Aurelius

Oops, I forgot to answer the 'army size' question. I believe the army also increased several times from Claudius down to the Severi. In the Augustan era, I believe the army was comprised of 23 legions, then it was increased by Domitian by 26, then Septimius Severus increased the number to 31. The auxiliaries were also increased similarly, probably more. I would like to think that an increase in the army would mean additional financial and logistical considerations, but somehow the emperors and the imperial bureaucracy managed it quite effectively. Though, I am not sure if the numbers were always up to date, for the most part of its existence, the legions and the auxiliaries were often at half-strength or slightly above that number. I am also tempted to suggest that an increase in army size would have 'solved' some of its limitations, though by careful consideration I am led to believe that the romans valued the calibre of their troops rather than their quantity. It would be also quite problematic and unwieldy for an emperor to effectively control a large army. Also, think about the cost of supporting the legions. Most of the Empire's revenues would have gone to financing the army, not to mention the annual/periodic donatives given y emperors at their ascension or at special occasions. Without careful financial and logistical consideration, the Empire's revenues would have been consumed unnecessarily by the army. To digress further, I think it was Vegetius who said that the strength of an army lies not in its numbers but in its discipline and the bond between soldiers.

To Publius Nonius Severus, With regards to your first question, in my essay I placed the concept of the frontier system as one of many significant limitations of the roman army c. 1st and 2nd centuries AD. I'm not suggesting that the romans were completely wrong about the structure of the frontier system. I'm pointing to the evidence of virtually no reserves behind the lines of fortifications in the major frontiers of the roman empire. It must be remembered that I'm ascribing to the conditions of both the empire and the army that prevailed during the so-called Principate, the period from Augustan ascendancy to the Third-century crisis. In my analysis of the sources, there seemed to be only slightly limited 'reserves' stationed behind the frontiers during this period. What mention of reserves are there mainly include the emperor's Praetorian Guard, Imperial Germanic bodyguard and some 'vexillationes' or detachments from the legions on the frontier. Delbruck sees this as a major deficiency in the frontier system, though he was not totally against the system. We must also consider the physical distances that traversed the breadth of the empire and the locations in which, we believe, the legions were stationed. It should be remembered that the frontiers were not totally fixed but fluid, reflecting geo-political situations around and within the empire, and that Rome had buffer states outside the frontiers. But even with its discipline, tough training and forced marches, the army could not possibly singly cope up with concentrated or simultaneous penetrations of the frontiers. Add to the equation, volatile political situations within, the distance of the executive centre of the empire to its major frontiers, the odd barbarian migration or invasion, and the probable ambitious streak of major army commanders, we would be amazed how the system even managed to survive for a considerably long period, more so how it even worked efficiently, to a degree, in the first place. As to the questions of central reserves, multiple reserves or enlarging the size of the army, I would say that the romans thought over these issues quite substantially and managed to adapt their army systems through the centuries, different dynasties and administrations, and varied external and internal threats. We should always remember that the Roman army was not a static or merely reactive entity, it was frequently changing and adapting new ideas, though more so in some periods than others. Delbruck suggests that the some 9,000 strong contingent of the praetorian Guard, not to mention the imperial germanic bodyguard of the emperor, was not suitable enough to act as a central reserve. Other historians argue that a larger number of about 10,000 strong contingents be placed at strongpoints and act as multiple reserves to several frontiers in the empire. Though i am not inclined to adopt a specific scholar's idea as the ultimate suggestion, simply because it is hard to judge military matters when sitting in an armchair and not actually experiencing the strategic difficutlies of defending a vast empire with only less than one percent of that same empire's population acting as armed forces. It is not only the question of numbers but the disposition of possible roman army reserves that merit attention from different scholars. As the 'number' suggestion, different theories abound as to the geographical consideration of these reserves. As Delbruck, Dobson, and Tomlin suggest, any central reserves based in Rome would have been virtually useless because they were far away from any frontier and were less likely to be mobilised. They mostly suggest different 'centres' or base of operations coinciding with the geographical layout of the empire. From what I can synthesise, they often suggest two bases of reserves for the Rhine; three or four for the Danube; two for the armenian frontier; one or two for the Syrian frontier, one in Egypt and North Africa--with one base having about 5000-6000 men and additional detachments of auxiliaries. Though it must be remembered that these were theoretical calculations and different scholars also suggested varying positions for these 'bases', usually in chokepoints or important cities. Even with our gift of hindsight, I would state that the romans did eventually pursue the "line of thinking" of employing multiple reserves often suggested by scholars. This is evident in the change in the army system during and after the third-century Crisis in the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine, but more importantly the evolutionary struggles of Aurelian and Gratian. Though we are often