power to intercede in defense of a citizen. Also by receiving the power without the office the problem of Augustus being a patrician was avoided.

Lots of good questions - thin evidence for some though - and forum member more knowledgeable than I. But... The priesthoods initially were patrician offices filled by co-option by the other members of each college, but at some time (I think in the second century BC) they were opened to plebians and a bill was passed requiring election by one of the assemblies (I forget which - some knowledgeable member will no doubt advise). Smith's Dictionary on the "Lacus Curtius" website (//penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/home) has many articles on religious topics. Legati were usually appointed and assigned to a magistrate or pro-magistrate with imperium by the senate, who usually also determined how many the commander would have. Sometimes, however. as a mark of respect, the senate allowed the commander to appoint his own legates. They could perform any military or diplomatic task assigned by their chief, such as command of a legion or expedition, or conducting negotiations. These were usually men of some rank, often ex-praetors. Six Military Tribunes were assigned to each legion and served as a sort of staff or as sub commanders of the legion. These were younger, less experienced men than the legates. The Centuriate Assembly elected the tribunes for the first four legions raised each year, when more than four legions were raised the additional tribunes were selected by the senate or magistrates - I'm not sure how that worked.(?) Apparently the candidates for office went around the forum in their whitened togas surrounded by their entourage soliciting the votes of the people. But there are also sources that indicate that this was seen as demeaning the dignity of the office being sought as well as the nobles who did it. (?) There were several changes in the schedule for magistrates taking office but I think in the late republic consuls took office on 1 January and tribunes on 10 December.(?)

True enough. In democratic Athens the spoils of empire were divided among the masses in the form of salaries for naval and public service, in Rome (due to those particular political and social mechanisms) the wealth of empire went to the senators who commanded the armies and equites who exploited the provinces - not to the peasantry of Italy. In fact the working classes suffered many injuries due to inflation, loss of their land etc.

Considering the historical importance and the tremendous interest in the Roman Army isn't it remarkable how little is really known about the actual tactics used by the Roman Legions in combat? Though gallons of ink have been spilled on the subject, is there any consensus on issues as basic as the spacing of legionaries in combat? Were they 3 feet or 6 feet part?-how much space is needed to make use of pilum, gladius and scutum? Do experts agree as to what was done about the intervals between maniples and/or cohorts in battle? A quincux with gaps between maniples may concievably have worked against a phalanx unwilling to break formation by pushing into the gaps, or Samnites using a similar loose formation, but how could they let hundreds of screaming celts into the rear of the fighting line without breaking all cohesion? And how on earth did they "relieve" the fighting line in the midst of battle? It's hard to believe that men could disengage, back-up and move to the flank in an orderly formation in the midst of the confusion and fear of hand-to-hand combat. I find the suggestions and questions raised in Gary Brueggemans website (www.garyb.0catch.com) fascinating and unresolved either by scholars or the experience of reenactors, though both raise more fascinating questions. Is it possible the maniples marched into line in closed formation (three feet to the man) then moved laterally into an open formation with six feet between soldiers thus closing the gaps-then attacked? Is it possible for the rear century to move directly forward - through the front century to "relieve" the fighting line in the midst of combat? Any strong opinions?

Isn't it more likely that the tremendous increase in the wealth and power of individuals, resulting from the spoils of empire, changed their relationship with their fellow citizens and the state; and this was the basic problem that was the root of all the others?

Did not Antonius exchange provinces via a vote of the people (Lex de permutatione provinciarum)? Wasn't that "legal" as things went at the time? Wasn't that as "legal" as the senate taking the side of Decimus Brutus who was at least a magistrate (by the acta of Caesar) and more "legal' thanlegalizing the private army of a 19 year old privatus? Octavian was more subtle and clever than Catiline but no less ruthless. Like Pompeius he raised a private army then betrayed his allies, like Lenin he split the "party" in order to take control of it. I don't pretend Antonius was trying to save the republic, but had at least made a peaceful arrangement with the liberators and used "constitutional" methods to retain primacy. Caesars heir had no interest in orderly government, only revolution and civil war could get him what he wanted. But "legality" was academic by this time and like Asinius Pollio one feels despair at the whole greedy crowd.

