Furius Venator

Command at platoon level is key. Subalterns and sergeants must get their men fighting (even if it's only firing in the vague direction of the enemy with their eyes closed. Good training helps but the officers and ncos must tell most of the men what to do. As regards higher command, good leaders have an impact. But it's more in the nature of 'conducting' the battle (in the sense of conducting an orchestra), knowinhg the likmitations of your troops and ensuring that you have local superiority of force at critical points.

The findings of Wigram and Marshall are quite clear. In any unit good or bad only 25% maximum can be relied upon. These studies included elite units such as US paratroopers but excluded special operations forces. It is possible that in some special forces units this proportion rises. But not in organisations as big as for instance the Waffen SS or the British Commandos. Better training, discipline and above all leadership will get the 'sheep' who make up the bulk of any unit to actually participate in some way. Firing their weapons for instance. Modern armies are much better post-Wigram/Marshall at actually getting their men to open up on the enemy. But it's still the same 20-25%who will actually aim at a target.

I think the idea of a 'young vigorous' Augustus being his public face is very possibly correct. I'm not exactly sure that he would have been keen to be seen as an Alexander exactly (Pompey was but didn't care about being portrayed as middle aged so long as the got his hair right!). Also nhere was a Roman thing with youthful ability, it was seen to Pompey and Augustus' credit that they succeeded to high office young. As to Livia I suspect the point is she didn't need or want to be seen as a youthful beauty (associations with licentious behaviour) but as the very embodiment of Roman female virtue.

The Zulu casualties in both engagements seem to fall within European norms. The Zulu War is good because we have a modern missile reliant army for whom close combat is anathema fighting against an army whose whole emphasis was on getting to close quarters. Even the most generous assessment of the Zulus fighting capabilities do not put him outside European norms (they could only press home their attack after the British ran short of ammunition due to their over extended line). Consider the heroic last stand of Captain Younghusband on his wagon. Utterly alone and armed only with rifle and bayonet he held the Zulu off for some time before being shot. If the Zulus were exceptional in their ability to come to close quarters, they's simply have rushed him. Mixed units cause all sorts of issues. I'm not opposed to women in the services but single sex combat units would be the obvious way to go.

But don't you see? The enemy will be tiring too. Hence there will have to be a break in combat (unless of course one side simply runs away). You don't have to take my word for it. Simply consider this: if we allow 3 feet per man (Roman close order, approx 1 metre) then in order for there to be a switch the men involved have exactly half that space in which to manoeuvre. I am thin yet measure slightly over one and a half feet across the shoulders (or 0.5m). Yet I am carrying no shield and wearing no armour. There just isn't room for one man to back away whilst his colleague advances. In every single other engagement at Dyrrachium Caesar's losses were minimal, trivial in fact. Go and read the account. The Civil Wars Book III.53. Don't come back at me quoting some sorry excuse for a military historian who has either merely glanced at the original source or (much worse) has quoted slectively to prove his own agenda. I don't get what you're driving at with the Ia Drang thing. Can you be clearer please?

Oh good grief... Obviously the Romans had a drill for rotating ranks and a drill for replacing formations. The point at issue is really quite simple: did they rotate ranks while the front ranks were in hand to hand combat. I have pointed out that this is a physical impossibility if they are formed in close order and that their engaging in melee combat in open order is inherently unlikely. Brady is simply wrong unless you have quoted him out of context (and I don't think you have). It is an outright lie to say that: As I say we have a single action (which is noteable enough that Caesar singles it out for special attantion) where one of his dozens of cohorts was so reduced. And it was not done in open battle (where he is very clear that few casualties were suffered) but in the defense of a fortification that came under heavy assault. It is well known that the defense of a building, fort or similar protective structure encourages men to fight on beyond the point where in open battle they would have fled. In the battle to which you allude the overwhelming bulk of the NVA were killed and wounded by air and artillery strike. What's your point caller? And you of course are at liberty to take the word of whomsoever you choose, even that of Colonel Brady should you wish. Personally I'd rather look at evidence.