deluded to think that the crisis faced by the Romans after the Severi was degrading, it brought about several significant changes that strengthened the Roman Empire for it to continue to exist and greatly improved its army system. I would also state that it was this formative period in rome's history that historians often overlook and usually associate with endemic civil strife and political instability. Military Historians also often fall into the trap of identifying the change in military equipment and tactics as sign of further degradation, most notably the abandoning of the lorica segmentata for the lorica hamata, the longer spatha for the gladius, and so on. We must always remember that romans were pragmatic when it came to military affairs and were able to adapt effectively to military challenges, even to go further as to adopting their enemies' tactics or equipment when they deem it much applicable. Though military strategy varied throughout the existence of the Roman Empire, it was most often a primarily defensive one, using calculated aggression to either annihilate or subdue any potential threat into total submission. The perpetual civil wars and the increasing pressure of barbarian strength and interests on the frontiers gradually made the Romans alter their military system, and in consequence bringing about political change. By sheer accident or through prudence, they realised that the empire could not be defended or maintained by a single imperial army or power base effectively dividing the defence and administration of several parts of the empire (as in Postumus' gallic empire and Odenathus' Palmyrene empire). This phenomenon, combined with constant warfare, made possible the creation of large, Mobile, quick reponse, reserve units stationed behind the frontiers and less substantial frontier units. The penetrations of barbarians across the frontier,such as the Marcommani and the Quadi, which were virtually large marauding parties instead of proper army units, forced the empire to maintain a flexible frontier because it was nigh impossible to intercept every barbarian raiding party, but also to include a quick retaliatory response to any armed intrusion. Thus, the origins of the reformed army system of the roman empire, with its Comitatenses and Limitanei under Diocletian and Constantine stem from the experimentation and actual experience of the third century emperors, legates, usurpers, and their armies. This military change was also reflective and part of the broader political change of the empire, which was divided into 4 parts during Diocletian's tetrachy and later formalised into the western and eastern empires. Now the question is, how could the early imperial armies and emperors fail to adopt this concept of multiple strategic reserves and consequently, a flexible frontier system. In all honesty, it would be quite difficult to wholly answer the question as it is based on variable but interconnected factors. But in my opinion, the answer lies in the combination of the political ideology of the Principate, the design of the empire's power structure, and its military applications and ramifications, and the considerable influence and power of the army itself. As it is seen in most sources of my bibliography, the position of the Princeps was a precarious one, as it was acquired through a most unconstitutional situation that was only later legitimised by Augustus through the Senate. The real basis of the emperor's power was the crucial support of the army. It was this factor that played out in favour of the Senate's approval of Augustan 'monarchy'. Woe betide the Imperator who forgot to reward his troops and thereby procure his support, as it is seen in the case of Nero and the year of the four Emperors. As an aside, Claudius used this concept to his advantage in directing military energies toward his invasion of Britain and thereby strengthening his position. The emperor's precarious situation also explains how the emperors of the Principate jealously guarded the support of the troops and would not permit any successful general to become popular and to gain support and establish a local power base. (e.g. Nero's recall of Corbulo, and Domitian's recall of Agricola). The emperors were also acutely aware of the armies great potential for making or breaking emperors and thus stationed the armies away from the cores of the provinces and out into the frontiers to reduce contact with political struggles and outside influences. The political ideology of the principate also dictated that all military endeavours and triumphs should only be attributed to the emperor and the imperial family itself. These circumstances created a considerably alienated army stationed in the frontiers that stifled any potential opposition to the imperial personage. Also, the emperors were forced by necessity to disperse popular commanders and recall them, if possible, thus effectively eliminating any circumstance for the formation of large reserve armies under single individuals, who might become popular and powerful enough to usurp the imperial position. This situation changed however, when armies were largely drawn from the same provinces leading to increasing 'Sectionalism' and several legates such as Galba, Vespasian, or Septimius Severus became more permanent commanders of large army groups, which created circumstances leading to the constant usurpation of imperial power. In conclusion, I believe that the reserve system was 'overlooked' simply because it jeopardised the already insecure position of the Emperor and because it could possibly undermine the contemporary power structure and political ideology of the Principate. Though I would rather say that this explanation requires more depth, which I cannot at the moment provide, and that there also other notable factors to be considered, such as the absence of any large, impending outside threat during much of this period in which to test the frontier system's efficiency (with the exception of Parthian aggression). I hope I have answered your enquiries P.N. Severus, and thank you once again for your salutations. I will answer M. Porcius Cato's questions next when i have the time. Until then, cheers, Aurelius

