Pompieus

Well Marcus Portius...for what it's worth, and unlike our namesakes, it seems we approach agreement - on this topic at least. You are quite right, I believe, that the impression of a sort of two-party system is an illusion caused by the lack of source material and, possibly, our anglo-saxon propensities. The actual rivalries and competition among the Roman nobles was undoubtedly far more complex than that, and positions and alliances shifted and changed - sometimes quickly. I think Gruens' books (Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts and Last Generation of the Roman Republic make a strong case for this. I believe Gruen is right when he says contention was rife among individuals and groups of allies unless the basic system was challenged (as in the cases of the Gracchi, Saturninus, Lepidus or Catalina), at which point the aristocracy would close ranks against the challengers - only to resume their rivalries when the danger had passed. I also agree that there was no de jure oligarchy. However, the Romans were a very conservative people who believed everything and everybody had its proper place in the scheme of things. A Roman voter, be he a Roman nobiles, a member of a princely clan in one of the towns of Italy, a wealthy banker or businessman, a Marsian peasant or a day laborer in Rome, could rarely be pursuaded to vote for a consular candidate who's name had not been famous for a century or more. This is, I suppose, what you mean by "oligarchy of influence" and again I would agree, if you concede that additions to the ruling class were fairly tightly controlled. I have a list I got somewhere that purports to sort the total number of consulships and consular tribunates etc between 509BC and 27BC by gens. It shows that 28% of them came from the five patrician gentes maiores, (Aemilii, Cornelii, Fabii, Valerii, Claudii) and almost 70% from the top 25 families. It is to the credit of these noble families that they sponsored able individuals (like Cato, Marius, Cicero, Manius Curius Dentatus, Titus Didius, Quintus Pompieus, etc), and brought them into the body politic, broadening its' base in the senate. Would this tendency have continued in the first century BC, and expanded to allow Romanized aristocrats from Gaul or Spain (like Balbus) to enter the senate? I presume your position is that it very well could have - you may be right.

This argument goes to your definition of "oligarchy". Was access to Roman magistracies and the senate closed like the senate of Venice? No, it is clear that new blood was regularly introduced to the back benches. Using the same data as Cato, you find that a third of the known tribunes, 29% of the known aediles and 22.5% of the known praetors were novi homines that is, from families that do not appear to have had senatorial ancestors. Half of the 200 known senators who had held no magistracy pedarii were new men. Sulla had added many of these men to the Senate, and later Caesar added more; both Roman [/i]equites and the upper classes from the municipalities and the towns of Italy. In earlier times, many of the most aristocratic Roman clans sponsored the entry of aristocrats from the towns of Italy into the Roman political scene, the Porcii, Perpernae, Otacilii, Metelii and Pompeii are examples. Munzer's "Roman Aristocratic Parties and Families" elucidates this. It had been going on since the Claudii arrived from the Sabine country. However, does this really mean that there was no "oligarchy"? Note how closely the consulship was guarded - only one novus reached the consulship in the whole period. In the senate, tradition demanded, and procedure saw to it, that the consulars and ex-censors exerted the greatest influence. Unless he had special qualities (like Cato), a back bencher was rarely heard from in debate. The actual business of the state was undoubtedly dominated by 20 or 30 men from 10 or 15 families. Sometimes it could be dominated by a mere faction within this group (again like Cato). Even in the elections it is questionable that anyone could be succesful without support from some section of the Roman aristocracy and could not succeed in the face of their opposition. Even Marius got his start as a protoge of the Metelii. So was Rome an oligarchy? Not legally - there was no blood or even wealth requirement for candidacy or entry to the senate. And, wisely, the ruling group was willing to broaden the base of the state by periodically co-opting individuals from the same social and economic classes in other parts of Italy. But would anyone contend that the government was not dominated by the few? Or that the real problem with the Republic wasn't the fierce competition between these aristocrats for wealth, influence and power? By the way, it would be incredible if/when those guys in Australia com up with an english language version of the Realencyclopaedie der Alterumswissenschaft!(?) Not only is it tough to find, but my German is poor and there is nowhere else that has all those biographies (and you alway see those notes against a guys name like RE(27)!)

It is true that Antonius was only marginally less a "lap vomiting wretch" (as Cato says) than Octavianus, but he was willing to compromise and negote to avoid civil war. And though he was undoubtedly determined to remain at the head of the Caesarean party, he didn't use his name to raise an illegal private army, march on Rome (twice) or demand a consulship at age 21.

