Furius Venator

Praetorians are sometimes shown as wearing muscled cuirasses, they may have been leather. Some stonework shows centurians in what appears to be muscled cuirass but it might be simple a lack of desire to carve mail or segmentata (statuary and carvings were painted so one could simply use a silver paint to indicate mail).

Troops weren't so equipped in the republic and early empire at least. I'm not certain about under the later empire. That certainly doesn't mean that such armour wasn't available for non imperial troops, to suggest that hardened leather was totally unknown to the Romans seems a bit extreme. Most evidence suggests a reliance on chain and scale armour with lorica segmentata being more popular under the early-mid empire.

There's a host of useful detail in the book. Very little of it deals with specific battles, it's mainly about the army as an institution. A better book for your purposes might be Goldsworthy's 'The Roman Army at War 100BC-AD200) or a book by Keppie whose exact title escapes me. Webster has some information too. A quick Amazon search should get you all these. I don't think we actually KNOW all the details of how commands were transmitted. Much can be deduced/infered though.

An advance is a manoeuvre, as I said above. And it requires intervals between units. Contrary to what you say, column was used extensively in the Napoleonic period.

It is IMPOSSIBLE to manoeuvre very wide formations over any distance of ground without them losing all order and cohesion. Not difficult, impossible. Even the Greek Phalank must have maintained intervals between separate units or it could not have advanced without falling into hopless confusion. In the eighteenth century, professional armies were drilled to as near perfection as we are ever likely to see. A frontage of about four or five hundred men seem the maximum that could be manoeuvered, narrower frontages move faster, much faster the narrower they get. A 'simple' advance is a manoeuvre. And far more difficult than one might think if one is to maintain cohesion. Even Greek phalanxes advanced! Thus the phalanx must have maintained intervals between units. Where is there any reference to ANY troops pushing each other with their shields, other than the highly contentious assertions of Hanson et al that this was the hoplite party trick. Napoleonic columns formed deep for manouever and shock (the 'weight' of a column so lamentably misinterpreted by Greek historians). Units form deep mainly for manoeuvre and steadiness. Hence good troops, well drilled can form as thin as three deep whereas untrained levies tend to be formed very deep indeed. Note that the Spartans tended to form thinner than other Greek nations. They'd be insane to do so if there really was a Greek version of the rugby scrum about to commence. They did so because they had very high morale and so did not need numbers of back ranks to give morale reassurance. They also marched very slowly and in time to music and in better order than other Greek states. Now gaps between units might be thought to increase the risk of flank attack. But for the enemy to manoeuvre (even just to counter charge) he must maintain intervals too. If an interval was large enough for an enemy unit to penetrate it would be very dangerous. A gap of perhaps twenty yards, perhaps even more would not allow penetration. Of course the Roman chequer formation did leave big gaps between units, but each gap was covered by a unit of the rearward line.

You are correct, it's a judgement call. Nonetheless some things are trotted out (even by professional historians and soldiers) without having been thought through hence my numerous postings. Vegetius wrote a theoretical manual, there's little evidence to suggest his ideas were ever used. Myself though, I suspect the gist is right, the manoeuver had to be carried out quickly because the enemy might be very close though not actually engaged. Can you name an ancient battle where the winners suffered more than 10% casualties, there aren't many. Usually the winner suffered less than 5%, often much less. Of course the 'lightly' wounded in the victorious army might not be counted in their casualties as they would return to the ranks quite swiftly. What is interesting is Caesar in his Gallic wars describing men as being too closely grouped to fight properly. It is unclear though whether he means that centuries were too close together so they could not manoeuver or individuals were too closely packed to use their weapons properly (in testudo agains javelins?) or both.