A horrible aspect of of the accusations of vestals (considering the penalty) is that at least some of them may have been politically motivated; that is they were attacks on prominent male relatives. Munzer suggests in Roman Aristocratic Parties and Families that the trial of Licinia in 115 may have been an attack on her father C Licinius Crassus who had tried to transfer the election of priests to the tribal assembly as tribune in 145. He also discusses the three times the fire went out. I was under the impression that vestals retired after serving the godess for 30 years - not so for Occia?

(and there's another 'M' abbreviated to M' but I can't think what it is - help Neph!), I submit that M' abbreviates "Manius" - but Nephele knows best.

Interestingly the two legions of unfortunate survivors of Cannae (one wonders at the "justice" in punishing the grunts, who did their duty rather than the officers who caused the disaster), after 12 years of exile in Sicily, were the core of the army Scipio took to Africa in 203 and defeated Hannibal at Zama.

Clodius, I think, is on the right track. Hirtius and Pansa (moderate Caesarians) were looking for some common ground with the majority of the senate and with Cicero (who was taking a hard line). Antonius too, I think, was amenable to some form of a compromise with the senate, as long as he could maintain his leadership of the Caesarian "party" if that anachronistic word can be used i nthis case. Cicero was the one standing in the way of compromise - as Cato had in 48BC. He insisted that Antonius - the legally appointed pro-consul of the Roman state- had to be destroyed. Even justifying the revolutionary and illegal levy of troops by Octavian to carry it out (as if he had not executed Roman citizens without trial for doing the same thing). Trying to use Caesars heir to destroy the Caesarian party ("lifted-up and lifted-off")! Obviously he had no idea what sort of fellow he was dealing with! There's no evidence Octavian had anything to do with the deaths of the consuls - but who had more to gain from the event?

I don't believe any legions were stationed in Palestine until the great revolt in 66AD (there were several in Syria). Auxilia cohorts stationed in the area before 66 AD probably included: I Damascenorum (from Syria) and I Sebastenorum (local). III Bracarum (Spain), IV Breucorum (Pannonia), I Montanorum (Alps), I Thracum (Thrace), I Flavia(?), and V Gemina (?) are also attested there on inscriptions, as well as I and II Ulpia Galatarum and IV and VI Ulpia Petraeorum; but these units probably were stationed in Palestine later by Titus or Trajan. These lists come from Cheesemans "The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army" - other inscriptions may have been discovered more recently and be listed in Spauls "Cohort".

In truth it is anachronistic to apply modern political ideologies to ancient political systems, particularly Rome. There were political catchwords and politicos sometimes appealed to the "traditions" of the aristocracy or the "rights" of the people but Roman politics was mainly a struggle for power, wealth and influence among individuals and families. After the plebian leaders gained access to the higher magistracies in 366 BC, the "tension" was usually between the leaders of the various powerful families not between rich and poor or patrician and plebiean. Of course there were exceptions - the Gracchan period is the most familiar- but when this happened the ruling class usually closed ranks, destroyed the upstarts and made what concessions were necessary to keep the syustem working and their power intact.

The ancient sources weren't into statistics or social history, but there were some discernable results of the heavy losses early in the Second Punic war that were revealed in military innovations such as the raising of two legions of freed slaves (the volones) in 216, the reduction of the property qualification and the enrollment of some former proletarii in the legions after 214. There were also signs of exhaustion among the allies as shown when 12 Latin colonies refused to provide their contingents in 209. It is only speculation, but could the independence of the voters in initially rejecting the senates' proposal for war with Macedonia in 200, and the election of Flamininus to the consulship etc be interpreted as a "democratic" reaction on the part of the proletarii who had served in the legions and the fleet in the long war?

The only reference I could find is the one paragraph in Suetonius. Typically, Suetonius writes mostly about the gossip and rumors surrounding Caesars supposed dalliance at the court of the king of Bithynia, and then says he "recovered his honor" by winning the civic crown at Mytilene. Could someone bribe a commander into awarding a civic crown? I guess it's possible, but there is nothing in any source suggesting it ever happened. It would be bad for army morale not to mention that there would be thousands of fellow soldiers and officers to dispute a false award. Could someone bribe his was to a Silver Star or Medal of Honor?

