caldrail

Firstly, the 'knight' evolved for social reasons, not military, and it can claim descendancy from Roman culture. The adoption of heavier armour would have occured much earlier had the Romans suitable horses strong enough to carry the extra weight without disadvantage - remember that ancient cavalry action was highly fluid and depended absolutely on mobility - cavalry were very concious of wearing out their horses first. Horses are not robotic machines. Secondly - any horseman has 'shock' value, and unfortunately the idea that armoured cavalry collided with infantry at full gallop is hilarious. Whilst it would result in a lot of dead and injured soldiers, it would bring the horse down and the rider with it. Accounts of medieval melee describe horsemen 'pushing' into formations, not colliding with them. Lances were used in a joust-like manner against opposing cavalry who could easily make room for the enemy to pass through at speed (thus the game of 'jousting' in the first place). Also we need to remember that trained or not, a horse is a very nervous animal that doesn't care too much for hurting itself. Should a horse perceive a block of enemy infantry as an unavoidable barrier, it will rapidly come to the decision to stop dead, and the man riding it usually falls off. Thirdly, Oman's description of the empires 'collapse' is pretty standard but ignores the reality that the attacks on the empire were not to destroy it, but to steal from it, and indeed when the last western caesar was ordered off his throne the empire was not destroyed but subject to a barbarian takeover (although the empire did not survive as a single political entity) Fourthly, the late Roman infantry were not quite what we popularly imagine, and in fact the prototype for the middle ages was already developing. They were becoming typical ancient/medieval infantry with their glory days behind them, although it's al;so true that the older heavy infantry were no longer the best solution to the empires military needs any more. Vegetius tells the strength and substance of the legion had gone in his day. Zosimus would later pour scorn on those late empire soldiers, referring to homosexual practises, effeminancy, cowardice, and we also see in Marcellinus a considerable reluctance of the legions to fight at all, with a culture of feathering your own nest among the rank and file. Fifth - the legions of the late empire were well aware of the increasing ascendancy of cavalry which allowed barbarian raids to penetrate far into the empires territory. That was why they split the legions into two classifications. One to guard the borders, another to react and obstruct the threat on home ground. This introduced a complexity into military defence that forced the Romans to develope a simple 'army' organisation above that of the legion, in order to coordinate efforts, but politically this was never going to work successfully in an empire that was increasingly less willing to remain actively part of the whole because the distinction between civilian and military in senior positions was still not seperated thus politics and war were all part of the same deal. In any case, the added complexity did not result in improved coordination because the imperial network was fragmented and more difficult to administer.

I don't believe the Romans ever named the classes as such, and the source that describes does so retrospectively, suggesting an older form of organisation that had become blurred and disused. Whilst the information clearly is factual (at least as far as our Roman author was concerned), we should be careful of drawing too many conclusions from it. Were these classes fixed or mutable? Did a person move from one to the other based on current fortune or was his place defined at some point regardless? I know that the reference to republican legions is based on these categories but again I think it's too simplistic to simply state these as 'units' of organisation, especially since they were civil in nature and represent a very cogent idaea in Roman society that all citizens must be prepared to defend their land against aggressors according to their means.

Those examples are out of context. During the civil war you would expect a Roman politician aiming to be victorious to have a hands on approach - that was par for the course with the Roman upper classes - military service wasn't mandatory but it provided considerable credibility - and always had. During the earlier republic it wasn't unknown for senators to rip open a toga to reveal a war wound. "Look! I have fought for Rome!", which we can interpret as a demand for respect. Mind you, senators were a bit demonstrative during their speeches, almost theatrical performances we may well amusing today. But back to the proxy business - that was what a legionary legate was. A senior Roman in charge of armed men. As for the system breaking down, well, it was a bit wobbly now and then.

Control of the legions was done by proxy. Legates were representing the authority of the state and the upper class. It is true that making sure these men stayed on side was a major concern. What is also true was that politics in the city of Rome were aimed at grabbing a share of both personal power and profit. Rome was an intensely competitive state - politics was no different.