Whilst I think it likely that rudimentary unarmed fighting was taught, it's unlikely that this was with an eye to using it in battle. Modern soldiers are encouraged to box etc to build aggression, physical courage and self confidence. It was probably the same for the Romans. As an aside, whilst the Roman army was quite well disciplined ther is no evidence to suggest it was better disciplined than other professional forces ofthe ancient world. To see them as second only to the spartans is going a bit far. And as for 'fighting to the bitter end', there are enough Roman defeats on record that we can state confidently that they were as other men in this regard, fighting to the last man being distinctly exceptional. (The mass suicides are interesting though).

'Men exhausted or slightly wounded would retire and be relieved by fresh men. The five rear ranks then took the place of these fallen or exhausted men, or perhaps increased the number of the attacking troops' And nowhere does he describe how this occurred, he merely states it as his opinion. 'Then as the enemy was met, there followed a series of hand-to-hand individual conflicts' This I agree with, as I suspect that most front rankers were barely engaged. 'When the first line as a whole had done its best and become weakened and exhausted by losses, it gave way to the relief of fresh men from the second line who, passing through it gradually, pressed forward one by one, or in single file, and worked their way into the fight in the same way. Meanwhile the tired men of the original first line, when sufficiently rested, reformed and re-entered the fight. This continued until all men of the first and second lines had been engaged. This does not presuppose an actual withdrawal of the first line, but rather a merging, a blending or a coalescing of both lines. ' This presupposes a complete break down of the units formation, an intermingling of ranks and the disintegration of files. This might have happened. Still sheds no light on how they actually pass each other given the lack of room. '"There was at times a natural tendency to close in, probably from the right, the exposed flank (latus apertum) to the left' This of course directly contradicts the Greek experience as described by Thucydides etc where units tended to drift RIGHT to protect their shield side. Perhaps the Romans were different. 'and this necessitated commands to open ranks and extend intervals ' which would not be possible whilst engaged. Much more likely done to allow reforming when the unit was unengaged but perhaps in proximity to the enemy.

I'm not so sure that they were 'basically correct'. They set out with the modern idea that mobility is paramount and so tend to be critical of anything that suggests defensive mindedness. Hence Fuller regards the use of marching camps as akin to trench warfare mentality. Which it clearly was not.

I hate to be pedantic (well ok actually, I quite enjoy it) but modern infantry tactics bear no relation to those of the Roman army. For a start, the Romans did not utilise 'fire and movement', did not rely on 'heavy' weapons and command control was far more rudimentary. I know withdrawals COULD be interpreted as routs but it does not follow that this was always so. Further, if the enemy have been driven off (temporarily) then troops can be replaced on their original position, there is no need to withdraw before their supports have come up. It is precisely the withdrawals whilst under enemy pressure that are most susceptible to becoming routs and precipitating panic amongst reserve formations. In your system troops are ALWAYS withdrawing whilst engaged, in mine seldom if ever. So your system seems more likely to give rise to panic... I do not dispute that front line units were relieved. I do dispute that this occurred whilst they were engaged in hand to hand combat. Could I please request that you don't keep telling me that I need to study the Roman army and its organisation. I have done so for a number of years (perhaps more than twenty...). Nowhere have I come across the Romans using their pilas as pikes in the manner you suggest.

The triumvirate merely exploited the weaknesses of the republican constitution to their own ends. How can a healthy political system allow a senior magistrate to push through laws by violence? Rome had seen coups, attempted coups and rebellions by Marius, Sulla, Lepidus, Sertorius, Catiline (and those are just the ones off the top of my head). Hardly a sign of a healthy constitutional government. The republic was flawed in conception and became more so through its evolution. It merely took time for men to realise how it could be best exploited for their own ends. Consider the 'laws of exemption' where the likes of Pompey were allowed to stand for office well before the constitution allowed, or the fact that the senate could vote to execute citizens without trial (when egged on by a pompous windbag- and I don't of course mean Cicero), or the fact that because officials could not be prosecuted whilst in office that men who had acted illegally would naturally seek extended commands and multiple office holdings.