Salve to all of you, Firstly, I would like to apologise for not being able to reply quickly to your enquiries about my essay. I have been literally bogged down with work and studies so as to prevent me from responding to any forum for the past month. Secondly, I would also like to thank you for your appreciation of my work and the critical questions you have posed. Though it may be a finished product, my work certainly has some weak points in which there is limited support for my argument and some which I haven't elaborated completely. Thirdly, I will answer all of your enquiries in due time,even though if my answers are a bit late in the giving. Once again, sorry for the delay, i will try to remedy it to the best of my abilities, and thank you.

Congratulations to everyone, especially Augusta and Publius Nonius Severus. I honestly haven't received any news about the History Writing Contest up until today when I was offered a break from my now hectic schedule. I want to say 'thank you' to all the judges for appraising my work and for the rewards given, I never expected to even be a runner-up with all the fine academic discussions. I look forward to reading some, if not all, the entries if Time would not be so cruel as to give me some breathing space. Thank you once again, especially for the donation of the prize funds. I wish this contest would expand the horizons of this already great site and realise its true potential--For the glory of the Senate and the people of UNRV!

I have to differ with some of you in several points about the factors that affected the alledged 'fall of Rome'. Firstly, I have read from other sources, including Heather's 'The Fall of The Roman Empire', that the climate which persisted in the Mediterranean during the period of Roman collapse remained relatively unchanged up until the little Ice Age during the middle ages, only with the exception of the disappearance of some fauna. Therefore, I believe that climate change is not a feasible explanation for Rome's demise. In starkingly blatant contrast, strong archaeological evidence of agricultural intensification and a blossoming population in both halves of the Later Roman Empire(I believe one of the archaeologists was a Frenchman named Goffart, cited by Peter Heather), that leads me to doubt the idea that the Western Empire was overthrown solely by environmental/resource mismanagement. Though, i would like to learn more about the evidence some of you cited about resource depletion in Gaul, Spain, and Egypt. Secondly,I believe the argument that the barbarization of the army led to the decline and fall of Rome is utter rubbish. 'Barbarization' occured even during the republic, as half of the consular armies were composed of 'socci' or allies, many of non-Italian origin. So-called 'barbarians' had been always drafted and recruited into Roman armies for their valour and their military prowess. Many emperors and high-ranking generals in the Late Empire were 'barbarians' including: Stilicho, Aetius, Flavius Constantius, Ricimer, Majorian. Many of these 'barbarians' were even more loyal to the Roman 'cause' than the local Roman elites in the provinces themselves. It was only in the incorporation of whole groups of 'barbarians' into the Empire as military overseers, which gave them a considerable share participation in Roman realpolitik, that tore apart the balance of power in the West. Thirdly, there is strong evidence that the Eastern Roman Empire was no mere backbencher in the field of Western Roman Politics. During the turbulent invasions of the Rhine and the Danube, both East and West armies coordinated to intercept whole barbarian tribes crossing the frontiers of the Empire. Though it can be said that their military sources were stretched to the limit, as a considerable portion of the Eastern Roman armies were stationed in the Eastern frontier where the threat of Sassanian Invasion was a very real one. Even during the rise of Attila, Aetius' counter-attacks in Gaul and Italy coincided with Eastern Roman intervention in the Great Hungarian Plain, prompting Attila to stop his advance into the WRE two times. As late as 468 AD, the Eastern Roman Empire still intervened in Western politics to appoint a suitable emperor, Anthemius, and to finance and send military expeditions that would have crushed the Vandals in North Africa and curtailed the Visigothic ambition in both gaul and spain but sadly ended in failure. Therefore, there was no shortage of assistance from the East thus debunking the notion that the WRE fell because of the East folowing its own 'destiny'.

