Furius Venator

Well the Celts seldom attacked walled cities. But their lack of seige activity is likely more due to their social structure and its inability to sustain field armies except in times of extreme crisis. At Cicero's camp, the Celts didn't use captured equipment, they constructed it themselves with aid from POWS and deserters. At Alesia the Gauls 'prepared a great quantity of fascines, ladders and grappling hooks' (Civil War VII 81). Vercingetorix 'sallied with fascines, poles, sapper's huts, grappling hooks and other implements (ibid VII 84). Now Caesar's defences at Alesia were impressive (as were Cicero's in his winter camp, the winter camps were considerably better fortifed than the marching camps). Quite clearly the Gauls are capable of conducting offensive siege operations when necessary. The evidence is in Caesar. It is not lack of ability that prevented them from assaulting towns but lack of opportunity. Sensibly they attacked Caesar's armies in Gaul, not allied townships and they lacked the organisation to maintain a field army for long enough to invade Italy. Also there is evidence on Trajan's column of the Dacians using siege equipment. If you really want me to I'll dig out some references.

From a practical point of view, it's actually irrelevant whether the pilum bent or not. Connolly says it couldn't be extracted from the shield so it doesn't need to bend to render the shield useless. Connolly's idea of the Roman soldier fighting in a very low crouch is rather unlikely and challenged by Goldsworthy in 'The Roman Army at War 100 BC- AD 200'. Connolly is an excellent author and an authority on ancient weapons. He does however tend to go a bit over the top with his weapon based analysis, even going so far as to claim that different shapes of gladius were used in different ways! The reinforced helmets were to protect against downward cuts. It is not necessary to be in a low crouch to be struck on the head!

I see what you are saying but I came away from the book with a strong sense of how the leadership operated at all levels. I don't think that the lack of a chapter devoted specifically to low level leadership is too much of a problem. As to training, on reflection I think you're correct. A second appendix at the very least

I suspect that a major problem is that there is virtually no evidence as to how the low level leadership operated. We can only assume it was akin to the 'middle ground' and/or 'leading by example. The evidence is overwhelmingly 'leading by example' but is hardly conclusive. Hence much of a junior leader section would be mere repetition. Training would perhaps warrant a section to itself I grant you. But given that he's concentrating on how the legion fought, it's a reasonable omission

The middle level of leadership either operates as the general (but for a section of the army) or commands a unit (and so is dealt with in the 'unit', and to an extent the 'individual' sections). Individaul centurions come across as leaders by example. The Pilus Prior as cohort commander could act in two ways: either by inspirational example as other centurions did or by direction of the cohort from immediately behind engaged units (exactly as Goldsworthy describes in the 'general' scetion. Now I grant you it's not brought out explicitly but it's there nonetheless.

Marcus Furius Camillus (446- 365 BC) Dictator five times, four triumphs, held the office of Censor in403BC. Given the title 'Second Founder of Rome'. Altogether, a class act.

From the lips of Caesar himself (describing the seige of Cicero's Camp) ...the Nervii surrounded the camp with a rampart ten feet high and a trench fifteen feet wide...in less than three hours they completed a fortified line three miles in circumference and during the next few days...[erected] towers... and [made] grappling hooks and sappers huts' Gallic War V 43. Now they did this with the aid of Roman deserters and POWs but they were clearly capable of conducting sieges by 53BC. Elsewhere he mentions the timber and stone constructed walls that were immune to Roman rams. Really, Caesaer is a mine of information on all this.

It's strange that none of the surviving military manuals really discuss the appointment of officers.

Geopolitics had nothing to do with Caesar's campaigns in Gaul. He fought for his own political prestige and political survival. His legates and tribunes for their own political advancement. His men fought because they were (relatively) long service professionals and had little choice. The booty on offer was a nice bonus for them and hekped keep morale high. Virgil: who is better than Goldsworthy on the legions? I've certainly never come across anyone. Out of interest, what would you say he gets wrong?

In fact the Primus Pilus seems to have risen from the ranks only rarely, more often having entered the army as a centurion. This of course would still mean he had plentiful experience. Again, the evidence is mainly Imperial and does not really exist in enough quantity to be dogmatic about it.

It's certainly fashionable to assume that the centurians were largely ex-rankers. Rather surprisingly though, very little evidence supports this. Under the empire, only a few centurion's tombstones refer to previous experience and there is plenty of evidence from a wide variety of sources to suggest that many were 'directly commissioned'. That is not to say that the majority of centurions were not former rankers, only that what little evidence exists actually indicates the opposite! (For the empire at least).

Easily the best. It's very much a modern approach to military history. If you like your neat battle narratives and battle diagrams then you won't find it here. What you will find is the single best attempt to date to define exactly how a Roman army fought. Really, it's Keegan's Face of Battle but applied to the Roman army. The writing style's not 'racy' but very informative and clear. One to read and reread. Worth every penny. Almost certainly this never happened, or was extremely rare. Greek infantry were untrained in the use of the sword and their formation with overlapping shields would have restricted its utility to the point of uselessness. It was certainly used once fromations had broken and one side was in rout but very rarely, if ever, until then. I can find only one ancient reference to swords being used by troops in phalanx and that is in Homer! Thucydides, Xenephon, Herodotos etc never mention its use in close combat between formed phalanxes. The manuals are very clear on the lack of training also.

On the pirates: In many ways the Romans were torn: the pirates provided an excellent source of slave labour but they disrupted trade and captured and either ransomed or killed Roman citizens. So it's not as simple as saying 'the senate tolerated the pirates because...' or 'the equites colluded with the pirates because...'. Imagine a senator who owns vast tracts of land which he has cultivated for some labour intensive activity, owns a gladiatorial school and has a sideline in educating the children of slaves and then selling them on. He's not keen to see the price of slaves rise at all. He makes a great deal of money from a supply of cheap slave labour so tries to undermine anti-pirate legislation. But then his son is captured whilst returning from Athens. The pirates don't even bother to hold him for ransom but turf him over the side. Now the senator has a personal vendetta against the pirates and so changes his attitude in the senate. It seems to me that the pirates simply grew too big for their boots. Rome would tolerate their activities whilst they were on a relatively minor scale but burning a Roman fleet at Ostia, capturing and ransoming prominent Romans (both Caesar and Clodius were held by pirates for a time) and killing lesser citizens and (above all) interfering with the all important flow of grain led to overwhelming numbers of politicians willing to take action and force through anti-pirate legislation

Goldsworthy's 'The Roman Army ast War 100 BC-AD 200' probably provides the definitive reasons for Roman superiority. The superiority of their training and the flexibility of their units (of all sizes) are what mainly account for their success.

But of course the troops WERE paid by the state. After deductions for living expenses and equipment they probably didn't see much money but throughout the Republic the common soldiers received state pay. They made their money from their share of booty handed out by their general and their general was also responsible for their donative (be it land or whatever) upon discharge.

Infanticide was almost certainly common during the entire Roman period, especially in rural areas. In fact it was still practised in remote rural areas of the UK in the early twentieth century. It is a natural, if repugnant, method of 'birth control' and has almost certainly been used in every human society. Of course in a sense we still practise infanticide today but in a tightly regulated way (abortion).

Training undoubtedly. The post Marian army had the colossal advantage over its opponents of being made up of well trained long service professionals. Good training is a (the?) key element in morale.