So you claim that the Roman soldier was unique in history, able to sustain 70% losses and still fight on. Interesting. Funnily enough, I have looked at the legions and their operations, and perhaps with an eye more cynical than yours. You claim then that a Roman unit NEVER retreated for tactical purposes in case it gave rise to a general rout, then later that Caesar often used tactical retreats. Which is it to be? Modern military tactics involve units in very open order (by ancient standards) overcoming their enemies by firepower, largely that of indirect fire weapons. The Romans fought in close order and forced the issue at close quarters. You should know this... Good luck with your book anyway.

The Republic was under sustained assault from at least the time of Marius. I suspect that by the time of the triumvirate the concept of passing laws in direct contravention of the spirit of the Republic was well established. Look at the rising number of 'special commands'. And the flouting of laws. Look at Pompey illegally raising an army to assist Sulla. Was he punished for such temerity? Of course not. I don't think it was the demands of governing of an empire that undid the republic but the inherent weakness of its structure. * Consuls regularly initiate legislation and what exactly is unconstitutional about that. You may argue about the specifics of Caesar's pushing through of legislation, but a consul was entitled to propose legislation. * Provincial commanders greatly affect politics in Rome itself And Marius, sulla, Pompey etc etc did not? * Intense electoral competition leading to secret pacts, bribery, and corruption Had always gone on. * Personal politics (via marriage alliances, patronage, personal loans) influencing public policy Had always gone on * Violence among rival crowds in the Forum That I grant you was especially prominent. * The decline of free, public speech (contiones) Example? The only really exceptional thing is the amount of street violence. And the senate was powerless to stop it

But the likes of Fuller and Liddel Hart were writing history as propoganda, obsessed as they were (and rightly) with 'the indirect approach' and mobile warfare. But it is not helpful to assume that those principles were the reason why, for example, Scipio triumphed over Hannibal. That's not to say that Fuller or Liddel Hart are not good writers, they are.

I understand your nice theoretical system. But that's all it is, a theory. What's your reference for this? And you still do not address the mechanics of how this nice drill was applied in action. Some points: A street fight is not a battle. My point is exactly that men could not fight for prolongued periods. This would give rise to lulls in the fighting during which the troops may heve replenished/swapped their front ranks. Modern military battle order has damn all to do with Roman tactics. You are describing the Romans grounding their spears like pikes. This is highly irregular. What's your source and why do you assume that, if it ever happened, it was a regular occurence. Whether or not you have been nearly killed is neither here nor there. I am fully prepared to believe that you are a very brave man who would never countenance running from the enemy. The plain fact is though that men in battle flee. And in ancient battles they fled well before losing 10% of their strength. The casualty figures speak for themselves.

There is no evidence to suggest that troops who were actually engaged in hand to hand fighting were relieved either. All 'replacement of men in battle' comments can be interpreted in either way. None are clear cut. So we apply Occum's Razor. Which is simpler, or presents fewest problems? As I've banged on about at length there is the physical impossibility of close formed infantry moving forward/backward due to lack of room. So in order to replace, open order must be assumed. We know that battle lines tended to form in close order. Thus replacement occurred during lulls in combat. Problems still exist: how did the lulls occur? I've tried to explain how that might have happened with reference to how men behave in battle. I'd like for someone to expain similarly how they think replacement in close fighting worked. Again, I have pointed out some things that I percieve to be flaws in this reasoning. A rebuttal would be nice.

Goldsworthy has written deveral good books on this. His best is The Roman Army in Battle 100BC-AD200. Much greater depth on the actual mechanics of battle than his Roman Army book which covers more the whole experience of soldiering. He is somewhat critical of amny modern authors, especially military men, who tend to view the Romans an like modern day troops in fancy dress and armed differently or who are trying to prove a general point about warfare (Fuller especially).