It is plausible, the Fimbriani were in Asia at the time. The story is in Suetonius Iul Caes 2; apparently Caesar saved the life of a citizen during the siege of Mytilene in 81 BC

When Marius returned victorious from Gaul there was no armed force that could prevent his domination of the state, yet he dismissed his troops and entered the senate. When Pompey returned from the East in 63BC no one could have stood in the way of the peoples hero and his army, yet he laid down his command and the republic went on. Even Sulla who did use his army to overthrow the government didn't establish a monarchy, but placed a reinforced senate in control. The ambition of all was to ENTER the aristocratic elite, the generals competed to control the state not to destroy it. I'm not convinced of the concept of "private armies" either. True the soldiers served their commanders for gain and loyalty, but Caesar and Sulla both appealed to their troops in the name of legitimacy and the republic not personal loyalty. And who's to say what Pompey would have done had he been victorious - would he have been more dominating in 47 than he was in 63? He didn't set up a monarchy then. Gruen emphasizes the continuity in the operation of government institutions through the last Generation of the Republic, and cautions against hindsight. We know the republic fell and are bound to look for the seeds of collapse in the years leading up to the crisis. Legislation dealing with the land, the allies and the provinces continued to be passed, elections continued, criminal trials (most with political implications) went on right up to 50 BC; and the final crisis was brought on by a wrangle over the interpretation of a law. Maybe it was all just a facade waiting to be tipped into rubble by a gentle push - but maybe it took 20 years of brutal war and terrorism to destroy the republic, and a politician/dictator of genius to keep down it's memory till the corpse was truly buried.

Plutarch says Crassus placed 7000 foot as garrisons in Mesopotamia in 54 and that he crossed the Euphrates with 7 legions, some of which were Pompeian veterans, in 53. However, in the battle Crassus formed a square with 12 cohorts on each side (48 cohorts) which doesn't correspond to 7 legions (70 cohorts). During the battle the younger Crassus, who with Cassius was a "wing" commander, made a sortie with 8 cohorts - if these cohorts were not part of the square we get 48+8=56. The remaining 14 cohorts might be accounted for by the 7000 men left in garrisons (14 cohorts at 500 each - the schematic figure for the strength of a cohort) or might have been in Cassius "wing". Another argument could use the fact that Plutarch says Crassus lost 20,000 killed and 10,000 captured and that there were 10,000 survivors which Cassius and Bibulus formed into 2 legions to defend Syria and who later fought with Pompey at Pharsalus. 20,000 + 10,000 + 10,000 = 40,000 the schematic figure for 8 legions. So Crassus had 7 or 8 legions. 2 had been left in Syria by Pompey in 63 BC. Gabinius who came out as governor in 57 had been given the right to recruit troops in 58 and probably brought out reinforcements, which he used to restore Ptolemy Auletes in Egypt. And Crassus himself raised troops in 55, though he was obstructed by tribunes and lost some men at sea on the way East. The numerals of the legions are probably unknowable (althought the coin with numeral "X" is interesting) because the scheme used during the republic is not understood. In 53BCE there were probably 23 or 24 legions in existence: 4 in Spain, 2 in Cilicia, 10 in Gaul under Caesar and 7 or 8 in Syria. Numerals I-IV were reserved for the consuls and Caesar had VI-XV. Crassus may have duplicated the numerals of Caesars army or used XVI and up.

If I may say (before M Porcius dives in) you are very right Clodius - history says as much about the time it's written as the time it describes. Though as a youth I admired Caesar and his vile great-nephew for thier genius; now, as our liberties and constitution are being daily dismantled in the name of security and efficiency (as always!) without a whimper of protest, I find hero worship of Caesar appalling . As far as the state of the Republic in 50 BCE, I go with Gruen et al. who say it was a going concern, not without problems of course (mainly the violent rivalries of the nobles) but a viable government until destroyed by the civil war.

There were lots of reasons for using non-Roman troops. It was much cheaper to require an ally to provide troops as part of a treaty than for the state to raise and pay them and ship them to the far reaches of Spain or Syria. And the local peoples knew the enemy and the tactics required to defeat them. Note that all the European colonial nations like Britain and France recruited and used "native" troops in their colonies just like the Romans did - even the US recruited Native Americans to fight other Native Americans in the "Indian" Wars. Some of the auxilia had special "national" capabilities like Numidian light cavalry, slingers from the Belearic Islands, Cretan archers and "amphibious" Batavians - it was obviously quicker and cheaper to get these skills from allies than to train Roman troops in these specialties. Additionally it was traditional that Roman armies include non-Roman troops. At first men from the Latin or Italian allies made up more than half of a Roman army, and this tradition morphed over time to include using Spanish or Gallic auxiliaries or the troops of client kings to supplement the legions. There was also a clear political aspect to this tradition as well, service with or in the worlds greatest military force sometimes instilled a certain "Roman-ness" in these troops. This eventually resulted in individuals or units that had especially distingushed themselves and later all retiring auxiliaries receiving Roman citizenship. Over all the long history of Rome how many ex-auxiia caused problems? Civilis, Arminius, Poppaedius Silo and the other leaders in the Social War - I bet I missed some others - but not so many for over 700 years.