Hey Honorius, I see that HSC projects are bogging you down. Well, we all have to go through these troubles in one time or another. Anyway, with regards to your suggestions, I should say that the Constantine idea is a better idea in comparison to the 'Theodosius' question. If you go down this particular road, you could specify your historical investigation to Constantine's adoption of Christianity as the official Roman religion, maybe: his unique relationship with Christianity (for example, his use of the religion to gain a secure power base and in upholding the ideology of a divinely ordained Empire and divinely inspired Sole Emperor), OR his efforts that transformed and shaped Christianity and the Roman World (the romanization of Christianity, the repercussions of his Edict Of Milan and the Council of Nicaea,etc.). In the making of your history major work, better specialize yourself in one aspect and limit your scope down a certain particular period or subject. With regards to sources, it's also better to have a mix of both the modern and ancient sources from a variety of mediums: books, journals, manuscripts, archaeological papers( if applicable), videos, even magazines if they're available. It's also a good idea to discuss your thesis with your teacher so that he/she could give some very helpful suggestions/tips and may even lend you data for your project . the Imperial Roman Army rolls on!, Aurelius

Oops, sorry about that..here's the link: http://archaeologynews.multiply.com/journal/item/589

Thank you for all the input on this subject. Now that you've given me some food for thought, maybe i'll reconsider doing some units in near eastern archaeology or maybe even focusing my studies with a blend of near eastern,classical and prehistoric/historical archaeology. I'm just so interested and passionate in the archaeology and antiquities from many sites and ancient civlisations around the globe that i find it confusing which area to delve into. Also, I have to consider the practical factors in my study of archaeology: finances, time taken for study, geographical proximity to my country(australia), employment optionsand so one and so forth. Unfortunately, I wasn't born with a silver spoon, so I have to earn and save up money in order to pursue higher studies in archaeology. I do hope that by the end of the first semester that I can finally decide what field of archaeology, in terms of geography and culture, i will specifically study in. Once again, thanks for all the advice.

4,300-year-old chimpanzee technology Unearthed by Researchers A University of Calgary archaeologist has found the first prehistoric evidence of chimpanzee technology, adding credence to the theory that some of humanity's behavioural hallmarks were actually inherited by both humans and great apes from a common ancestor. Dr. Julio Mercader, one of the few archaeologists in the world who studies the material culture of great apes, especially chimpanzees, uncovered stone 'hammers' last year in the Ta

Yes, Those marvelous buddhist statues are all but gone now due to religious fanaticism and human idiocy. Just imagine the amount of relics,artefacts, and ancient sites that could have been properly developed, analysed and studied if not for the endemic conflict in the Mid East. But I suppose conflict and tension have existed since the rise of civilisations in the region, so that any difficulties in historical investigation proves to be no surprise at all. Ursus, thanks for pointing out the 'greater Eurasian idea'. Don't know how I missed that one out, especially that connection with the Indo-Europeans and the Etruscans. I suppose that, as Maladict states, there are still ongoing archaeological excavations in the area. Though with the quite plausible war with Iran and the riots stirred up by the restoration near the Temple Mount, it still remains a volatile area. I would think that the only relatively 'safe' areas in the Mid East today would be Turkey, parts of Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and some Central Asian states.

We are all familiar with the political, religious, social, and economic turmoil in the Middle east caused or characterised by the invasion of Iraq, the hostilities between Lebanon and Israel, Iran's agressive stance on the nuclear issue, afghan resistance, Hamas and Fatah rivalry, Iraqi sectarian violence, and lately palestinian riots over the excavations near the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Would any archaeological excavation or historical investigation still be economically or academically feasible, and safe in the Near East, especially in the Levant and Central Asia area? Given the strained diplomatic relations and various religious or political tension between factions, would the historically 'rich' regions of the Near East be denuded and/or left underdeveloped? And is there any future for Near eastern ancient history or archaeology, in the face of the destruction or barred entry of archaeological and heritage sites due to unecessary conflict. These questions are of an important concern to me, as I am now contemplating whether to proceed in my studies either with combining classical archaeology with prehistoric and historic archaeology OR combining near eastern archaeology with prehistoric and historic archaeology OR in dealing singularly with classical archaeology or Near eastern Archaeology. I have also found out quite recently that numbers of students studying Near eastern archaeology in my university have dropped since the last two years.

I agree with Cato. The weather in North Africa. north of the 15 degree parallel was much more humid in the ancient past than it is today. I've read something about this matter in Heather's 'The Fall of the Roman Empire', especially concerning the agricultural productivity of the Maghreb region in North Africa due to the nature of its climate. Though I can't quite remember what was exactly said in the book, i'll have to try and trace it up. I'll also look on Cato's suggested paper, it sounds interesting.