Formations are deep for two main reasons: Manoeuver. It is almost impossible to keep order when moving forward in extended line, it also takes long thin lines much more time to change facing or wheel. Also a column can deploy into a thinner line by rear troops advancing, to go from line to column on the same position, troops must withdraw which might damage morale. Disciplined troops can thus form thinner than irregulars Morale. A unit formed eight deep looks more impressive than one three deep. It also feels more 'solid' to the troops forming it. Hence veterans can form thinner than recruits. So trained veterans like Caesar's 'Gallic' legions at Pharsalus could form 3 deep to compensate for their lack of numbers whereas Pompey's more numerous but generally less good troops formed deeper. Equally, freshly raised irregulars would tend to form very deep. Now the Macedonian phalanx was often 16 deep, which is very deep indeed. But this was a very cumbersome formation to manoeuver due to the length of the pikes. Given that it ofen extended its frontage by forming 8 deep, it's greater depth allowed for this. Now the nonsense: It pains me that otherwise intelligent and highly respected historians (I am thinking of Hanson and others) can see no better reason for Greeks to have formed eight deep than to shove each other forward with their shields. A moment's reflection shows that this is highly unlikely. First the evidence rests on statements in the sources that say there was a 'shoving of shields' and there are exhortations to the unit to 'go one step more'. Now there was very likely a shoving of shields between the front rankers of rival formations, in fact that is virtually certain, but if 'pushing' included all ranks shoving forward like a rugby scrum then we must conclude that the front rankers would have the breathcrushed from them in short order. Second, early musket armed troops formed even deeper.Are we to assume that they also resorted to scrumming? Of course not. In fact its only Greek historians who have come up with this theory, yet other nations formed as deep or deeper. It really will not do. Replacing casualties. The winners in ancient battles seldom suffered more than 5% casualties, often less. It is accepted tat most of the losing soldiers troops were slaughtered in the rout. Even if we assume that not all units engaged then a unit taking 10% casualties would almost certainly break and run. If a unit of 80 men is formed 8 deep, and will rout after 8 of its number fall, then one needs less than 8 men to replace casualties. So clearly there is no need to have more than three ranks to allow for men falling out (which is interestingly the absolute minimum depth that ancient troops formed in). See my lengthy postings on 'gutful men' above. Deeper ranks would however allow fresher men to replace tiring front rankers during lulls as in my hypothetical example above.

But how is this physically accomplished? Do you mean that they go intobattle in their open order of six feet per man (that would allow room for ranks to move forward). The only way I can see it being done in contact with the enemy is thus: ABCDEFG 1_2_3_4 _5_6_7_8 where '3' is hurt and 7 reinforces (the letters are attackers and the numbers are the Romans in open order). ABCDEFG 1_2__7_4 _5_63__8 and then some shuffling in the rear. But note that this opens a big gap in the Roman formation into which big 'D' can advance. If you simply assume that another Roman moves forward to prevent that then pretty soon you'll have a solid rank preventing withdrawl. Notice that the legionaries are outnumbered also making their right sides vulnerable to attack. So it seems less likely than the sensible alternative that they formed up 3 feet per man and had to wait until their enemy broke off before the fatigued and injured could be relieved (see lengthy post above).

When we don't know, we try to come up with reasonable theories. Front rankers can only be replaced if incapacitated (ie collapsed on the ground, dying, unconscious or in too great pain to remain on their feet), their rear man can conceivably step forward over them. If 'merely a flesh wound' then he has little option but to hold his ground as best he can because his rear ranker is physically prevented from moving forward as I pointed out earlier. I'd love someone to come up with a better theory though. Any takers?

The mass of men in a Roman legion would be willing enough to serve, and to kill if at an advantage (in pursuit for instance). They would not have our modern morals and many would have few qualms about killing a man who was trying to kill them. It is the aggressiveness and/or confidence that most would lack. One must be both brave and competent if one is to successfully assault another armed man with melee weapons. Even trained and experienced soldiers might well baulk at increasing their own chance of injury by trying to kill an opponent. And I suspect that Caesar, as a competent commander, would seek to inspire by encouragement (and we have many examples of him doing this) rather than by threat of punishment. But as you say, the only time the front rank can have been replenished were in lulls (barring a man stepping forward over a fallen colleague which is not the same thing).