Friedrich Munzers "Roman Aristocratic Parties and Families" has 28 Genealogical tables including the Servilii, Quinctii, Aemilii Lepidi, Licinii, Livii, Cornelii Scipiones, Metelli and several showing the relationships of Cato, Brutus and Servilia. This book was published in 1920 and thus is dated in places, but it was the seminal work in this area.

You are probably right. When I made this database I was just fooling around trying to learn to use "ACCESS" and the only data I had was a list of consuls by year - so that's what I used to enter the data. I used the nomen as the key so I could line up all the consulships from each family via queries. Then I added what I could find from the fasti etc against the first entry of each individual. Not having Broughton I had no way to check earlier magistracies held by each man. By the way can Nephele or someone post a list of patrician gens ? I have: Aemilius, Cornelius, Fabius, Valerius, Claudius, Iulius, Servilius, Postumius, Furius, Manlius, Sergius, Sulpicius, Quinctius but Mommsen says there ewere 22 patrician families attested after 367BC and surely there are others on Nepheles list.?

Marcus Porcius - does this help to illustrate the rise and fall of a gens? It is a query from my homemade database that purports to show all the Fabians who held consulships (I can never get the columns to line up!). The "No" identifies an individual sort of like like the Paully-Wissowa number in the "encyclopaedie". "Other" gives iterations, some filiation info (f=filus, n=nepos) and offices and dignities attained e.g Dictatorships, Triumphs and Ovations and designation as Princeps Senatus, and the "year" column shows the consulships held. Thus M Fabius Ambustus -son of N(?) grandson of Marcus, twice Dictator, Princeps Senatus, Triumphed and celebrated an Ovation, was consul in 360 BC (as well as 356 and 354). Fabius No Pnmn Nomen Cognomen Other Year 14 M Fabius Ambustis N f M n (Dict 351 321)(PS)(Tr 354/3)(Ov 360/59) 360 19 C Fabius Ambustis N f M n 358 14 M Fabius Ambustus (II) 356 14 M Fabius Ambustus (III) 354 45 M Fabius Dorso 345 86 Q Fabius Maximus Rullianus (Dict 315 301) (Cens 304) (PS) 322 86 Q Fabius Maximus Rullianus (II)(Tr 322/1 308/7 295/4) 310 86 Q Fabius Maximus Rullianus (III) 308 86 Q Fabius Maximus Rullianus (IV) 297 86 Q Fabius Maximus Rullianus (V) 295 145 Q Fabius Maximus Gurges (PS)(Tr 291/0 276/5) 292 145 Q Fabius Maximus Gurges (II) 276 180 C Fabius Licinius 273 187 C Fabius Pictor 269 193 N Fabius Pictor (Tr 266/5 II) 266 145 Q Fabius Maximus Gurges (III) 265 231 N Fabius Buteo 247 233 M Fabius Licinius 246 235 M Fabius Buteo (Cens 241)(Dict 216)(PS? ) 245 259 Q Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (Cens 230)(Dict 217 221)(PS 209) 233 259 Q Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (II) (Tr 233/2) 229 259 Q Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (III) (suf) 215 259 Q Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (IV) 214 303 Q Fabius Maximus Q f 213 259 Q Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator (V) 209 363 Q Fabius Labeo (Tr 188/7) 183 444 Q Fabius Maximus Aemilianus L f 145 451 Q Fabius Maximus Servilianus 142 493 Q Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus (Tr 120) 121 503 Q Fabius Maximus Eburnus Servilianus (Cens 108) 116 648 Q Fabius Maximus (suf)(Tr 45) 45 757 Paullus Fabius Maximus 11 758 Africanus Fabius Maximus 10 From this one might conclude that the Fabii were dominant in the mid 4th to mid 3rd centuries, recovered power during the war with Hannibal, had to adopt sons from other patrician clans to maintain themselves in the mid 2nd century but declined in the late first.(?) I don't pretend this is exhaustive or even complete - but it gives data on the gens in one place. I have one for the Valerii too.