I've tried in vain to find any oriental data. As regards mixed gender units, it's a bad thing. The women do just fine, no better or worse than men in an all male unit. But the introduction of women to a fighting unit means that the men are less effective. There seems to be a 'protective' instinct that means they try to 'look after' the woman, degrading their effectivenesss. These studies are largely US.

It is only harder to do so if the man opposite you is actually trying to kill you. In fact about 1 combat in 16 will see both men going all out to kill each other and three quarters of 'combats' will be between men who are simply concerned with staying alive. One can expect blows to be exchanged but with little risk to either party (though it will not feel like that to the men involved).

It's years since I read it and I can't find my copy at the moment. My recollection is that it divided the empire into distinct phases of strategic policy, a rather flawed concept as each emperor would have his own ideas, and might change their minds from time to time... I tend to agree with Flextone, I doubt that the Romans saw strategy as anything particularly long term but took opportunities and adjusted to setbacks as they came along. That said, books like this are really good because if you don't agree with the central thrust they do make you think about why it is you don't agree. Political scientists are the bane of my life (or at least one of the banes) so maybe I'm biased. Mybe I'll dig out my copy and re-read it.

I've studied this in some detail and the plain fact is that all our observable data suggests that in any force of infantry, be they seasoned verterans or raw recruits, about 20-25% of men actually fight as well as is normally regarded typical. There seem to be deep rooted psychological reasons for this. There was an objection above that a man in close combat could not 'sham fight' which is an excellent point. Yet there is a huge difference between trying to stay alive and trying to kill tour opponent. Aggressive fighting at close quarters leaves you more susceptible to getting hurt. Also conside the fact that if 75% of those engaged are not too keen on getting to grips, there is an excellent chance that one's opponent is merely trying to stay alive also. It is very difficult to come to terms with this (I still have real difficulty at times, I keep thinking 'oh yes but the Tenth would have more real fighters than that'). Common sense and our own preconceptions are in conflict with the observable data, also with the literary evidence. I know which side I have come down on... Spurius, your father was certainly one of those that the British soldier Wigram termed 'gutful men' the five or six men in a platoon who could be relied on to do anything. You should be proud of him (I mean, you almost certainly are proud of him, but you're right to be).

Oh come now. Caesar had political reasons for prolonging his stay in Gaul. In fact the initial conquest was over by 56. There were then some rebellions of which Vercingetorix's was the most serious. Apart from the destruction of a recruit legion under peculiar circumstances (a complete failure of judgement on the part of the commander) and the setback at Gergovia which was largely due to indiscipline, the Gauls achieved little (beyond putting up a courageous fight). Urban cohorts were not elite troops in a fighting sense. I agree that the Spartans, in their heyday were superlative but if we take a legion and supporting auxiliaries and compare it to a force of Spartans and their helots and allies, the legion is far more balanced as a fighting unit. I'm sure the gallant Spartans would remain on the field fighting to the bitter end after their allies had been routed but you can't take a single, unique force and say 'all hoplites could have been this good if only...'. If you're looking for proper phalanx versus Roman battles then the Macedonian wars and the wars of Phyrrus are really all there is. Hannibal did not have many spearmen and Cannae is not a typical battle. What you want to do is ask yourself WHY the Romans had a better quality of troops.

Whilst I agree with Virgil regarding the comparative ease with which spearmen (as opposed to pikemen) can be trained, I really must take issue with the notion that the Scots who followe Wallace or Bruce were given to fighting in a Celtic tribal way. That might have been true of the highland allies but the sturdy Scot spearman was typically a lowland peasant or burgher whose culture was mainly Anglo-Saxon based, albeit with Celtic and to an extent Norman and Flemish influence. The spear 'phalanx' had been the weapon of the Scottish lowlands for centuries before Wallace and there appears to have been no retaraining of the highlanders, who would likely have distained lowland techniques anyway (they fought very much as allies rather than subjects).