Keegan and Goldsworthy are good on this. For studies of men in battle, the works of Marshall (for the US) and Wintringham (UK) are best. These men were serving soldiers who studied what men in battle actually did. Their findings influence small unit tactics to this day. Human psychology remains stone age. Same for us as the Romans etc. Now cultural attitudes change and we have a veneer of socialisation that abhors violence as entertainment, but now as then nobody wants to get hurt. Once more, a commander would not tell a century to send new men to the front, that job would properly be the centurions (when he did it is the issue). So when Caesar tells us he sent fresh men to relieve the tired and wounded, what are we to believe? That he did the job of the centurions? Or that he did his own job and sent up fresh cohorts (or centuries if he was micro-managing). Instances of the acts of the 'gutful men'. Josephus is quite good on this but Caesar mentions the odd incident too, as do others, not always writing about Romans. Just a few examples. Sabinus and eleven of his comrades (from an auxiliary cohort perhaps 240 strong in action, so perhaps 5% of its strength) are the only ones to mount an assault on a breach in the Antonia fortress at Jerusalem (Josephus VI 54f). Sabinus reached and took the wall alone. Eight survived the unsuccessful attack. All were wounded and brought down by their comrades, indicating that the mass of the cohort was near the action but unwilling to commit until they had seen the results of the assault party of 'gutful men'. Later in the siege of Jerusalem, a centurion seeing a party of Romans retreating in disorder launched a single-handed attack that drove the Jews back in panic. He was unfortunate to slip on smooth flagstones and seeing him fall, the Jews rallied and dispatched him only after a prolonged struggle (Josephus VI 81f). At Carrhae, the Romans harassed by cataphracts: 'Some...found the courage to dash out against their attackers' (Plutarch, Crassus 27). The Persians at Plataea: 'Sometimes singly, sometimes in groups of ten men- perhaps fewer, perhaps more- they fell upon the Spartan line and were cut down' (Herodotus IX 62).