Since the centuries originally represented the entire levy of the Roman state, the 18 centuries of equites and the 85 centuries of iuniores, or perhaps only the 40 centuries of iuniores in the Ist class, may have actually had 100 men each. The centuries of seniores were probably smaller, and the unarmed centuries of musicians fabri and the proletarii are anybody's guess. This is discussed by G.W. Botsford Roman Assemblies and L.R. Taylor Roman Voting Assemblies

Poor Cicero. All his flaws, vanities and insecurities are revealed because we have his personal lettters. Actually his actions are usually understandable in the context of his situation. He was a "new man", and had to be careful not to offend the "great men" and to maintain his prestige, reputation and dignity among the aristocracy. That he rose as high as he did without being a military man shows his abilitites must have been great. I think his greatest failure was at the end, when he decided to finally make an uncompromising stand for the Republic and against Antonius. He tried to bring down Antonius by raising up Octavianus - intending to eventually get rid of Octavian (who he thought was the weaker) as well. A terrible miscalculation! Antonius, at least, was a traditional Roman aristocrat - Octavian was a ruthless terrorist and revolutionary who would stop at nothing in his pusuit of power!

Here is a question: What is the consensus on where the Senators voted in the "comitia centuriata"? Gelzer says that a Senator practically required at least the equestrian census to be active politically (there was apparently no Senatorial census requirement until Augustus); did the Senators vote in the equestrian centuries (those 18 centuries of men who held the "equo publico")? Or were the Senators excluded from the equestrian centuries and thus voted in the Ist Class? In 123BC the "lex Sempronia" of G Gracchus specified that "judices" (jurors) would be selected from voters of the equestrian census (400,000A). (Plut C Gracc 5, App BC i 22, Tac Ann xii 60). In 105BC the "lex Servilia repetundarum" specified judices needed equipment or census of an equestrian, could NOT be a Senator, and must be 30-60 yrs old. Did the Senators vote in the equestrian centuries until 123 (lex Sempronia), then in the Ist class? There appear to be several examples of Senators holding the public horse before 123 (M Livius Salinator, Ti Claudius Nero, L Cornelius Scipio (Livy xxix.37, xxxix.44) but none later. Did an equites give up his horse (and his place in the equestrian century) when he became a senior at age 46 (Poly vi, 19)? When he entered the Senate? Were the Senators' sons registered in the equestrian centuries before they entered the Senate? Pompey, the son of a Senator, certainly held the public horse (Plut Pomp 22). For that matter, where did the classic equestrians (the wealthy bankers and businessmen who chose to avoid politics) vote? Was there room for them all in the 18 centuries of equites who held the public horse? or were they filled up with Senators and the sons of Senators?

One can belittle Pompeys victories...but (like Sam Spade said) look at the number of them. Also, Pompey defeated two of the greatest generals in Roman history in Sertorius and Caesar (at Dyrrachium). He was probably the finest strategist and logistician of them all - these are talents that do not stand out like Caesar's impetuosity, but it was these abilities that made his successes seem so easy. Also the literary tradition is uniformly hostile- the aristocrats always hated him (the young butcher).

Though I understand Catos passion about his namesakes' inimicus, and I agree that Caesar was willing to do violence to the republic in defence of his personal dignitas (and his ambition), it seems to me that E S Gruens hypothesis that it was the scale and duration of the conflict(s) of 49-31BC that wrecked the republic has merit. I also would argue that the great-nephew (military adventurer, terrorist, unprincipled schemer, incomparable politician and brilliant propagandist) is possibly even more to blame than his adoptive father for the demise of free institutions. After all, who knows what Caesars plans were (if he had any). The republic survived Sulla, why couldn't it have survived Caesar?

M Cary and H.A. Omerud in volume IX of the Cambridge Ancient History say Pompey distributed 384 million sestertii to his troops, which they equate to 3,360,000 pounds sterling (1951 pounds). After the distribution, Pompey still had 480 million sestertii to hand over to the treasury which they equate to 4,200,000 pounds, and he increased the annual revenue of the Roman state by 200-340 million sestertii. There is some disagreement as to how much was provided to the treasury, Plutarch says Pompey handed over 120 million denarii, while Pliny says 50 million. (What was the relationonship of sestertii to denarii? 16-1?) Each private soldier in Pompeys' army apparently received 1500 denarii in the distribution (Pliny NH xxxvii, Plut. Pomp 45.3, App. Mith. 126). The annual pay of a soldier according to Polybius (poly vi.39) was 120 denarii per annum (later there was a re-evaluation of the coins that confuses things). H.M.D. Parker in"The Roman Legions" and Suetonius say Caesar doubled the soldiers' pay to 225 denarii and Parker equates this to 8 pounds sterling (1928 pounds). So before Caesar raised it the private soldier got something like 110-120 denarii a year from which stoppages were made for rations and equipment etc. - about 4 pounds sterling according to Parker. I don't know how these eminent scholars made their calculations to arrive at equivalent modern values for the ancient money (weight of the actual silver?), but clearly purchasing power was FAR greater in the past (even in 1951!) than it is now! If a soldier could live on 120 denarii or 4 pounds a year, or even on 225 or 8 pounds, that has to equate to at least 10 or $15,000 in todays money doesn't it? I think an "Imperial Grunt" in the U.S. Army (an E-1) gets about that today.(?) I tried the arithmetic but was reminded why I'm not an engineer. But Pompey brought home a whole slug of denaro (or denarii) and still left the East in better conditions than it had experienced in two centuries.