I can see what you're getting at. But if we're going to play 'let's pretend' (and I think there is no harm in it, and possibly some merit- after all modern armies wargame both theoretically and practically, but they do so under pretty firm rules) then we need to be aware that if we use historical formations in novel ways then a) the troops aren't going to know what's going on and will fear the strangeness and there might be excellent practical reasons for why such novelty was not practised by Roman generals. So you need at least an umpire and that umpire must be both impartial and have a good knowledge of the historical capabilities of the troops in question. You also have to fill the generals in a bit: how long have they been in command, are their men veterans or recruits? What's their morale, what subordinates are available and what is your impression of their capabilities (and their real capabilities might differ from the impression)? etc etc. Which is kind of why I went for 'Line up in the usual way chaps and see those gutless bastards off in the usual way'.

Is mail really easier and cheaper to make than leather? I think you might be right about the longevity thing, Although mail rusts and will wear out it is surely easier to repair properly. Og course the only real way is to conduct a test. Let us find two hundred volunteers. Clad half in leather and half in chain. The first leather clad man takes an almighty swing (or thrust) at the torso of a mail clad subject. Then the first mail clad man (not necessarily the one struck previously of course) returns the compliment. We repeat until the subjects can take no more and observe which side is in the better condition. After any necessary hospitilisation, the roles are reversed (leather clad donning chain and vice versa) and the experiment repeated. This should give a pretty conclusive result. Do you think I might get funding?

Probably in Sallust's Catiline It's unlikely to be a completely accurate record (though the flaour is probably right enough. Caesar's and Cato's speeches were taken down by Cicero's recorders and so Sallust probably had access to them. But it can be demonstrated that Sallustis not above 'improving' speeches so they are possibly not 100% as delivered.

How is the phalanx more disciplined? After all a phalanx of Athenian citizen militia was considerably less disciplined than one comprised of Spartiates. The late republican legion was made up of full-time soldiers, they'd have more discipline than Greek militia, though perhaps comparable to Macedonian phalangites. Well that's because they fought in a different way. Being different is not the same as being superior. I thought Phyrrus did rather well against Rome. I don't recall the Romans having too many problems with Greek states apart from Macedon. And there were no swordsmen in the Greek phalanxes, or those of Macedon. I am not aware that they were added at a later date. I fail to see how it would have improved their efficiency. Well now, if the phalanx was so perfect, how is it that it did not triumph over the legions? As a matter of interest, where does it imply that the Athenian hoplites started training young? I grant you the Spartans were an exception but mercenaries apart, the Greek city states fielded armies of part time militia.

By heavy infantry I simply mean close order foot. The later Romans likely manoeuvred in quite open order (faster) but closed ranks for combat. I don't think that the legions of this tme were that flexible (though I might be wrong). It's really hard to get formed bodies of men to move at any speed cross country without them losing formation- potentially deadly for troops trained to fight in close order rather than skirmish. I know you could send messengers, but they do take time and pre arranged signals limit the level of communication that can be achieved...

well, as I said above: Praetorians are sometimes shown as wearing muscled cuirasses, they may have been leather. Some stonework shows centurians in what appears to be muscled cuirass but it might be simple a lack of desire to carve mail or segmentata (statuary and carvings were painted so one could simply use a silver paint to indicate mail). So it's certainly possible, yes. Though why officers would wear it, if the other ranks did not is puzzling if it is in fact very stiff and uncomfortable. An equestrian officer would be able to afford a metal breastplate. Perhaps the leather was more efficient than metal but if so the legions would have adopted it. A puzzle.

The maniple (and later cohort) were certainly flexible in a sense but my point is that that flexibility was more in the nature of allowing rapid reinforcement of weak spots in the line rathe than meaning they they could wander about the field at will paying little heed to the overall cohesion of the legionn of which they were part. Further, my impression of 4th century Roman legions (it's not my main field) is that they were less flexible than the legions of the Punic Wars, I may be wrong. But if the legions were in a phalanx like formation at Cannae I'll eat my copy of Livy. That's to digress though. 'The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, ' Polybius demonstrates exactly what I'm saying. The flexibility of the maniples is that they are not all committed. The 'gaps' in the Roman formation allow the phalanx to become dislocated and the reserve maniple fall on the flanks of the unit that has 'breached' the open roman line. He's not talking about the walking round the sides of then enemy formation, rather describing the effect of the three line 'chequerboard' formation.