Converting costs into modern currency is for me a non-starter. The actual value of things is often relative, and what we really need to know is not how much an ancient coin is worth in todays money, but how much that sword would have cost the warrior in terms of his own income.

Your professor cannot possibly be right. A sword that expensive would have made the weapon unavailable to the common warrior. That doesn't mean a noble wouldn't pay for a fine sword costing that much (or more), but rather that swords were often cheaper. The 'fighting class'? Does he mean the chivalric classes? Common people fought too, of course, although they never had the same affinity for fighting that the upper classes revelled in. The cost of a sword was not the originating factor in any case - it was a societal development based around the horse and land ownership, evolving from Roman and Germanic culture, as swords were used by all classes and could not therefore be a defining factor.

Jeez, Ursus... I can see you liked it but good grief it was the most forgettable film ever. Sorry, what were we talking about?

You will find that a majority of those same young men aren't all that expert at military history either. Some of them are very knowledgable - but that's not the same thing. It's a natural instinct for youngsters to learn endless facts and information, and to readily identify with violence or those forces employing it, but often they lack the maturity or worldliness to appreciate why these conflicts occur and also the more human aspects of them. I would point out that after the economy had recovered from the stockmarket crashes of the late twenties the mood was more bouyant. Nations were deveopling again and a sense that things were possibkle had returned, not just in Germany. By the time of Chamberlains visit to Germany many people had woken up to the possibility that Hitler was not going to stop. Although some, especially in America, had lauded Hitler for bringing Germany out of the mud and restoring it to a vibrant and confident nation, there were plenty who recognised that all was not well, particularly since jews were being forced to emigrate at that time and brought with them stories of what was actually going on. There was clearly a general preparation for possible German aggression by 1938. War requires leadership. Even in situations when another nation is hated, nothing much beyond angry demonstrations will occur, as populations do not go to war without someone to tell them to (the phenomenon of the 'terrorist' has developed from victorian times but evven them represents a minority of of individuals who desire a form of unofficial action). Churchill was not well liked in British circles - he was biewed (correctly) as something of a loose cannon, an adventurer, whose schemes had already cost Britain heavily. He was however a figure that was able to lead a nation in war, and Chamberlain was not The Romans tell us that too. Vegetius sighs and says the 'strength and substance of the legions has gone'. Zosimus accuses them of effeminancy and homosexual practises. At face value this would agree with your young men's views although I accept the situation is more complex, as for instance Sebastianus selected a corps of keen recruits to lead his crack raiding formations ahead of Valen's column. Successfully too. Yet it was Roman prosperity that attracted the Germans across the frontier in the first place. It's well known that in some aspects the empire was doing okay in terms of agriculture and so forth. The financial problems were due to increasing bureaucracy and inefficiency, and a desire from common people to avoid tax and military service. I would point out that Caesar was a rarity as an individual, combining charisma and adventurous spirit, who took initiaitive for himself. The Roman state preferred safe and cautious commanders to avoid military disaster and offset the possibility that these generals would rebel and mount a coup, which I would also point out was what Caesar did.

By and large cavalry charge at infantry to 'break' their formation in terms of morale and commitment rather than actually collide (horses are animals too and don't like getting hurt, though they are somewhat heavier than us and if you study footage from those police video tv shows, clearly people have a natural tendency to want to back off from an advancing horse, and couldn't do much if they decided otherwise). In other words, a cavalry attack aims to frighten the infantry and push into their ranks rather than collide, which would almost certainly bring down the horse and render the whole thing rather pointless from the cavalry point of view. This is especially true of the ancient era when horses were valued for mobility and were more expensive anyway, never mind relative rarity and social exclusivity. The idea of a couched lance attack is not typical of the period (the shorter lances were used overhand in stabbing attacks back in Roman times) and in any case, such attacks were primarily against opposing cavalry even in later periods (hence the medieval jousting lists) because a horse at speed would pass through the opposing formation, which wasn't possible with compacted infantry.