The other (in fact the traditional) explanation is that the social, economic, military and political problems that arose as Rome acquired a world empire could not be dealt with by the oligarchic city-state government. In this interpretation, the conquest of the second century BC brought vast wealth into Roman society and concentrated it in the hands of the nobles who ran the government and the businessmen who exploited the provinces. The influx of cheap grain and other rescources from the provinces and constant military service ruined the Roman and Italian peasantry economically, and the newly won capital in the hands of the few was used to buy their land (the only safe investment in those days). The landless peasants drifted into Rome and became a volatile proletariate that could be used by demagogic politicians to disrupt the control of government by the senate of nobles while the large land holdings were operated as ranches by large gangs of dangerous slaves. Another problem was the demands of the Italian allies for a larger share in the benefits of empire and protection against the arbitrary actions of Roman magistrates. The senate is also blamed for military incompetence and an unwillingness, due to narrow-mindedness or traditionalism or corruption or self-interest, to make the changes needed to deal with the new economic and social conditions that the conquest of an empire brought to Italy. Thus the reactionary senate crushed the attempts made by the Gracchi, Saturninus, M Liviuis Drusus and others to reform the system, and led Roman armies to disasters in Spain, Numidia and against the Teutones and rebellious slaves etc. All this leads to "popular" politicians opposing the senate by appealing to the masses and recruiting armies from that same proletariate which they used to recover from the disasters caused by senatorial commanders and that they eventually use to overthrow senatorial control of the government and establish one-man rule. I've always felt this was a little too formulaic an interpretation, though there is a probably good deal of truth in the economic and social aspects of the argument. To me there seems to have been much more continuity than disruption in Roman politics of the last two centuries BC and a good deal of change - trying to solve some of these problems. The real break comes with the civil war of 49 which lasted longer and was more destructive than the troubles of 91-82.

Didn't Caesar initially propose the land bill in the curia (before taking it to the assembly)? And isn't the thrust of Cassius Dio 38. 1-4 that the bill itself was not particularly objectionable on it's face, but was opposed by Cato and Bibulus because of the political benefits its passage would bring to Caesar and Pompey (as triumvirs or as individals)? Dio even makes it seem that the majority of the senate might have acquiesced had it not been for the inflexible opposition of Cato. After all, the veterans deserved their reward.

One could argue that the Republic was destroyed by the nearly twenty-year civil war (49-31BC). Of course that begs the question: Why the civil war? One answer is that the struggle of rival Roman nobles for Office, Authority, Dignity and wealth that had once been confined to the senate house and forum, had expanded to encompass first all Italy, then the whole Mediterranean world. Battles for primacy in the state that had been fought in elections, votes on bills and in the courts - each noble marshaling his clients as voters and advocates - were eventually fought on the battlefield, using client armies, kings and nations. One noble, crushing all his rivals, gathered all the armies, kings, nations and classes as HIS clients, then declaring the Republic restored.(?)

This is a fascinating discussion, and I'd like to inject one idea. Far be it from me to question the sincerity of Cato's stoicism, or his concern as quaestor for the public treasury. Nor would I question the real economic and social problems that faced the Republic in the first century BC, or that the vested interests of senators, equestrians and Italians affected their attitudes. But at the bottom of any Roman political battle is the struggle of individuals and groups of nobles for dignitas, auctoritas and honores. It is dangerous, and possibly an anachronism, to fully accept programs, principals and policies as central to these political struggles, though clearly they played a role. A strong case can be made that the resistance and obstructionism of Cato and his coterie were designed to discredit the triumvirs (especially Pompey), heighten public indignation against them, divide them and weaken their position in the state, rather than any ideological opposition to the measures themselves. Actually their tactics worked pretty well. The triumvirs were very unpopular by 59 BC; they had trouble getting their supporters elected to office, Pompey was attacked in public and upset at his failures while Crassus gloated and nursed his hostility. I think that Roman "politics as usual" needs always to be considered.