Please don't misunderstand me, you could obviously give orders as you pleased. All I meant was that the troops might well not have the training to follow them through correctly. I don't think heavy infantry, especially the Romans of the 4th century are mobile enough to do as you suggest. and I don't think that battles are exactly 'mobs hacking away' either., but I take your point, simply saying, 'Form line of battle chaps and get after them!' isn't what we consider good generalship, so obsessed are we with flash tactics. I'd far rather win in grand, sweeping style so future historians could marvel at my adroit handling of troops. But, if your putting me in command of a Roman legion (of any era) I'm going to stick to tried and tested (I'd rather be boring than defeated). How will you maintain communication with your subordinate commander who has half your force and is perhaps a mile away?

I doubt tyhe legion of that era is flexible enough to divide as you suggest. Other than Scipio at Ilipa, can anyone recall fancy tactics employed by the legions? I can't (though that's not to say there aren't any). Whilst the later legions were quite flexible in their formations, that seems to have been used to aid reinforcement of the line and so on rather than fancy flanking. Form them up and leave them to it generally worked very well for the Romans, attempts to tinker (eg Cannae possibly) generally didn't work out too well. The better Roman commanders used their reserves well, the superb ones (eg Caesar at Pharsalus) used there reserves in unexpected ways. But Roman infantry could be trusted to break almost any foe in head on collision (Hannibals centre was destroyed in each of his victories). To my mind, it's the poor Samnites who need to do something clever (like laying down their arms and pleading for terms- I'm prepared to be generous...)

The exploder of myth exploded... Do you think 6mm of stiff leather might be quite cumbersome to wear, hence the preference for more expensive mail?

I understand your thinking Gaius but I think dividing your forces in the face of the enemy is pretty much a cardinal sin unless you have very very good reason to do so. You risk being defeated in detail rather than flanking your opponent. Also in the 4th century BC, the Romans were a lot less flexible than they were later on IIRC they were not too far vremoved from the hoplite era at that stage.

Form line of battle and drive straight at 'em. Not very elaborate but it worked for the Romans very well... I might wait till later in the day to avoid the disadvantage of the sun in my troops face but not if the enemy looked like withdrawing, or indeed if they looked like doing anything other than standing still.

Where in the Civil wars does Caesar claim that all his men were wounded at Dyrrachium? I think the egregious colonel is referring to a small action fought by a cohort under Scaeva that were holding a fort. Caesar says 'Thus on one day there were six engagements...not more than twenty of our men were lost in all the skirmishes put together. In the fort however, not a single soldier escaped being wounded.' Read the full account for yourself in Civil war III.53 So he's actually suffered light casualties although one unit holding a fortification, into which Caesar says about 30 000 arrows were fired, suffered very heavily. A unit in a fort reacts very differently to one in open battle, it is not in formation for a start. I am glad that you've brought Colonel Brady to my attention however. when I am in need of some comic reading, I'll know where to turn... Ancient warfare was considerably less deadly than modern warfare, even allowing for numbers of participants. Where on earth does he get his ideas from? Furthermore, and I am trying hard to make allowances for the fact that English is not your first language, if you actually bothered to read my postings you'll see that I do not claim that ranks were never rotated, but that they were not rotated whilst troops were actually in melee combat. That in no way detracts from my utter disbelief that you can refer to a situation where a unit is holding a fort and deduce from that that similar things happened in open battle. I am even more startled that you quote a (very dubious) secondary source when the original is easily obtainable. Why did you not check? I'd have though better of a man who has studied the Roman Army in such depth and for as long as you have.