1)whether you feel that the Roman oligarchy/republic was worth saving The Roman oligarchy was still there in the Empire but under new management. If however do you mean was it worth putting back in charge, the answer is probably no, because they were no less self-serving than the Caesars who ordered them around, and in any case, since Julius Caesar had proven that autocratic power was possible, that there would always be ambitious members among them waiting to grab sole power in some way. 2)whether it was possible, anyway, to save it As a ruling concern? It very nearly resumed control on a number of occaisions and some changes of Caesar were inspired by senatorial instigation. In fact, I would say that the julio-claudian era was a period of transition between oligarchial and autocratic power. Augustus was a sly dictator who wrested power out of their hands. Until Nero was declared 'Enemy of the State' and committed suicide, the Senate was working toward running the empire again right under the noses of the Caesars, though in fairness, some Caesars were quite happy for the assistance. 3)had you been there, at the time, what actions you would have taken to save it Create a constitution which established succession and the legal limits for control of the empire. The idea that a man could be Dictator For Life (as the Caesars were) would be made illegal and fixed term offices re-introduced.

Normally in ancient battles cavalry initially faced each other off to settle who controlled the flanks - not all battles followed this conventional wisdom. Against each other they would often be seen riding back and forth, remaining mobile, and only closing in for melee to force the issue. In terms of action against infantry, this was generally reserved for harassment attacks (in which the horsemen threaten the infantry and lob volleys of spears) or pursuing the hapless losers of a melee (and it was a fortunate infantryman who got away unscathed). If the flanks were decided an attack from the side or rear was possible. The sort of frontal cavalry charge against infantry we normally think of was very rare in ancient times, although becoming an accepted practice toward the end of the empire with the regular use of heavy cavalry, and even then, was not entirely successful until medieval times capitalised on the rarity of professional infantry.

This practice was developed to allow the soldier to draw his sword in tight formation without bumping the guy next to him, bearing in mind he was holding a shield (a square/rectangular, elongated hexagonal, or oval scutum) and thus could foul the sword when the soldier least expected it. With a short blade it remains practicable, and note that centurions wore their swords on the left side.

The biggest issue with AA was targeting. It wasn't easy to get shells at the right point although the Germans became quite skilled at it. However, AA was clearly not bringing down enough allied aeroplanes over Europe and so the Germans began experimenting with ground-to-air missiles. They had a number of projects on the go but the targeting problem remained the same.

Lots of red-heads in Britain, although many would have whitened and spiked their hair.

Not quite. You need to go back a few years for that. But the day/month is correct. Hic.

Yet the appearance of germans in Rome inspired a fashion for blonde wigs, suggesting that blonde hair is mostly an imperial import both real or imitation. Also women are known to have dyed their hair - there's a letter from one Roman husband giving his wife the benefit of his opinion after frequent re-colouring caused her to go bald.

It doesn't, and the pike wielding soldier would know that, although he wouldn't be immune to the normal sensations of standing there in front of a cavalry charge. A lot depends on what the horses sees. If it believes it can barge past a few individuals of lesser stature, sort like us really, then a trained horse can be urged to do so. If it perceives the infantry unit ahead as a big solid barrier - such as a compact mass of frightened guys behind a shield wall - the horse will in all probability refuse and deliver the hapless rider in front of the enemy unceremoniously if he's not quick witted or skilled enough. No sensible rider in the world is going to impale his mount on a stick in any case. Realise that a cavalry charge isn't about impact, it's about playing chicken. Who will give way first? Will the infantry soil their underwear and 'break', or will the rider wheel away at the last minute? In warfare cavalry does not impact upon formed infantry in defence if they have reasonable means to do so. It will however exploit a weaker formation and woe betide any infantryman who gives a cavalryman enough room to get into the formation, countered by the possibility that the infantry could unhorse the rider (in which case he generally doesn't live long, armour or not)

This is an intersting point. Once, many years ago, I was at a race meeting at Hexham and as the horses piled down the finishing straight, I leaned out to take a good look (safely, mind you). I was struck by the sensation of weight coming at me. The ground was vibrating, the hooves were pounding audibly, and the sense of unswervable purpose in the riders came across. had they been wielding weaponry, it would have been a very daunting experience.