Well virtually any quote where fatigued or hurt troops are being relieved. I agree that they can be interpreted two ways. The first, and most commonly assumed is rear rankers swapping places with their front rankers. Yet this seems physically impossible to achieve. The second is to assume that troops spent much of the battle in very close proximity to the ememy but not actually fighting. Actual burst of fighting would be short and retirements would be as a body, allowing a reinforcing unit to take over. The difficulty with this is merely that it runs counter to the hollywood conception of hand to hand combat. Such withdrawl requires discipline to be done effectively. Hence 'barbarians' would tend to fight fiercely at first as the 'gutful men' (see my post above) amongst them engaged but when they became dispirited, orderly withdrawal would be nigh impossible and the rout. Drilled troops could withdraw as a body, requiring steadiness but if their foes were tiring after a few minutes of combat and reluctant to follow up then one can see how it might be achieved. To be fair though it is possible that if units met only in very close proximity one might get a situation like this: 80 Gauls, formed about eight deep, including 12 'gutful men' engage a century of 48 men (8 'gutfuls') formed four deep. The unit frontages as they face each other are roughly equal, 12 across. The Gauls charge, their heros leading the way and their battle line becoming slightly disordered. The Romans throw their pila, causing further disorder in the Gauls (the heros tending to push on, the rest tending to lag). Let us assume that three pila cause wounds sufficient to disable and that the 'heros' suffer disproportionately (being in the front rank, 2 of them go down). The Romans now counter charge, keeping better order but moving more slowly. Let us now assume that we have ten Gallic 'heros' coming up against the Roman line but that the pila charge has meant that they come raggedly. The other Gauls see that the Romans have not fled precipitately and so slow to a halt, encouraging their mates with shouts and throwing the odd javelin. Let us now assume that the Romans hold. Two of their front rankers are disabled and a couple more sustain minor wounds. In return they bring down another two Gauls. The men standing behind the fallen Romans move forward and stand above them to prevent the Gauls breaching the formation. The two less seriously wounded men hang in there, fighting defensively. Now if we assume that the 'gutful' Romans are more evenly distributed in the ranks then there would be say four in the front rank of whom we will count one as slightly wounded. So we now have 8 Romans, three fighting aggressively and five holding their own against eigt Gauls who are laying about them with a will. After a few minutes the Gauls tire (all that flailing of swords). The Romans are also tiring but to a lesser extent. Another Roman has been brought down and two more slightly wounded. Two Gauls have sustained minor wounds. Now its 8 Romans (let's say two fighting aggressively) against 6 Gauls (the two wounded retiring (they can do this as the Romans can't follow up without breaking formation. The Gaullic gutfuls have been reduced by 50% and are now effectively outnumbered. The Roman front rank is still at full strength and their 8 gutfuls are reduced to 6 (only 25%). Total losses thus far are 5 gauls disabled (4 heros) and 2 heros slightly wounded (a couple of the back markers might have been hurt by the pila too so we'll say 5 down and 4 hurt. The Romans have 3 down and 4 hurt. At this point, the tiring Gauls break off combat and run back to the rest of their unit which, seeing them withdraw, retires swiftly about 50 paces. This gives the Romans time to replace the slightly wounded front rankers and toget their disabled behind the unit (they don't pursue as they have been ordered to hold their ground so as not to expose their flanks. The front rank is now comprised of fresh men (except the centurion who holds his place) and will contain as many reliable men as it did before. If the Gauls come again, they'll only have 6 heros to lead the way and the Romans (though reduced in numbers, will still be fighting 8 wide and in 3 ranks. It's unlikely that that Gallic unit will charge again but if it does it will likely be no more successful. Notice the Romans could probably hold at least one more charge by an entirely fresh Gallic warband. Now all the above is merely hypothesis. But it would allow for replacement 'in combat' (the unit hasn't been relieved but replaced its front rank after the Gauls withdrew.

The first quote agrees with me, as you point out. The second refers to a naval action. It is unclear to me whether these men are engaged in close combat or throwing missiles. In any event they are fighting across a physical barrier which would allow retirement of a soldier and his reliever to gain position before an opponent could cross over. Troops defending an obstacle such as a wooden pallisade or a tower are not in formation. Reinforcements to replace the injured or fatigued... Labienus is doing this. He is a general and responsible for the movement of cohorts, perhaps even centuries. He's not talking about the replacement of men actually engaged in close fighting. Fresh cohorts or centuries would replace those that had seen fighting. But until I have explained to me a reasonable mechanism that would allow front rankers of close order foot to be replaced whilst actually fighting or have unequivocal evidence presented that this did happen (which I do not believe exists, though it may, one can hope...) then I will maintain that it is far more reasonable to assume that lulls in the fighting would allow replacement, whether by rear rankers replacing the front or by wholesale replacement of a fatigued unit. Troops in combat tire. Stress wears them down even if they're not actually being engaged. Also studies of units in WWII (by both US and UK officers tell us that even in the best units, only about 25% of the men actually fight, as opposed to merely stay alive. Fewer in non elite troops. A unit will waver and need replaced because these 'gutful men' (as the British army called them) tire, lose heart, and/or take casualties. Casualties will be disproportionate from this group also. So as the better men get fatigued, the whole unit suffers. One might argue that the Roman soldier was somehow hardier than a US paratrooper or UK regular longserviceman. But as men's natures has not changed it seems likely that it still holds good. Look at the high numbers of casualties in the centurionate. Also there are numerous examples in the literature to bear this out. But I digress. The long and the short of it is that for a whole number of reasons it is very unlikely that rear rankers replaced front rank men (unless perhaps they were killed or incapacitated). And the best reason is the one I first stated: it seems physically impossible for a man just under two feet wide (allowing for shield and armour) to pass through a gap one and a half feet wide whilst his comrade tries to fall back through a similarly impossibe gap...