I have the same names for the pontifices (pontifexes? sadly I have no latin) (Do you need praenomens?) Somewhere I've seen L Cornelius Lentulus Lupus (cos 156 cens 147) and P Cornelius Lentulus (cos 162 added to the princeps senatus list after Ap Claudius Pulcher. Someone has to fill the gap here as Appius died in 131 or 130 and Marcus Aemilius Scaurus wasn't appointed until 109 or 108, but I hesitated to list them as I had no reference.

I have a list of sorts that I compiled from various sources, mostly starting with Friederich Munzer's "Roman Aristocratic Parties and Families" and Broughton's "Magistrates of the Roman Republic" (when I could get hold of a copy). German scholars like Mommsen, Gelzer, Munzer and Meyer in the 1860's - 1930's apparently created the study of this stuff (prosopography(!)) later taken up by the Brits like Broughton, Syme et al. The list may not be complete and its accuracy is certainly open to challenge. (All dates are BCE) M Fabius Ambustus (cos 360 et al) Q Fabius Rullianus (cos 310 et al) Q Fabius Maximus Gurges (cos 292 et al) L Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus (cos 237 cens 236) - Apptd ca 220 (?) Q Fabius Maximus Verruccosus (cos 213 et al, cens 230) - Apptd 209 P Cornelius Scipio Africanus (cos 205 194 cens 199) - Apptd 199 (?) L Valerius Flaccus (cos 195 cens 184) - Apptd 184 M Aemilius Lepidus (cos 187 cens 179) - Apptd 179 P Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum (cos 162 155 cens 159) - Apptd 147 Ap Claudius Pulcher (cos 185 cens 136) - Apptd 136 M Aemilius Scaurus (cos 115 cens 109) - Appd 109 (?) L Valerius Flaccus (cos 100 cens 97) - Apptd 86 (?) The censors traditionally appointed the senior ex-censor of one of the five "senior clans" (Fabii, Aemilii, Cornelii, Valerii, Claudii) as princeps senatus. There is little reliable data prior to 366BC and no censors completed the "lustrum between 65 and 28 BC. Undoubtedly the "divi filis" was appointed in 28. If you are REALLY interested I have a list of the "pontifex maximi" too.

You've set yourself quite a task, one that's filled whole encyclopedias! If you really want additional suggestions I might respectfully mention for the earlier period: M Fabius Ambustus - Cos 360 358 354 Dict 351 321 Triumph 354 Princeps Senatus Q Fabius Maximus Gurges - Cos 292 276 265 Triumph 291 Princeps Senatus M Popilius Laenas - Cos 359 356 350 348 Triumph 350 L Papirius Cursor - Cos 326 320 319 315 313 Dict 325 324 309 Triumph 324 319 309 The other possibilities are endless. Do you want to include all the guys who were "princeps senatus"? ( L Cornelius Lentullus (cos 239) L Valerius Flaccus (195) M Aemilius Lepidus (187 175) Ap Claudius Pulcher (185) L Valerius Flaccus (100)) What about Africanus' colleague and pontifex maximus P Licinius Crassus Dives (cos 205) ? or Q Mucius Scaevola the jurist (cos 95)? Ti Claudius Nero and M Livius Salinator surely belong as victors at the Metaurus, but what about Ti Sempronius Gracchus (cos 215 213) or M Fulvius Nobilior (189) conqueror of Achaea?

[ Fine exposition. Part of my family hails from Chieti which was once Teate - the city of the Marrucini, others come from the Abruzzi - Samnite country. But I am curious why you believe the allies were organized as "manipular legions" as the Romans were. Everything I have seen seems to indicate that the allied troops were organized in cohorts of infantry and turmae of cavalry from each allied community, commanded by their own officers; with the overall command of each of the two "wings" or "alae" assigned to each consular army under a Roman "prefectus sociorum". Polybius says nothing of any organization beyond the alae and the "socii extraordinarii", and Livy's description of the beginning of the battle of Pydna specifically mentions the exploits of a cohort of Paeligni. It also seems that independent cohorts would be useful tactically in many ways, such as garrisons, so that the legions themselves could remain united.