That would depend on how much interaction with natives taking place. I don't know anything about the local population of natives there, but where there any in the area?

A breach in the wall or gate is a signficant moment in that it allows enemy troops into the fortification. That does not mean the defenders can't repel them, only that they are under pressure and their defenses are weaker for that breach from that point. The usual defensive tactic is to withdraw to inner defences which is often the case with fortifications. Many castles have an inner bailey which is an extra gate to be breached (the gates being usually the easiest point of forced entry). The defenders at Masada built crude inner defences, consisting of stone and timber layers, knowing full well the Roman legions would eventually breach the wall. However, since the defenders will eventually succumb to dehydration, disease, starvation, and poor morale, a well timed assault has every chance of success.

He doesn't hate religion, he just doesn't believe it has any intellectual value. I do note however that he seems to assume that religion is doomed for the very reason he refuses it, ignoring that for many religion is an important part of their lives and may indeed be a necessary part of the human psyche irrespective of which relgion you ascribe to.

Sorry, I wouldn't know where to find it. I only saw the program by chance.

Perhaps, but these things are relative given the different means of achieving the casualty rate. It takes a certain amount of time to approach, fight, and slay/overcome an opponent. Direct fire weapons are much faster in reaching their objective even with greater distances, and given the modern ability to compound the effect with mechanical repetition at a high rate, the conclusion is obvious. Therefore the result at Cannae has to be seen as the result of manual attrition as opposed to mechanical or automatic attrition.

Richard Dawkins is currently presenting a series on life after God. He uncovered interesting statistical research that shows moral behaviour compared between religious and non-religious people is hardly different, only the religious people feel shame about it. Strong religion does not like independent thought, because intellectualism questions standard teaching. We see the same tendencies in political regimes too. As I said, the strictness of religion goes hand in hand with the strictness of society.

The length of service was already defined. However we know that legions in Pannonia during the reign of Augustus had kept men on for thirty or forty years plus active reserve duty, thus requiring of those men a life long service, which was not standard policy and hadn't been since Marius brought standing armies in being. Tacitus further hints that such things weren't exceptional. The issue might have a number of causes relating to recruitment and training, which far from being 'the best ever' as is usually stated, were not at an all time peak in Illyria at least. The issue of taking out the commander is something we see where a soldier has the option to target him, so this has become particularly heightened in the firearm era, especially after aimed fire began to dominate group fire (which was not well aimed to begin with, and considering the musket was too inaccurate, often pointless). Note that ancient missile weapons, arrows, javelins, sling stones etc, all had the potential for aimed fire if the user was skilled, but that the use en masse tended to make aimed fire a secondary consideration. In other words, fighting hand to hand in a large formation makes it unlikely that the commander was at any more risk than anyone else despite obvious recognition. Since battlefield commanders only started to become anonymous in the reign of the rifle, we can see historical evidence for this. There is ione example of aimed fire at a commander that I can think of relating to the ancient world, though I cannot vouch for historical fidelity. In one battle, Julius Caesar ordered his men to advance upon the enemy Romans. They refused to budge, being somewhat exhausted and demoralised under campaign conditions. Caesar was furious. He demanded obedience. He threatened them with dire punishment if they didn't obey. He swore at them, describing them as poofs. No-one moved. Eventually Caesar grabbed a shield from the nearest legionary, drew his sword, and strode down the hill toward the enemy line, who clearly could not believe their luck. A volley of pila was aimed at him. Caesar stepped aside from some, took others on the shield (which I imagine he was unable to hold up further). In the silence that followed, Caesar beckoned his troops to follow him into battle - and they did.