As Maladict stated, I think that's a good choice. But also, as Maladict stated, it will involve some deep historical investigation and a background of the events that led to Alaric's sack of rome in 410. I think Maladict will be the expert for this period, as he's doing his MA on the subject, and you should direct your further inquiries to him. Might I suggest a more specific question, like 'the effect of Honorius' imperial policy toward the Goths in bringing about Alaric's sack of Rome' or 'the significance of Alaric's sack of Rome as one of the events that brought about the fall of the western Roman Empire'. or something along those lines. Best of luck, mate. I will try to help you as best as i can with these matters.

I recommend reading Peter Heather's "The Fall of the Roman Empire"- a brilliant analysis combined with colourful narrative on the perennial question of Rome's demise. I also suggest Graham Webster's "The Roman Imperial Army of the first and second centuries AD" for the archaeologist's investigation into the Roman legions. I also recommend Peter Connoly's illustrated books on the : "The Roman Army", "Hannibal and the Enemies of Rome", and "The Ancient Greece of Odysseus". Though it is quite dated, The illustrated encyclopedia: "Warfare in the Classical World: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons, Warriors and Warfare in the Ancient Civilisations of Greece and Rome" is still a good compendium of ancient military knowledge.

Hello Honorius, I see you have found yourself in the same predicament as i was in a year ago, the major project for extension history for the HSC. However, I did my major on the Imperial Roman Army. I see that you have tasked on the perennial topic of "why Rome fell?". I will try to help you in the best way possible in providing you with advice in structuring your major work. Firstly, you need to narrow down on a specific period in Roman history to discuss and investigate. By the 'fall of Rome', do you mean the fall of the western Roman Empire in AD 476 or the eastern Roman Empire(Byzantine) in AD 1453. Secondly, you also have to explicitly consider the nature of your historical investigation. What factors brought about the fall of Rome:social, economic, military, internal weakness, barbarian invasion, loss of tax revenues? What do you consider as the fall of the western Roman Empire (im assuming this is your case study)--the loss of 'Central Romanness'?, the dismantling of the Western Roman empire?, the loss of Latin culture and civilisation? The replacement of Roman political and legal structures by Feudal systems?... Now regarding the sources, during this period in Late Antiquity, primary sources are often hard to come by, what we currently have are a few fragments dating at most to the fifth/sixth centuries AD. There is firstly, Ammianus Marcellinus, writing in the 4th century AD, who discussed about Julian the Apostate, the arrival of the Goths on the Danube, the Wars with the Goths, Emperor Valens' defeat at the battle of Hadrianople. Contemporary sources include Frigiderus, Symmachus, Olympiodorus, Themistius, Priscus (especially with his embassies to the HUns). There are also fragments from Zosimus, Jordanes' Getica, Cassiodorus, the later byzantine extracts, and others. Unfortunately access to these sources, with the excpetion of Ammianus and Priscus, is well nigh difficult, therefore i suggest that you look up on the modern historians such as Gibbon (take gibbon with a pinch of salt), J.B. Bury, Michael Grant, et al. I strongly urge you to get a copy of Peter Heather's book "THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE" (which i have just recently read and thoroughly enjoyed). It contains an exhaustive list of primary and secondary sources, weaving brilliant and insightful analysis with anachronistic wit and colourful narrative. This is a new 'school of history' with regards to your question. Traditional/Orthodox schools of history can be cited from older authors particularly the 19th and 20th century ones. I believe that the question you pose is rather broad and not feasible for a major project of not more than 2,500 words (disregarding the bibliography,notes,etc.) Condensing all the information from this very broad investigation will prove to be a very hard task, well nigh impossible. Several historians and laymen have written BOOKS about the subject. Therefore I suggest picking a more specific case study in the same period that you're interested in, the later Roman Empire lasting roughly from AD 250- AD 476. I suggest you should research more on the events between the Diocletian's establishment of the 'tetrarchy system' to Odovacer's deposement of the last western Roman Emperor, Romulus Augustus. There is a vast array of topics that can be drawn from this period: the creation of the Gothic supergroups( Visigoths and Ostrogoths) and its effect on the empire's fall; the migration of the nomadic Huns and the transformation of the Roman world; the efforts of the Roman generalissimos, such as Stilicho, Aetius, Majorian, in preserving the Roman empire; The battle of Hadrianople and its consequences for the Roman Empire; The barbarian invasions of the 4th-5th centuries AD and its effects on the stability of the Western Roman Empire; Alaric's sack of Rome and its significance; Geiseric and the Vandals' invasion of North Africa; The rise of Attila the Hun, and the list just goes on and on.... Hope I may have heped you out, mate. Aurelius