Ursus and Cato have given some decent background on the Social War and I can add a few interesting points. For me it's a special event, as I've stated before my family is from the province that was the hotbed of revolt. I'd like to delve into a it bit more but major works on the subject are rare. I can add that by 91BC many of the Roman armies consisted heavily and sometimes predominately of legions from the Italian tribes (I believe they were all set up in manipular legions like the Romans). They are the same tribes that had remained loyal to Rome during Hannibal's invasion. It was in fact a Roman army filled with Praetutii, Frentati and Marrucci that destroyed Hasdrubal's reinforcement army to Hannibal, cutting off his head and throwing it over the ramparts to the Carthaginians. I've read, but forgotten the source, that the Marrucci legions were equal or better than the Roman ones. The point of the war as other posters have stated was inclusion into the Republic. The tribes; the Marsi, Samnites, Vestini, Paeligni, Picente, Frentati, Praetutii and Marruccini, set up a capital for their confederation in the city of Corfinium whose ruins still exist. The federation elected a Senate and called itself "Italia", the first known instance of that term for a political entity. The fighting is said to have been brutal with Sulla making a reputation for himself. Part of the problem for the Romans had to have been that there were thousands of Roman citzens in colony-cities living in the tribal areas. As I've posted before my own family is from the town of Guilianova founded as Castrum Novum, a Roman colony in 283BC among the territory of the Praetutii tribe. So these Romans had been living amongst the tribes with Roman citizenship and their enhanced rights for at least two hundred years. This could only have made the situation that much more acute--though there's no surviving evidence knowing the nature of warfare in those times it doesn't take much of a guess that many of these Romans were killed or run off of their lands or their cities laid to siege or that they did the same to the surrounding tribes. In the end the Romans cleverly dissolved the hostilities by offering citizenship to tribes that did not revolt and tribes that were willing to lay down arms immediately. It's a critical moment in Roman history.

Usually a senatorial committee was sent out to organize a new province at the time it was annexed. A law (lex provincia) would be drawn up by the commitee describing the relationship of the various towns and tribes of the province with the Roman state, including the taxes. The law would be discussed and voted on by the senate and, when approved, established the basis of the provincial administration. Always advocates of "small government" the Romans took the "privatisation" route and auctioned off the right to collect the taxes of the various provinces in Rome, as described by Cato. Companies were formed by Roman buisinessmen (equites) to bid on these contracts and so spread the risk. And like businessmen and lobbyists today, they used their political contacts to win the contracts and obtain better terms when they could. One of the ways Crassus built up his political influence was by cultivating the wealthy businessmen of Rome and Italy, and by advocating their interests in government circles. So it was natural that the holders of the Asian tax contract would approach him for relief when they got into trouble. The "First Triumvirate" itself was not an unconstitutional, revolutionary seizure of power but an agreement between three politicians to cooperate in order to achieve their goals - the stock in trade of Roman politics (although it had a bad odor to traditionalists). Caesar wanted the consulship, Pompey wanted his organization of the Eastern Provinces approved (he hadn't waited for the usual senatorial commisssion but had organized things himself) and the land grants he had promised his veterans, Crassus wanted the revision of the Asian tax contract and possibly other "behind the scenes" concessions that have not been preserved in the sources.

As PP mentioned above. And this command occurred earlier than Spartacus, not between Spartacus and Carrhae, which is the time period in question. So, no--Crassus commanded nothing between Spartacus and Cannae, except his army of tax-farmers. Quite right. A good ten years earlier. Undoubtedly he spent the time developing his political clout. As to the standards lost at Carrhae, I believe Tiberius (the future emperor) negotiated thier return in 20 BC in exchange for the Parthian rebel Tiridates.

Crassus commanded Sulla's right wing at the decisive battle of the Colline Gate in 82BC. While Sullas' left was driven back against the walls of Rome, Crassus' troops crushed the enemy opposed to them and won the victory.

The Cambridge Ancient History [/i]CAH vol vii pg 655. [/i] mentions the legion at Tarentum in 272 BC, I haven't been aable to find the primary source that mentions this first Roman garrison - have you ? The CAH also says on pg 798 that a legion was left to garrison Sicily under the newly appointed praetorian governor in 227 BC. Polybius Poly ii 24, in describing the efforts made to meet the Gallic invasion in 225 BC, says reserve legions were stationed in Tarentum and Sicily. Had these garrisons been maintained since 272 and 225? If so, the troops were probably maintained the same way as the later garrisons in Spain, eg. each commander took newly conscripted reinforcements with him when he left Rome and brought time-served soldiers back with him when he returned. The legions in the third and second centuries BC did not have the organizational continuity they had later with permanent numbers and esprit-de-corps, but were formally reconstituted each winter with new tribunes a new chief centurion and, probably a new numeral. Attempts are made to describe the armies and garrisons maintained by the Republic between 218 and 31 BC in Blunt Italian Manpower and Toynbee Hannibals Legacy